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This thesis examines the influence of the idea of development on policy in late 
colonial Papua New Guinea, during the three decades after World War II. It is 
shown that Australian and indigenous officials were heavily influenced by the 
idea, although what was meant by development varied considerably. A major 
reason for the variation lay in the idea of development itself, because of the 
continuous tension between development as a spontaneous process, and as an 
intentional process, to take ameliorative action in response to what is seen as 
negative or destructive in the former.
The argument is illustrated through an examination of development thought and 
policy in distinct phases, from immediate post-war uncertainty to uniform 
development of the 1950s and the 1960s accelerated development period. The 
early 1970s transition to self-government and Independence is shown to be one 
of increasing uncertainty once more, due to the growing conflict among 
indigenes about what development would mean for a new nation-state. Further 
detail for the argument is provided by case studies of two crops, rice and cocoa 
which were central to colonial development policy.
The thesis concludes that the conventional picture of the colonial administration 
as an obstacle to development derives from a paradox which lies at the centre 
of the idea of development itself. Development was central to colonial policy in 
each phase, and the colonial administration was deeply attached to the 
objective of bring development to and for the indigenous people. With such an 
attachment and the commitment of substantial resources to attain the objective, 
how is it possible -  as is now so regularly done - to castigate Australian 
colonialism for failing to bring development? It is argued here that the resolution 
of the paradox lies in the continuing tension between imminent, spontaneous 
and intentional development. As the thesis shows, policy framed to meet the 
latter objective was unable to control the former, when the development of 
capitalism determined what eventuated.
DEVELOPMENT
AND THE CONTINUING VIRTUE OF VILLAGE LIFE
‘We have to contemplate in the long term the problems that may 
be set up by the early creation of a landless, urban proletariat.
Our concern with such an eventuality is not repressive in 
intention but is one which pays regard to the risks to which the 
individual and the group will be exposed in the course of the 
transition. We have to be careful that they do not lose their social 
anchorage in the village before we can be sure that they find an 
equally safe social anchorage...as wage-earners in the town.’
(Paul Hasluck ‘Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea’
1956, also cited in Huntley Wright ‘A Liberal “Respect for Small 
Property”: Paul Hasluck and the “Landless Proletariat” in the 
Territory of Papua and New Guinea, 1951-63’ Australian 
Historical Studies V.113, No.119, April 2002, pp.55-72)
‘Whenever I went home on leave, I regarded myself not as a 
teacher but as a village man, and I behaved like everyone else.’ 
(Michael Somare Sana: an autobiography of Michael Somare 
Port Moresby: Nuigini Press, 1975, p.41)
‘One important asset that Papua New Guinea possessed at the 
transition from colonial government was the survival of the village 
as a viable and attractive, or potentially attractive, social and 
economic unit in many rural areas. Very few Papua New 
Guineans had grown up entirely outside villages. The idea of life 
in the village, improved by better services and opportunities to 
earn incomes, was to relatively few Papua New Guineans the 
unacceptably inferior alternative to urban life that it was in many 
other countries.’
(Ross Garnaut The Framework of Economic Policy-Making’ in 
J.A.Ballard ed. Policy-Making in a New State: Papua New Guinea 
1972-77 St Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1981, pp.161-162)
‘It is important to the overall stability of PNG to recognise the on­
going importance of village agriculture, and to ensure that the aid 
program does not undermine its role by inflating expectations 
that are illusory. It is clear that, even on the most favourable 
assumptions about growth, village agriculture will continue to 
sustain the overwhelming majority of Papua New Guineans for 
the foreseeable future.’
(Alan Morris and Rob Stewart Papua New Guinea Analytical 
Report for the White Paper on Australia’s aid program Canberra: 
AusAID, September 2005, 9-18)
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INTRODUCTION
Development as an Idea
The study of the relationship between ideas and government policy has a 
lengthy history. The thesis aims to extend understanding of this relationship 
through an account of one idea and its effect on policy, specifically policy for 
and in a colony, before and during the transition to Independence. 1 That idea is 
development.
As will become clear, development was an especially powerful idea which 
influenced and was employed by Australian officials who, for more than two and 
a half decades after World War II held state power in Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
Development also exerted a strong influence upon the indigenes who 
subsequently came to power.
Dominant ideas acquire and retain their power through a capacity for adaptation. 
This adaptation involves processes through which ideas intersect with specific 
conditions. So the study of an idea is also a study of a process. The conditions 
or circumstances under which the idea of development is reshaped are central 
to any account of the idea.2 This thesis examines changes in development as 
an important idea for late colonial PNG, as well as the process by which 
adaptation of the idea occurred.3
1. Robert Jackson The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International 
Relations’ in Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane eds. Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, 
Institutions, and Political Change Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995, pp .H I- 
135, describes how other ideas were important for their influence upon changes in colonial 
policy. See also the discussion in other essays in this collection, including G.John Ikenberry 
‘Creating Yesterday’s New World Order: Keynesian “New Thinking” and the Anglo-American 
Postwar Settlement’ pp.57-86. For a study of ideas and their effect in a particular country, see 
Tony Killick Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana London: 
Heinemann,1978.
2. See Frederick Cooper ‘Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development 
Concept’ in Cooper and Randall Packard eds. International Development and the Social 
Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997, pp.64-92; Robert H. Wade ‘US hegemony and the World Bank: the fight over 
people and ideas’ Review of International Political Economy v.9, no.2, Summer 2002, pp.215- 
243
3. For an account of development theory as a body of thought subject to a process of 
emergence, ascendancy and subsequent decline, particularly since World War II, see Colin 
Leys The Rise and Fall of Development Theory London, Bloomington and Nairobi: James 
Currey, Indiana University Press and East African Educational Publishers, 1996, pp.3-44, Ch. 1. 
See also accounts of the post-World War II invention and construction of the academic 
discipline of development economics, including: H.W.Arndt Economic Development: The History
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The Power of Development
Development was perhaps ‘the idea of the twentieth century’ ,* 4 and continues to 
be important. There are major international as well as national institutions 
constructed to bring development (eg. the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, the United Nations Development Program and the Australian 
Agency for International Development). Development Is also widely applied to 
processes undergone by nations and individuals.5 Importantly, development 
remains a critical component of ruling ideas internationally, even as the extent 
of ‘trust in development’ waxes and wanes.6
As a dominant idea which influences state policy, development contains and 
conveys the intent to transform the conditions of undeveloped, less developed, 
and underdeveloped.7 Making these conditions disappear is described as the
of an Idea Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987; Gerald M. Meier Biography of a Subject:
An Evolution of Development Economics Oxford: OUP, 2005; Robert L.Tignor W.Arthur Lewis 
and the Birth of Development Economics Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006;Shahid
Yusuf et.al Development Economics Through the Decades: A Critical Look at 30 Years of the 
World Development Report Washington: IBRD/World Bank, 2009
4. Ed Brown ‘Deconstructing development: alternative perspectives on the history of an idea’ 
Journal of Historical Geography v.22, no.3, 1996, p.333
5. The application continues to be extended: see Victor Breton Solo De Zaldivar ‘From Agrarian 
Reform to Ethnodevelopment in the Highlands of Ecuador’ Journal of Agrarian Change v.8, no.4, 
October 2008, pp.583-617
6. Cf. James C.Scott Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998; Michael Cowen 
Trust in Development Working Paper 11/98 Helsinki: Institute of Development Studies,
University of Helsinki, December 1998; Cowen ‘Quakes of Development’ Historical Materialism 
no.6, Summer 2000, pp.149-214
7. The description underdeveloped has at least two distinct meanings. One, which appeared in 
US President Harry Truman’s often cited 1949 inauguration address, describes an outcome not 
yet attained (http://www.bartlebv.eom/124/pres53.html ). Underdeveloped is not developed but 
capable of becoming so. An underdeveloped country and/or people became the object of the 
intent to develop, especially with the assistance of, support from, governments of countries 
which had attained the status of being developed. However the second sense, associated with 
dependency thought which rose to international prominence in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
asserts that development requires underdevelopment. A unified process of exploitation joins 
that which is developed, usually a country or countries, with similar entities which are 
underdeveloped. In the original dependency formulation underdevelopment was a permanent 
condition unless a radical rupture was effected between the exploited and their exploiter, usually 
by the rejection of capitalism and adoption of socialism. The latter would provide the basis for 
previously underdeveloped countries and people to become developed. For arguments about 
the second sense, see Andre Gunder Frank Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 
1969; Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa London: Bogle-L'Ouverture 
Publications, 1972; Samir Amin Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of 
Underdevelopment New York: Monthly Review Press; Colin Leys Underdevelopment in Kenya: 
The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism London: Heinemann, 1975; and Azeem Amarshi, 
Kenneth Good and Rex Mortimer Development and Dependency: The political economy of
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realisation of development, of becoming developed. Thus there are developed 
and underdeveloped countries, as well as countries not yet developed, which 
are being developed or not developing.* 8
During the late colonial period Papua New Guinea was often described as 
underdeveloped. Even when those who employed the term attributed different 
meanings to it and proposed different courses of action, they were united in the 
belief that state agency should and could be applied to make development 
happen. The power of the idea of development was such that the holders of 
colonial and transitional state power continuously framed and justified their 
prescriptions for the people and country in the name of development. So too do 
critics of late colonial policy.9
The idea of development
The origins of the modern idea of development have been traced to the strife- 
torn years before the middle of the nineteenth century in Western Europe. As a 
response to the disorder and unemployment which followed the Napoleonic 
Wars, the idea of development was formulated to transcend earlier thought 
which described the process of change that early industrialisation brought in 
positive terms, progress. Identifying negative consequences of this process of 
change was intended to provide the basis for ameliorative action. In recognising 
both positive and negative effects of industrialisation, the modern idea of 
development was invented as a description of, and prescription for joining what 
were understood as two processes of change. The first process was considered 
to be spontaneous, as in the spontaneous development of capitalism. The 
second process was intentional. The latter was the appropriate subjective or 
willed response to the negative consequences of spontaneous development. 
Intentional development meant the application of deliberate, intended policies, 
to counter what was negative, destructive in the first process. Disorder,
Papua New Guinea Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1979. As will be shown below, both
senses have been employed in descriptions regarding development in PNG.
8. Recently change in the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, was described in 
terms which take the description one step further: see Tim Butcher ‘Ruination of Congo’ The 
Australian Financial Review January 9, 2009, p.5 where it is claimed the ‘...Congo was so 
actively undeveloping that the clock seemed to spin backwards’.
9. For one instance among many see Peter Fitzpatrick Law and State in Papua New Guinea 
London: Academic Press, 1980, who raises the possibility (p.254) of ‘integrated development’ 
as an antidote to the existing condition of ‘underdevelopment’.
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including unemployment and impoverishment, which had come to be seen as 
inherent in the process of spontaneous development was to be counteracted, 
negated through intentional development.10
Because the modern idea of development was formulated as a unity of the two 
processes, spontaneous development and intentional development, it has 
retained the positive as well as negative components of the former process. The 
positives, increases in production and the potential for improvements in living 
standards remain central to the current popular usage of development as 
meaning economic growth. Other necessary but negative consequences of 
spontaneous development, including unemployment and various forms of 
disorder, continue to appear.
The extent to which development is a process conditioned primarily by 
endogenous or exogenous circumstances, in this case within or without the 
colony of PNG, is particularly germane. This study will show that no simple 
relationship exists between the external and the internal, for either the 
formulation of the idea of development or colonial policy driven by this idea. 
Australian officials, academics and others who adopted and adapted the 
international idea of development shaped colonial development to prepare 
Papua New Guineans for independence. International conditions and those in 
the colony substantially affected their thought, policy and practices, whether or 
not the officials and academics were based in Australia or the colony. By the 
1960s and early 1970s, the idea of development had become central to the 
thought and policy prescriptions of the most ardent nationalists, indigenous and 
expatriate, in PNG.
In the passage to Independence in 1975, as the hold on state power passed 
from the Australian government and colonial administration officials to Papua 
New Guineans, development continued to influence state officials and policy. 
The transition from the colonial state to the nation state occurred under an 
indigenous leadership intending to bring development, even as tussles that 
changed the content of the idea and process continued. The idea had become
10. Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton Doctrines of Development London: Routledge, 1996, 
pp.1-59
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so entrenched among the population that school children in Bougainville 
described the effect of the European presence on the island in terms of its 
contribution to development.11 In the early 1970s, the dominant idea of 
development included an emphasis upon redistribution of land and other 
commercial assets towards indigenes, without resolving exactly which Papua 
New Guineans were to be the beneficiaries of what benefits.
So pervasive and long-lasting has the employment of the idea of development 
been in PNG, that during the 30 years since Independence most parties to 
major debates and conflicts in PNG have continued to invoke development 
when framing and justifying policies. The specification of a ‘Melanesia Way’ to 
achieve development has been advocated as a national and even regional 
antidote to the perceived ills of ‘western’ development or what is often employed 
as a synonym, modernisation.12
Development as an Agrarian Doctrine
Development Thought
The role of agriculture in thought about development was especially important 
during the late colonial period, for colonial and national officials. Increasing 
agricultural production was envisaged as the main form which economic growth 
should take in order to satisfy the output increases and improved living 
standards requirement which was at the centre of development thought. The 
principal basis for the increases was to be lifting output by households 
occupying smallholdings, parcels of land usually from less than one to three 
hectares in size. One positive dimension of development, growth in production, 
was to be attained by utilising household labour processes upon smallholdings 
to grow crops for immediate and marketed consumption at raised levels of 
production. Exchanging income earned from marketed crops for goods 
manufactured through industrial processes in other countries was intended to lift
11. Alexander Marmak and Richard Bedford ‘Bougainville’s Students’ New Guinea v.9, no.1, 
1974, pp.4-15
12. Utula Samana Papua New Guinea: which way? : essays on identity and development North 
Carlton, Vic.: Arena, 1988; Bernard Narokobi The Melanesian Way: total cosmic vision of life 
Boroko: Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1980; Narokobi ‘Which way now, Melanesia?’ 
in Peter King, Wendy Lee and Vincent Warakai eds. From Rhetoric to Reality? Papua New 
Guinea’s Eight Point Plan and National Goals After a Decade Waigani: University of Papua New 
Guinea Press, 1985, pp.447-450. Further east, a similar concern prompted Fiji’s longest serving 
Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara to formulate ‘the Pacific Way’. See The Pacific Way: a 
memoir Honolulu: East-West Center, University of Hawai’i Press, 1997.
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living standards, improve welfare and maintain what was conceived of as rural 
community or communities. To achieve such ends, state coordination and 
supervision of households were placed at the centre of the colonial agrarian 
doctrine of development. 13
Post-war development thought envisaged a major break with the previous 
orthodoxy in Papua and New Guinea. It was also to distance ‘native agriculture’ 
in the colony and trust territory from that which Australian colonial officials 
understood to be predominant in other colonies, including British West Africa. In 
the latter, production of export crops, particularly cocoa, was envisaged as 
taking an especially disorganised, spontaneous form of peasant farming. This 
farming was considered as having resulted in low productivity, vulnerability to 
crop diseases and the production of inferior quality bulk cocoa.
The smallholders or household producers of what was intended by the agrarian 
doctrine which informed colonial officials in post-war PNG were to be distinct 
from peasant farmers on two principal grounds: the first being the object of 
production and the second, the methods of production, including labour 
processes employed and the relationship of the indigenous producers to the 
state, in the form of the colonial administration. Peasant farmers were 
conceived first and foremost as driven by the objective of meeting immediate 
consumption needs as a form of simple reproduction. What marketed 
production or purchased consumption as did occur in peasant households was 
envisaged by colonial officials in PNG as only fulfilling low levels of need. 
Household producers, instead, would engage in marketed production for local 
and international markets, while also growing food and other crops for 
immediate consumption at continuously increasing levels of need.
Secondly, for peasant farmers, relatively undifferentiated family labour 
processes were the principal forms of labour employed, and the state’s role was 
envisaged as largely confined to facilitating the maintenance of subsistence at 
low levels. In the agrarian doctrine of development formulated for post-war PNG 
state coordination and supervision was a prerequisite for systematically
13. Huntley Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production: Late-Colonialism and the 
Agrarian Doctrine in Papua New Guinea, 1942-1969 Ph.D. Thesis Palmerston North: Massey 
University provides an extended treatment of the doctrine.
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increasing household production and consumption. Improved welfare would 
follow through commercialised production and consumption, including of crops 
marketed locally and internationally. Unlike peasant farming as envisaged by 
Australian officials, which was deemed to be incapable of further improvement, 
household production was not to be a terminal stage. Instead with close 
coordination and supervision through the colonial state, in PNG households 
were expected to be capable of continuous development, resulting in increased 
incomes and consumption of purchased goods.14
During the 1950s, the distinction between peasant farming and household, 
village producers was cast in an especially sharp form. According to one of the 
key colonial officials responsible for emphasising the difference, villages, as the 
previous focus of administrative attention, were too small and an inadequate 
basis for moving the indigenous population beyond the mythical ideal of ‘the 
sturdy peasant farmer’, unrealised ‘anywhere in the world’.15 Instead the 
movement required a reshaping of the colonial administrative structure and 
official roles so as to more closely coordinate and supervise household 
production to further raise output and consumption.
Because the prevailing idea of development also sought to deal with the 
negative consequences of growth, colonial thought paid attention to the need to 
restrain international and local manifestations of the spontaneous development 
of capitalism. The connection between the positives and negatives of growth 
and development is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 1 below. For the 
moment it is sufficient to point out that for colonial officials in post-World War II 
PNG, constraining plantations and other commercial enterprises which 
employed wage labour occurred in order to check the formation of a landless
14. For arguments which cast household production in PNG as peasant farming, see: Diana 
Howlett Terminal development: From tribalism to peasantry’ in FI.Brookfield ed. The Pacific in 
Transition: Geographical Perspectives on Adaptation and Change London: Edward Arnold, 
1973, pp.249-273; Rolf Gerritsen Groups, Classes and Peasant Politics in Ghana and Papua 
New Guinea PhD Thesis Canberra: ANU, 1979, p.20; Peter Fitzpatrick The Creation and 
Containment of the Papua New Guinea Peasantry’ in E.Wheelwright and K.Buckley eds. 
Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism v.4 Sydney: ANZ Book Co., 1980, 
pp.85-121; L.Grossman Peasants, Subsistence Ecology and Development in the Highlands of 
Papua New Guinea Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 14; Barry Shaw Agriculture 
in the Papua New Guinea Economy Discussion Paper No.20 Port Moresby: Institute of National 
Affairs, 1985
15. NAA M331/1 No.35 D.Fienberg-Correspondence 17/4/56 Fienberg to Director of 
Department of Native Affairs p.12.
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proletariat. In late colonial PNG, particularly in the twenty years after the military 
conflict ended, this meant preventing further increases in the area of land 
occupied by largeholdings which employed labour under wage and other 
arrangements.16 Preserving village life as the desired form of (class-less) 
community remained the favoured objective,17 which also came to have wide 
support among educated and politically active Papua New Guineans.
From Development Thought to Development Policy 
Any doctrine of development requires more than an ambition to make 
development occur.18 As was obvious immediately after World War II, and again 
in the early 1970s, widespread agreement about the need to improve living 
standards for the rural population by raising smallholder output did not 
automatically become state policy. From 1946 until the end of the decade, the 
administration in PNG was preoccupied with post-war reconstruction, short of 
resources and given little detailed policy direction from Australia. While there 
was substantial agreement about what development meant for PNG, particularly 
the importance of maintaining attachment to smallholdings under conditions of 
improved welfare, there was uncertainty about what was required by way of 
official policy to make development happen.
In the 1950s, uncertainty disappeared. Instead the intention to bring 
development was effected through a strengthened and well-defined policy of 
uniform agrarian development for the whole colony. Later, in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, the linkages between the idea of agrarian development and state 
policy again became weaker.
16. As will be shown briefly in Chapter Four, the establishment during the 1950s of coffee 
plantations on leasehold land in the Eastern and Western Highlands provinces is an important 
exception to the general point. Even here, the bulk of the leaseholds were acquired by 
expatriates in a very short period, from 1952 to 1954. Cf. Paul Hasluck A Time for Building 
Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea 1951-1963 Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1976, pp.118-25; Ian Downs The Australian Trusteeship Papua-New Guinea 
1945-75 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980, pp. 174-186; MacWilliam 
‘Placing the Planters: European Settlers in Late Colonial PNG’, forthcoming considers this 
exception in more detail.
17. See The Continuing Virtue of Village Life’ above. The most substantial treatment of this 
objective remains Wright State practice and rural smallholder production] see also Wright 
‘Contesting community: the labour question and colonial reform in the post-war Territory of 
Papua and New Guinea 1942-1946’ The Journal of Pacific Studies v.25, no.1, May 2001, pp.69- 
94
18. Doctrines of Development p.viii
8
Particularly during the uniform development phase, colonial officials acting as 
trustees in the name of agrarian development coordinated and supervised 
household planting of an expanded range of crops. They oversaw commercial 
marketing of produce and operated as intermediaries between households and 
private enterprises which processed and traded smallholder output. In some 
parts of the colony, colonial officials acted as marketing agents for household 
produce. Officials also checked recruiting of labour for employment on 
plantations and other enterprises to limit any deleterious effects which this work 
might have had on household capacity to increase production.
Subsequent critics of colonial policy have mistakenly identified the 
encouragement and supervision of smallholder production of export crops, 
including cocoa and coffee, as a bias which supposedly commenced in 1951 
towards plantation crop production and away from food crops.19 As is 
demonstrated below, the colonial emphasis upon the primacy of smallholders in 
agrarian development did not presume any such bias. Food crops were 
accorded equal priority in smallholder production, and households were 
continually given priority over plantations in the late colonial agrarian doctrine of 
development. In any case, during the late nineteenth and twentieth century 
production of many crops, including cocoa and coffee, was increasingly 
undertaken internationally by household production on small holdings. As the 
earlier plantation ascendancy faded, by the twentieth century and especially 
after World War II, smallholder crop is a more accurate description of cocoa, 
coffee and other agricultural production.
The Idea of Development and State Agency
Three preliminary points need to be made here about state agency. Firstly, the 
importance of the colonial state for bringing development in PNG arose from a 
vision which was primarily a version of liberalism.20 According to this view, both 
the means and end of development was to secure and extend individual rights,
19. See Gordon Dick and Bob McKillop A Brief History of Agricultural Extension and Education 
in Papua New Guinea Extension Bulletin No. 10 Port Moresby: Department of Primary Industry, 
1976, p.22.
20. Primarily because, as will be shown, the idea of development held by Australian officials 
was also influenced and bolstered by radical Tory and Fabian strands of thought. See 
MacWilliam ‘Liberalism and the End of Development: Partington against Hasluck and Coombs’ 
Island Issue 70, pp.88-100; Ron May Nugget, Pike et.al. Discussion Paper 8/98 Darwin: 
Northern Australia Research Unit, ANU, 1998, p.7
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especially to private property in the form of land holdings occupied to increase 
living standards. It is necessary to note, however, that the heritage of the idea of 
development which was important for PNG is distinct from much that currently 
passes as liberal, or sometimes neo-liberalism. Instead Australian liberal 
developmentalism had roots reaching down to the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, among writers including Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill.
The ‘primarily liberal’ description holds despite the criticisms of the modern idea 
of development which have flowed from both left and right of the ideological 
spectrum. In the mid-nineteenth century Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels derided 
some of the European intellectuals who were important contributors to the 
formation of the modern idea of development as utopian socialists.21 In the next 
century, F.A. von Hayek -  doyen of late twentieth century liberalism - castigated 
John Stuart Mill, another important figure in the formation of thought about 
development as ‘chiefly responsible for converting the intellectuals of the 
western world to socialism’ .22 Nevertheless, as is shown here, the construction 
and role of the colonial state in and for PNG was overwhelmingly the response 
of Australian officials guided by a particular liberal view of how to bring 
development.
Secondly, while the point of state agency for the liberal Australian version of 
development was to improve ‘native welfare’ through an enlargement and 
extension of private property rights, these rights were of a specific kind. 
Household labour was subjected to, subsumed by capital, without taking what 
some consider the ‘classic form’, separated from ownership of other means of 
production, including land, and employed in capitalist enterprises. Instead, 
through continued occupation of smallholdings, the value of householders’ 
labour power was determined through the production and consumption of 
commodities:
which circulate(d) on international and domestic circuits of capital.
Whether the commodities are agricultural export crops, tinned fish
and rice, the labour power of household members which exchanges
for a wage, or the roads, bridges, medical services and education
21. Doctrines of Development pp.21-25. The Communist Manifesto London: Verso, 1998, 
pp.72-75.
22. Cited in Andrew Gamble Hayek The Iron Cage of Liberty Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1996, p.5. For Mill’s importance in development thought, see Cowen and Shenton 
Doctrines of Development pp.35-41 ‘Progress and Development: J. S. Mill and “Knowledge”’
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which (were) central to household consumption, neither their 
production nor exchange is non-capitalist. 23
Although the colonial administration erected barriers against what might now be 
construed as the operation of ‘free’ markets, this was not done to overthrow or 
sustain a revolt against ‘the external authority of development [which continued: 
SM] to be capital’ .24 While particular capitals, including those engaged in 
largeholding agriculture and trade, were restricted another distinct relation of 
capital to labour was constructed. The colonial administration’s application of 
the idea of development secured a form of capital’s authority which sustained 
accumulation in the specific conditions of colonial PNG.25
Thirdly, if the idea of development was originally a response to the ‘negative’ 
aspects of early industrialisation and prolonged warfare in post-Napoleonic 
Europe, by the twentieth century at least there was no need for unemployment 
and disorder to appear before officials recognised the necessity for intentional 
development to prevent these from arising. Colonial officials acting in and for 
PNG intended to give development a particular content to avoid undesirable 
phenomena from arising in the colony as well as in response to particular 
conditions. The belief that industrialisation would have negative consequences 
for village life, leading to the destruction of community, reflected earlier
23. H. Thompson and S. MacWilliam The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea Manila and 
Wollongong: Journal of Contemporary Asia Press, 1992, p.7. Without pursuing the argument in 
detail here, it should be apparent from what has been said already that the description of 
household production employed here does not conform to the terms of what is often described 
as non-capitalist petty or simple commodity production. For some of the relevant literature, see 
the subject index entry ‘Simple Commodity Production’ The Journal of Peasant Studies Index 
1994, p.130; Colin Leys The state and the crisis of simple commodity production in Africa’ IDS 
Bulletin v.18, no.3, 1987, pp.45-48. See my previous consideration of this description and the 
related ‘articulation of modes of production’ proposition extended to PNG smallholder 
agriculture by Mike Donaldson and Ken Good Articulated Agricultural Development: Traditional 
and Capitalist Agricultures in Papua New Guinea Avebury, Aldershot: Gower, 1998, in 
‘Smallholdings, Land Law and the Politics of Land Tenure in Papua New Guinea" The Journal 
of Peasant Studies V.16, No. 1, October, 1988, pp. 77-109; MacWilliam ‘Smallholder Production, 
the State and Land Tenure’ in Peter Larmour (ed.) Customary Land Tenure: Registration and 
Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea Boroko: IASER, 1992, pp. 9-32;Thompson and 
MacWilliam The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea esp. pp.4-8 and pp.120-155, Ch.4 
‘Household Production in the Countryside’.
24. Doctrines of Development p.xv.
25. Cf. Donald Denoon ‘Capitalism in Papua New Guinea: Development or Underdevelopment’ 
Journal of Pacific History v.XX, no.3, pp. 119-134, esp. p.119 where Denoon proposes that late 
colonialism in PNG was ‘without capital’ and development was therefore absent. See for a 
further rebuttal of Denoon’s argument, Wright ‘A Liberal “Respect for Small Property”: Paul 
Hasluck and the “Landless Proletariat” in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, 1951-63’ 
Australian Historical Studies v.33, no.119, April 2002, pp. 55-72
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international experience.26 In the circumstances of late colonial PNG, 
development thought and policy invariably had an anticipatory component. 
Anticipating the negative conditions as well as formulating a specific response 
to bring development when these did appear were both aspects of the modern 
idea of development.
Each of the three features of stage agency was present in the agrarian doctrine 
of development applied in late colonial PNG. The liberal objective of extending 
private property rights, that the rights to property expressed the authority of 
capital, and the intention to act in advance of whatever negatives of 
spontaneous development appeared, shaped colonial policy and practices that 
kept households attached to land in conditions of expanded commodity 
production and consumption.
Development, the State and Trusteeship
Spontaneous or immanent development arises from the action of individuals, 
including capitalists and workers, acting on their own behalf to accumulate 
capital or acquire consumption goods. However intentional development 
requires trustees and trusteeship to shape and implement development 
policies.27 Because development is a combination of two processes, 
spontaneous and intentional, the existence of people shaping and exercising 
state power on behalf of others is an essential feature. Acting or purporting to 
act on behalf of others to bring development is the role of trustees, exercising 
trusteeship. A central component of effective developmental trusteeship is the 
capacity to exercise political or class power upon state power.28
Trusteeship can be construed in formal legal terms, such as the conditions 
defined in the UN Charter through international negotiations, and in non-legal
26. Wright ‘Contesting community’
27. Cowen and Shenton Doctrines of Development pp.25-27. Meier Biography of a Subject p.7 
‘focus(es) on development economists in their role as “trustees for the poor’” .
28. The distinction between class power and state power which is important for this account 
was at the centre of what became known as the Miliband-Poulantzas debate. For the seminal 
works see: Ralph Miliband The State in Capitalist Society London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1969, Marxism and Politics Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, Class Power and State 
Power Political Essays London: Verso, 1983, Divided Societies: Class Struggle in 
Contemporary Capitalism Oxford: OUP, 1991; Nicos Poulantzas Political Power and Social 
Classes London: New Left Books, 1973, Classes In Contemporary Capitalism London: New Left 
Books, 1975, State, Power, Socialism London: New Left Books, 1978
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terms by people acting according to notions of duties, obligations and 
responsibilities for the welfare of others. For most of the late colonial period, 
formal international trusteeship provided the legal basis for Australian authority 
over PNG. Papua was initially a British colony, handed over to Australia in 1906. 
After World War II, New Guinea which previously had been a League of Nations 
Mandated Territory became a United Nations Trust Territory. However the 
difference between colony and trust territory was of little significance for the 
terms of colonial authority after World War II. When, in 1949, the two entities 
were joined in an administrative union, the importance of the distinction 
between colony and trust territory for trusteeship paled even further. The 
particular formulation of development framed and adopted by the Australian 
administration made no policy separation either. During the 1950s, in refusing to 
bestow further preference upon the most advanced areas of the union, ‘uniform 
development’ was particularly even-handed between colony and territory, and 
within each.
Some of the Australian officials who determined development policy for post­
war PNG had been involved with the formulation of the terms of UN Trusteeship. 
Several, including the Labor Party Foreign Affairs Minister Dr H.V.Evatt and the 
Liberal Party Minister for Territories (Sir) Paul Hasluck, were active participants 
in the formation of the post-war international settlement, for which the United 
Nations and the trusteeship conditions defined in the UN Charter were central.29 
Subsequently Australian officials were constantly reminded of their legal 
position as trustees by visiting UN missions, examining compliance with what 
member states construed as trusteeship conditions.30
However, as is shown in the thesis, the UN and its visiting missions were of 
secondary importance for policy. Of greater significance were the colonial 
officials, in Australia and PNG, who emphasised their role as trustees of 
development for the colony’s people. While the responsibility of trustees for
29. William R. Louis Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British 
Empire, 1941-1945 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997; MacWilliam ‘Papua New Guinea in 
the 1940s: Empire and Legend’ in David Lowe ed. Australia and the End of Empires: the impact 
of decolonization in Asia and the South Pacific,1945-1965 Geelong,Vic.: Deakin University 
Press, pp. 25-42;MacWilliam ‘Liberalism and the End of Development’
30. W.Tomasetti Australia and the United Nations: New Guinea Trusteeship Issues from 1946- 
1966 Bulletin No.36 Canberra and Boroko: New Guinea Research Unit, ANU, July 1970
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‘native welfare’ or ‘native development’ remained a guiding principle of colonial 
policy, changes occurred in what this meant as between ‘uniform development’ 
and its 1960s successor ‘accelerated development’. The latter placed greater 
emphasis upon the force of spontaneous development. Official policy 
encouraged the development of capitalist enterprises without as much concern 
for their destructive effects, including the separation of households from land 
and the potential of unemployment.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s a further element was added into the mix of 
major influences upon state policy. During the passage to self-government and 
Independence, the formal terms of international trusteeship were being 
displaced by national sovereignty. PNG was in the process of becoming an 
independent nation-state, with membership of the UN. In this process, state 
power was being reformed. Indigenes were gaining a greater grip over this 
power through the institutions of liberal democratic representative government.
Trustees claim and have the capacity to act on behalf of others. During the last 
years of colonial rule, while indigenes who held political power could still claim 
to be acting for ‘their people’, the effectiveness of these claims was limited. 
Unlike the colonial officials who were largely barred from acquiring land and 
other property in the colony, no such barrier existed for indigenes who occupied 
state positions. Indeed, the reverse was more common. Many indigenes who 
held positions of authority were also members of the local capitalist class and 
allies in intermediate strata. These Papua New Guineans were straddling, 
between wage and salaried occupations and ownership of largeholdings and 
commercial enterprises. While straddling was essential as a means of 
overcoming barriers previously constructed by the colonial administration 
against their advance, their activities nevertheless ensured that any claims to 
act on behalf of others were contested. Smallholders and landless also reaching 
for the fruits of independence challenged their authority.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the country and people passed from 
colony to nation-state there was considerable uncertainty in development 
thought and policy due in part to the increasing tussles over land and other 
property. Intentional development, which acted to maintain smallholder
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attachment to land at higher levels of agricultural production and increased 
living standards, became a less important force driving state policy.
Thesis Outline
The thesis has six main chapters, an Introduction and Conclusion. Part I 
consists of four chapters which provide an account of how development as idea 
and policy was invented, shaped, adopted by Australian colonial officials and 
further adapted in the circumstances of late colonial, post-World War II Papua 
New Guinea. Part II includes a brief introductory statement on the practice of 
intentional development in PNG, and two case studies of crops, rice and cocoa, 
which were central to the scheme of smallholder production.
Chapter One discusses the early nineteenth century European origins of the 
idea of development, and changes which occurred internationally into the 
twentieth century. While initially British, German and then Australian colonial 
policy for Papua and New Guinea emphasised development’s spontaneous 
character, by the late 1930s greater awareness of international changes in 
thought about development and the deleterious consequences of labour 
recruitment for Papua New Guineans had begun to influence Australian official 
thinking. During World War II Australian politicians and senior officials began to 
plan a new phase of development policy, described as ‘positive Australianism’, 
which emphasised the importance of intentional development.
Chapter Two shows how, despite what was intended, initial post-war 
circumstances in Australia and PNG acted to limit what could be done to bring 
development. Although colonial development thought identified the primacy of 
smallholder agriculture as the principal means of economic growth and securing 
households upon smallholdings, village life, as its central components, little by 
way of detailed policy had been formulated for attaining either. Instead, with 
international demand for agricultural produce in excess of supply, the force of 
spontaneous development from plantations owned by international firms and 
expatriate owner-occupiers, as well as indigenous growers, continually 
challenged official efforts to shape a new policy. The result was a phase of 
considerable uncertainty.
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The 1950s, examined in Chapter Three, became the high-water mark of 
intentional development for late colonial PNG. Under a determined and 
interventionist Australian Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck, policy-making 
was centralised and given a specific direction described as uniform or even 
development. Uniform development was so successful that in order to maintain 
the objective of continuing increases in production, by mid-decade there was 
growing pressure for further expansion of smallholdings, including through 
making available unoccupied land for landless households. Australian officials, 
from the Minister down were forced to search for means of increasing the 
colonial administration’s capacity to drive further expansion.
The final chapter in the first section of the thesis shows how the search included 
eliciting advice from the World Bank, which in turn made possible a shift away 
from uniform development. The 1960s became the decade of accelerated 
development, during which the relationship between spontaneous and 
intentional development shifted once more toward the former. However the 
association of rapid growth with indigenous representative politics and 
increased anti-colonial nationalism resulted in opposition to accelerated 
development. As self-government and independence approached, this 
opposition focused upon redistribution of assets previously owned by 
expatriates. The result was a tussle about the meaning of development itself 
and conflict over how much priority should be given by a national government to 
the competing claims of indigenous capital and smallholders, particularly over 
land.
In order to provide more detail about development policy and practice, Part II of 
the thesis contains two case studies of crops which were central components of 
the scheme of smallholder production. Through the detailed examination of rice 
and cocoa production, it is shown how different crops had distinct trajectories.
As Chapter Five describes, despite the considerable attention given to dry, 
upland rice growing by households, there were only minor increases in output 
within the colony. Instead the availability of greater quantities of irrigated wet 
rice on international markets, including from Australia, made it possible for this 
crop to form a major part of Papua New Guineans’ diets. Instead of self- 
sufficiency in rice production, as was intended by colonial officials for more than
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decade after World War II, imported rice became part of the diets of indigenous 
households and was important for improving the population’s health.
Cocoa, by comparison, was not grown for domestic consumption but, along with 
copra and coffee, formed the basis of considerably increased agricultural 
exports. Unlike rice, where imports rather than domestic production were 
important for rural households, growing cocoa fastened households to the land, 
as was intended under the agrarian doctrine of development. However as 
Chapter Six also shows what appeared to be an important successful outcome 
of intentional development, expansion of smallholder production of cocoa, also 
provided more space for the spontaneous process of capitalist development. 
The success of colonial development policy in expanding household production 
of cocoa sharpened the existing conflict between largeholdings and small, 
particularly in East New Britain where land shortages were already acute.
The Conclusion considers the importance of the thesis for any evaluation of late 
colonial PNG. In particular it takes up the arguments either that development 
did not occur or if it did this was despite what was intended by Australian 
colonial policy and practices. The thesis concludes that there has been 
insufficient recognition of the extent to which Australian colonial policy was 
driven by a particular idea of development and that this idea was a major 
influence upon colonial policy. This policy played an important part in increasing 
agricultural output by smallholders and raising living standards, while securing a 
particular form of the authority of capital. The problem of understanding late 
colonial development in PNG, if indeed there is one, therefore lies with the idea 
of development itself and its relationship to capitalist accumulation.
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PART I
The Idea and Policy of Late Colonial Development
Chapter One
The Australian Adoption of Colonial Development
Introduction
The idea of development which became so important for late colonial PNG had a 
lineage extending back at least to early nineteenth century Europe. The first part of 
this chapter outlines the most important elements of the idea of development and 
its evolution before becoming influential for PNG. This initial account draws 
extensively from the detailed description provided by Michael Cowen and Robert 
Shenton and referred to in the Introduction.1
From the late nineteenth century the idea of development had begun to affect 
policy in Australia, Papua and New Guinea. The second section of the chapter 
shows how, from the late nineteenth century until the outbreak of World War II, 
Australian colonial policy was informed by an idea of development which 
emphasised the importance of immanent, spontaneous development led by private 
firms and expatriate planters. With this continuing emphasis, Australian policy 
toward PNG lagged behind changes that had begun to occur in British and French 
colonies, where intentional development was becoming more important.
In response to the economic and political turmoil of the 1930s and early 1940s, 
thought about -  as distinct from official policy towards - colonial development in 
PNG began to change, catching up with international shifts. Part three describes 
the nature of the shift in official Australian thinking from the 1930s. During World 
War II, when the description ‘positive Australianism’ was first coined, the changes -  
particularly regarding trusteeship -  helped shape international thought about post­
war reconstruction and development.
During and immediately after World War II, the official Australian idea of what 
development policy would constitute for PNG and the indigenous population was 
sharpened. Part four of the chapter describes the outcome and process which was 
central to further defining and implementing ‘positive Australianism’. Deliberate
1. Cowen and Shenton Doctrines of Development Ch.1 The Invention of Development’
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steps were taken to ensure that development would not resume along pre-war 
lines. The Australian reformulation was largely settled even when the immediate 
capacity of the post-war administration to advance the development objectives was 
limited.
The Modern Idea and Doctrines of Development
Invention and Design
Development refers to both an idea about how change should occur, and to a 
process by which change could be made to happen in a desired, positive direction. 
The onset and advance of industrial capitalism in Western Europe produced 
enthusiasts about the changes, including Adam Smith,2 as well as critics. The latter 
came from a range of political-ideological positions. For an English radical 
conservative, William Cobbett,3 the ruin of his beloved rural countryside went hand 
in hand with the displacement and impoverishment of yeoman farmers and 
agricultural workers.
However for present purposes by far the most significant objection to the process
which for Smith was immanent, spontaneous and the basis of progress came at
the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries from a group of
French intellectuals who would be known by the name of their leading figure, Henri
de Saint-Simon. The Saint-Simonians, including Auguste Comte:
posed the same problems that had inspired Adam Smith: the creation of 
order in a society undergoing radical transformation and the nature of 
that transformation itself. The answers they provided were, however, 
markedly different. 4
In early nineteenth century Europe, specific undesirable or negatives of growth and 
progress were especially prominent. The unemployment and disorder of post- 
Napoleonic Europe prompted the initial formulation of the modern idea of 
development in response to these conditions.
2. The Wealth of Nations Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978
3. See the discussion of Cobbett’s importance for the formation of class consciousness in early 
industrial England in E.P. Thompson The Making of the English Working Class_Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1978, pp.820-837. I have previously documented the empathy felt by Australian Territories 
Minister Paul Hasluck (1951-1963) for Cobbett’s objections to the effects of industrialisation. See 
MacWilliam ‘Liberalism and the End of Development’..
4. Doctrines,p.22
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That is, development was formulated to express the need and the basis for framing 
a solution to that which appeared desirable as well as undesirable. Because 
unemployment and disorder were seen to arise as necessary, objective features of 
spontaneous development, which also brought the increases in productivity and 
welfare that were seen as progress, any response had to counter the former while 
retaining the advances. A positive, intended response could provide a means to 
overcome that which was negative without rejecting spontaneous development’s 
benefits. Accordingly development as an idea had two components, spontaneous 
development and intentional development.
While the Saint-Simonians were not alone in their diagnosis of capitalism’s ills, they 
were, in Cowen and Shenton’s words, important because of the extent to which 
they ‘attempted to impose constructive order upon what they took to be industrial 
disorder of the present’ .5
By rejecting metaphysics, and emphasising the connection between empirical
methods for understanding the past and the capacity to predict the future, the
Saint-Simonians formulated the positivist basis of the idea of development. As
Cowen and Shenton conclude:
The positive is nowadays distinguished from the normative 
rather than the negative, but it was the desire to avoid what was 
destructive about change that fired the attempt to create a 
system of positive thought. A gap between the positive science 
of how to evaluate a past and a normative intention to manage 
was to be filled by the idea of development.6
Two features of this history of the idea of development need to be emphasised 
here and placed in the circumstances of colonial PNG. Firstly, at its invention 
development did not represent an objection to the positive or desirable 
consequences of growth, including improved living standards. Development was 
not framed to supplant that which Smith and others regarded as an essential 




the purpose of intentional development was to make productive that which had 
become unproductive or under-utilised because of growth’s negative 
consequences, including unemployment and disorder.
As a consequence of the earlier experience elsewhere and the influence of the 
idea of development, Australian officials emphasised the importance of anticipating 
the possible negative consequences of industrial capitalism, particularly in the 
forms of plantation agriculture and mining.7 However their thought also retained an 
emphasis upon the perceived benefits of spontaneous development, increased 
productivity and raised living standards. While development policy, including for 
PNG, was framed in anticipation of the possibility, even certainty that if left 
unchecked the spontaneous process of industrial capitalism would result in 
unemployment, policy also placed a major emphasis upon encouraging further 
growth. Thus while there was continuing concern that industrialisation would lead 
to unemployment and the destruction of ‘village life’, which was idealised as the 
local form of classless community, there was also a policy emphasis upon 
encouraging productivity increases through other, mainly smallholding agricultural, 
forms of production.
As a reforming idea constructed during industrial capitalism’s rise, development 
accepted, indeed was even framed to secure ‘the external authority of capital’ .8 In 
the PNG case, capitalism as incessant accumulation and persistent competition 
between capitals was always present. Development policy accepted the logic of 
capital accumulation, while encouraging a specific form of production, smallholder 
agriculture.9 The power of capitalism’s focus upon accumulation ensured that the 
possibility of intentional development being effected to counter the negatives of 
spontaneous development, including the tendency to create unemployment, was 
always uncertain.
7. See also Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production; Wright ‘Contesting community’
8. Cowen and Shenton Doctrines p. xv. This acceptance was of course the basis of Marx’ and 
Engels’ criticism of the Saint-Simonians as utopian socialists.
9. See below for the case studies of rice and cocoa production by smallholders, which provide the 
detailed examination of how colonial development intent was continually affected by, subject to 
international and domestic markets, in particular, and capitalism’s ‘growth obsession’ to employ 
Elmar Altvater’s description, in general. See ‘The Growth Obsession’ in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys 
eds. A World of Contradictions Socialist Register 2002London: Merlin, 2001, pp.73-92.
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However, the process of accumulation is itself always conditional since it is driven 
by the struggle between capital and labour to raise the rate of surplus value, 10 and 
the competition between capitals over the appropriation of shares of that surplus.* 11 
Even in the absence of generalised, substantial threats to accumulation, including 
depressions and wars, the continuous pressure on capitals to accumulate also 
generate conditions, including unemployment, which may justify the pursuit of 
intentional development.
That is, the process of immanent, spontaneous development may set off a political 
reaction either favouring or against constructive development. If the latter reaction 
occurs, then non-development, spontaneous development unmodified by 
intentional development prevails. One such occasion, when non-development was 
dominant, was of considerable importance for the twentieth century shaping of 
development as idea and doctrine. But before exploring this moment, two other 
central features of the modern idea of development need to be outlined.
Firstly, how are development policies formulated and by whom? Secondly, once 
intentional development has been designed, how is it implemented? Trustees are 
an important element in the answer to both questions. Instead of individual 
capitalists, driven solely by the imperative of accumulation, intentional development 
necessitates trusteeship exercised by holders of political power. To make 
development happen such trustees must be able to bring state power to bear in 
accordance with a vision of what is required to deal with the negatives 
consequences of the spontaneous process of development.
10. Karl Marx Capital V.1 Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976
11. Marx Capital V.2 Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978; Dick Bryan ‘Monopoly in Marxist method’ 
Capital and Class No.26 Summer 1985, pp. 72-92 makes the point (p.72) that ‘monopoly is to be 
regarded as a form of competition rather than its antithesis’. Geoffrey Kay Development and 
Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis London: Macmillan, 1976, provides the seminal account of 
the effect of the tussle between industrial and merchant capital for the process of development and 
under-development.
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The existence of the intent to develop and powerful trustees are the necessary
conditions to the construction of a doctrine of development, a systematic form of
intentional development. As Cowen and Shenton explain:
An intention to develop becomes a doctrine of development when it is 
attached, or when it is pleaded that it be attached, to the agency of the 
state to become an expression of state policy.12
The two most substantial forms which a doctrine of development has taken thus far 
are agrarian and manufacturing.13
After development’s initial formulation in early nineteenth century Europe, the idea 
of development travelled back and forth between metropolitan countries and their 
colonies, linking conditions in each to the other.14 Unemployment in industrial 
Britain, as during the last decades of the nineteenth century, could be resolved 
through the expansion of markets in the colonies for British manufactured goods. 
For some influential officials, including British Colonial Secretary Joseph 
Chamberlain (1896-1903), state-sponsored development of agriculture and 
manufacturing at home also meant constructive development of colonies. Rural 
unemployment and urban impoverishment as well as fears about Britain’s long­
term decline as an industrial power, prompted rethinking about colonies as outlets 
for investment and as markets.15 As this thesis shows, during the twentieth century 
development as an idea continued to be reshaped by the intersection of concerns 
in industrial metropolitan countries and primarily agrarian colonies.
12. Doctrines p.viii
13. Doctrines Parts Two and Three, Chapters 4-7.
13. For nineteenth century liberalism, as well as the Australian idea of development in PNG (see 
below), John Stuart Mill is a seminal figure in linking colonial practice with metropolitan government, 
as well as for making development acceptable as a ruling idea. See Cowen and Shenton Doctrines 
pp.42-49. The shift from the position of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and Edmund Burke, 
opponents of imperialism, towards support for developmental imperialism by nineteenth century 
liberals, including both James and JS Mill, is neatly charted by Jennifer Pitts in her A Turn to 
Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2005, esp. Chapters 1-5, pp. 1 -162, with an earlier counter-point provided by 




For this account, the international shaping of development as an agrarian doctrine 
is of critical significance. The next section outlines the process by which this 
occurred.
Fabian Development and Agrarian Priority
Subsequent to the 1906 electoral defeat of the British government in which 
Chamberlain was Colonial Secretary and lasting into the inter-war years and the 
Great Depression, successive British governments refused or failed to apply 
Chamberlain’s project of imperial development.16 However, during this period 
circumstances including war and economic turmoil also began to change in favour 
of a new phase of developmental intent, which had a strong Fabian influence.17 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Fabians had focussed upon 
Britain as their field for development. However during the inter-war years Fabians 
extended their interests beyond the metropolitan terrain to a concern for colonial 
development.18 That extension influenced Australians formulating late colonial 
development policy in PNG. An especially clear expression of the shift in 
development thought, from concern with metropolitan to colonial conditions, 
occurred in relation to Africa, and particularly Kenya.
16. Cf. Anne Phillips The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa London: James 
Currey,1989; M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton, R.W. The Origin and Course of Fabian Colonialism 
in British West Africa" Journal of Historical Sociology V.4,No.2, June 1991,pp.143-174, ‘Bankers, 
Peasants and Land in British West Africa 1905-37’ The Journal of Peasant Studies.V. 19,No.1, 
October 1991,pp.26-58, ‘British Neo-Hegelian Idealism and Official Colonial Practice in Africa: the 
Oluwa Land Case of 1921’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History V.22,No.2, May
1994,pp.217-250. The parallels with the dominance of spontaneous development and the 
weakness of developmental intent in colonial policy during the late nineteenth century and into the 
inter-war years in Papua and New Guinea are striking, as indicated below.
17. The literature on the Fabians and Fabianism is, of course, extensive. For present purposes, 
especially to show the importance of the distinction between intent and the capacity to shape state 
development policy, it is sufficient to employ the brief description of Fabianism’s principal objective, 
as envisaged by founding figures Sidney and Beatrice Webb, which is provided by Victoria 
Glendinning in her Leonard Woolf: A Life London: Pocket Books, 2007, p.170: The purpose of 
Fabianism was to infiltrate democratic socialist ideas into the thinking of the political and governing 
classes...’ For the influence of a post-war Fabian on thinking about development, see Tignor W. 
Arthur Lewis.
18. See, in particular, by Cowen and Shenton: The Roots of Trusteeship: The Moral Basis of Fabian 
Colonialism ; Development and Agrarian Bias Part 1:The Original Theory of Development; 
Development and Agrarian Bias Part 2: Agrarian Bias ; Development and Agrarian Bias Part 3:
Land Nationalisation Working Papers 18-21, 1992, Department of Economics, Faculty of Business, 
City of London Polytechnic, as well as Doctrines.
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After World War I, the growing conflict over land and labour between indigenous 
Africans, European settlers and Asians (Indians) with aspirations to extend beyond 
commerce into large-holding agriculture in Kenya forced the British Government to 
explicitly spell out the basis of its colonial policy. A 1923 White Paper set out the 
central principle, declaring that British policy for land and labour should follow a 
direction expressed by the phrase ‘the paramountcy of native interests’.19 The 
White Paper concluded that both Europeans and Asians were only to be allowed to 
advance to the extent that ‘native interests’ were not damaged. This effectively 
blocked Asian capital from moving into largeholding agriculture and restrained 
further European settler expansion. Although it took a further thirty years to change 
the pronouncement of policy intent from an essentially negative injunction into a 
positive direction promoting African smallholder agriculture, the White Paper was 
nevertheless important for Kenya, and became so for Papua New Guinea.
In 1925, at the British Labour Party’s twenty-fifth annual conference, for the first 
time a major debate was conducted on colonial policy. This debate marked an 
important step for Fabians trying to influence the holders of state power. The 
outcome, ‘to socialise’ rather than ‘to smash’ the British Empire, ‘was a Fabian 
imprint on Labour policy...[aj policy [which was] nothing other than trusteeship’.20 
Garnished with the claim that it was socialist, this new trusteeship aimed to provide 
a moral basis for colonialism, and colonial development. To distinguish this 
trusteeship from earlier forms, leading Fabians identified a third British Empire 
distinct from the two previous ‘old’ empires, of the white colonies, India and the 
Caribbean. According to Sidney Olivier, leading Fabian, member of the Labour 
Party and Secretary of State for India, the third Empire:
19. The White Paper has become known popularly as the Devonshire Declaration after the British 
noble who lead a mission to examine conditions in Kenya and provide direction for policy-makers. 
As far as I am able to ascertain, the phrase first appeared as a statement of official British policy in 
the 1923 White Paper, and may well have been coined by J.H. Oldham, secretary of the 
International Missionary Council. See Rosberg, C.G. Jr and Nottingham, J. The Myth of ‘Mau Mau: 
Nationalism in Kenya Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1966, pp.68-69. I have previously 
indicated that the expression ‘paramountcy of native interests’ travelled widely in the twentieth 
century, including into Australian colonial policy for Papua New Guinea. See MacWilliam ‘Papua 
New Guinea in the 1940s: Empire and Legend’ in David Lowe (ed.) Australia and the End of 
Empires: the impact of decolonization in Asia and the South Pacific,1945-1965 Geelong, Vic.: 
Deakin University Press, pp. 25-42’ esp.p.37. The Australian adoption is discussed in more detail 
below.
20. The Roots of Trusteeship,p.1
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was created according to two motives: Firstly, to secure on economic 
grounds, sources of materials and minerals which would have been 
appropriated by other powers: Secondly, to protect Africans “from 
destruction and exploitation” .21
This reformulated focus for trusteeship, which justified the retention of colonies, 
also brought the matter of land ownership and distribution in the motropole and the 
overseas territories to the fore. Colonial trusteeship, in the hands of a British 
Labour Party guided by Fabian precepts, made it possible to imagine a political 
alliance of working people extending from the industrial working class of Britain to 
the peasants of the colonies. The alliance, its advocates intended, would be united 
against oppression and exploitation by capitalism which was considered to be the 
major barrier to development. Most importantly, colonial trusteeship was informed 
by an opposition to the further extension of wage labour and capitalist exploitation. 
Indigenous land rights were to be protected and secured as the basis for colonial 
development. At the same time, by securing peasants upon land in the colonies, it 
would not be possible for one set of workers to be used as a source of cheap 
labour to undercut the wages and conditions of other workers in the industrialised 
metropolitan countries, including Britain. Thus Fabian colonialism provided a moral 
basis for imperial and colonial development22
Fabian colonialism also implanted a very strong agrarian orientation at the centre 
of schemes for metropolitan and colonial development. The origins of the 
orientation and the implications for government policy regarding Britain itself are 
not important for this thesis.23 However rural colonisation became an element of 
development which extended beyond planning to deal with unemployment in 
Britain, into colonial schemes for settling households that neither employed nor 
sold their labour upon smallholdings to deal with disorder, even the threat of
21. The Roots of Trusteeship,p.3
22. For a wider emphasis on the morality of empire and colonial rule in post-World War I 
international political arrangements, see Jeanne Morefield Covenants without Swords: Idealist 
Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. Morefield’s study is 
of special importance for PNG. One of the two principal figures in her account of inter-war British 
liberal reformism is Gilbert Murray, brother of Hubert Murray, Lieutenant-Governor of Papua from 
1908 to 1940. The latter maintained a steady, mutually supportive, correspondence with his brother 
during the years Gilbert was a British academic and international activist. See Francis West ed. 
Selected Letters of Hubert Murray Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1970
23. The origins and British application are, however, treated extensively in Cowen and Shenton 
Development and Agrarian Bias Parts 1 and 2
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revolution. This emphasis upon smallholder agriculture for agrarian development 
doctrine became especially significant subsequently.
By the late 1930s, British officials recognised the need for a revitalisation of their 
African colonies. In Nigeria, the failure of the colonial policy of non-development 
was acknowledged by no less important a colonial official than Governor Bernard 
Bourdillon, who urged an end to the ‘exploitation theory’ of colonialism and its 
replacement by ‘the development theory’.24 Thus the connection which 
Chamberlain previously had drawn between conditions in the metropolitan centre 
and those applying at the colonial periphery re-appeared in the idea of 
development embraced by Fabians and non-Fabians alike. The economic and 
political crisis of the 1930s also gave considerable impetus to further modifications 
of the idea of development, including in its application to Britain’s colonies. One 
consequence of this impetus was the passage of the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Acts of 1939 and 1945, even though these had ‘an overwhelmingly 
welfarist [rather than developmental: SM] agenda’.25
When the Labour Party came to power in 1945, followed by the sterling crisis of 
1947, another British Government attempted to couple national interest with 
colonial development, along the lines proposed by Chamberlain at the turn of the 
century. On this occasion, anti-Marxist Fabians acting in the name of socialism 
and through the Labour government resuscitated development doctrine.26 But, 
according to Cowen and Shenton:
24. Doctrines,pp.294-295
25. Doctrines, p.296. A shift from welfare, including state-sponsored means to deal with diseases, 
to development, making productive what had been rendered unproductive during the military 
conflict, awaited the end of the military conflict for British colonial policy, as it did for Australian 
colonial policy towards PNG.
26. Colin Leys ‘Socialism and the Colonies: Review’ Fabian Journal No.28, July 1959, pp.20-24, 
which is a review of Arthur Creech Jones ed. New Fabian Colonial Essays London: Hogarth Press, 
1959. See in particular Creech Jones’ essay The Labour Party and Colonial Policy 1945-51’ pp.19- 
37. Between 1945 and 1950 Creech Jones, founder of the Fabian Colonial Research Bureau, was 
British secretary of state for colonies. I have previously noted how in December 1942 Paul Hasluck, 
as an adviser to the Australian Minister for External Affairs Dr H.V.Evatt, developed a close 
association with Creech Jones while attending the eighth Institute of Pacific Relations conference 
held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec. According to Hasluck, Creech Jones, then a Labour MP and 
parliamentary secretary to Ernest Bevin, seemed ‘to be one member of the British delegation who 
was not living in the past...I found a lot in common with Creech Jones’. MacWilliam ‘Papua New 
Guinea in the 1940s’ p.33. See also Tignor W.Arthur Lewis.
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This was a late-imperial doctrine to maximise production in African 
colonies to meet British national material need. The intention to develop 
schemes for the large-scale production of primary products -  from eggs 
in Gambia to groundnuts in Tanganyika -  was guided by a national need 
to swiftly expand exports to Britain and to save the need to spend 
dollars on imports of food and other immediate needs.27
The exceptional character and brevity of this moment needs to be emphasized.
This was the ‘only occasion on which there was concerted British state effort to 
make colonial populations do the work of generally maintaining subsistence, and 
therefore productive capacity, in Britain itself.28 In other words, there was no 
consistent imperial practice that sought to tie the production of colonial peoples into 
development in and of Britain. As will be shown later, this conclusion is only slightly 
less appropriate for Australian rule in PNG. The account now turns to the chapter’s 
second theme, thought about development and its effect on policy in the earliest 
phase of Australian colonial rule over Papua and New Guinea.
Development in Early Colonial Papua and New Guinea
An important proposition of this thesis is that the late colonial idea of development 
which informed Australian policy for Papua New Guinea represented a major break 
with pre-World War II thought about the colony. Understanding the extent and 
significance of the shift is facilitated by an outline of the earlier, displaced idea of 
development which initially influenced colonial officials and policy.
Development in the spontaneous sense was ‘a word much used in the discussions 
about Papua in the first decade of [the twentieth: SM] century’. Further, the term 
contained little ambiguity, resting as it did ‘upon two assumptions common to the 
men of that day and generation’. The assumptions were the right of private 
European entrepreneurs to accumulate and the potential of Papua as a ‘profitable 
(colonial) possession’. The role of government was to realise the potential by
27. Doctrines, p.296. As is shown in Chapter 2, the late 1940s and early 1950s was also when 
Australian officials considered linking expanded production of agricultural crops in PNG to 
Australian domestic needs, for consumption and exports, and to British imperial objectives of 
constructing a sterling bloc of countries to defend Britain against the US’ ascendancy.
28. Doctrines,p.297
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making the colony ‘attractive to white settlers and entrepreneurs exercising their 
undoubted rights’.29
Similarly, as Stewart Firth has noted regarding German New Guinea, the drive to 
extend trade and establish agricultural largeholdings, whether company or 
individually-owned, dominated in the north-east mainland and islands territory. 30 
Albert Hahl, in charge of the German Protectorate of the New Guinea Company 
from 1896 until 1898, subsequently acting governor, then governor of German New 
Guinea until 1914 ‘had no doubts about the aim of German colonisation. It was to 
open up the country to European planters and traders’.31 Indeed, according to 
Firth, ‘(w)ith the exception of the Dutch, the European powers in Melanesia before 
1914 all wanted their possessions to become plantation colonies.’32
West locates the place of the indigenous population in the schema, in ierms which
could also be applied to New Guinea:
There were, of course, obligations to native races involved in 
development, but in 1906 in Papua they could be stressed more 
lightly because the duty of the government to Europeans had 
scarcely begun to be discharged. The first and most urgent task, 
which Hubert Murray fully accepted, was to ensure that 
development took place.33
Drawing in part upon experiences in other colonies, the authorities recognised that 
spontaneous development posed a threat to the indigenous population.34 In the
29. The quotations in this paragraph are from Francis West Hubert Murray The Australian Pro- 
Consul Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1968, p.122. That plantations at least in Papua 
turned out to be generally unsuccessful does not make any less relevant this understanding of 
development: see D.C. Lewis The Plantation Dream: Developing British New Guinea and Papua 
1884-1942 Canberra: The Journal of Pacific History, ANU, 1996
30. The New Guinea Company, 1885-1899: A Case of Unprofitable Imperialism’. Historical Studies 
v.XV, 1972, pp. 361-377
31. ‘Albert Hahl: Governor of German New Guinea’ in James Griffin ed. Papua New Guinea 
Portraits. The Expatriate Experience Canberra: ANU Press,1978,p.30
32. Stewart Firth New Guinea under the Germans Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1982,
p.66
33. West Hubert Murray,p. 122.
34. James Griffin, Hank Nelson and Stewart Firth Papua New Guinea: A Political History Richmond, 
Victoria: Heinemann, 1979, p.8, notes how Commodore James E Erskine, the British official who 
presided over the ceremony at which the Papua Protectorate was proclaimed, sought to protect the 
indigenous population. The biographer of the first Administrator of the Protectorate Sir William 
MacGregor, Roger Joyce, also indicates how the official’s previous experience in Fiji affected his 
initial policy to support this direction. The failure of ‘his plans to make the Papuans independent
30
Preface to his autobiographical Gouverneursjahre, first published in 1937, more
than twenty years after he left German New Guinea, Hahl stressed that:
In New Guinea, the native problem was and still is of first 
importance. The clash of two cultures, ours and that of stone- 
age man, inevitably led to dislocation and friction. It was 
imperative to avert these, and appropriate means had to be 
found, on the success of which hinged both the expansion of 
economic penetration and the cultural development of this island 
domain.35
The tension between profit 'forc(ing) the pace’, to use Bill Gammage’s explanation 
for the Hagen-Sepik Patrol of the late 1930s into the New Guinea highlands and 
north coast,36 and finding a means of averting ‘dislocation and friction’, continued to 
underpin much that happened during the inter-war years in each colony. Murray’s 
pre-World War I recognition that demands from European plantation owners for 
workers threatened to turn the indigenous population into a landless proletariat was 
significant. In Papua, finding positive means to safeguard the position of the 
indigenous population took modest steps,37 including Murray’s largely unsuccessful 
drive to establish ‘native largeholdings’.38 However from the 1920s in New Guinea,
producers’ saw MacGregor turn to encouraging European enterprises, which Murray in turn initially 
maintained as a policy direction. See R.B. Joyce Sir William MacGregor Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1971, p.205.
35. Albert Hall Governor in New Guinea Edited and translated by Peter G. Sack and Dymphna 
Clark Canberra: ANU Press, 1980,p.xxii.
36. The Sky Travellers. Journeys in New Guinea 1938-39 Carlton South, Victoria: The Miegunyah 
Press and Melbourne University Press, p.17
37. Griffin, Nelson, and Firth Papua New Guinea Chapter 3. For an account of labour policy across 
the entire period of Australian colonial rule which differs fundamentally from the argument produced 
here, see Charles Rowley The New Guinea Villager: A Retrospect from 1964 Melbourne, Canberra, 
Sydney: F.W.Cheshire, 1968. Rowley’s general assessment (p.90) is: ‘Even where there was little 
concern for native rights, or with justice, a minimum of protection was necessary, to maintain the 
value of the colonial asset. Thus the recruitment of labour, and the return of those who completed 
their contract terms safely to their villages, had to be controlled, to preserve the willingness to go 
out to work, which is an economic asset of the first importance.’ The accuracy or otherwise of this 
influential depiction of late colonial policy, is examined in more detail below. See also Wright 
‘Contesting Community’ and Wright ‘A Liberal “Respect for Small Property”
38. Cf. L. Lett Sir Hubert Murray of Papua London and Sydney: Collins, 1949, pp. 184-185, esp.
p. 188, with West Hubert Murray p. 132. West notes (p.213), of Murray’s post-World War I policy for 
Papua: ‘Murray’s own definition of his policy...his own assessment of its distinctiveness, lay in 
native taxation, native plantations and the creation of native councilors to ensure that these 
measures became appreciated by villagers as in their own best interests. None of these aspects of 
policy was unique in itself, but Murray believed that in combination they were, and especially that 
they were in actual colonial practice, as distinct from politics for show.’ For a specific consideration 
of Murray’s emphasis on native plantations, see R.G.Crocombe Communal cash cropping among 
the Orokaiva Bulletin No.4 Canberra and Port Moresby: New Guinea Research Unit, ANU, May 
1964, pp.4-20
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the Australian administration had little trouble ‘put(ting) business first’,39 with a 
substantial increase in the number of indigenous labourers recruited for work on 
plantations and in gold-mines 40 Despite Administration efforts in both territories to 
limit the worst effects of wage employment on the indigenous population, West 
argues that:
(t)hc demand for labour always pressed heavily on the sources of 
supply, and a high proportion of labour was drawn from the 
relatively backward or recently opened up areas of the country, like 
the Sepik river district.41
In 1939, a commission was established by the colonial administration to investigate 
what was believed to be the growing shortages of labour to work land already 
alienated for largeholdings, but not yet developed. The investigations revealed that 
an increase in the total potential labour force from 60,000 to 85,000 would be 
required, without any known reserves available to meet the likely demand.42 Even 
without the deaths and other deleterious effects of the prolonged military conflict 
which was to come, existing production relations were under severe strain. War 
rendered the previous emphasis on spontaneous development untenable.
Inventing ‘Positive Australianism’
The Metropolitan Australian Influences
During World War II, particular emphasis was given to redefining the basis of 
Australian colonial authority.43 Senior Australian officials specifically rejected what 
they understood as the Japanese-formulated Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
the Orokaiva Bulletin No.4 Canberra and Port Moresby: New Guinea Research Unit, ANU, May 
1964, pp.4-20
39. Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea p.55; see also Charles D. Rowley The Australians 
in German New Guinea 1914-1921 Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1958, esp. Part VII 
The Sacred Trust’
40. Hank Nelson Black White & Gold: Goldmining in Papua New Guinea 1878-1930 Canberra: ANU 
Press, 1976
41. Francis J.West ‘Indigenous Labour in Papua-New Guinea’ International Labour Review V.77,
No.2, 1958, p 91
42. West ‘Indigenous Labour’ p.91. West emphasises (p.95) that the shortages were particularly 
substantial in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea. Most largeholdings were located in this 
territory and considerable areas of alienated but not yet planted land were available.
43. Huntley Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production pp.90-126, provides an 
extensive account of the war-time reshaping of trusteeship for Papua New Guinea. See also Wright 
‘Protecting the National Interest: The Labor Government and the Reform of Australia’s Colonial 
Policy, 1942-45’ Labour History No.82, May 2002, pp. 65-82; MacWilliam ‘Papua New Guinea in the 
1940s’.
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Sphere model of development as undesirable because of its exploitative 
character.44 The phrase which came to embody the principal thrust of Australian 
post-war policy toward Papua New Guinea was ‘positive Australianism’. It was 
used publicly in early 1944 by the Minister for External Affairs Dr H. V. Evatt when 
castigating critics of the recently signed Australia - New Zealand Agreement.45 
The Agreement changed previous consultative arrangements between the two 
countries into a formal treaty, one of whose effects was to influence negotiations 
between major war-time allies over reforms to international trusteeship 
conditions.46
The treaty contained a chapter entitled ‘Welfare and Advancement of Native 
Peoples of the Pacific’. The Chapter specified that ‘...the main purpose of the trust 
is the welfare of the native peoples and their social, economic and political 
development’.47 in order to bring this aim, or intention, to fruition colonial policy 
should cease to be negative, merely reducing the deleterious effects of existing 
colonial policy. Instead government policy and state agency should make 
development happen as a positive consequence of the reformed international 
trusteeship arrangements.
It has previously been pointed out that the Australian -  New Zealand emphasis 
also was influenced by changes in international thinking about development which 
had commenced in the 1920s.48 It is less often noted that conditions prior to the 
outbreak of the war in the metropolitan country were also important in changing 
how powerful and influential Australians envisaged the future for Australia and for 
PNG after WWII ended. The Depression deeply affected Australians who were to 
become central in defining what ‘positive Australianism’ meant, in particular its 
agrarian emphasis. The early 1930s crash in agricultural prices which drove
44. Wright ‘Protecting the National Interest’ pp.66-67
45. See Evatt Foreign Policy of Australia: Speeches Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1945, pp.183- 
184.
46 . On the context, see Louis Imperialism at Bay Chapter 18, pp.289-308. Louis stresses how 
important was the Agreement, and the Australian-New Zealand intervention in international 
discussions about post-war arrangements for the South Pacific.
47. Louis Imperialism at Bay p.290, citing from the original text of the Agreement.
48. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production Chapter 3; Wright ‘Protecting the 
National Interest’; MacWilliam ‘Papua New Guinea in the 1940s’
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individual European largeholding owners off their plantations in PNG, leading to 
greater concentration of ownership in the hands of the large firms, especially Burns 
Philp and Carpenters,49 had a parallel in Australia. Rural and urban unemployment 
reached nearly thirty per cent in 1931-32. ‘[GJreat pockets of poverty in the cities 
and in the countryside’, 50 had a lasting effect and not only on those who were 
impoverished and unemployed. While some so affected became politicians and 
Ministers,51 others were employed as senior bureaucrats and advisers.52 In 
addition to the Fabian reformulation and advocacy of intentional development 
outlined above, the demand management economics of J.M.Keynes increasingly 
influenced these politicians, policy advisers and senior administrators.53
49. For the advance during the 1930s of Burns Philp in particular, see Ken Buckley and Kris 
Klugman “The Australian Presence in the Pacific”: Burns Philp 1914-1946 Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 1983, Chapters 12-16, pp.213-325.
50. D.H.McKay ‘Post-War Agriculture’ in L.T.Evans and J.D.B.Miller eds.Politics and Practice 
Essays in Honour of Sir John Crawford Sydney: Australian National University Press and 
Pergamon Press, 1987, p.34
51. David Lee Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia's Postwar Foreign and 
Defence Policy St.Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1995,p.8 notes that: The circle of Australian 
Labor Party (ALP) ministers who made Australian foreign policy in the 1940s had come to the fore 
as critics of social injustice in the depressed conditions of the 1930s.’
52. Lee Search for Security p.9 lists among the ‘gifted bureaucrats’ who assisted these ALP 
ministers, John Burton, head of External Affairs and H.C. Coombs (on whom more below). William 
Coleman, Selwyn Cornish and Alf Haggar Giblin’s Platoon: The Trials and Triumph of the 
Economist in Australian Public Life Canberra; ANU E Press, 2006 especially Chapter 9, note that in 
1941 an Inter-Departmental Committee on Economic Relations was established in Canberra to 
work out the most appropriate response to US efforts to tie aid to the removal of barriers to US 
imports. This response involved supporting the US position on trade in return for a commitment to 
full employment, which was inserted as Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, despite US’ 
objections. Coleman, Cornish and Haggar Alf Giblin’s Platoon p.200 states: ‘Giblin, strongly 
supported by (Leslie) Melville and Coombs, was responsible for formulating the “positive approach”, 
or the “full employment approach’” In the industrial countries full employment was principally for and 
of a landless proletariat: in PNG, positive Australianism meant full employment for and of 
households attached to smallholdings. Nevertheless, in either circumstance, state action to make 
productive that which had become unproductive through unemployment or underemployment was 
the premise of the ‘positive approach’.
53. Heinz W. Arndt A Course through Life: Memoirs of an Australian Economist History of 
Development Studies 1 Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, ANU, 1985, notes 
(p.27) how from 1952 there were regular meetings at the Commonwealth Bank in Sydney of a 
group of economists. On the background and views of those invited by Coombs, Arndt summarises 
(p.28): ‘We were all in our thirties and early forties, we all shared the same interests and much the 
same Keynesian point of view-l doubt whether any of us were not Labor voters...’. On the nature of 
the shared Keynesianism of leading economists, see below, and Nicholas Brown ‘”lt’s a Case of 
Using Any Stick to Beat a Dog”: R.l.Downing, the Keynesian Revolution and Reconstruction’ History 
of Economics Review No.30, Summer 1999, pp.90-107; Selwyn Cornish ‘Sir Leslie Melville 
Keynesian or Pragmatist?’ History of Economics Review No.30 Summer 1999, pp. 126-150; Alex 
Millmow ‘Revisiting Giblin: Australia’s first Proto-Keynesian economist?’ History of Economics 
Review No.31, 2000,pp.48-67; Millmow ‘W. Brian Reddaway-Keynes’ emissary to Australia 1913- 
2002’ Economic Record V.79, No.244, pp. 136-139; Coleman, Cornish and Haggar Alf Giblin's 
Platoon.
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Two of them were Dr H.C.(Nugget) Coombs,54 and (Sir) John (Jack) Crawford.55 
Coombs’ part in shaping the role of governments in the conduct of war and 
reconstruction, especially under Labor governments wedded to placing security of 
employment at the centre of policy, is well known.56 So too is the extension of this 
policy direction to PNG.57
Crawford’s significance for this account lies in the emphasis he placed upon post­
depression agricultural reform, emphasising the need for positive state 
involvement, a need which also was transferred to his view on PNG’s 
development.58 The death of laissez-faire liberalism in Australia,59 and the 
increasing emphasis in liberal thought upon the state’s role in dealing with the 
economic crisis was especially important for Crawford, whose personal experience 
of the depression aiso reinforced ‘broad sympathy with underdogs’.60 During 
appointments as an economist with the Rural Bank of New South Wales (1935- 
1942), as Rural Advisor to the Commonwealth Department of War Organisation of 
Industry (1942-1943), and as Director of Research in the newly formed Department
54. See Tim Rowse ‘Coombs the Keynesian’ History of Economics Review No.30, Summer 1999, 
pp. 108-125; Rowse Nugget Coombs: A Reforming Life Port Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002; H.C.Coombs Other People’s Money Canberra; ANU Press, 1971, esp.pp.75-93; 
Coombs Trial Balance South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1981;Coombs. From Curtin to Keating: The 
1945 and 1994 White Papers on Employment: A Better Environment for Human and Economic 
Diversity? A Discussion Paper Darwin: Northern Australia Research Unit, 1994;MacWilliam 
‘Liberalism and the End of Development’ and ‘Papua New Guinea in the 1940s’
55. Evans and Miller eds. Policy and Practice; H.W.Arndt Sir John Crawford Pacific Economic 
Papers No. 128 Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, RSPAS, ANU, November 1985; Sir 
Richard Blackburn, Coombs, H.C. et.al. Sir John Crawford Canberra: ANU, 1986
56. Rowse Nugget Coombs pp. 116-121.
57. Rowse Nugget Coombs pp. 178-181 ‘Reconstructing Papua New Guinea’ provides a brief 
summary of Coombs’ war and immediate post-war role most relevant to this account.
58. In the late 1950s, Crawford also advised PNG coffee growers to press for a marketing board to 
strengthen their position when negotiating with exporters and overseas manufacturers: see 
MacWilliam ‘Placing the Planters’ forthcoming.
59. F.W. Eggleston Reflections of an Australian Liberal 2nd ed. Melbourne: F.W.Cheshire, 1953, 
Chapter 1, pp.2-5. Eggleston describes (p.5) The path [of a twentieth century liberal: SM] from 
laissez-faire to [British Liberal: SM] Lloyd George is a transition from a negative policy of destroying 
feudalism to a positive policy of social reconstruction through which the free creative activities of the 
citizen will be fully employed.’
60. Max Crawford ‘My Brother Jack: Background and Early Years’ in Evans and Miller eds. Policy 
and Practice p. 14.
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of Post-war Reconstruction, headed by Coombs, Crawford drew upon this 
experience to influence development in Australia and PNG.61
While working in Post-War Reconstruction, Crawford commenced an association
with the Rural Reconstruction Commission. The Commission played an important
role in stressing the importance of maintaining ‘family farms’ in Australia,. A mid-
1940s report included the statement that::
...farmers and their families constitute the basic units of the most natural 
form of society, and rural communities are among the most vital to the 
nation...The farmer has the right to a reasonable living.62
Because farmers’ incomes had been cut substantially during the depression, and 
increased agricultural production was required to meet war and post-war demand, 
Crawford and the Department of Post-War Reconstruction became heavily 
involved in devising means of raising prices and finding other ways for improving 
rural livelihoods. A self-declared ‘interventionist’, Crawford’s principal significance 
was to place agricultural expansion and farmers’ living standards at the centre of 
government considerations on international relations and the domestic economy. 
McKay notes the connection between government policy on full employment, as 
expressed in the 1945 White Paper on the subject, and rural policy.63 Most 
importantly for Australia and, as will be shown below, for PNG, the connection 
meant an emphasis upon increasing agricultural exports for a ‘hungry world - 
especially in the United Kingdom and Europe’.64
Another key figure for late colonial development in PNG with close connections to 
Crawford and agricultural policy in Australia was C.R. Lambert, who was 
subsequently appointed by Coalition Minister Hasluck, as Secretary for the newly 
constructed Department of Territories, formerly External Territories. Like Crawford, 
Lambert had worked in the Rural Bank of New South Wales (1933-1948), and was 
Chairman of the Rural Reconstruction Commission (1943-46). Immediately prior to
61. McKay ‘Post-War Agriculture’ in Evans and Miller eds. Policy and Practice pp.36-37 stresses 
how Crawford continued to see post-war agriculture and its problems through the prism of pre-war 
conditions.
62. McKay ‘Post-War Agriculture’ p.35.
63. ‘Post-War Agriculture’ pp.37-38
64. McKay ‘Post-War Agriculture’ p.38
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becoming Secretary for Territories, Lambert had been Commonwealth Director of 
Regional Development. With this background in designing and implementing state 
action to expand agriculture in Australia, it is unsurprising that Lambert and 
Hasluck forged a lengthy working relationship aimed at bringing agrarian 
development to PNG (see Chapter Three).
H. V. Evatt and British Colonial Influences
An especially important figure in the reformation of the idea of development, giving 
it a particularly Australian flavour, was Dr H. V. Evatt. In Evatt’s case, 
championship of ‘the underdog’ extended domestically and overseas. This support 
was expressed for individuals facing injustice and small countries threatened by 
major powers’ domination.65 Evatt’s role as Minister for External Affairs from 1941 
onwards is of special significance for the international reshaping of trusteeship (see 
below). Evatt’s knowledge of and sympathy for the welfare of people in countries 
other than Australia grew during the inter-war years, when he was an academic, 
lawyer and judge of the High Court of Australia. The most important dimension of 
Evatt’s personal development for this account involves Kenya and the Devonshire 
Declaration.66
65. This sense of sympathy was particularly evident in the belligerence of Minister for External 
Affairs Dr Evatt when dealing with British and US officials over the meaning and terms of 
trusteeship. Louis emphasises how Evatt ‘championed the cause of the underdog’, a stance which 
he stretched to include ‘small powers’ internationally as well as ‘dependent peoples’: Imperialism at 
Bay p.291 Contending accounts and assessments of Evatt and his various roles can be found in:
K.Buckley, B. Dale, and W.Reynolds Doc Evatt: Patriot, Internationalist, Fighter and Scholar 
Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1994; Allan Dalziell Evatt The Enigma Melbourne: Lansdowne 
Press, 1967; P.G.Edwards Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 
1901-1949 Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp.140-185; F.W.Eggleston Reflections on 
Australian Foreign Policy Melbourne: Cheshire, 1957; H.V.Evatt Foreigh Policy of Australia: 
Speeches Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1945; Evatt Australia in World Affairs Sydney and 
London: Angus and Robertson, 1946; W.J.Hudson Australia and the Colonial Question at the 
United Nations Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1970; Hudson Australia and the New World 
Order: Evatt at San Francisco 1945 Canberra: ANU, 1993; Lee Search for Security, David Lee, and 
Christopher Watts eds. Evatt to Evans The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy
St.Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1997; Louis Imperialism at Bay especially Parts lll-IV;
W.Reynolds H. V.Evatt: The imperial connection and the quest for Australian security, 1941-1945 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Newcastle, 1985; Reynolds ‘Dr H.V.Evatt: Foreign Minister for a Small 
Power’ in Day, D. ed. Brave New World: Dr.H.V.Evatt and Australian Foreign Policy St.Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1996, pp. 146-157; Kylie Tennant Evatt Politics and Justice 
Sydney: Angus and Robertson 1970; Alan Watt The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938- 
1965 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, pp.42-105.
66. Tennant Evatt Politics and Justice, an early laudatory account of Evatt’s career, does not 
mention this formative phase. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production p.100 also 
notes the place of Kenya and the 1923 White Paper in Evatt’s thinking about trusteeship. Wright
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As Louis notes, Evatt was:
...the only one of the protagonists of the trusteeship controversy who 
had had as part of his background the authorship of a treatise on the 
[League of Nations] mandates in international law. ... [In the essay,
Evatt located] the foundation of British trusteeship as the Kenya White 
Paper of 1923.67
The argument appeared in a monograph Evatt prepared and published in 1935
while a judge of the High Court of Australia.68 The central proposition that Evatt
took from the White Paper on Kenya was that British governments exercised:
...a trust on behalf of the African population, and they are unable to 
delegate or share this trust, the object of which may be defined as the 
protection and advancement of the native races 69
Evatt highlighted the above phrase from the White Paper and then extended 
trusteeship beyond British concerns. For Evatt, responsibility exercised by His 
Majesty’s Government was as ‘trustees before the world for the African 
population’.70 That is, trusteeship should be practised according to international, 
and not simply imperial, principles, a conclusion Evatt constantly pushed during the 
1940s at a series of conferences and during negotiations about the future of post­
war arrangements.
There is no need to repeat here how Britain and the United States, in particular, 
disagreed about the terms of colonial authority after the military struggle ended. 
Nor is it necessary to document again the role played by Australian and New 
Zealand representatives in persuading the major powers to acknowledge the 
specific importance these two British Dominions placed upon post-war 
arrangements, particularly but not solely for the colonial territories of the South­
west Pacific. It is sufficient to note that Dr Evatt’s dogged belligerence, backed up
points out that in 1923 another Australian, Edmund Piesse, a senior official in the Prime Minister’s 
Office, had seen the parallels between British policy for Kenya and the Australian situation in the 
Mandated Territory of New Guinea. Piesse drew the conclusions in comments he made upon a 
recently published essay by British Radical Liberal, later Independent Labour Party, MP E.D.Morel.
67. Louis Imperialism at Bay p.108
68. See H.V. Evatt The British Dominions as Mandatories’ Proceedings of the Australian and New 
Zealand Society of International Law v.1, 1935, pp.27-54.
69. Evatt The British Dominions as Mandatories’ p.29; also cited in Louis Imperialism at Bay 
pp.108-109
70. Evatt The British Dominions as Mandatories’ p.29; also cited in Louis Imperialism at Bay p.109
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by persistent support from Australian officials, including Paul Hasluck, then working 
in External Affairs and attending many of the most important meetings, played a 
substantial part in changing the terms of trusteeship to include international 
supervision, but not international control or administration of colonies.71 As well as 
formulating a means for closer international scrutiny over colonial powers, the 
emphasis in the justification tor continuing colonial rule shifted considerably toward 
a responsibility for promoting indigenous welfare and hastening self-government, 
even national independence.72
Deliberations on Australia’s Post-war Defence
Wright emphasises how the appeals to a new form of internationalism by 
leading Australians was associated with, even driven by, a need to protect 
what was conceived as the Australian national interest.73 Not surprisingly at a 
time of war, one conception of interest involved territorial occupation with a 
direct military presence. But a second view of territorial security was also 
influential, and ultimately prevailed. Its foremost advocate was the Australian 
military commander General (later Sir) Thomas Blarney.74
As the Australian Labor Government prepared its plans for the Australia-New 
Zealand Conference of January 1944, the Defence Committee of Cabinet 
prepared a report. The document argued that ‘the “best means of securing 
Australia from invasion” was “by taking strong offensive action from 
established and well-defended forward bases’” . While Australia would be
71. Wright ‘Protecting the National Interest’ pp.68-69 correctly emphasises that the principal feature 
of the context in which the idea of trusteeship changed was anti-colonial nationalism, in which the 
US, Australian and NZ officials found themselves in agreement more often than with their British 
counterparts. However distrust of US ambitions in the South Pacific meant the officials from the last 
two countries allied with British Labour Party supporters of a ‘degree of international accountability’ 
and a postwar trusteeship arrangement which could be distinguished from pre-war imperialism.
72. Louis Imperialism at Bay provides a comprehensive account of the negotiations and their 
various outcomes; see also Hudson Australia and the New World Order, and Wright State Practice 
and Rural Smallholder Production Chapter 3.
73. ‘Protecting the National Interest’ notes that from the late nineteenth century a concern for 
national defence was central to the Australian ‘imperial presence, first in Papua and later in New 
Guinea’ (p.65) and proceeds to show how the terms of this concern changed during WWII.
74. David Horner Blarney: The Commander-in-Chief St.Leonard’s, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1998, 
especially Chapter 19, pp.436-438
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responsible for maintaining the bases ‘”the naval commitment should be 
regarded as an Imperial obligation”’.75
In a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Defence (Sir) Frederick 
Shedden, Blarney disagreed with this position. He argued that Australia’s 
strength lay in its "’strategic isolation’’’, the preservation of which should be 
‘”our strategic aim’” . 76 Blarney asserted that not only could Australian 
garrisons in the Pacific be bypassed by an attacking enemy, maintenance of 
the bases would be a problem when defence expenditures were cut during 
peacetime. Blarney preferred a close alliance with Britain, and conditional 
encouragement for US bases in the Pacific.77
Devising a defence strategy for Papua and New Guinea located so close to 
northern Australia, and over which military authority already existed -  in the 
form of ANGAU (Australian and New Guinea Administrative Unit)78 -  posed 
questions distinct and separable from the proposal for maintaining forward 
bases that Blarney opposed. As the Australia-New Zealand Agreement was 
negotiated, Blarney placed his views on the record about ‘the long-term 
strategic problems connected with the present military and future civil, 
administration of Papua and the Mandated Territory’.79
Blarney had a lengthy document prepared by his Director of Research, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Alf Conlon, and submitted to Prime Minister John Curtin 
on February 4, 1944.80 The document, titled The Situation of Australian 
Colonies as at January 1944’ envisaged a long-term program of development 
for the territories and ‘po inted) to the necessity of a sustained interest by 
military officers in developmental projects’. Development in PNG should have 
two objectives, as far as Australia’s strategic interests were concerned. First,
75. Quotes are from Horner Blarney pp.436-438
76. Horner Blarney p.437
77. Horner Blarney p.437
78. See Peter Ryan The Australian and New Guinea Administrative Unit’ in K.S. Inglis ed The 
History of Melanesia Second Waigani Seminar held at Port Moresby May 30-June 5, 1968 
Canberra and Port Moresby: ANU and University of Papua and New Guinea, 1971, pp.531-548
79. Horner Blarney p.438
80. On Conlon and the Directorate of Research, see Wright ‘Contesting community’ p.77
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there was a need to forestall ‘a sudden and uncontrolled [post-war] rush of 
competitive interests’ into the south-west Pacific, where the interests were 
both of rival nation-states and commercial concerns. The second objective 
reflected the changing focus of trusteeship outlined above, to place native 
welfare at the centre of economic and political development, rather than 
allowing a return to pre-war conditions. The document lent complete support 
to the position being developed elsewhere in the Australian civilian 
administration that domination by the trading and plantation interests should 
not be restored after the conflict ended.81
Most importantly, as Wright notes, the position adopted by Blarney made it 
possible to combine ‘wartime idealism...with the executive power of the 
Army’. The circumstances, by Blarney’s reckoning, ‘presented the Labor 
Government with a unique, “epoch making”, opportunity to exercise policy on 
the “highest moral level as a justified weapon of power politics to protect not 
only the future of the native peoples of the Pacific but the strategic security of 
Australia”'.82
Within a few days of Blarney’s letter to Curtin, from February 7 to 12, a 
conference of ANGAU officers of headquarters and district staff was held in 
Port Moresby.83 While some of those who attended may not have envisaged 
major changes in the terms of colonial rule as a consequence of the war, the 
general thrust of the published papers asserted the importance of improving 
the welfare of the indigenous population. Nor were the proposed future
81. NAA Series CP637/1/1, Item 65 The Situation of Australian Colonies as at January 1944 
4/2/1944 General Sir Thomas Blarney to PM Curtin; see also Wright ‘Contesting community’ and 
‘Protecting the National Interest’. The document presented to Curtin provides (p. 15) another early 
official application of the phrase ‘the paramountcy of native interests’, first used to describe the 
terms of Britain’s trusteeship in Kenya (see above), to post-war colonial policy for Australian 
colonies.
82. ‘Protecting the National Interest’ p.73; quotes in Wright’s document are from Blarney to Curtin 
The Situation of the Australian Colonies as at January, 1944’ pp.3-4.
83. NAA Series No. A9372, Item No. Vols. 1-3, Item Title: ANGAU. [Australia and New Guinea 
Administrative Unit.] Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of District Staff. Port 
Moresby 7-12 February 1944. Papers and Discussions. Cf. Gammage The Sky Travellers p.225, 
who gives the venue of the conference as Melbourne.
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directions outlined by ANGAU personnel at the conference ever distant from 
the line being formulated by civilian and military authorities in Australia.
When Major J. L. Taylor said: ‘I take it that you all agree that a higher 
standard of living is necessary for the native people’ ,84 he was advocating 
something which would have found no dispute at either military HQ or In the 
Curtin Labor government. Further, when stating that this standard should be 
reached through ‘the development of native agriculture, greater native 
production, and hence greater wealth’, and not by further increases in 
plantation production, Taylor was in step with what was fast becoming the 
dominant position in development thought about policy for post-war Australia 
and PNG. The last stage in the formulation of this position during and 
immediately after World War II is now considered.
Planning Post-War Development: Defence, Reconstructing Community 
and Paying a Debt
Through settlement schemes and other forms of state assistance, family farms 
were to provide the basis for post-war agricultural expansion and employment for 
returning soldiers in Australia. But in PNG, the urgency of the global food 
shortages initially appeared to favour reconstruction and expansion on another 
basis altogether, the rehabilitation of plantations owned by expatriates and 
overseas firms that employed indigenous labour.85 As the conflict ended,
84. See Taylor ‘A Paper on Native Welfare’ (no pagination) in Series No. A9372, Item No.V.2, Item 
Title: ANGAU [Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit]. Conference of Officers of Headquarters 
and Officers of District Staff. Taylor was an advocate of the labour subsidy thesis, claiming that: 
‘Plantations in this country exist to a considerable degree by virtue of the low standard of living of 
the native employees-that is, by cheap labour. It is essential to raise this standard of living in an 
endeavour to reduce the high death rate of indentured labourers, the pick of the community, which 
stood at between 15 and 20 per 1,000 before the war. This is an extremely high death rate and is 
the answer to those who contend that labour conditions [on plantations: SM] were satisfactory.’ 
Gammage The Sky Travellers p.225 suggests a major divide between Papua and New Guinea 
officers on “native welfare’ at this conference with the latter less supportive of the position Taylor 
espoused. The divide is not immediately apparent in the published papers (see below). See also 
Wright ‘Protecting the National Interest’ and ‘Contesting Community’
85. Harry H. Jackman Copra marketing and price stabilization in Papua New Guinea: A history to 
1975 Pacific Research Monograph No. 17 Canberra: NCDS, ANU, 1988, pp.82-97 discusses the 
establishment in 1943 of centralized produce marketing, particularly for copra, under National 
Security Regulations and support from ANGAU. He notes how in the same year the Australian New 
Guinea Production Control Board (ANGPCB) had taken over plantations operated by ANGAU, and
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largeholding owners chaffed at any restrictions which slowed their return to 
plantations abandoned in the face of the Japanese military’s rapid advance.86 But 
these aspirations now confronted government and administrative opposition to 
plantation agriculture and international companies.
As noted above, even prior to the start of the war, there were concerns about 
the effects on the indigenous population of plantations and their demands for 
labour. War-time changes internationally and in Australia in the idea of 
trusteeship made dealing with these concerns even more important. During 
the war, the potential for conflict between plantation operations and 
indigenous welfare became a central focus for government officials working in 
Australia. Opposition to ‘development by Europeans with native labour’, 
strengthened in Canberra, although renewing the importance of plantations 
remained the direction favoured by J.R. (Reg) Halligan, the most senior 
official in the Department of External Territories.87 As the destructive effects 
of the military conflict, particularly on indigenes and village life, became 
greater and better known, this opposition increased.88 The September 1943 
appointment of a Minister for External Territories E.J. (Eddie) Ward who 
fervently opposed the continuation of the pre-war direction of colonial policy, 
gave the opposition its most prominent representative. While Ward was never 
alone in his antipathy to the re-assertion of plantation and trading company
become the central marketing authority for these and privately owned and operated plantations in 
areas where the Japanese army had not been of a sufficient threat to force the departure of owners.
86. Initial assistance to returning planters, including through the Production Control Board, prodded 
Coombs’ concern, expressed in a letter to Treasurer Ben Chifley, as a member of a government 
committee formed in February 1944 to determine policy for post-war PNG. The concern was that 
without proper consideration the Government would acquiesce in the re-establishment of an 
economy dominated by largeholdings. See Rowse Nugget Coombs p.179; Wright ‘Protecting the 
National Interest’, and 'Contesting community’
87. Wright ‘Protecting the National Interest’ p.74, cites a memo of November 1943 prepared by the 
Second Secretary of the Department of External Affairs (DEA) which described the plantation 
system as a form of production ‘doomed from the beginning’. Instead ‘native’ policy’ for postwar 
PNG needed ‘to be based on the broad principle that the interests of the natives are to be 
paramount and that nothing should be allowed to impinge on this principle.’ The same memo, 
however, showed an attachment to a form of indigenous production, ‘a scheme of modified 
collectivization under the direction and control of the government, with the cultivation of such crops 
as the world needs’ that would have no place in postwar PNG (see below).
88. Wright ‘Protecting the National Interest’ and ‘Contesting community’ provides a more detailed 
analysis of the war-time ascendancy of the ‘paramountcy of native interests’ position within the 
Australian government and colonial administration.
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dominance, his particular combination of populism and labourism placed the
Minister at the forefront of the opposition. As Wright concluded:
The vehemence with which Ward attached the labels of exploitation and 
non-development to the so-called “vested interests” operating in the 
Territory created a climate in which more interested parties [than Ward 
on colonial development] could insert demands for expanded indigenous 
welfare into the domain of intentional development.89
As already noted, officers in ANGAU were among the interested parties in PNG. 
These officials had the advantage of holding administrative authority at the critical 
moment as the Japanese forces retreated and before civil administration was re­
established. Whatever the extent of disagreement among senior ANGAU officials 
about how the ‘paramountcy of native interests’ could be effected, there seems to 
have been little dispute that this should be the organisation’s primary concern. 
While acknowledging pre-war differences between conditions in Papua and New 
Guinea, and recognising that ANGAU was not in a position to determine post-war 
arrangements, Chairman of the 1944 ANGAU Conference Brigadier D.M.CIeland 
nevertheless emphasised the need for policy ‘applicable to both Territories’ which 
represented ‘a progressive development on rational lines’. For Cleland, rejecting 
‘retrogression’ and embracing ‘progression’ meant ‘betterment’ in ‘the best 
interests of the country [ie.PNG] and its people’.90 Other speakers left little doubt 
which people’s interests were of concern for many ANGAU officeholders.91
The dominant view neatly combined Australian defence interests with the 
‘paramountcy of native interests’ development thrust. Officers most concerned with 
the deleterious effects of pre-war indentured labour and wartime military demands 
upon the indigenous population sang from the same song sheet as General 
Blarney and government officials in Australia regarding the principal objectives
89. ‘Contesting community’ p.76
90. Cleland ‘Summary of Chairman’s Address on “ANGAU Organisaton and Policy” and of his final 
survey of the Conference Papers and Discussions’. [No pagination] NAA Series No. A9372, Item 
No.V.2, Item Title: ANGAU [Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit]. Conference of Officers of 
Headquarters and Officers of District Staff.
91. In addition to Taylor’s paper on ‘Native Welfare’ already cited, see also papers by Lt-Col. 
J.M.Mack ‘Preventive Medicine’, Capt W Trembath ‘ANGAU Dental Services’, Major L Austen 
‘Native Welfare’, Lt-Col E.Taylor, Lt-Col S Elliott-Smith ‘Native Labour, Major D.H.Vertigan ‘Native 
Labour’, Lt J.B.McAdam ‘Land Tenure’, R.E.P. Dwyer ‘Agriculture’, Capt W.R.Humphries ‘A Review 
of Native Plantations’, Major W.H.H.Thompson ‘Rice Cultivation’ and Lt-Col. W.E.Stanner ‘Broad 
Aspects of Colonial Administration’.
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behind post-war reconstruction in PNG.92 Taylor stated this underlying purpose 
neatly in his conference paper:
Leaving sentimental and moral reasons aside, it is vitally necessary for 
Australia, because of her geographical position, to have a large and 
contented native population in New Guinea as a buffer between 
Australia and Asia. This is of paramount importance, and our aim should 
be 10,000,000 New Guinea natives with an Australian culture and 
Australian sympathies, so that in the wars of the future a vigorous native 
race unaffected by any Pan-Asiatic movement will stand with Australia a 
bulwark against the Orient.93
Other interested parties, including religious denominations, trade unions and 
academics, easily supplied the ‘sentimental and moral reasons’. At the November 
1943 Anglican Archbishops and Bishops Conference held at Cheltenham, Victoria, 
a ‘Native Charter’ for the South-west Pacific was adopted. Drafted by Sydney 
University anthropologist A. P. Elkin and Bishop J. W. Burton, the Charter re­
asserted the ‘paramountcy of native interests’ doctrine, and ‘urged ‘that every effort 
be made to establish native community enterprises...and to develop peasant 
proprietorship’” .94 In February 1944, when Blarney was setting out his preferred 
position to Curtin and the ANGAU conference was taking place in Port Moresby, 
the Anglican missions prepared and sent a submission to External Affairs Minister 
Evatt. The submission explicitly tied the destruction and disruption of the military 
conflict, the effect upon the indigenous population and Australia’s strategic security 
together in moral terms as a debt owed which should be repaid at least in part by 
the abolition of the indentured labour system.95
92. The close ties between senior ANGAU personnel and key Directorate of Research officials go 
some way to explaining the coincidence of views. Gammage The Sky Travellers p.224 notes how in 
June 1943, while on leave in Australia, John Black, Jim Taylor’s friend, pre-war expedition partner 
and ANGAU colleague visited the Directorate of Research in Melbourne and expressed anti­
colonial and anti-imperial views favoured by the organisation’s head Alf Conlon. As Gammage 
concludes: ‘Conlon marked the young soldier’. Black attended the 1944 conference in Port 
Moresby, while Lt-Col Stanner, along with Majors J.D.Patience and J.R.Kerr, subsequently a 
controversial Governor-General of Australia, also attended the conference as Directorate of 
Research representatives. Stanner’s importance to the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian 
military forces is described in Horner Blarney p.466.
93. Taylor ‘Native Welfare’ [No pagination] NAA Series No. A9372, Item No.V.2, Item Title: ANGAU 
[Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit]. Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers 
of District Staff.
94. Wright ‘Contesting community’ p.82, citing A.P.Elkin Wanted - A  Charter for the Native Peoples 
of the South-west Pacific Sydney: Institute for International Affairs, 1943, p.10.
95 Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea pp. 102-112, Chapter 8 ‘Paying a Debt 1945-1949’ 
details the strength of this moral purpose, especially in the immediate post-war years.
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In December 1944, Minister Ward organised a Native Labour Conference in 
Sydney. To representatives of various interested parties, and in the absence of 
representation from either Papua New Guineans or the large plantation companies, 
Minister Ward’s purpose in calling the conference was made clear. In the absence 
of Ward, External Territories Department Secretary Halligan, the man regarded in 
official circles as most enthusiastic for a ‘return to the past’, was given the task of 
reading the Minister’s conference opening statement expressing the Government’s 
commitment to abolishing the indenture system. The indentured system under 
which indigenes were employed for up to three years was to be replaced by an as 
yet undefined arrangement. The revised terms of employment would be those 
‘"best suited to the people”, and would “cause the least upset to [the] village 
economy, [and] permit...native peasant production’” .96 Conference deliberations 
were to assist the Government and colonial administration in finding a new 
arrangement, not to debate whether indenture should be preserved.
In July 1945, a further clear and defining public expression of the shift in 
development thought and policy was given. Speaking to the Australian Parliament 
on the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Bill, Ward emphasised the 
principal connections between ‘positive Australianism’ and post-war rule. There 
would be a break with the past, when not enough had been done, and a future of 
‘better health, better education, more participation in the wealth of their country and 
eventually a say in its government’ for the indigenous population.97 Ward signalled 
a major overhaul of the Native Labour Ordinance with a substantial increase in 
legislated minimum pay rates, reduced working hours and indentures cut from 
three to one year, with indentures to be abolished altogether ‘as soon as 
practicable’.98
In late 1946, as expatriate planters anxious to re-establish holdings pressed the UK 
Government to intervene and overturn the newly introduced labour laws, Ward 
spelled out how ‘native development’ would affect largeholding and other similar
96. This and other quotations in the paragraph are from Wright ‘Contesting community’ p.94, citing 
NLA E.J.Ward Papers MS2396/12/260-346, Native Labour Conference December 1-2, 1944
97. Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea p.102
98. Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea p.102
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commercial interests. Without acknowledging the lineage of the idea ‘paramountcy
of native interests’, this most anti-British Australian Labor Party politician stressed
once more how development would change in PNG." Ward emphasised that:
Non-native expansion must...be governed by the well-being of the 
indigenous inhabitants of the Territory as a whole... [and while as in the 
past the basis for the economy will be native and non-native working 
side by side: [now] the limit of non-native expansion [would be] 
determined by the welfare of natives generally’ .100
Ward’s statement summarised just how far Australian official thinking about 
development had travelled since the start of the twentieth century, and 
particularly during World War II. Previously dominant expatriate settler 
interests now had every reason to be ‘unsettled’, in Ted Woifers’ phrase .101 
While the major commercial firms had less reason for concern, given their 
dominance and critical role in trade which would become central for post-war 
reconstruction and beyond, nevertheless they too were major employers of 
indigenes. As substantial plantation operators, these firms too had to adjust to 
the shift in thought and policy towards the primacy of smallholder agriculture. 
Clearly for both settlers and international firms, as well as for colonial officials, 
the immediate issue would be how an administration short of skilled 
personnel and essential equipment could transfer the shift into detailed policy 
that secured ‘the paramountcy of native interests’.
Conclusion
For decades colonial rulers in PNG paid only minor attention to the negative 
consequences of growth driven by plantation and mining operations. Colonial
99. On Ward’s anti-British views, see John Kerr Matters for Judgement: An Autobiography South 
Melbourne: Macmillan, 1978, p.122. Ward was not the first or last Australian to transpose a general 
anti-British disposition into his views on what development should mean in PNG. Lucy Mair 
Australia in New Guinea 1st ed. London: Christophers, 1948, pp.12-13 notes how pre-World War II, 
even as ‘standards of colonial rule advanced in other parts of the world till Papua was no longer in 
the vanguard’ Lieutenant-Governor Murray was determined to distance Australian practices in 
Papua from what he understood to be colonialism in general and the practices of other colonial 
powers. For Hasluck’s position regarding British and other European colonialism, see Chapter 
Three.
100. NLA E.J.Ward papers MS2396, Series 12, Folder 557-624 Statement by the Hon.E.J.Ward, 
MP, Minister for Territories December 6, 1946 ‘External Territories of the Commonwealth’, also 
cited in MacWilliam ‘Papua New Guinea in the 1940s’ p.37.
101. The unsettled settlers: New Guinea in Australia, 1942-1946’ Journal of the Papua and New 
Guinea Society v.1, no. 2, 1967, pp.7-15
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policy makers elsewhere, including Britain and France,102 had adopted the 
idea of intentional development but Australian thought about development for 
PNG lagged behind. Despite the pre-war awareness of some officials about 
changing international thinking and policy, it took war-time conditions to 
accelerate the process by which these changes were inserted into Australian 
thought about and policy for PNG.
By 1945 a major transformation had begun in thinking about the policies 
necessary to make post-war development happen. The priority of officials 
became trying to shape further commercialisation in a manner which satisfied 
defence needs and international demand for agricultural commodities while 
maintaining indigenous attachment to “village life’ at higher living standards. 
However initially little progress was made towards these objectives. The 
thesis now turns to the years immediately after the military conflict ended.
102. Monica M. van Beusekom Negotiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts at 
the Office du Niger, 1920-1960 Portsmouth, NH, Heinemann; Oxford, James Currey and Cape 





Once the war ended in 1945, and over the next two years as the administration of 
Papua and New Guinea passed from military to civilian hands, defining and 
applying ‘positive Australianism’ was especially difficult. As Cowen and Shenton 
emphasised:
Any doctrine of development faces the inherent difficulty of bringing an 
intention to develop to bear upon a process of development.1
It was one thing for colonial officials to ‘plead’ that the ‘paramountcy of native 
interests’ should occur on the basis of development policy aiming to bring about a 
major expansion of household production. It was quite another matter to work out 
what the policy meant and how it could be achieved.2 The over-arching theme of 
this chapter is that the difficulties faced during the late 1940s produced uncertainty, 
tensions and debates but also resulted in responses which subsequently would 
shape development policy.
One source of difficulty was the Australian government and the Department of 
External Territories. Previous accounts have stressed how the Minister for External 
Territories, Eddie Ward and the priorities of the Department Secretary Halligan did 
not assist officials in PNG to define what ‘positive Australianism’ might mean in 
practice. The first section below briefly considers this explanation.3 Section 2 
discusses how uncertainty also arose out of the distinct circumstances faced in 
PNG because of widespread and substantial destruction during the military conflict. 
The third section of the chapter outlines some of the post-war challenges faced by 
the administration, which heightened the uncertainty surrounding how to bring 
development. The final section shows how in the late 1940s, increases in
1. Doctrines of Development p.ix
2. The term ‘plead’ is taken from Doctrines of Development p.vii where: ‘An intention to develop 
becomes a doctrine of development when it is attached, or when it is pleaded that it be attached, to 
the agency of the state to become an expression of state policy.’
3 A more substantial consideration has been provided by Wright State Practice and Rural 
Smallholder Production pp. 126-163, Chapter 4
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indigenous production began even while colonial development policy remained 
vague.
Political and Administrative Uncertainty4
In 1949 the Ben Chifley-led Labor government lost the second post-war election to 
a Liberal-Country Party coalition headed by R.G. (Bob) Menzies. For the previous 
six years, Eddie Ward had been Minister for External Territories. Fie was also the 
Minister for Transport, and heavily involved in internal Labor Party and trade union 
politics. Apart from making general proclamations which emphasised the changed 
direction of development thought and policy, Ward provided little guidance for 
either the Department in Canberra or the Administration in PNG. Ward’s principal 
preoccupation was domestic Australian politics, which included tussles over his 
own political survival.
The External Territories Department did not offer clear guidelines either. Headed 
by a secretary J.R. (Reg) Halligan who favoured the re-establishment of the 
primacy of plantations and other large private enterprises, the department was 
small. Staff shortages meant it was unable to engage in detailed planning, even 
had the specifics of policy been settled. Consequently, when Colonel J. K. Murray 
assumed office in late 1945 as the first post-war Administrator at the head of the 
Provisional Administration, he did so with little more than general advice from 
Canberra and the lingering influence of the military administration which 
determined the availability of personnel and equipment.5
4. There is a substantial literature which deals with the extent to which internal tussles within the 
colonial administration were responsible for what occurred in the colony between 1945 and 1952 
when Murray ceased to be the Administrator. See in particular Murray The Provisional 
Administration of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea Brisbane: University of Queensland, 1949; 
Brian Jinks Policy, Planning and Administration in Papua New Guinea, 1942-1952, with Special 
Reference to the Role of J. K. Murray Unpublished Ph.D. Sydney: University of Sydney, 1975;
Jinks ‘Australia’s Post-War Policy for New Guinea and Papua’ The Journal of Pacific History V.17, 
No.2, 1982:86-100 ; Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production pp.126-203; Ian 
Campbell The ASOPA Controversy: A Pivot of Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea, 1945- 
49’ The Journal of Pacific History V.35, No.1, 2000, pp. 83-99.
5. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.19 notes that: ‘...the restoration of civil administration was 
almost entirely dependent on the manpower and material resources which the Army could release’. 
The latter were limited and under the control of the Commonwealth Disposals Commission, so that 
even though the Department was taking over authority from the Army, it had to deal with another 
organisation to obtain needed equipment and other supplies.
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Insufficient personnel and the different backgrounds and expectations of staff 
exacerbated continuing tussles about how to bring about development. To make 
matters worse, the personnel shortages continued into the 1950s and affected 
attempts to make planning more precise and detailed 6 To increase the size and 
range of activities undertaken, critical local departments, including Public Health, 
needed personnel who were flexible about the tasks they could and would 
undertake.7
The staff shortages were made even more serious when one of the central tasks 
taken on by the post-war administration was to extend colonial rule over areas and 
people not yet subject to the Administration’s authority. While military victory over 
Japan entitled Australia to international recognition as the governing power over 
both territories,8 this authority did not yet exist in an uncontested manner over the 
entire population or territory. External recognition was in advance of internal rule,
6. For the shortages, see Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional 
Administration pp.14, 16-21. Under Personnel, the Report commences with (p. 16): ‘Discussions 
with Departmental Heads have, without exception, disclosed that one of the major handicaps to 
post-war reconstruction and development is inadequate staffing. The Committee feels that it cannot 
stress too strongly this serious problem which is fundamental even to a return to the status quo 
without proceeding to any development [underlining in original: SM].’ The significance of the 
shortages of skilled personnel also was emphasized in communications between the Administration 
and the Australian government. See NAA A518, AQ800/1/1 Part 1 Administration. Territory of 
Papua-New Guinea Coordination of Plans for Development. Inter-departmental Committee 1947 
27/4/1947 J. K. Murray to Chairman, Inter-Departmental Committee on the Planning and 
Development of New Guinea p.3 ‘Already in New Guinea the fundamental problem is one of 
recruitment and supply including shipping and the dispatch of goods. Prior to any question of long 
term policy of (sic) plan, these problems must be solved.’ The shortages were world-wide, as the 
Administration soon realized when attempts were made to recruit in the UK. A518, AQ800/1/1, Part 
2, 1/10/1947 Minutes of Sixth Meeting of Inter-Departmental Committee, p.13 ‘The Colonial Office 
was in such a bad position regarding Agricultural Technicians that Junior Field Officers were being 
appointed to posts direct from approved Agricultural Colleges without any further training ...’
7. Donald Denoon et.al. Public Health in Papua New Guinea: Medical possibility and social 
constraint, 1884-1984 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp.72-73
8. The terms of, and expectations attached to this authority continue to be misrepresented. Hugh 
White and Elsina Wainwright Strengthening Our Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Papua New 
Guinea Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2004, p.22) suggest that ‘after World War II 
[Australia] settled into what was expected to be an indefinite period of colonial administration’. In 
contrast, Hank Nelson correctly points out that with the Territory of New Guinea under the 
International Trusteeship System, by Article 76, the Australian government was committed to 
‘"promote [the inhabitants’] progressive development towards self-government or independence’” in 
accord with “the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned’” . Although Papua was an 
Australian colony, ‘under the joint administration it was generally accepted that what applied to one 
Territory, applied to the other’. Over the entire late colonial period, from 1945 until 1975, what 
ambiguity existed in this commitment was mainly over the pace of advance towards and the timing 
of national independence. Nelson ‘A Comment On’ Unpublished Paper May 2005.
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particularly in parts of the most populous Highlands region of mainland Papua and 
New Guinea. In the immediate post-war years, warfare between indigenes and 
attacks against the officials trying to assert authority still marked the colonial 
frontiers, particularly in the Highlands. A limited number of officials had to be 
spread more thinly, including often over terrain that was difficult to traverse by 
frequent and sometimes lengthy foot patrols. Experienced as well as inexperienced 
officials, supported by indigenous carriers and police, had to move cautiously in 
case of attack.9
As Charles Hawksley notes, from 1945 the civilian administration supplanted 
military authority region by region. In 1947, the takeover extended to the Highlands 
which was gazetted as a separate area, the Central Highlands District, with its 
headquarters at Goroka where the Allies had built a substantial airstrip. While the 
district was divided into ten sub-districts, only five (Kainantu, Bena Bena-Goroka, 
Chimbu, Hagen and Wabag) were allocated assistant district officers.10
Securing colonial law and order requirements over a larger area and more people 
was an easily defined basis for administration efforts. It was more difficult to specify 
how smallholder production could be expanded. While some of the uncertainty 
arose from conditions within PNG, considered below, others involved relations 
between the colony and the metropolitan country. In particular, the general 
objective of increased agricultural production did not specify to what extent 
development in the colony should be subordinated to development in the 
metropolis, where post-war reconstruction was also a government priority. One 
early area of tension, which highlighted the more general difficulty, arose over 
which markets should be the focus for PNG agricultural exports.* 11
9 August Kituai My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea police, 1920-1960 
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998
10. ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM: District Administration and Colonial “Middle Management” 
in Kelantan 1909-1919 and the Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea 1947-1957 Ph.D. Thesis 
Wollongong: University of Wollongong, p.308: The other five CHD SDs were administered in a 
theoretical rather than real sense.’
11. Some sense of the uncertainty regarding the connection between the goal of expanding 
agricultural production and linking exports with overseas markets can be gauged from the following 
statement (pp.1-2) in the ‘Introduction: Scope of Enquiry’ for the 1948 Report of the Economic 
Development Committee of the Provisional Administration. ‘It was hoped at the outset to cover, in 
this report, a five year plan for the economic development of the Territory of Papua-New
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Global post-war reconstruction rapidly increased international and domestic 
demand for labour and materials. World-wide shortages of food and other 
agricultural produce resulted in considerable pressure for the rebuilding of 
plantations, especially coconut producing largeholdings where there were relatively 
easy output increases available from previously planted trees. Under trees, large 
piles of nuts lay awaiting collection and processing, providing cash-flows for further 
rehabilitation if sufficient unskilled labour was available.12 International shortages 
extended beyond copra to a wide range of crops which could be grown in PNG. 
However the shortages also affected Australian manufacturers and traders trying to 
rebuild production and meet the demand for agricultural goods in Australia.
While there was easy initial agreement that there should and could be substantial 
increases in agricultural production, particularly of crops in demand in Australia, 
there was uncertainty about the relationship between production in PNG and in 
Australia. The uncertainty arose especially clearly when an early premise of post­
war reconstruction was that production of crops in PNG could be ‘integrated’ with 
supply of and demand for agricultural produce in Australia. However it was more 
difficult to determine the appropriate policy response if there were barriers to 
‘integration’ of the two economies. 13
Guinea...and to support this with a program of building and with reasonable estimates of 
expenditure for the period. However...it quickly became obvious that such an aim, desirable though 
it undoubtedly was, was quite impossible at this stage. There is too little known of the Territory on 
the one hand and there are far too many intangibles on the supply side and in world markets to 
enable precise and long range planning to be attempted...The Committee feels that, for some time 
yet, this Administration must face its problems individually as they arise, and use the limited 
seasoned experience that is available to it to arrive at judgments which will not interfere greatly with 
the ideal when an integrated plan of development is capable of enunciation.’
12. Scott MacWilliam ‘Post-War Reconstruction in Bougainville: Plantations, Smallholders and 
Indigenous Capital’ in Anthony J Regan and Helga M Griffin eds. Bougainville before the conflict 
Pandanus: RSPAS, ANU, 2005 p.232 notes: The quickest way to recommence plantation 
operations was to collect and process the nuts that had already fallen. Burns Philp managers- 
reports speak of stacks of nuts 15 and 20 feet high under trees, accessible once elementary 
clearing up had been done.’
13. Initial post-war thinking was influenced by the idea that development in PNG could best occur 
by ‘integrating’ the two economies. As the minutes of the first meeting of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee for the Coordination of Plans for the Development of Papua-New Guinea held on April 
29, 1947 in the Office of the Secretary of the Department of External Territories, Canberra record: 
‘With regard to the economy generally of the Territories, Colonel Murray [JK Murray, Administrator] 
said he was quite in ignorance of what the Australian Government’s intentions were but the 
Territories could produce copra, rubber, tea, coffee, cocoa, spice crops and rug crops (all things
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In the late 1940s and early 1950s, one of these barriers was international, including 
US government objections to preferential trading agreements. Another difficulty for 
policy formulation arose when there was a greater advantage for colonial revenues 
and grower incomes in PNG by fitting production in the country to the wider 
international, rather than Australian demand. This possibility arose over cocoa 
production, which was solely an export crop. Soon after the war ended when 
decisions were being made about the type of cocoa trees to be planted on small 
and large holdings, there was an immediate tension over priorities (see below and 
Chapter Six for more detail). Subsequently in the 1950s and 1960s, colonial and 
metropolitan nationalism were regularly pitted against each other over increased 
production and marketing of several crops grown in the colony.14
Major shortages of food crops on international markets encouraged officials in 
PNG who were looking to expand agricultural production for export markets 
particularly but not solely by smallholders to look beyond the Australian market. In 
these circumstances, local officials could and did argue that their first priority was 
maximizing colonial income and revenues. Producing and selling crops that yielded
that Australia is dependent on somebody else’s dependent territories for), to balance out Australia’s 
economy as a whole and make Australia independent of foreign states, particularly in time of war. 
Unless something like that is envisaged, he could not see how the social and economic 
development of these people could be advanced. They would have to produce cash crops of some 
kind or the Australian Government would have to provide, more or less in perpetuity, the necessary 
money for the running of New Guinea.’ NAA A518, AQ800/1/1 Part 1, Administration-Territory of 
Papua-New Guinea, Coordination of Plans for Development. Inter-Departmental Committee. 1947. 
Part 1
14. The expression colonial nationalism needs clarification, in particular to separate it from 
indigenous anti-colonialism and indigenous nationalism. As indicated below, immediately after 
World War II anti-colonialism was expressed by some cargo cults. However beginning in the 1940s, 
the most important advocates of future national sovereignty and national self-sufficiency for the 
colony, against an unquestioning primacy of Australian concerns, were expatriate settlers and 
colonial officials. Among the latter were some who resided in Australia. The terms of the UN 
Trusteeship, noted above, were important for these colonial nationalists. That is, colonialism was 
not conceived as antithetical to nationalism, but as supportive of its development, even if the 
support was provided by people not indigenous to PNG. Subsequently, in the 1960s the most 
prominent espousers of anti-colonial nationalism were indigenes, expatriate academics and 
advisers (see Chapter 4). For a history of colonial nationalism from the perspective of Britain’s 
‘white colonies’, see Norman Etherington and Deryck Schreuder eds. The Rise of Colonial 
Nationalism: Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa first assert their nationalities, 1880- 
1914 Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988 esp Ch 2 Schreuder The making of the idea of colonial 
nationalism’. See also Luke Trainor British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: manipulation, 
conflict and compromise in the late nineteenth century Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
1994.
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the greatest return, wherever the markets could be found was their priority. 
Restricting exports from PNG to the small Australian market was not in the colony’s 
best interests, according to some senior officials.
The choice of priorities was made more difficult by the fact that as far as PNG 
agricultural exports were concerned, Australia and its colony also belonged to the 
sterling currency area: post-war reconstruction in both was fastened to British 
imperial needs for agricultural commodities and as a means of overcoming Britain’s 
indebtedness to the USA.15 Access to US dollars influenced official thinking on a 
wide range of matters, including how to obtain Caterpillar tractors for road 
construction and preparing flood-prone land for rice production in PNG.16 
Increasing copra exports could meet PNG and Australian requirements as well as 
the British requirement for sources of supply within the sterling area.17
Although the tension between colonial and metropolitan priorities came to the fore 
more and more in the 1950s and 1960s, it was nevertheless also present 
immediately after the war. While cocoa production and marketing provided a more 
substantial long-term test of administrative commitment to maximizing export 
income (see Chapter Six), the appropriate priorities regarding exports of timber 
needed to be settled almost immediately after military hostilities ended. In this 
initial instance, officials in Australia including Minister Ward were decisive in 
establishing policy.
Commercial timber harvesting, mainly carried out by international and expatriate 
firms in a small number of areas, required the local administration and colonial 
government to rank possible markets for PNG produce. The Inter-Departmental 
Committee of the Australian Government, formed in April 1947 to ‘report to 
[External Territories Minister Ward] on plans for the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of the territories to accelerate their development’ spent much of its
15. MacWilliam ‘Papua New Guinea in the 1940s’
16. See Chapter Five below, as well as MacWilliam ‘Fungibility in Fashion: Australia, the World 
Bank and Agricultural Development in Papua New Guinea’ forthcoming.
17. Harry Jackman Copra marketing and price stabilization in Papua New Guinea A history to 1975 
Pacific Research Monograph No. 17 Canberra, NCDS, ANU, 1988,Chapter 5
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time debating how to ‘exploit (the) softwood timber stand at Bulolo for plywood 
manufacture’. The controversial matter had been referred to the Inter-Departmental 
Committee by the Commonwealth Cabinet Sub-Committee on Secondary 
Industries. The reference was a response to ‘Australia's urgent need for plywood’. 
Queensland, as the principal source for plywood supplying seventy per cent of 
domestic requirements, was believed to have only enough timber for a further six 
to seven years.18
While there were international trade agreement barriers to giving PNG timber 
preference in the Australian market,19 the principle established in June 1946 for the 
forest policy approved by Minister Ward asserted an even more important limit 
upon giving the metropolitan market priority. While holders of pre-war harvesting 
permits were to be encouraged to re-establish their operations, they were required 
to first meet ‘immediate Territory requirements’, then meet Australian ‘shortages of 
sawn timber and logs’ and finally supply the larger ‘export market as shipping 
becomes available’.20 In short, not only was there no automatic subordination to 
Australian requirements, there was a deliberate strand of development thought 
about and in the colony which gave primacy to PNG’s immediate post-war 
rebuilding needs.
Because the war had been especially destructive for many Papua New Guineans 
and for the colonial economy, in one direction meeting these needs was especially
18. All quotes in this paragraph are from NAA A518, AQ800/1/1 Part 1, Administration-Territory of 
Papua-New Guinea, Coordination of Plans for Development. Inter-Departmental Committee. 1947. 
Part 1 25/6/1947 Minutes of Fourth Meeting
19. NAA A518, AQ800/1/1 Part 1, Administration-Territory of Papua-New Guinea, Coordination of 
Plans for Development. Inter-Departmental Committee. 1947. Part 1 2/6/1947 Minutes of Second 
Meeting. Opposition from the United States of America to ‘discrimination’ was specifically cited by 
the representative of the Commonwealth Department of Trade and Customs as a reason why 
preference could not be given to PNG timber veneers imported into Australia.
20. NAA A518, AU800/1/1, Administration general. Subjects to be dealt with by Inter-Departmental 
Committee on co-ordination of plans for development of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea.
22/5/47 Exports of timber in the log from Papua and New Guinea. A note dated 21/5/1947, added to 
the bottom of the document which laid out the policy priorities specified above, indicated that 
between 15,000 and 20,000 feet of walnut logs was being shipped via Sydney to the USA and 
asked if this was acceptable. The note continues: ‘It would appear from this inquiry that the timber is 
not required in Australia and in such circumstances there would be no objection from a Territory 
point of view to its (sic) re-export to (the) United States of America. This would result in assisting 
Australia’s dollar exchange position.’
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clear-cut. The destructiveness shaped the administration’s first phase of giving 
priority to ‘native interests’ and also affected future development policy.
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Prolonged modern warfare had disrupted indigenous existence in PNG on a scale 
far beyond that wrought pre-war by plantations and mines.21 The military conflict 
had wrought havoc in some areas but done little damage in others. As Worsley 
indicates, where the war ‘did touch it destroyed utterly’.22 At least fifteen thousand 
indigenes and an estimated 100,000 pigs had been killed.23 In rural areas, houses, 
food gardens, roads and bridges suffered extensive damage. Bombing and other 
forms of fighting had been severe and especially destructive in their effects in the 
areas of the country where plantation agriculture had been substantial, including 
the Gazelle Peninsula, Bougainville, New Ireland and Madang.24 At the end of the 
war, there were very few undamaged buildings in the main towns of north coastal 
and island New Guinea. Rebuilding ‘village life’ absorbed scarce resources, even 
as the Australian government lifted the revenues provided for colonial 
administration.
21. Territory of Papua and New Guinea Report of the Economic Development Committee of the 
Provisional Administration, 7th September 1948 Port Moresby: TPNG, 1948, pp.13-14 makes the 
explicit comparison with two British colonies, stating: ‘In the hopes of finding a model for long term 
planning, the Committee studied the Ten Year Development plans for Nigeria and Fiji. From the 
point of view of development planning, this Territory is badly handicapped in comparison with the 
two Territories for which the development plans were available. In both the cases, the 
Administrations had not been disrupted by war and development planning had not meant much 
more than telescoping the long range plans of the Heads of Departments into the ten year period.’
22. Peter Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of “Cargo” Cults in Melanesia New York: 
Schocken Books, 1968, p.195. See also Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea, especially 
pp.91-99, including for the assessment (p.91) that: The burden of war fell unevenly on Papua New 
Guinean communities. Some groups suffered while others were untouched...The war had almost 
no effect on about one-third of the people of Papua and New Guinea.’
23. Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound p.195. Again, the unevenness is striking. As Worsley notes: 
‘Over a quarter of the population were killed or died of sickness during the war in the Kokopo area 
[near Rabaul in East New Britain where the Japanese army established a large military base: SM] 
alone. Health and social services were non-existent under the Japanese, but the invaders, on the 
other hand, did not place such heavy demands upon the local population for labour as did the Allied 
Forces.’
24. Jackman Copra marketing and price stabilization in Papua New Guinea p. 96, notes: ‘Before 
the war, about 370 plantations had been worked in (New Guinea) and 130 in Papua. By April 1944 
[after the 1943 formation of the Australian New Guinea Production Control Board which took over 
the operation of all plantations from ANGAU and the return of some plantation owners and 
managers in areas not under Japanese control: SM] there were 121 producing estates, 67 under 
owners and 54 managed by the Board’.
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In addition, thousands of people had left rural holdings to perform various war- 
related tasks, most prominently as soldiers and carriers. At the peak, the Allied 
forces probably employed about 55,000 indigenes, and many more worked without 
signing-on.25 Griffin, Nelson and Firth also note indigenous employment by the 
Japanese military, concluding: The total number of Papua New Guineans 
employed by the Japanese is unknown.’26 Initially, the health of many workers 
suffered.27 However, in the last years of the war, as rations increased conditions of 
service improved for those employed by the Allies.28
The recruitment of males for military service and associated work reduced the 
labour available for cultivating household gardens, increasing the burden on 
women and children of maintaining food and other supplies. Forced removal of 
many villagers from their existing homes and gardens for safety as well as military 
purposes made the task of maintaining subsistence even harder.29 Adding to the 
effect of war damage, immediately after the fighting ended thousands of indigenes, 
mainly males, employed as carriers and other military assistants were demobilised. 
The numbers of indigenes employed on wages plummeted dramatically. 
Responsibility for feeding and providing other requirements of iarge numbers of 
people returning to rural villages was transferred on to households, resulting in at 
least short-term deficiencies in many items of necessary consumption.
25. Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea p.96. Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound p.124 
also emphasises the effect of war-time employment on the indigenous population, noting: ‘After the 
physical devastation of people and livestock, huts and gardens, the large-scale dragooning of 
native labour was the most shattering effect of the War upon the lives of the native people.’
26. Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea p.97.
27. Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound p. 125, notes: ‘Sick wastage among native carriers on the 
famous Kokoda Trail was 30% at its worst, and malaria and dysentery were introduced into the 
Highlands, previously free from these diseases.’
28. Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea p.96 state: Towards the end of the war most army 
employees were better fed and provided with better health services than pre-war labourers, but 
men working on plantations for the Production Control Board [that during the war operated 
plantations in areas under Allied control: SM] were still supplied according to the old inadequate 
scales’. However as Geoff Gray has recently re-emphasised, there was criticism, most notably by 
anthropologist Herbert Ian Hogbin ‘of practices he saw as endemic, particularly the systematic 
brutality of ANGAU overseers [toward plantation workers: SM]’. See his ‘Stanner’s War: 
W.E.H.Stanner, the Pacific War, and its Aftermath’ The Journal of Pacific History v..41, no.2, 
September, 2006, pp. 145-163, esp. p. 155, citing Hogbin ‘Report of an Investigation of Native 
Labour in New Guinea’ (Unpublished document).
29. Major L. Austen ‘A Paper on Native Welfare’ [No pagination] NAA Series No. A9372, Item 
No.:V,2, Item Title: ANGAU [Australian New Guinea Administration Unit]. Conference of Officers of 
Headquarters and Officers of District Staff.
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One of the first priorities of the post-war colonial administration, and especially the 
Department of Public Health under its newly appointed Director John Gunther,30 
was to deal with the health concerns of the indigenous population. The welfare 
consequences of the military conflict and the withdrawal of the civilian 
administration from important if limited pre-war activities dealing with indigenous 
health and welfare, posed urgent problems. The concerns of public officials about 
the state of indigenous health, and their efforts to assess conditions, neatly 
illustrate not only how the post-war welfare of the native people was evaluated, but 
also how the assessment reinforced the importance of planning to make 
development happen.
The medical, non-nutritional characteristics of health attracted immediate attention. 
Malaria, hookworm, tuberculosis and leprosy as well as other primarily tropical 
illnesses seriously affected many Papua New Guineans. They also undercut long­
term welfare, including the physical characteristics of stature and strength, key 
ingredients of the capacity to labour.31 Reducing the prevalence of these illnesses, 
either not found in or previously substantially reduced in their effects upon 
populations in industrial countries, had priority.
In 1946, Gunther decided that:
...his first task was to provide basic health care as quickly and as widely 
as possible. Needs were greatest among those communities that had
30. Hasluck A Time for Building p.103 praised the work of Gunther in the five years before Hasluck 
became minister, stating that: ‘Handicapped by lack of staff and an incomplete departmental 
structure, he had achieved much. He was easily the strongest single driving force in the 
Administration as well as being one of the very few senior men with a trained intelligence and a 
practical political sense’. For more on Gunther’s appointment and personal qualities, as well as the 
operations of the Department of Public Health in the immediate post-war years, see also Downs 
The Australian Trusteeship pp.43-49; James Griffin ‘"Someone Who Needed No Pushing”: The 
Making of Sir John Gunther’ in Sione Latukefu ed. Papua New Guinea: A Century of Colonial 
Impact 1884-1984 Port Moresby: National Research Institute and the University of Papua New 
Guinea, 1989, pp.223-246; Denoon et.al. Public Health in Papua New Guinea pp.67-84, Part II, 
Chapters 8-9: Sir John Gunther ‘Post-war medical services in Papua New Guinea: a personal view’ 
in Sir Burton G Burton-Bradley ed. A History of Medicine in Papua New Guinea: Vignettes of an 
Earlier Period Kingsgrove, NSW.: Australasian Medical Publishing, 1990,pp.47-76.
31. As previously emphasized: ‘Welfare of the people... is always particular welfare of specific 
people. Where the people comprise the class of labour, welfare is gauged by the capacity to 
labour’. See Scott MacWilliam ‘Smallholdings, Land Law and the Politics of Land Tenure in Papua 
New Guinea’ The Journal of Peasant Studies v. 16, no. 1, October,p.92.
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become dependent [pre-war] upon government or mission health 
services and then been cut off from all aid during the war. [The 
apparent] signs of ill-health were the numbers of people suffering from 
skin diseases, yaws, enlarged spleens resulting from malaria, and 
respiratory diseases.32
However ill-health soon acquired a more comprehensive conception than particular 
infections and diseases, being extended to Include nutrition and other medical 
characteristics of the indigenous population. Systematic data collection began on 
these dimensions, initially through fact-finding visits by individual officials, including 
by Gunther to war-torn Bougainville.33
In 1947, the Department of External Territories and the Provisional Administration 
responsible for the Territories of Papua and New Guinea commissioned a nutrition 
survey.34 This Survey, conducted with thirteen field staff and seven staff of the 
Institute of Anatomy in Canberra, operated under the direction of a Planning 
Committee. The Committee included the Directors of the three Departments which 
were at the centre of post-war reconstruction for the colony, Health, Education and 
Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries.35 The Survey was part of a continuing drive to 
reduce or eliminate the most debilitating conditions faced by the indigenous 
population, envisaged as protein shortages and a range of diseases. The low level 
of protein consumption became an immediate target for colonial officials, who were 
aware of the war’s effects on indigenous herds and flocks.
For pigs in particular, the military conflict had been especially destructive.
Pig populations in many parts of the country were almost entirely 
annihilated during the Japanese occupation. As the pig is one of the
32. Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea p.106
33. Murray ‘In Retrospect 1945-1952’ p.198
34. Published as Commonwealth of Australia Report of the New Guinea Nutrition Survey Expedition 
1947 Sydney: Government Printer, 1950
35. Wright ‘Contesting community’ p.87 notes that the previous year the Director of Agriculture, W 
Cottrell-Dormer had ‘outlined to the [Territory of Papua and New Guinea Missions Conference] a 
“Proposed Policy and Working Plan" for indigenous agriculture’ which linked ‘the Administration’s 
goal of a “stable social structure based on a family unit’” with the improvement of ‘the nutrition and 
the standard of living of the native peoples of the Territory’. Cottrell Dormer advocated an ‘ideal 
form of production’ of mixed farming on individual smallholdings which combined production for 
immediate consumption with cash cropping (see below).
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chief sources of meat to most natives, a serious unbalancing of the 
native diet has been brought about in such areas. 36
Consequently colonial officials paid particular attention to increasing meat 
production by importing and distributing chicken and pigs. Small studs of pure 
breed imported pigs were established at Lae, Aitape, Rabaul and Sohano, to make 
possible the distribution of better quality animals to indigenes.37 Similarly day old 
chicks and quality cockerels were flown into the colony for distribution.
Previously the Institute of Anatomy in Australia had been advising the
Administration, through the Department of External Territories, regarding the
appropriate ration scales for labourers employed on plantations, mines and other
occupations. Preparing this advice had not required data about consumption
patterns of villagers and particularly not of locally produced and immediately
consumed produce. The first objective of the post-war Survey explained that:
As the Administration was anxious to use as much native grown 
food as possible it was considered desirable to collect information 
relative to the food patterns of native groups living exclusively on 
indigenous foods, and at the same time ascertain the nutritional 
status and health of these same groups.38
The second objective involved locating areas where ‘conditions were known to be 
normal’, so that ‘abnormal conditions [that is, the localised areas where food 
shortages did occur: SM] would not give a distorted picture’. By collecting 
‘quantitative data on food production and food consumption’ where conditions were 
normal, a base set of data could be established as a yardstick for future 
‘investigation of food shortages’.
36. Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration of the Territory of 
New Guinea-From 1st July, 1947 to 30th June, 1948 Canberra: Commonwealth Government 
Printer, 1949, p.23
37. Robin Hide Pig Husbandry in New Guinea: A Literature Review and Bibliography Monograph 
No. 108 Canberra: Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, 2003, pp. 8-9. Cattle 
numbers too, which had been reduced from around 30,000 head pre-war to almost nil during the 
war, were slowly increased, by a similar process of importation and distribution. PNGNA AN12, Box 
3893, F/N 1-1-84 Planning and Development 1949-1952 Part 1 5/11/52 R.E.P. Dwyer, Director, 
DASF to Government Secretary, Port Moresby ‘Recommendations made by Senator A.M.Benn 
after a visit to the Territory of Papua and New Guinea’ p.3
38. Report of the New Guinea Nutrition Survey Expedition 1947 p.13
61
So far, the Survey’s terms might seem to suggest only the aim to maintain the
status quo in household production. However the third objective pointed to a
potential for change being considered, which was in line with Director of Agriculture
Cottrell-Dormer’s ‘ideal form of production’ noted above. For the Survey had:
A third purpose, of perhaps lesser importance, [which] was to 
ascertain whether it would be possible and desirable to 
recommend a policy of native agriculture which could combine the 
production of “cash” and native food crops without detriment to the 
latter.40
The phrase ‘without detriment to the latter’ is especially important. It stresses the 
primacy of ‘native food crops’ over household production of cash, mainly export 
crops, in the initial post-war phase of fleshing out the details of thinking about 
development for PNG. That is, while faced with the immediate problem of how to 
remedy the war affected state of indigenous existence and to overcome immediate 
welfare deficiencies, by 1947 the colonial administrative priority of information 
collection as a guide for health policy was also suggesting a direction which an 
expanded post-war scheme of smallholder agriculture could take.
The terms of the Survey implied a specific developmental objective for indigenous 
health. To understand why, it is important to recognise the Survey proposed that 
household living standards needed to be raised to match those prevailing in 
industrial countries, especially Australia. As a 1947 Report of the Provisional 
Administration emphasised:
Australia offers a rich prize to the teeming Asiatic millions. Australia’s 
nearest friends are at a considerable distance in America and South 
Africa. Apart, then from the ethical obligations to develop her dependant 
peoples which Australia accepted when she accepted the trusteeship of 
the Territory of New Guinea, it is of extreme strategic importance to her 
that she has control of this buffer area. But, to ensure that this area does 
function as buffer state and not a festering wound in the Australian way 
of life, it is essential to extend that way of life to the peoples of this 
Territory as rapidly as they can absorb the changes.41
40. Report of the New Guinea Nutrition Survey Expedition 1947 p.13; see also W.R. Conroy and 
L.A. Bridgland. ‘Native Agriculture in Papua-New Guinea’ Part 3, pp.72-91 in Report of the New 
Guinea Nutrition Survey Expedition 1947.
41. Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional Administration Port 
Moresby: September 7, 1948, p.10
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‘(N)ormal areas’ within PNG provided the base for domestic comparisons. But in 
order to define these areas, the Survey constructed the appropriate yardstick of 
adequacy, in nutritional and other terms, by reference to standards found outside 
the colony. The idea of welfare took on a precise nutritional basis, and one which 
permitted easy international comparisons. Summarizing the Survey findings, the 
Report stated:
When the intake of foods is expressed as nutrients it is seen that 
the calorie intake is slightly lower, and the protein intake much 
lower than amounts recommended as desirable to ensure 
adequate nutrition amongst people of Caucasian origin.42
In this instance, the specific Caucasians were from Sydney, while other 
comparisons were made using (p.107) ‘National Research Council Recommended 
Dietary Allowances... based solely on North American data’.43 Data derived from 
mainly urban populations in leading industrial countries, formed the basis of major 
comparisons for the Survey. Most importantly, the comparisons made it possible to 
re-emphasise what was deemed necessary if development was to occur and 
indigenous living standards lifted. ‘(A)dequate nutrition’ at Australian and US levels 
was the necessary basis for raising the indigenous capacity to labour.
The Survey thus reinforced, through specific dietary and other health conditions, 
the demarcation between undeveloped, or underdeveloped in US President Harry 
Truman’s sense of the term (see Introduction), and developed peoples and 
territories which was so important for colonial development planning. In so doing, it 
also set terms for the subsequent emphasis upon improving welfare by increasing 
production and raising productivity through reformed agricultural practices.
42. Report of the New Guinea Nutrition Survey Expedition 1947 p.23. The indigenous population 
were not always judged ‘worse off, less developed, than the overseas comparators: the availability 
of regular sunshine and less clothing among babies made possible higher Vitamin D scores and 
thus greater calcium absorption, leading to lower rickets frequencies than children attending Sydney 
hospitals in the 1930s (pp. 154-155). Similarly the incidence of dental caries was (p.248) ‘much 
lower than that usually observed among most “civilized” peoples’.
43. Report of the New Guinea Nutrition Survey Expedition 1947. In the case of calcium, the use of 
the North American data was accepted only as a temporary measure (p. 107) ‘realizing that these 
figures are probably well in advance of the actual calcium requirements of the natives’.
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diseases and malnutrition, which continued to exist into the 1950s at least. In
1958, Gunther, who had become Assistant Administrator, could still state:
(t)he population is not healthy: the expectation of life is half of what it 
should be; the infant mortality rate twice to ten times what it should 
be...These indigenous people of the Territory are only 80 per cent 
well...This (is) the physical condition of the people which has to be 
improved so that their country may progress, for they are the only labour 
force available to achieve development.43
Hasluck subsequently made much of his continuing preoccupation, when 
Territories Minister, with ‘the physical welfare and the physical needs of the 
people’, as well as expressing his contempt for ‘parliamentary buffoons’ in Australia 
who mocked when told of medical campaigns, including to overcome yaws.44
However, by 1948 some reconstruction and rehabilitation had been completed. 
The official assessment was that:
Despite the shortages in material and personnel, much has been 
achieved in the two and a half years since the return of the Civil 
Administration [in 1945]. Most of the villages disturbed by war have 
been rebuilt, the natives settled and the gardens re-established on pre­
war levels....It is only the European establishments and that part of the 
native economy which is dependent on imports that has not reached 
prewar levels.4
This ordering of restoration priorities, indigenes in occupation of smallholdings over 
plantations and other expatriate-owned enterprises was in accord with official 
objectives. Further, in their initial attention to reconstruction and rehabilitation, 
officials understood that the process of rebuilding was not simply a technical 
matter, fixing bridges and roads, eliminating diseases by the application of 
medicines. They recognised that dealing with the damaging and deleterious effects 
of warfare upon the indigenous population also had consequences for the future 
social relations of production. As much as the first response of officials seemed to 
be determining and meeting the welfare needs of Papua New Guineans, this
43. See The People’ in J. Wilkes ed. New Guinea and Australia Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1958, p. 49
44. Hasluck A Time for Building , pp. 101-102. Chapter 11 on health services includes some of the 
most intensely emotional as well as revealing passages in anything Hasluck wrote or spoke about 
while Minister for Territories. See, on the same point, Robert Porter Paul Hasluck: A Political 
Biography Ned lands: University of Western Australia Press, 1993, pp.112-113
45. Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional Administration pp. 11-12
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social relations of production. As much as the first response of officials seemed to
be determining and meeting the welfare needs of Papua New Guineans, this
occurred with an awareness of the future implications for ‘the paramountcy of
native interests’. As Administrator J. K. Murray explained in 1947:
In the carrying out of its policy, the Administration has so far been 
hampered by the requirements of rehabilitation in this country - the 
major victim in the Australian theatre during the recent war. It has been 
suggested that this task could be more readily accomplished if all new 
features of policy were postponed until it was completed. The 
Administration has not accepted this view. It does not believe it either 
possible or desirable to make such a separation between rehabilitation 
and future development; the Territory must be reconstructed and 
developed now on lines in keeping with our intentions for the future.
What is done now determines in a large measure the future pattern.47
However beyond improving indigenous health, rebuilding roads and bridges, and 
re-establishing household gardens growing food crops for immediate consumption 
and local markets, little was settled on what development policy was to be and how 
policy could be implemented. As shown in section one of this chapter, the lack of 
detailed direction provided from the minister and department in Australia was one 
impediment to determining what development policy and practice might be. There 
was also a particular conjunction of international conditions and circumstances in 
the colony which affected the administration’s capacity to bring development.
Post-War Challenges Affecting Development Policy
Despite the limitations of staff shortages and the difficulties of post-war conditions, 
Administrator Murray was certain about some aspects of the direction the 
Administration should take. He and other officials continually stressed the 
importance of their trusteeship role for securing ‘native interests’ against the 
potential for harm, including the breakdown of community. In late 1947, the 
Administrator argued that economic growth would inevitably mean the 
transformation of ‘the way of life of native people’, but ‘native tradition’ could be
47. ‘Memorandum on the Policy of the Administration’ September 8, 1947 sent to the Chairman of 
the local Administration’s Economic and Development Committee on Planning and Development of 
Papua and New Guinea, subsequently forwarded to the Commonwealth Inter-Departmental 
Committee for the Coordination of Plans for the Development of Papua-New Guinea. NAA A518. 
AQ800/1/1 Part 2, Administration-Territory of Papua-New Guinea, Coordination of Plans for 
Development. Inter-Departmental Committee. 1947
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preserved as long as the attachment to land was maintained. The Administration 
acting as trustee could adjudicate on what was ‘still vital in native tradition and 
what [would] become obsolete’ 48
What was obsolete? Determining vitality, what should be preserved and extended 
in ‘native tradition’ was difficult for colonial officials,49 even if stopping local fighting 
and attacks against administration patrols were obvious ‘traditions’ which had to be 
made obsolete. Several post-war conditions threatened the Australian 
government’s major policy guideline, that the pre-war dominance of plantations and 
mines would be supplanted by a concentration on raising smallholder output to 
improve ‘native welfare’, and secure the ‘paramountcy of native interests’. The 
responses of the colonial administration to each threat further defined what was to 
occur under this guideline, while also creating space for other obstacles to arise. 
Officials established key policy parameters, including for labour and land, which 
were to become central to ‘even’ development in the 1950s. The present section 
details the most substantial challenges which were faced and how officials 
responded.
Some difficulties arose from the consequences of the war itself, including the 
world-wide food and other material shortages which encouraged immediate 
restoration and expansion of plantations. Other challenges resulted from the efforts 
of colonial officials to overcome the worst effects of the conflict on the indigenous 
population. With improved health and better food supplies, many indigenes -
48. Wright ‘Contesting community’ p.80, citing from NAA A1838/283, F/N 301/1, 8/9/1947
J.K.Murray Memorandum on the Policy of the Administration. There are few clearer statements of 
the Administration’s development intent than this document, including the following passage 
(p.2):’The challenge and problem facing the Administration is, in its essence, the widening and 
advancing of the economic productivity of the country as a whole, but with activities qualified and 
circumscribed in strict accordance with the other territorial obligations of the Commonwealth in 
respect of native welfare, the social and political development of the native peoples, and 
conditioned by a policy of conservation of the natural resources of the Territory. Continued progress 
will, in the last analysis, be dependent on a simultaneous development and conservation of 
economic resources.’
49. To cite Murray again from the same document Memorandum on the Policy of the Administration 
on the ‘problem’ (p.3): ‘In this economic advance, the way of life of the native people will inevitably 
be transformed. Regret will be felt for the passing of much that is admirable and gracious in the 
traditional life of the people. But the very presence of existing institutions in the country has doomed 
much of the old order to attenuation and extinction; the choice now lies, in great part, between 
inaction or development-that development must be directed upon lines calculated to produce the 
greatest human happiness.’
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especially males -  could leave smallholdings in home areas to work for commercial 
enterprises and the administration. In the immediate post-war years, the out­
migration of potential labour threatened the colonial objective of expanding 
household production. Extending colonial authority to new areas, particularly of the 
central Highlands, and reducing the importance of warfare could also either make 
possible the recruitment of increased numbers of labourers or provide the 
opportunity for more leisure activities. Neither possible outcome satisfied the 
principal objective of colonial policy and so had to be prevented or at least limited 
where possible.
Even with a drive to increase production and marketing of copra in the last years of 
the war, by 1946 only thirteen per cent of all plantations had returned to production. 
High prices and a nine year purchasing contract for copra with the British Ministry 
of Food,50 led to the rapid resuscitation of many largeholdings. By 1949, 380 of the 
pre-war total of 636 coconut plantations had restarted operations. Between 1945- 
46 and 1948-49 production of copra increased from 11,000 to 46,000 tons.51
After 1945, the war-time turn in government policy against the iarge firms and 
owner-occupiers who had operated plantations pre-war was also extended to 
international companies looking to set up similar operations in PNG. While the 
principal barrier was the refusal to allow the expropriation and consolidation of land 
for an expansion of largeholdings, the focus upon the rehabilitation of household 
agriculture also limited the supply of labour for plantation agriculture. Australian 
government policy was supported by important officials in the colony.52
When political and commercial connections between Australia and Britain were 
being refashioned, the British government and major UK firms were searching for 
areas within the sterling bloc to expand agricultural production under their direct
50. Jackman Copra marketing and price stabilization p.107
51. A large number of the plantations, 160 of which were in the Territory of New Guinea, had been 
so badly damaged during the war that it was uneconomic to re-open them. NAA A518 H927/1 
Development of the Territories. Organisational. Report on Present Conditions in Papua & New 
Guinea. (February 1950), p. 11.
52. See the mid-1946 exchange of correspondence between the Director of DASF, W.Cottrell- 
Dormer and Minister Ward. NAA A518/1, A58/3/3 Commodities-Cocoa Papua and New Guinea 
Proposals for Development.
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control. The failed Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme remains probably the best 
known instance of this search. Conceived in 1946 by an official of the United Africa 
Company, subsidiary of Unilever, the project was taken over by the British 
government-owned Overseas Food Corporation until closed in 1951.53 PNG was a 
focus of attention too, with some colonial officials holding out limited hopes that 
either the Overseas Food Corporation, or a major international food company, 
would be able to successfully expand production. The hopes were never realised.
Even before the war, international supplies of cocoa had been threatened by a 
major outbreak of the swollen shoot virus in West Africa. The virus was especially 
widespread among the extensive plantings in the British colony of the Gold Coast, 
later Ghana, the largest exporter in the world. Soon after the war, representatives 
of cocoa and chocolate manufacturing firms in the UK and Australia began to press 
their governments for assistance in establishing new areas of supply. PNG’s 
production had been decimated by the war, with an estimated 80-90% of sole 
planted bushes and approximately 60% of bushes interplanted with coconuts 
destroyed.54 However with climatic and soil conditions in many parts of PNG 
regarded as extremely favourable for growing cocoa, the colony was considered a 
potential major source to fill a substantial portion of international demand at a time 
of serious post-war shortages.
Private firms in Australia and the UK, as well as representative organisations of 
merchants and manufacturers exerted pressure on the colonial administration and 
Labor government for rapid action to support expanded production.55 The
53. See also Michael Cowen The Early Years of the Colonial Development Corporation: British 
State Enterprise Overseas during Late Colonialism’ African Affairs v.83, no.330, January 1984, 
pp.63-75
54. NAA A518, A58/3/3, Commodities-Cocoa Papua and New Guinea, Proposals for Development 
8/1/48 R.E.P. Dwyer Acting Director DASF to Government Secretary ‘New Guinea Cocoa Industry’. 
In the inter-war period PNG was distinct as one of the few places in the world where cocoa was 
inter-planted with another tree crop, in this case coconuts.
55. NAA A518, B58/3/3 Commodities-Cocoa. Papua and New Guinea. Proposals for Development, 
Commonwealth Chocolate and Confectionery Manufacturers Association. The pressure was 
exerted at a time when world demand exceeded supply and quotas limited the availability of cocoa 
for Australian manufacturers. Over 80% of cocoa imports into Australia came from West Africa, 
where a combination of disease and political turmoil was making supply even more uncertain. One 
proposal, outlined when production in PNG was negligible, envisaged the planting of 175,000 to 
200,000 acres, yielding around 25,000 tons to ‘produce, close at hand, sufficient Cocoa Beans for
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Australian government and the British Overseas Food Corporation briefly flirted 
with a project to assess how increases in major agricultural crops, particularly 
cocoa, might be achieved.55 More seriously, Cadbury Brothers, the UK parent 
company of Cadbury-Fry-Pascall Ltd, based in Claremont Tasmania, sought a 
large land grant to develop a cocoa plantation on a scale which would dwarf all the 
existing largeholdlngs In the colony. Consideration of this venture was only finally 
terminated in 1956, when Cadbury gave up on establishing a plantation, settling 
instead for a role as major purchaser and exporter of PNG cocoa.56 In addition to 
the Administration’s opposition to substantial increases in the land occupied and 
operated by plantation firms, there were also fears that more largeholdings would 
further increase the demand for labour.
These fears were grounded in post-war changes. While an initial substantial 
reduction occurred in the numbers of Papua New Guineans in wage employment, 
within five years of the war ending the flow of labour away from smallholdings had
Guinea, Proposals for Development. 21/11/47 Gordon L. McLure to E.J. Ward, Minister for External 
Territories.
55. NAA A518, C58/3/3, Commodities-Cocoa. Papua and New Guinea. Proposals for Development. 
British Overseas Food Corporation. The file includes a lengthy document prepared in response to a 
questionnaire sent by the BOFC. The BOFC was already involved in Queensland, in association 
with the State Government, and was ‘interested in the possible large scale production of Cocoa in 
the Territories’. Department of External Territories File memo 17/8/1949. At various stages, the 
BOFC enquiries and related meetings involved Australian High Commission officials in London, 
Australian Prime Minister and Treasurer J.B. Chifley , the Director of the Commonwealth 
Department of Post-war Reconstruction, and Dr. H.C. Coombs, the Governor of the Commonwealth 
Bank, as well as the Minister for External Territories and Department officers. The British 
Government and the BOFC were being pushed by chocolate manufacturers in the UK ‘anxious to 
improve supplies of cocoa’. 11/10/1948 DET File ‘Notes of a Discussion with the Overseas Food 
Corporation held on 7th October’ p.1. However the expressed interest went nowhere, but not before 
Coombs had advised PM Chifley: ‘My reaction to their [the BOFC: SM] proposition was that it was 
somewhat unrealistic in the form submitted [ie. ‘for a three-party corporation producing cocoa by 
mass production methods in Papua and New Guinea’: SM]. Large-scale production of any 
commodity in (P-NG) presents...very real difficulties. If a labour force of any magnitude were 
required, it could be obtained only by mass movement of natives with attendant difficulties of a 
health, social and economic character.’ Coombs recommended an investigation into the proposal 
and the BOFC lost interest when asked to share the costs of the investigation.
56. NAA A518, A58/3/1 Cocoa-Papua and New Guinea, Research General documents the 
continuing close relationship between officials of the Department of External Territories and 
Cadbury-Fry-Pascall Ltd head office in Claremont, Tasmania. There was a regular flow of 
correspondence and papers, including reports about the world cocoa situation, between Claremont 
and Canberra. On December 20, 1956, Cadbury advised Territories Minister Hasluck that while it 
continued to support cocoa research being undertaken at Keravat, near Rabaul on the Gazelle 
Peninsula, the firm had ‘come to the conclusion that both our interests and those of people 
connected with the growing of cocoa will be best served by the establishment of [Mr Wilfred Smith, 
formerly of the Department of Agriculture, Gold Coast, now working in PNG as an adviser to 
plantations] ...rather than by an attempt on our part to establish a plantation.’
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within five years of the war ending the flow of labour away from smallholdings had 
been reversed. Between August 1945 and February 1946 the number of employed 
indigenous labourers fell from 34,000 to 4,100, as many Papua New Guineans 
previously in wage employment took the opportunity to return to their villages. 
Subsequently, post-war reconstruction demands resulted in increases of around 
10,000 workers per year. By mid-1950, the number of indigenes in wage 
employment had become over 48,000.58 There was also an increase in labour 
militancy.59
One immediate effect of the increase in commercial and government activities was 
raised concerns about the consequences for village life. These concerns were 
heightened by other indigenous responses to the war and the post-war re­
establishment of civilian colonial authority.
‘Cargo cults’, political stability and development thought60
Cults had flourished in some areas prior to World War II. In other areas, including 
the Highlands, there were cargo - inspired movements during the war, particularly 
in recently pacified locations from which the Administration’s presence had been 
removed or reduced. The most prominent areas where cults flourished immediately 
after the war and even into the early 1960s were in the Sepik, Madang and Morobe 
Districts, although they were also active in Papua, Manus, New Ireland and 
Bougainville, particularly on Buka Island.61
58. Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound p.196.
59. Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound p.197, citing Lucy Mair Australia in New Guinea 1st edition 
London: Christophers, 1948, p.216 in which Mair draws particular attention to : ‘A new feature of the 
post-war period has been the great number of demonstrations by native employees against 
conditions with which they were dissatisfied.’
60. The complexities involved in describing what is meant by the expression ‘cargo cult’ are 
discussed at length in Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound including in ‘Introduction to the Second 
Edition: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations’ (pp.ix-lxix) and ‘Introduction to the First 
Edition’ (pp. 11-16). Worsley (p. 11) outlines the principal characteristics of the ‘cults’ as: religious 
movements in which ‘a prophet announces the imminence of the end of the world in a cataclysm 
which will destroy everything. Then the ancestors will return, Or God, or some other liberating 
power, will appear bringing all the goods the people desire, and ushering in a reign of eternal bliss’.
61. Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.61-65. One Buka cult, the Hahalis Welfare Society, 
involved ‘a large scale rejection of the (Catholic) mission...in 1961’ when ‘a mood of economic 
frustration and disappointment fuelled resentments which merged with a cargo cult tradition that 
had been spasmodically manifest since the early 1930s.’ Hugh Laracy "’Imperium in Imperio”?: the 
Catholic Church on Bougainville’ in Anthony J.Regan and Helga M.Griffin eds. Bougainville before 
the conflict Canberra: Pandanus Books, RSPAS, ANU, 2005, p. 131. See also: Albert Maori Kiki
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The international warfare, carried out by militaries using equipment of types and
quantities never previously seen, unsettled indigenous existence beyond the
effects of actual destruction and loss of life. Downs notes:
Uncertainty and suspicion [of the colonial authorities: SM] were not 
diminished by the extent of the allied armadas that ended the Japanese 
invasion. The massive use of men and material was in extra-ordinary 
contrast to the small penurious pre-war administrations...When the 
people saw the extent of the allied war effort they could not help making 
comparisons.61
Where war-time experience had included contact with Australian and US troops, 
including black Americans, the effect was often profound. The experience 
sometimes strengthened a distinction between ‘Australians’ who as military 
personnel were admired for their friendly egalitarianism, and officials plus 
employers who were classified as ‘English’ because they maintained discriminatory 
practices and attitudes towards indigenes.62
Comparisons reinforced previous puzzlement about the basis for the wealth or 
cargo possessed by Europeans, which had been present almost from the start of 
colonial rule. Comparison and conjecture combined with unemployment and 
impoverishment fuelled the formation of organisations that speculated about and 
became committed to finding the source of the now so obvious wealth. For many 
cults and their leaders, the abundance of goods associated with the European 
presence - military and civilian alike -  did not appear to be a consequence of 
labour. Cargo came into the colony with no labour and other means of production 
seemingly involved, except by the largely indigenous labour force which unloaded 
ship and aircraft cargoes.63 Not only was its production ‘hidden’ because the goods
Bulletin No.14 Canberra: New Guinea Research Unit, ANU, 1972; James Griffin ‘Movements 
Towards Secession 1964-76’ in Bougainville before the Conflict pp. 291-299.
61. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.61
62. Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound p.126
63. The official assessment, provided in a February 1950 secret report was that the cults in part 
represented a ‘definite misappreciation of the ramifications of production and supply’. Accordingly: 
‘These manifestations [of cargo cultism] are dealt with tactfully and every effort made to acquaint 
the people with the lack of foundation for the cult and to instruct them in the processes of 
manufacture and supply, including incidental labour, by which the outside world acquires its 
“cargo”’. NAAA518/1, H927/1 Development of the Territories. Organisational. Report on Present 
Conditions in Papua and New Guinea (February 1950) p.9
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were manufactured elsewhere, but ownership within the colony passed into the 
hands of those who did not labour - the plantation owners, government officials and 
company managers whose wealth could not be associated with any particular 
productive labour they carried out.
In some cases, the increased supplies of goods not obviously connected to labour 
produced leaders who garnered support by promising to find their source, ‘capture 
it’ and bring wealth to an organisation’s members. Unsurprisingly, and especially 
potent in the areas where post-war impoverishment was most severe, cult activities 
were often directed at finding and identifying the seemingly mysterious source of 
wealth which arose without labour.
War-time experiences and post-war hopes fuelled by the cessation of military 
conflict provided suitable conditions for revitalized and reshaped cultist activities.65 
Unemployed or underemployed villagers and increased commercialisation of 
consumption opened further space for the rise of cargo cults. For Australian 
officials countering cults played an important part in shaping development thinking 
along colony-wide lines. In countering the claims of cult leaders that increased 
consumption could occur without a concomitant increase in labour, colonial officials 
were also forced to re-emphasise how increased production by households was 
central to their development plans.
The initial Administration efforts to co-opt cult leaders showed concern over a 
different kind of threat. Post-war cults and their leaders sometimes developed as
“cargo”’. NAAA518/1, H927/1 Development of the Territories. Organisational. Report on Present 
Conditions in Papua and New Guinea (February 1950) p.9
65. Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound remains the most comprehensive account of these activities. 
For an assessment of the significance of cults during and after World War II, from the position of a 
former senior Administration official, see Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp. 61-65, 201-206.
To Worsley’s description of cults, should be added Downs’ important point (p.62) that: The 
differences between cults based on expectations of material rewards, cults promising a better way 
of life, cults protesting against unfair treatment and those that were omens of embryonic nationalism 
were hard to distinguish. Some movements, officially categorised as cargo cults in official reports, 
may not have deserved that description.’ See also Peter Lawrence Road Belong Cargo: A Study of 
the Cargo Movement in the Southern Madang District, New Guinea Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press and Humanities Press, 1964
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administrative authority, including its Christian basis. When cult leaders became 
anti-mission and/or opposed to the colonial government in word and deed, they 
were either turned or jailed.66
A favoured Administration response was to attempt to co-opt cult leaders in post­
war reconstruction efforts as well as to try to explain the ways goods were 
produced.67 Of greater long-term importance, cult activities:
...compelled the attention of the Government and resulted in closer and 
more intensive Administration support. The evidence is clear that all the 
major cult movements and disturbances were followed by more 
favourable Administration treatment of the areas in which they 
occurred.68
In calling attention to the more impoverished areas, the cults were important in 
forcing officials to emphasise that development should be ‘even’ across the colony. 
During the 1950s, tackling cults contributed to the construction of a more precise 
official direction for late colonial development, uniform or even development (see 
next Chapter).
Paliau Movement (pp. 186-188) ‘established control over most of southern Manus...organized a 
boycott of the Administration, and [its leader Paliau] is said to have urged the expulsion of the 
Europeans and the Asians’.
66. The case of Yali, the ‘outstanding Cargo leader on the Rai (Madang) Coast’ in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, is exemplary in this respect. At first the Administration sought to temper his anti­
mission views, persuading him to encourage followers to form cooperatives and other acceptable 
development projects. However (p.218): ‘As the [Letub Cargo movement] snowballed, missionaries 
were threatened with violence, non-believers were gaoled [by the movement], and illegal taxes 
were levied. The cult was fast becoming a dangerous threat on a mass scale, and violence was 
increasing. Consequently, in 1950, Government arrested Yali, who was charged with incitement to 
rape, and extortion of money. He was eventually sentenced to six and a half years’ imprisonment.’ 
Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound pp.216-218.
67. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.62 states: ‘Administration efforts to stop objectionable cult 
practices included moral persuasion, economic aid, better education, social reconstruction, better 
communication and, as a last resort, police action. Most cult situations were resolved by a judicious 
combination of all these methods. Some cult leaders were taken on conducted tours of Australia to 
see the source and manufacture of goods. The tours proved popular, but the tourists were not 
easily convinced. For example, the Mint in Canberra was beyond explanation and had to be 
dropped from the itinerary.’
68. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.65; see also Wright ‘Economic or Political Development’ p. 
198, fn.34, who cites an August 1953 letter from anthropologist Margaret Mead to Hasluck 
regarding the establishment of a Local Government Council on Baluan Island, Manus District that 
rescued ‘the constructive elements in the Paliau movement [ie. ‘cargo cult’: HW] and arrested what 
might -  under other policies -  be a focus of trouble and destructive activity’.
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The Threats of Leisure and Wage Employment
Improving indigenous welfare required lifting household output, which under
conditions of a relatively simple division of labour mainly involved increasing the
numbers of workers and lengthening working hours on smallholdings. However the
provision of compensation for damage to housing, livestock and gardens made
increased leisure an enticing and realistic possibility which particularly arose in
lowlands and islands areas. By the end of 1949, almost one million pounds
Australian had been paid to indigenes in war damage compensation, with more
than one million yet to be paid. A committee of enquiry formed in July 1945 by the
Administration to recommend an appropriate basis for compensating indigenes
was concerned about how money would be spent, stating that:
The leisure thus made available is largely spent in gambling, and it 
seems inevitable, unless the flow to the Islands of goods of a type which 
are necessary to native subsistence -  garden tools, fishing tackle, etc. -  
is considerably increased, that the money which was intended to enable 
natives to replace these losses will have been frittered away before it is 
possible for them to do so.69
Changes in consumer preferences, toward purchased rather than domestically 
produced goods, affected some Papua New Guineans’ propensity to labour in 
household gardens. This was particularly the case among younger indigenes living 
close to urban centres with shops and markets.70 Early signs that post-war 
conditions had opened up the possibility of more leisure rather than labour were 
the substantial numbers of young men seen in rural villages and some urban 
centres, playing cards or simply visiting friends. Some indication of the liquidity of 
indigenous households is given by the amount of money in Commonwealth
69. Development of the Territories. Organisational. Report on Present Conditions in Papua and 
New Guinea (February 1950) pp.8-9. Mair Australia in New Guinea pp.219-224. Mair notes too that 
compensation also furthered commercialization, as well as early attempts by indigenes to enter 
commerce, transportation and related activities.
70. The Administration faced the disinclination of younger indigenes, particularly those who lived in 
villages proximate to major urban areas, to grow rather than purchase food. Shortages of locally 
grown food occurred in part because ‘the Hanuabadian [resident of Hanuabada village adjacent to 
Port Moresby: SM] had become urbanized and now refused to work gardens or permit his family to 
till the soil. They are now aping the Europeans...’ PNGNA Accession No. 12, Box No. 3,875, File 
No. 1-1-4 Plans for Native Welfare, Social Development and Economic Development, 1947-1951 
8/8/51 Minutes of Meeting of Inter-Departmental Committee on Native Development and Welfare 
held in Conference Room of Department of District Services and Native Affairs. However the 
minutes also noted the view that there was little land available to till in Hanuabada.
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Savings Bank accounts. In 1950, there were 33,415 accounts with £466,050 
deposited.72
The prospect of more leisure rather than productive labour was especially strong in 
the Highlands, but for different reasons. The Highlands had provided few plantation 
and mine workers before World War II so the basis of concern was not that 
workers returning from war-service or the recently abolished indentured 
employment would select leisure rather than re-entering wage labour. Instead in 
the region where ‘first contact’ had only occurred within the last twenty years,73 the 
establishment of the colonial peace reduced the uncertainty arising from warfare as 
well as the amount of labour-time needed to prosecute combat.74 The increasing 
availability of steel tools, especially axes and shovels, also lessened the time 
required for many domestic tasks, particularly clearing trees and bush from land 
prior to cultivation and planting of crops.75 Again potential working age males were 
most affected as these activities tended to be performed by males.
An immediate if limited solution to the problem of unemployment and 
underemployment was labouring in public works, directed by administration 
officials. This fitted with the increased provision of public revenues for expenditure 
on roads and other facilities.76 Hawksley notes that:
72. See NAA A518/1, H927/1 Development of the Territories. Organisational. Report on Present 
Conditions in Papua and New Guinea (February 1950) pp.8-9. MacWilliam ‘Post-War 
Reconstruction in Bougainville’ pp.229-230 notes how the popularity of as well as official antipathy 
toward gambling, sometimes for large amounts of money, continued into the mid-1950s.
73. See: Michael Leahy The Central Highlands of New Guinea’ Journal of the Royal Geographic 
Society 1936; Leahy and Maurice Crain The Land That Time Forgot New York and London; Funk 
and Wagnalls, 1937; Anon. ‘"A Second Kenya" in Central New Guinea: Return of Hagen-Sepik 
Exploring Party’ Pacific Islands Monthly v. 10,no.1, August 15, 1939:19-20; Bob Connolly and Robin 
Anderson First Contact: New Guinea’s Flighlanders Encounter the Outside World New York: Viking 
Penguin, 1987; Gammage The Sky Travellers
74. Ian Downs, a kiap [colonial official, who subsequently became District Commissioner, Eastern 
Highlands: SM], notes how in the immediate post-war years his predecessor George Greathead 
had reported that: ‘Something had to be done to provide opportunities for a huge population in 
desperate need of some outlet to fill the vacuum which pacification had created.’ ‘Kiap, Planter and 
Politician: a Self-portrait’ in James Griffin ed. Papua New Guinea Portraits: The Expatriate 
Experience Canberrra: ANU Press, 1978, p.243
75. Richard F. Salisbury From Stone to Steel: Economic Consequences of a Technological Change 
in New Guinea Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1962
76. Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea p.102 note that in 1939-40, the Australian 
Government provided a mere £A90,000 to administer Papua. In the first year after the war ended, 
this had increased to £A505,000 for the two territories. Five years later the allocation was almost
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Peace therefore created a relatively large population of surplus male 
labour. The administration’s fear was that boredom would set in and... it 
attempted to soak up some labour for public and private works to 
prevent highlanders from reverting to warfare.77
However, as Hawksley also emphasises, the numbers employed by the 
Administration were relatively small by comparison with the large populations in the 
Highlands. The imbalance between the number of waged jobs and the number of 
idle potential workerswage employed and potential labour force became ever 
greater as colonial authority was extended into more and more areas.78 During 
1947/48, in the Bena, Chimbu and Kainantu sub-district, with an estimated 
population of 250,000 people, only 2,017 were employed on a permanent and 
casual basis.79 Not until the 1950s, as the road and bridge building programme 
gathered pace in the Highlands through the use of unpaid gangs of workers from 
nearby villages, did the public works programme draw more upon the available 
labour force (see Chapter 3 below).
Before this programme could take effect and an expansion of smallholder coffee 
growing occurred, however, there was a rapid exodus of Highlanders, primarily 
males, from the region. Other changes occurring within the Highlands increased 
the attractiveness of waged employment. Due to the extended commercialisation 
of Highlanders’ existence, which had begun before the war and further accelerated 
during the conflict, previously valuable goods lost their appeal. The gradual 
introduction of a colonial currency as the principal medium of exchange increased 
buying and selling of recently introduced products, whose uses spread rapidly 
across the region.80
£A9 million. However from 1945 to 1950, administration expenditure on all activities in PNG 
increased much less, from $A601,000 to over $A11 million, according to Downs The Australian 
Trusteeship p.122, Table 6.2. See also J.K. Murray ‘In Retrospect, 1945-1952: Papua-New Guinea 
and Territory of Papua and New Guinea’ in K.S. Inglis ed. The History of Melanesia Canberra and 
Port Moresby: RSPAS, ANU and UPNG, 1971, p.206. Converting pounds into dollars at the rate of 
1:2, the gap between allocation and expenditure is striking and suggests much about Administration 
capacity, a point made by Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.37 who states: There was not a 
shortage of money, but rather a lack of method for budgeting and spending money efficiently’.
77. ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM p.339.
78. For a detailed consideration of the process of extending colonial authority, see Hawksley 
ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM pp.317-319, and below.
79. ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM p.340
80. Ian Hughes New Guinea Stone Age Trade Canberra: ANU, 1977; Ian Hughes ‘Good Money 
and Bad: Inflation and Devaluation in the Colonial Process’ Mankind V. 11, No.3, 1978, pp.308-318
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Under the Highlands Labour Scheme, which formalised the movement of workers 
out of the region, plantations and mines in particular came to depend upon these 
workers. Commencing in January 1950, by June over 4,000 workers had left 
Goroka, the collection point from which labourers departed. A further 5,000 were 
assembled, waiting to leave. By June 1951, of the 8,400 workers who had left the 
district, less than 1,000 went for employment with the colonial administration and 
the remainder to work on plantations, primarily in Madang and New Britain.81
Recruitment continued during the 1950s and 1960s. As smallholder production of 
crops expanded, recruiters had to move further and further into highland areas, 
where no coffee or other commercial crops were grown, to sign up workers. Going 
away to work on plantations for a contracted period, usually two years at a time, 
became a rite of passage for many young highlanders, and a means of acquiring 
consumption goods, including bride price payments.82 The immediate attraction of 
leisure and ceremonial activities, while not disappearing and in some instances 
even blossoming during the next two decades,83 added to the challenge that wage 
employment posed for a colonial administration attempting to bring development. 
Neither leisure nor migration as wage workers suited official plans for increasing 
smallholder production. In the 1950s, a more desirable solution was found (see 
next Chapter).
Turning the Highlands into the next major labour frontier threatened household 
existence and the dissolution of community, especially if males left the region for 
employment in coastal and islands areas.84 Highlanders leaving for coastal and 
island areas of the colony where illnesses were found which were not common at 
higher altitudes also caused official concern. The threat increased the already
81. The figures are from Hawksley ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM pp.341-342.
82. See Paula Brown The Chimbu: a study in change in the New Guinea Highlands London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, p.27; also cited in Hawksley ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM 
p.342
83. Cf. Chris Gregory Gifts and Commodities London: Academic Press, 1982
84. Francis J.West ‘Colonial Development in Central New Guinea’ South Pacific v.9, no.2, 
September-October 1956, p.308. Worsley The Trumpet Shall Sound p.196 makes the same point.
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substantial attention being paid by the post-war colonial administration to 
indigenous health.85
However not all the uncertainty about the most desirable direction of development 
policy arose because of the indecisiveness of the colonial government, the extent 
of the war damage and the pressure for a further expansion in plantation 
production. The war and some post-war conditions also stimulated shifts in 
indigenous agriculture, including by ambitious indigenes who wanted to expand 
their activities further using wage and other forms of employed labour. During the 
initial post-war years, sorting out which ‘native interests’ would be ‘paramount’ and 
which form of indigenous production should receive administration backing was not 
settled immediately or easily.
Changes in Indigenous Agriculture
Pre-war indigenous growers had produced copra for international markets, as well 
as sold coconuts and other produce into village and nearby urban markets.86 The 
European administrative, mission and commercial presence had begun to 
encourage major changes in production and exchange, not least by increasing 
supplies of shells used as a medium of exchange and store of value.87 One effect 
of this pre-war increase in commerce was to enlarge the space occupied by
85. In early 1950, the Department of Public Health noted that: The greatest advance [in 
prophylactic health measures: SM] was to establish an active anti-tubercolosis team who are using 
the B.C.G vaccine on a mass scale in the Central Highlands, thus allowing the recruitment of labour 
and so increasing the economic potential and doing as little harm to these completely non-immune 
people.’ NAA A518/1, H927/1 Development of the Territories. Organisational. Report on Present 
Conditions in Papua and New Guinea (February 1950) Appendix E A Report on the Present 
Position of the Department of Public Health p.1. See also Hawksley ADMINISTRATIVE 
COLONIALISM p.341
86. The particulars of indigenous sales of copra in the inter-war years are difficult to establish. Apart 
from the lack of official attention, much of this production was sold to nearby plantations for on-sale 
to trading firms. Selling to plantations conceals the amount of exported copra that came from 
indigenous growers. See M.A. Wheeler, M.A. Sackett and D.R.J. Densley Coconuts Agriculture in 
the Economy A Series of Review Papers Konedobu: Department of Primary Industry, n.d., p.5.
87. Hawksley ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM p.263 notes how from the end of the nineteenth 
century Tolai growers supplied German plantations with local produce, including vegetables. On the 
inter-war years, see Hughes New Guinea Stone Age Trade , and Hughes ‘Good Money and Bad’;
A.J.Strathern-‘Political development and problems of social control in Mt Hagen’ in R.J.May ed 
Priorities in Melanesian Development Canberra and Port Moresby: RSPAS, ANU and University of 
Papua New Guinea, 1973, pp.73-82, esp. pp.73-74
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indigenous capitalists, who joined trading with producing crops for sale to the 
colonial administration, missions and expatriate plantations.
For areas of the country outside the immediate war zones, the military conflict 
accelerated commercialisation of indigenous agriculture. Military bases and 
administration centres populated by Allied and ANGAU personnel required large 
amounts of food, not all of which could be imported. With substantial numbers of 
indigenes removed from villages for employment as carriers, soldiers and other 
essential personnel, the demand for purchased food supplies expanded. Where 
the occupying Japanese military engaged in growing rice and other produce, a 
demonstration effect in agricultural practices and new crops flowed over to village 
producers.
indigenous growers responded in two intersecting ways to post-war shortages and 
increased demand for their produce in PNG and abroad. Firstly, there was a 
spontaneous surge, which was especially prominent in but not confined to 
vegetable production for missions, administration centres and remaining military 
bases. In late 1952 an Australian Senator who toured PNG and subsequently 
made recommendations to Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries officials 
in PNG pointed out that:
The vegetable production on the Flighlands for such areas as Port 
Moresby, Lae and Madang, has already reached their peak and many 
thousands of pounds come out weekly. The Armed Forces personnel in 
Manus are also supplied from the Central Highlands and the local 
islands there.88
The activities of wealthy indigenes were vital for the surge. Many accumulated 
capital from their return on growing and processing crops for domestic and 
international markets. The early efforts by administration officials to encourage and 
supervise indigenous growers were also important. These efforts accelerated 
recognition of the fact that there were two principal forms of indigenous production 
and the Administration would have to restrain one while advancing the other. As
88. PNGNA Accession No. 12, Box 3893, F/N 1-1-94 Planning and Development Part 1 1949-1952 
REP Dwyer, Director, DASF to Government Secretary ‘Recommendations made by Senator A.M. 
Benn after a visit to the Territory of Papua and New Guinea’ p.3
79
part of the general drive against extending plantations and increasing wage 
employment, indigenous largeholdings would subsequently have to be restrained. 
Initially at least distinction amongst indigenous growers was not critical for colonial 
policy. Instead, the early post-war growing, processing and marketing of rice and 
cocoa illustrate how indigenous ambitions and initial colonial efforts to encourage 
‘native interests’ intersected.
Rice
Prior to World War I, plantations and missions in New Guinea were already heavily 
dependent upon rice to feed labourers and others.88 While there had been minor 
attempts to grow the grain in New Guinea, one as early as 1903,89 the bulk of rice 
consumed was imported from Asia. In 1918, the Native Plantations Ordinance 
came into effect in Papua with the intention, in part, of ‘mak(ing) the Territory self- 
supporting as regards rice’.90 In reporting another, largely unsuccessful, drive 
during the 1920s Lieutenant Governor of Papua Sir Hubert Murray stated that the 
aim had been to make the Territory self-supporting in rice’.91
Between the wars, ‘rice cultivation [in the Mekeo area] was encouraged by the 
Papuan administration and the Roman Catholic Mission of the Sacred Heart.’92
88. Rowley The Australians in German New Guinea p.6 notes a December 1914 report from 
Colonel William Holmes, the head of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force which 
occupied the German colony, to the Australian Minister for Defence, G.F.Pearce. The report states 
in part: When the War broke out the white Planters were called to join the Defence Force, 
consequently the native labourers on the plantations were left to themselves, and at once ceased to 
work. To make matters worse, food supplies ran short in consequence of trade steamers having 
stopped sailing, and in many cases natives were almost starving as they depended mostly upon 
rice.’
89. Hahl Governor in New Guinea p.100. It seems likely that the first planting in Papua was in 
1891, of seed brought from the Philippines and grown at the Beipa mission station by a missionary 
from the Catholic Mission at Yule Island, north of Port Moresby. See Peter R. Hale Rice Agriculture 
in the Economy A Series of Review Papers Port Moresby: Department of Primary Industry, c.1977, 
P.7
88. Hale, Rice, p.7
91. Cited in Gordon Dick and Bob McKillop A Brief History of Agricultural Extension and Education 
in Papua New Guinea Extension Bulletin No. 10 Port Moresby: Department of Primary Industry p.17.
92. F.J. Jeffreys The Mekeo Rice Project Unpublished MA Thesis, Port Moresby: Economics 
Department, University of Papua New Guinea, 1974, p.20. Bryant Allen details other rice growing 
stimulated during the inter-war years under the Native Plantations Ordinance in northern Papua:
The North Coast Region’ in Donald Denoon and Catherine Snowden eds. A time to plant and a 
time to uproot: a History of Agriculture in Papua New Guinea Port Moresby: Institute of Papua New 
Guinea Studies for the Department of Primary Industry, 1981 p. 112. See also Crocombe Communal 
Cash Cropping Among the Orokaiva p.11.
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Initially production increased under considerable administration supervision and 
enforcement of Native Regulations requiring agricultural production. Although 
official supervision was withdrawn in the 1934-35 production year, the Catholic 
Mission stepped in to purchase rice that was surplus to domestic consumption and 
paid spot cash. Production peaked at between 300 to 400 tons in 1936-37, and 
slumped thereafter.93
During World War II, the military controlled Australian New Guinea Administrative 
Unit (ANGAU) attempted to produce much needed supplies in the Mekeo flood- 
plain, north of Port Moresby. The Japanese also tried to increase local supplies of 
rice, with substantial compulsory schemes in New Britain and New Ireland,94 and 
small plots on Bougainville.95
In February 1944, Major W. H. H. Thompson, District Officer, Lakekamu who was 
responsible for increasing rice growing in ANGAU-controlled territory noted how 
labour intensive was the method currently being employed on village holdings in 
the Mekeo. Thompson also indicated the extent to which mechanisation was 
employed, how this increased output and how ANGAU had made limited use of 
compulsion. In 1944, mechanisation was extended from planting to harvesting,96 
and rice growing provided not only food for household consumption but also for 
trade. Thompson concluded optimistically:
[I] cannot see why in the future perhaps a district, or the whole Territory,
should not be self-supporting as far as rice is concerned.97
93. Jeffreys The Mekeo Rice Project p.22
94. Hale Rice p.7; T.S. Epstein Capitalism, Primitive and Modern: Some Aspects of Tolai Economic 
Growth East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968 p.60
95. John Connell Taim bilong mani: The evolution of agriculture in a Solomon Island society 
Development Studies Centre Monograph No. 12 Canberra: The Australia National University, 1978, 
pp.67-68
96. Hale Rice p. 13, concludes that as a result of the war-time experience: The Mekeos have never 
looked back to manual production’.
97. NAA A9372/1,Vol.3 ANGAU.[Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit]. Conference of Officers 
of Headquarters and Officers of District Staff. Port Moresby 7-12 Feb. 1944 Papers and Discussion. 
Major W.H.H.Thompson ‘A Paper on Rice Cultivation’; also noted in Jeffreys The Mekeo Rice 
Project p.134. Cf. Thompson’s account with that provided by Rolf Gerritsen, ‘Aspects of the political 
evolution of rural Papua New Guinea: towards a political economy of the terminal peasantry’ in 
Gerritsen, R. May and M.A.H. Walter ROAD BELONG DEVELOPMENT. Cargo Cults, Community 
Groups and Self-help Movements in Papua New Guinea. Working Paper No.3 Canberra: 
Department of Political and Social Change, RSPAS, The Australian National University, August
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However with the end of hostilities, a ‘sharp decline both in interest [regarding rice 
growing in the Mekeo] and acreages occurred in the 1945-46 and 1946-47 
seasons’.98 Revitalization of rice growing in the Mekeo flood plain did not occur 
until 1948 when, as happened elsewhere in the colony, Administration concerns 
and indigenous efforts were at least temporarily united in a brief period of high 
prices and global shortages. However the union brought to the fore tensions over 
how substantial the administration’s role should be, whether there should be a 
complex division of labour, increased by mechanization, and whether yields could 
ever be substantial enough on a flood plain with unpredictable rainfall using dry 
land cultivation methods.99 While these tensions became more apparent from the 
early 1950s, the initial post-war revitalization of rice growing took place in a manner 
which contained all the elements of the later turmoil.
John Connell has described how in 1948, in Siwai in southern Bougainville, there 
was the ‘first government effort at agricultural extension’ in the area. The actions 
involved supervising rice plantings at two villages in order to produce seed for 
further plantings.100 The 1949-50 estimates for the colony’s Department of 
Agriculture Stock and Fisheries (DASF) indicate the scope and nature of the 
Administration’s post-war ambitions regarding research and extension activities 
designed to increase rice production. Eight district agricultural stations and two 
sub-district agricultural stations had either commenced and intended to continue 
activities, or were initiating work. At Madang, Sohano, Popondetta, Beipa and 
Aitape work had begun, while at Lae, Bainyik via Maprik, Manus and Buin the 
estimates projected that ‘rice experiments [were] to be initiated’ or ‘rice [was] to be 
introduced’.101
1981, p. 39; Bob McKillop in Dick and McKillop A Brief History of Agricultural Extension p.21; and 
Hale Rice p.21 .
98. Jeffreys The Mekeo Rice Project p.27
99. Then, as now, the bulk of the world’s rice is grown as wet land produce, in flooded irrigated 
fields, by smallholders and industrial largeholders. See Chapter 5 below.
100. Taim bilong mani p.92, but compare with the subsequent claim that (p.100) ‘(t)here was no 
official administration interest in the general expansion of rice growing in New Guinea until after 
1952 although there were then odd pockets of development in Madang and Sepik.’
101. See NAA A518/1, G927/4 Economic Development of the Territories-Commodities-Rice 11/5/50 
F.G.G. Ross to First Assistant Secretary, Department of External Territories ‘Rice Production:
Papua New Guinea’. Michael Bourke has emphasized the importance of the research effort which
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In each case where substantial efforts were made to produce rice, it was the local 
class of capitalists and would-be bourgeois that initially led moves to expand 
indigenous production. While these moves fitted within the general rhubric of ‘the 
paramountcy of native interests’, colonial officials were cautious about encouraging 
any advance of such a class. Shifting indigenous rice growers from Rural Progress 
Societies to cooperatives with close official supervision of financial contributions 
from members, other income and expenditure, became one means of limiting the 
siphoning off of funds for individual accumulation. But it was harder to supervise 
the uses to which administration-provided machinery, tractors, harvesters and mills 
were put.
Initially rice played a significant role in the commercial advance of local 
businessmen,102 including in southern Bougainville, where linking trade and 
production was integral to their post-war activities.103 However by the mid-1950s, 
rice growing declined as a cash crop in southern Bougainville. The decline 
occurred in the face of crop disease, the rise of a superior source of income and 
revenue, cocoa growing, and ultimately the long-term decline in world prices for the 
grain. However even as it ceased to provide income or revenue returns 
commensurate with those available from other produce or wage labour, rice
went into producing rice strains suitable for PNG, and particularly village dry land conditions. He 
notes that of agronomic food trials conducted between 1928 and 1978, trials on rice (234) 
constituted between one fifth and one-sixth of all trials (1228) and exceeded those conducted on 
any other crop. See Bourke Agronomic field trials on food crops in Papua New Guinea 1928 to 
1978 Technical Report 82/3 Port Moresby: Department of Primary Industry, 1982, pp.7-8. Dr 
Bourke’s figures do not include any trials conducted during the first five years after the war. 
Although the exact extent of trialling for rice during the immediate post-war years is unknown, it is 
certain that the number calculated by Dr Bourke would be considerably increased if figures for the 
period 1946-1951 were available. (I am indebted to Dr Bourke for an exchange of correspondence 
in March 2009 which makes it possible to be sure of the accuracy of this claim.)
102. Bryant Allen The Importance of Being Equal: the Colonial and Post-Colonial Experience in the 
Torricelli Foothills’ Paper prepared for the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research 
Symposium No. 95 Sepik Research Today: the Study of Sepik Cultures in and for Modern Papua 
New Guinea, held in Basel, Switzerland August 19-26, 1984, p. 16. Epeli Hau’ofa Mekeo: Inequality 
and ambivalence in a village society Canberra: ANU Press, 1981, p.19 describes the presence of 
profitable commercial rice farming and farmers in the Mekeo in the early 1970s, who sold the crop 
to local consumers through trade-stores.
103. North Solomons Provincial Government Archives Buin Patrol Reports Report No.4,1952/53 
Patrol to Kono Paramountcy p.2; also cited in MacWilliam ‘ Post-war Reconstruction in 
Bougainville’; see also Connell Taim bilong mani pp. 199-200
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entered into necessary consumption to such an extent that households continued 
to grow it for immediate non-marketed purposes.105
Straddling, between higher wage and salaried employment, and accumulation 
through rice production was also a feature of indigenous efforts in other regions of 
the colony. A well known instance occurred in the Sepik, according to Hale ‘a result 
of self-help agricultural extension’.106 Bryant Allen explains the origins of post-war 
rice growing in East Sepik as a consequence of men from the region serving 
alongside ‘Rabaul natives’ in ‘carrier lines, plantation and vegetable garden labour 
gangs, the para-military police and the newly formed Papuan Infantry Battalion, in 
which Papuans and New Guineans were mixed for the first time since Britain and 
Germany had divided the eastern end of the New Guinea island as colonies.’ Allen 
continues:
Men from the Sepik who served in these units heard talk about 
‘Kampani’, a new form of organisation which was thought to resemble 
the social and political organisation of Europeans who ‘worked together’ 
to achieve wealth and did not fight among themselves as did Papua 
New Guineans. ‘Kampani’ also seems to have been closely associated 
with rice.107
A similar impetus behind post-war Sepik rice growing came from Pita 
Simogun of Dagua village, west of Wewak. Having trained during the war 
in Australia for guerrilla fighting in New Britain, Simogun encouraged police 
in Port Moresby to ‘return to their villages after the war to initiate “bisnis” 
enterprises, using whatever cash crops would grow best in their respective 
areas.’ With funds contributed from war damage compensation, in 1947 he 
established the Dagua Rural Progress Society. Concludes Allen: ‘Simogun 
planted rice, peanuts and coffee at Dagua, but rice grew better than 
peanuts and became the major annual crop of the cooperative in 1948 and 
1949.’108
105. North Solomons Provincial Government Archives Buin Patrol Reports Report No. 10 1959/60 
Patrol to Eastern Paramountcy of Buin Sub-District p.9.
106. Hale Rice p.9
107. Allen The North Coast Region’ p. 115
108. Allen The North Coast Region’ p. 116
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This venture had considerable influence in nearby and distant areas. By using the 
ex-policemen network, Simogun was able to affect activities beyond the Sepik 
District, including the Erap Mechanical Farming Project in the Markham Valley, 
where the main crops grown and marketed became - after a failed attempt to grow 
and sell rice - sweet potato and peanuts.109
In 1948, the same year as government extension activities were to expand into 
southern Bougainville, officials in Port Moresby received a request from a 
prominent indigene in the Mekeo. An official of Inauaia village asked for 
government assistance to obtain a rice mill, in order to ‘start their industry’. The 
request was made to the first post-war Director of the Department of Agriculture, 
Stock and Fisheries, Cottrell-Dormer, then on an inspection tour of the area. 
(Cottrell-Dormer had been involved in the 1947 Nutrition Survey, as a member of 
the central Nutrition Survey Planning Committee, considered above.)110
Rice production at Inauaia, and at least another six adjoining villages, was tied to 
the first flowering of Rural Progress Societies in the area. Extension centres were 
created at Anabunga and Beipa to facilitate hiring out of machinery to the Rural 
Progress Societies ‘to enable them to cultivate commercial holdings of rice’. For 
the 1950 season about 80 acres of indigenous plantings were harvested, with 
about half of this area planted using machinery. The native people were 
enthusiastic at first, but were disappointed when the monetary return from the first 
season’s crop was small’. ‘By 1951 rice mills had been set up in six villages and an 
agricultural research station had been established to investigate mechanisation, 
variety selection and to carry out research into pests and diseases’. Although there 
was further expansion over the next two seasons, by 1953 ‘it was apparent...that
109. R.G. Crocombe, R.G. and G.R.Hogbin The Erap Mechanical Farming Project Research 
Bulletin No. 1 Canberra and Port Moresby: New Guinea Research Unit, ANU, 1963, reprinted July 
1968
110. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/628, Mekeo Rice Project P & NG 11/61 Paul 
Hasluck to Master Roger Barker
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the project was rapidly declining’, and needed reform (of which more in Chapter 
Five).111
The official departmental analysis drawn upon by the Territories Minister Hasluck
under-states the extent to which mechanisation requirements increased for the
post-war Mekeo Rice Project. A more accurate assessment was made by Cottrell-
Dormer, who resigned in 1950 as Director of Agriculture to become Regional
Agricultural Officer in charge of the project. In a bitter critique of an article about the
Mekeo Project being prepared by Professor O.H.K. Spate of The Australian
National University,112Cottrell-Dormer succinctly explained why the project had
taken the direction of greater mechanisation. He said:
Full mechanisation in rice production is the objective because only in 
this way can the great potentiality of the fertile flood plain be exploited 
with the existing population density and available labour.113
Attempting to utilise a fertile flood plain, subject to extensive flooding as well as 
long periods of hot weather without rain,114 brought its own special problems if 
mechanisation was to be extended to soil preparation, planting, and harvesting as 
well as milling. When the Mekeo people were disinclined to work in collaborative 
endeavours, for either Rural Progress Societies or later for cooperatives, hiring of 
equipment became necessary for nearly every aspect of rice growing on even the
111. Quotations in this paragraph are from NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/628,
Mekeo Rice Project P & NG 11/61 Paul Hasluck to Master Roger Barker, which was a letter the 
Minister wrote to a schoolboy who had asked for information about rice production in PNG.
112. O.H.K.Spate ‘Changing native agriculture in New Guinea’ The Geographical Review 
V.43, No.2, 1953,pp.151-172; with an extract from this original article published as: The Rice 
Problem in New Guinea’ South Pacific November-December 1953, pp. 731-736
113. PNGNA Department of Primary Industry AN 12, BN 3,901, FN 1-2-6(D) Mekeo Rice Project 
4/7/52 W.Cottrell-Dormer to Professor O.H.K.Spate. Cottrell-Dormer was almost certainly referring 
to Spate’s South Pacific article when he said, in a letter written on 31/7/52 to another ANU 
academic Cyril S. Belshaw , who had sent reprints of three recent publications, that:’...I think your 
article is a very good one and useful to us here as it does draw attention to possible pitfalls and 
weaknesses-and not like one other recently (which) contribute(d) nothing of any use whatever.’ The 
labour problem to which the Director refers was in part a function of the desire for leisure and 
ceremonies among Mekeo, the pull of wage employment in Port Moresby and the availability of 
higher priced alternative crops which could be sold in the main administrative and commercial 
centre.
114. Hale Rice pp.13-14 concludes regarding the attraction of the Mekoe area for rice growing, 
stating: ‘Overall there is the recurring theme that rice can be easily grown because rice has been 
grown, and superficial examination(s) of the climate and terrain have not driven home the 
unpredictability of the rainfall.’
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smallest holdings.115 In 1954, the Agronomist-in-Charge of the Epo Experiment 
Station pronounced that as far as rice production in the Mekeo was concerned ‘the 
impetus has...shifted from peasant to mechanised production’.116
As is shown in Chapter Five, even this shift and the associated substantial 
administration resources involved did not bring a major continuing increase in the 
production of rice. Rice growing elsewhere In PNG did not raise the same 
problems for the colonial administration, or receive as much attention and 
resources as in the Mekeo, but in these areas output also remained low. Instead 
imports increased substantially to meet a rapidly growing demand, and the 
objective of colonial, then national self-sufficiency was never achieved.
Spate claimed that:
the Mekeo has to some extent primed the pump for other schemes.
Indeed, the Mekeo and the Gazelle Peninsula rank as the Territory’s 
experimental forcing houses for native agriculture’.117
The rider ‘to some extent’ is critical. As will now be shown for cocoa, the parallels 
between the crops, the populations and areas of the country are very limited. Most 
importantly for this account (see Chapters Three, Five and Six), compared to its 
promotion of rice production, the Administration’s subsequent role in extending 
smallholder production and fitting the growing, processing and marketing of cocoa 
and also coffee into the agrarian doctrine of development was much more 
effective.
Cocoa
Since at least the beginning of the twentieth century, cocoa has been grown as a 
plantation crop in PNG.118 During the inter-war years, some plantation owners
115. James McAuley was an early important critic of the direction being taken by rice growing at 
Mekeo. For his objections, publicly aired after Territories Minister Hasluck took office, see 
‘Mechanization, Collectives and Agriculture’ ‘Mechanization, Collectives and Native Agriculture’ 
South Pacific April 1952, pp.276-281.
116. NAA Department of Territories A518/1 AR927/4 Development. Papua & New Guinea.Rice- 
Research 7/9/54 T.Sorensen ‘Rice Improvement in Papua and New Guinea’
117. The Rice Problem in New Guinea’ p.735.
118. Cf. Firth The New Guinea Company’ p.367 which points to a cacao plantation operating in 
1891, while D.R.J. Densley and M.A. Wheeler Cocoa: Agriculture in the Economy A Series of
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began to inter-plant the crop with coconuts. The leaves of the tall palm trees 
reduce the amount of sunlight that reaches the ground, which in turn checks the 
growth of weeds around the cocoa bushes and cuts maintenance costs. Inter­
planting spread among plantations, although the availability of unplanted land on 
many largeholdings before the war meant that some of the largest firms engaged in 
sole planting of bushes as well. While there was little planting of cocoa by 
indigenes before World War II, the ability to inter-plant bushes subsequently made 
the crop especially suitable to indigenous growers with limited land who retained 
coconut palms for immediate consumption needs as well as cash incomes from 
marketed nuts and copra.119
During the war, most of the cocoa bushes were destroyed and there was 
widespread damage to coconut trees. Some stock survived and soon after the 
military conflict ended, administration officials began to distribute planting material 
collected from the Lowlands Agricultural Experiment Station at Keravat,120from 
Rabaul Botanic Garden and Asalinga Plantation to plantations and some 
indigenous growers.121 The stock was of the Trinitario type, higher yielding and 
more vigorous by comparison to the Forastero type then growing in West Africa. By 
using local stock, officials were aware that the post-war expansion would not be 
affected by the swollen shoot disease which had already substantially reduced
Review Papers Port Moresby: PNG Department of Primary Industry, n.d. c.1978, p.2 suggest that 
the crop was introduced to PNG around 1905 by German settlers.
119. Richard Salisbury Vunamami: Economic Transformation in a Traditional Society Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970, p.14
120. Anon. Lowlands Agricultural Experiment Station Keravat, Papua New Guinea 1928-1978 
Rabaul: Trinity Press, 1978, p.2
121. An early indication of the extensiveness of the Administration’s aims for cocoa growing in PNG 
is given in the following assessment of suitable growing areas. Drawing upon plantation experience 
growing cocoa as well as research conducted in the inter-war years, an agricultural official 
concluded that cocoa grew best up to 1,400 feet above sea level, in areas protected from strong 
winds. The 1947 report indicated that ‘the geologically newer soils...situated on the islands of New 
Britain, Bougainville, Witu Islands, and Kar Kar Island were most suited to cocoa cultivation. These 
are still the best cocoa areas available. It has since been ascertained, however, that cocoa thrives 
very well on the mainland of New Guinea eg such as the Markham, T.N.G. and Dobodura,
Papua...Cocoa has been found to flourish fairly well on soils derived from raised coral such as 
where a number of T.N.G. coconut plantations are situated on New Ireland. The importance of the 
selection of the correct type of land in suitable areas...cannot be stressed too much’. R.E.P. Dwyer 
Cocoa Production Territory of Papua-New Guinea Part 1 The Economics of Cocoa Production Port 
Moresby: DASF, July 3, 1948, p.1.
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cocoa output in Ghana and other nearby countries.122 Furthermore Trinitario 
formed the basis for fine and flavour cocoa, for many years regarded as superior to 
the bulk Forastero cocoa, which was used for milk and drinking chocolate.
The decision to use Trinitario stock for the post-war expansion was not solely due 
to availability and its swollen shoot free status. It has already been noted above 
that colonial officials in Australia were in regular contact with cocoa traders and 
manufacturers. The Australian manufacturers sourced most of their cocoa from 
West Africa. With the swollen shoot disease and anti-colonial eruptions in Ghana 
adding to post-war shortages, they were concerned to secure other sources of 
cocoa. In 1946, it was predicted that shortages in international supplies would 
reach about 200,000 tons and a price increase for 1947 of 150%. The prediction 
prompted Australian manufacturers to raise the possibility that employment in the 
local confectionery industry would decline. It was in these circumstances that 
proposals were advanced for a major expansion of largeholding production in PNG 
(discussed above). Neither the recommendation to extend plantations,123 nor the 
attempts by Australian manufacturers to influence what type of cocoa would be 
grown in the post-war expansion,124 were welcomed or acted upon by the 
Australian government.
122. Swollen shoot continues to be of major concern to cocoa growers in these countries. See 
http://allafrica.com/stories/20Q811280432.html. As of late 2008: The disease accounts for about 15 
per cent of the total global loss of the crop. Taking this in terms of the 2007/08 crop output of about 
3.7 million tons, the disease would account for the loss of approximately 550,000 tons throughout 
West Africa’.
123. NAA A518/1, A58/3/3, Commodities-Cocoa Papua and New Guinea Proposals for 
Development. Undated W Cottrell-Dormer, Director, DASF to Secretary, Department of External 
Territories p.1. Cottrell-Dormer was responding to an April 30, 1946 letter from Mr McLure, the 
lobbyist for the Australian confectionery industry cited above, written to the Minister for External 
Territories Ward, which pushed for government support to further develop existing plantations ‘and 
to aid in the planning and establishment of new plantations’. The Director was strongly opposed to 
indigenes becoming ‘a race of wage-earners dependent upon European industry for their livelihood 
and losing the greater part of their native-self-reliance’.
124. The direction of attempted influence was not always from the metropole to the colony. In his 
1948 assessment of the economics of cocoa production, the DASF official noted that while between 
80-87% of the Australian cocoa requirements was for bulk cocoa, which was imported from West 
African ‘Accra cocoa’, the remainder was ‘fine’ cocoa from Ceylon, Java, Trinidad and Samoa. 
Dwyer proposed that ‘Australia should aim to utilise a bigger percentage of fine cocoa, and New 
Guinea at producing this grade’. Cocoa Part 1, p. 1. Dwyer also pointed out that West African cocoa 
‘was native grown produce’.
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The manufacturers, who had imported very little PNG plantation cocoa pre-war, 
wanted the post-war administration to push the production of bulk cocoa for their 
requirements.125 In an early instance of a clash between Australian manufacturing 
and colonial administration objectives, agricultural officials in PNG rejected this 
proposal. Not only did Trinitario ‘trees come into bearing 6-12 months earlier than 
is usually experienced in any other country’. On the light pumice soils around 
Rabaul, yields were considerably higher than for Forastero, the basis of ‘Accra 
cocoa’. 12(5
Strengthening the local officials’ position even further, there was a price advantage 
to be gained by selling into continental Europe rather than to Australian markets. In 
European markets fine and flavour cocoa which formed the base for bitter rather 
than sweeter milk chocolate was preferred. Although only forming a small 
proportion of the world market, fine and flavour cocoa -  then produced from 
Trinitario -  was in high demand. Selling to this important potential market would 
also reduce PNG producers’ reliance upon and subjection to the Australian 
manufacturers.
The position taken by local officials, to target the fine and flavour market with the 
use of Trinitario stock was strengthened by support received from Colyer Watson, 
one of the principal exporters of PNG cocoa. Although largely a purchaser of 
plantation cocoa, when only a small number of indigenes had bearing bushes, the 
firm was already looking to a future of substantially increased production and 
exports. In October 1950, five months before the letter from Richardson, just cited, 
the exporting firm’s principal R.A. Colyer wrote to the Secretary, Department of 
Territories about a recent successful trip to the UK. Drawing attention to previous 
unsatisfactory treatment of PNG cocoa by ‘Australian users’, Colyer stressed the 
importance of making:
125. NAA A1422, 12/2/11 Part 1 New Guinea and Papua-Cocoa 1938-52 19/3/51 Fred B 
Richardson, for Cadbury-Fry-Pascall Type of Cocoa Which Should be Grown ‘I would strongly 
recommend that you concentrate [for PNG] on the development of a good quality bulk cocoa which 
would command satisfactory rates in world markets as well as in Australia. If this were done I think 
lines of research should tend towards improvement of yield rather than to development of 
characteristic flavour’.
126. Dwyer Cocoa Production Part 1, p.3
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...our beans better known to the world...where New Guinea beans... 
had a considerably higher value [than that placed on them previously by 
the Australian Confectioners’ Association]. We must keep on shipping 
these beans so that the world’s markets will get to know them as a 
‘special bean’ so that when production increases the planter will derive 
the benefit of their full value’.126
As an especially astute commodity trader, Colyer is likely to have known not only 
that plantation owners were beginning to include cocoa in their post-war 
rehabilitation plans, but also that the Administration was giving priority to increasing 
indigenous production of the crop. With the company’s main buying office located 
in Rabaul, Colyer could hardly have missed the attraction of the crop for wealthy 
Tolai on the Gazelle Peninsula, East New Britain, who were adding another 
dimension to their already substantial commercial activities.
Important accounts of the early post-war move into cocoa by Tolai growers, 
provided by Salisbury and T. Scarlett Epstein, provide very similar descriptions for 
Vunamami, near Rabaul, and Rapitok, also on the Peninsula but at the frontier of 
Tolai settlement.127 With the encouragement of DASF officials, wealthy and 
influential Tolai were the first to embrace cocoa. These individuals often had 
unplanted land and the capacity to mobilize labour from ‘clan dependants’.128 While 
there were important differences in the sources of the wealth for these Tolai in 
Vunamami and Rapitok, their similarities are what matters for this account.
In the case of densely populated and relatively affluent Vunamami, with a long
history of contact with European owned plantation and administration personnel,
the first planter was a senior political figure who grew cocoa on his own and his
wife’s clan lands in the neighbouring Balanatam and Vunamami villages. Apart
from the first planter, Salisbury notes that:
The early growers were for the most part landed and progressive older 
men; others were drawn in only after 1953-1954 when the early planters 
began reaping large returns from cash sales.129
126. NAA Department of Territories A518/1, A58/3/1 Cocoa-Papua and New Guinea, Research 
General 22/10/1950 R.A.Colyer to Secretary Halligan.
127. For a recent account, see Michael H. Lowe Smallholder Agrarian Change: the experience in 
two Tolai communities Ph.D.Thesis Canberra: ANU, 2006, especially Chapters 4-6
128. Vunamami p.136
129. Vunamami pp. 135-136
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In Rapitok, the critical initial source of wealth utilized for cocoa cultivation had been
previous migration to work on plantations. Once again, there was a flow-on effect
from the activities of the first planters to other returned migrants and then more
widely to other indigenes. As Epstein states:
One of Rapitok’s migrants, who is the most enterprising and also the 
wealthiest man in the parish, was the first prepared to experiment with 
planting cocoa [in 1948]...before the first trees began to bear, a number 
of migrants had followed the example and also planted cocoa. The 
Rapitoks were selling copra in the meantime and encouraged by these 
earnings they were prepared to extend their investment in perennial 
cash crops. 0
The rapid adoption of cocoa by Tolai who planted substantial acreages and others 
who grew a few trees meant that Director of Agriculture Cottrell-Dormer’s preferred 
position for the best form of indigenous production became irrelevant for official 
policy toward cocoa growing on the Gazeile. His preference was for ‘the 
development of Government plantations on behalf of the natives, ie. on the natives’ 
land and for the purpose of handing over to native ownership in the shape of co­
operative societies in the future’ utilizing European management. Even though 
Minister Ward agreed with the rejection of proposals for more largeholdings, 
Cottrell-Dormer’s favoured direction was never applied, for cocoa or any other 
crop.131 Instead the spontaneous process of development, with Tolai bourgeois 
and would-be bourgeois to the fore, initially out-ran official planning and capacities. 
Only in the 1950s, under a new Minister and strengthened state machinery was 
cocoa production placed at the centre of the scheme of smallholder production.
Conclusion
The immediate post-war period in PNG was marked by a particular form of 
uncertainty. While by 1945 the Australian government and influential colonial 
officials were agreed on a general direction for post-war development, ‘positive
130. Capitalism, Primitive and Modem: Aspects of Tolai Economic Growth pp.60-62
131. NAA A518/1, A58/3/3, Commodities-Cocoa Papua and New Guinea Proposals for 
Development. Undated W Cottrell-Dormer, Director, DASF to Secretary, Department of External 
Territories p.1. Cottrell-Dormer was responding to an April 30, 1946 letter from Mr McLure, the 
lobbyist for the Australian confectionery industry cited above, written to the Minister for External 
Territories Ward, which pushed for government support to further develop existing plantations ‘and 
to aid in the planning and establishment of new plantations’.
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Australianism’ was little more than a vague statement indicating a preferred 
direction. Subsequently, between 1945 and 1950-51, in the circumstances of post­
war reconstruction and rehabilitation, it continued to be hard to shape development 
in ways which would flesh out what was intended. Instead securing barriers 
against the return of what had been seen as destructive in the circumstances of 
pre-war PNG, and surmounting some of the most deleterious effects of the military 
conflict dominated official activities. Despite the best of intentions to bring 
development, only tentative moves along the intended route had been made, 
including in areas of the country and among populations previously only loosely 
included in the colonial territory.
All this was to change from the early 1950s, to the extent that just over a decade 
later the dominance of smallholder agriculture was firmly established. The colonial 
administration’s part in securing this ascendancy, which improved living standards 
for most of the population, was central. Of particular importance for the change 
was the political dominance of the Australian Minister for Territories, Hasluck, and 
the Department in Canberra. Unlike Ward, ideologically certain but little involved in 
giving effect to his beliefs, Hasluck focused his energies on gaining control of, and 
revitalizing the colonial administration. With power centralised, and detailed 
consideration given to how the main premises of development thought could 
become policy, the Minister drove major reforms. The change from uncertain 
development to the central policy direction of even or uniform development was 
pronounced, as the next chapter shows.
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Chapter Three
Uniform Development Framed, Implemented and Challenged 
Introduction
During the 1950s uncertainty was replaced by a well-defined strategy to make 
development happen. The most important consequence of colonial development 
policy over the decade was a substantial expansion of smallholder agriculture and 
commercialised consumption by households. The change from the uncertainty of 
the immediate post-war years occurred through an enlarged, better resourced 
administration following a policy direction which came to be known as uniform or 
even development.
Uniform development built upon the policy priorities established during and 
immediately after World War II, discussed in the previous chapters. While the 
language of development policy changed, to the extent that the terms ‘positive 
Australianism’ and ‘the paramountcy of native interests’ largely disappeared from 
official discourse, the main elements of each remained influential. Bringing 
development, rather than letting it happen spontaneously, remained the central 
premise of official policy. Neither did the December 1949 defeat of the Labor 
government and a decade of Liberal-Country Party governments bring the shift 
against ‘native interests’ which some anticipated. Instead the important changes 
which occurred during the 1950s expressed considerable continuity in the idea of 
development which informed Australian policy for PNG. The first section of this 
chapter shows how even as a major political change occurred in Australia, there 
was no break in either the previous emphasis upon the importance of state action 
for intentional development. Nor did the principal focus of government plans, 
increased production and consumption by indigenous households attached to rural 
smallholdings, change.
The second section of the chapter considers how, during the 1950s, intentional 
development was defined as even or uniform development so that it could become
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effective.1 This form of development had three inter-connected policy pillars. The 
first emphasised measures to encourage greater homogeneity among the 
indigenous population. The second focused upon the comprehensiveness of 
administrative action throughout the colony, particularly coordinating and 
supervising smallholder agriculture using household labour processes to increase 
production.2 Thirdly, linked with the first two, administrative effort was to be applied 
to all regions and populations to check inequalities between and within areas of the 
country, rather than concentrating state resources upon smallholders in the most 
advanced areas. Even development also meant continuing barriers against 
international firms and expatriate enterprises, as during the initial post-war period, 
and checking the advance of an indigenous capitalist class which had emerged in 
some parts of the colony.
The third, final section of the chapter shows how while even development was 
highly successful in expanding smallholder production, by the mid-1950s the 
colonial government was concerned that the pace of growth had slowed. 
Considerable thought was given to the problem of achieving further increases in 
the rate of growth while maintaining the emphasis upon colony-wide uniformity, 
rather than encouraging greater unevenness which was becoming apparent in the 
most successful export crop growing areas of the colony. Increased revenues plus 
reforms to the administration which included further expansion in the number of 
agricultural extension officers were directed at plans and projects designed to raise 
output of locally consumed as well as internationally marketed produce. The 
decade ended with the administration still determined to maintain the primacy of 
smallholder agriculture.
1. I have been unable to find a specific document which sets out what was intended as uniform or 
even development. Regardless, the policy position which became synonymous with Minister 
Hasluck’s period in office should be thought of as having evolved over the early to mid-1950s. This 
evolution corresponds to the unity of idea and process, discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 1, 
by which the idea of development was formed, reshaped and attached to colonial policy. See also 
Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.126-163, Ch.7 ‘Achieving uniform development’.
2. An instance among many of the priorities of the Minister appears in a File Note of June 1954 on 
Commerce-Papua and New Guinea Food Supplies, in which Hasluck stated: ‘In communicating the 
decision please stress again that the advancement of native agriculture -  for local food supply and 
improved land use in village gardens, as well as for economic production of crops for sale -  has a 
high priority in Government policy for the Territory’. NAA M1776/1 Vol.5, Minister for Territories 
Instructions to Department 1/1/1954 to 30/6/1954.
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Change within Continuity
Some thought the electoral defeat of the Chifley-led Labor Party government in 
1949, and the victory of the Liberal-Country Party coalition would pave the way for 
a major shift in thinking about development in PNG. There were hopes as well as 
fears that the new Minister for External Territories, the Liberal Percy Spender, 
would support a change from ‘socialism’ toward ‘free enterprise’.3 In particular, it 
was anticipated that in order to take advantage of world-wide food shortages, the 
Minister would encourage more favourable treatment of the demands arising in the 
colony, Australia and the UK for a major expansion of largeholdings.
During his only visit to PNG in early 1950 and in a subsequent statement to 
parliament, as well as in a substantial policy document prepared in the 
Department, Spender disappointed those hoping for a major shift.4 He continued to 
emphasise two principal inter-locking objectives. The first was improved indigenous 
welfare and the second development of the colony’s resources. Spender 
maintained the connection which had appeared in the first years after the war 
between resource development and making the colony self-supporting. The latter 
would, in the Minister’s view, include the ability ‘to supply the needs of Australia 
and the world generally with the valuable commodities that the Territories are 
capable of producing’. Spender also accepted the established view that the size of 
the available labour force was a limiting factor. His position, that the colonial
3. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.69 notes how the Planters’ Association sent a 
congratulatory cable to P.C.(Percy) Spender, who became Minister for External Territories and 
Minister for External Affairs, which urged him to make an ‘early visit to Territory to gain first hand 
information difficult problems confronting planters due former Government’s negative policy...’
4. Administrator Murray ‘In Retrospect, 1945-1952’ p.179, suggested that there was at best a sense 
of ambiguity in Spender’s public position, noting that the Minister although ‘reserved in his attitude 
to [ a forthcoming UN Mission which visited PNG after Spender made his first visit in early 1950: 
SM]... also gave less than was hoped for and expected by the leading commercial interests’. As 
Murray continued: ‘Old territorians in the private sector rather expected that with a Liberal-Country 
Party in power, the 1945 policy [of Labor Minister Eddie Ward expressing the paramountcy of native 
interests and restricting further extension of the largeholding area] would be revised in their favour. 
At a dinner tended to him at Kokopo [on the Gazelle Peninsula near Rabaul] by commercial and 
plantation interests, Mr Spender made a speech which they found non-committal, perhaps 
disappointing.’ However Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.70, on the basis of a report from 
District Commissioner J.K.McCarthy and transcripts of verbatim reports prepared by journalists who 
accompanied the minister, rejects Murray’s version of the position expressed by Spender at the 
Rabaul dinner. Downs’ account emphasises instead Spender’s public attachment during his PNG 
visit to the ‘established rails of Australian policy’ (see below).
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administration should be given a major role in securing ‘a generally improved 
standard of living for the native peoples’, was also in line with previous thought 
about how to give effect to ‘positive Australianism’.5
Like Ward, Spender held responsibility for another, more substantial ministerial 
post. While Ward had been Minister for Transport as well as Minister for External 
Territories, Spender held the latter office and that of Minister for External Affairs.6 
During a visit of Administrator Murray to Sydney, Spender finalised some thirty 
submissions which had been awaiting decisions, some for long periods.7 However 
Spender contributed little new to thinking about how to bring development to PNG. 
Nor, before leaving the Menzies government in April 1951, did he manage to make 
his substantially enlarged Department noticeably more effective in determining how 
development could be made to happen.8 Spender’s main contribution was to 
emphasise the importance of an instrumental role for private capital, as a means of 
obtaining additional resources to supplement those provided by the Australian 
government so that indigenous welfare goals could be pursued more effectively.9
5. NAAA518 1927/1 Development of the Territories. Organisational. Minister’s Policy Speech, June 
1950 ‘Australia’s Policy in Relation to External Territories’ p.2 for quotations in this paragraph. 
Spender’s own later summary of this speech and the intended direction in part explains why his 
position could be interpreted differently. His account (Politics and A Man Sydney: Collins, 1972, 
pp.271-279), stresses Ward’s ‘socialist approach’ and the absence of ‘a practical plan for the 
advancement of [PNG’s]] people’. Spender claimed that his contribution was to begin the process 
of planning, which was presented in his statement to the Federal Parliament on June 1, 1950 (see 
below). He also claimed (p.277) that the principal point of his presentation was to encourage private 
investment, and this was ‘a radical departure from previous policy’. However since the bulk of his 
speech (p.275), placed :’The emphasis ...on the welfare of the native people...’, it is hard to see 
Spender’s desire to increase private investment as other than instrumental (see below) or a failure 
to recognise the ambiguities inherent in his approach.
6. Each Minister only visited PNG once, whereas Hasluck was a frequent visitor, who would have 
traveled to the colony more often had parliamentary and other responsibilities not prevented him 
from so doing.
7. Murray ‘In Retrospect’ p.178
8. Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.83-84 outlines changes which had occurred in the 
department immediately prior to the fall of the Labor Government. In particular he notes that there 
was a First Assistant Secretary, and three Assistant Secretaries, with a total staff of 49, up 
substantially from its size at the end of the war (p.10).
9. ‘Australia’s Policy in Relation to External Territories’ p.3. According to the Minister, in order to 
fulfil the task of advancing ‘these peoples’: ‘It is to private enterprise under proper safeguards that 
the Government must to a major extent look for assistance in securing the economic advancement 
of these Territories. To this end every encouragement will be afforded to private enterprise in 
bringing its available skill and capital to bear on the development of the Territories’ natural 
resources and, in so doing, to impart to these backward peoples the means of participating to an 
ever increasing extent in developing the wealth of their country’. That this was not a solitary, out of 
character, statement of Spender’s position is demonstrated by a similar quote from an unpublished 
document prepared at his behest in the Department of External Territories but not released before
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A new Minister and changed department: Hasluck takes office 
After a one month interregnum, from April until May 1951 while (Sir) Richard Casey 
also occupied both the ministerial positions of External Affairs and External 
Territories, Hasluck was appointed Minister for Territories. Simultaneously, the 
department was revamped from the previous External Territories, to Include 
responsibility for both internal (the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital 
Territory) and external territories. Hasluck remained in the position until December 
1963, and held no other ministerial duties as part of his permanent portfolio.
Hasluck came to office with extensive experience at the international political- 
administrative level, including as a participant at major meetings on post-war 
development. His employment in the Department of External Affairs between 1941 
and 1947 working on the formation of ihe United Nations and in particular the 
trusteeship protocols,10 had prepared him far better than either Ward or Spender 
for the task of colonial minister. Hasluck’s intellectual heritage included knowledge 
of as well as admiration for the English radical Tory objections to the destructive 
effects of early industrialisation upon rural life.11 As a person who came to maturity 
in the early twentieth century, Hasluck was an Australian liberal who did not believe 
in laissez-faire but in a positive role for the state and the importance of trusteeship, 
along the lines advocated by earlier Australian liberals (see Chapter One above). 
He was also sympathetic toward indigenous Australians whose impoverished 
condition he regarded as a consequence of European settlement.12
he left office. In this document it was stated that with the objective of native advancement foremost, 
nevertheless given their current inability and primitive condition, it was up to government ‘through 
programmes for social advancement, to enable these people to take a constantly increasing share 
in the running of their country’. As well ‘the Government must, to a large degree, look to private 
enterprise, under proper safeguards, to economically advance the region.’ See NAA M335/1 No.2 
Australia in New Guinea. The Post-War Task. A Paper prepared in the Department of Territories 
During the Term of Office of the Hon. P. Spender p.9. The document is dated October 1951, six 
months after Spender left office, but was prepared during late 1950 and early 1951.
10. Murray ‘In Retrospect’ p.178-179 states ‘I have often wondered whether he (Hasluck) devised 
the Trusteeship provisions.’ Louis Imperialism at Bay Parts III and IV provides a more substantial 
account.
11. MacWilliam ‘Liberalism and the End of Development’ p.90
12. Paul Hasluck Black Australians. A Survey of Native Policy in Western Australia, 1829-1897 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1942
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Hasluck concluded that the destruction of indigenous life was so complete in 
Australia that ‘today there is nothing that can be recognised as a homogeneous 
and integrated aboriginal society’ .13 As the Minister whose Department also held 
responsibility for the Northern Territory where substantial numbers of indigenes 
lived, European responsibility for this condition and national government 
obligations for its amelioration required assimilation of the indigenous population. 
For Hasluck, assimilation meant incorporation into what he construed as the 
mainstream of Australian life, primarily through becoming wage workers. Hasluck 
advocated a specific form of positive state agency, development through 
assimilation, to overcome the deleterious consequences of capitalism’s advance in 
Western Australia, about which he had researched and written, and the Northern 
Territory, for which he now held ministerial responsibility.
Hasluck drew a separate conclusion about what was required for development in 
PNG, as MacWilliam noted:
Assimilation required trusteeship, where the indigenous population were 
in the minority, as in Australia, just as the paramountcy of native 
interests required trusteeship where the indigenous population were in 
the majority, as in Papua New Guinea.14
If the over-all premises of international trusteeship were known to Hasluck, 15 he 
had no direct experience of or much knowledge about PNG before taking 
ministerial office. At the beginning of his tenure, these lacunae pushed Hasluck to 
temporarily accept existing policy. 16 The secretary of the newly constructed 
combined Department, C.R. Lambert, who was appointed soon after Hasluck
13. Hasluck ‘Some Problems of Assimilation’ Address to Section F of ANZAAS 34th Congress,
Perth, 1959, p.1
14. MacWilliam ‘Liberalism and the End of Development’ p.91
15. In A Time for Building p.5, Hasluck indicated a familiarity with ‘questions of colonial trusteeship’ 
from his work ‘on post-hostilities planning and in international discussions at the (1945) San 
Francisco Conference but had been very happy to leave most of the work in this field to others. At 
the United Nations I had considerable scepticism about the outcome of the trusteeship provisions of 
the Charter’. However as noted in Chapter One, p,28, fn.26, Hasluck ‘s international experience 
included attending the 1942 Mont Tremblant conference where he responded favourably to the 
stance adopted by British Fabian Arthur Creech Jones.
16. A Time for Building p.25, where Hasluck stated: ‘At the commencement of my work I found no 
need to restate policy. My reading of departmental papers and public pronouncements did not 
arouse any immediate doubts about the objectives and principles that had been declared. In any 
case I could not draw on any knowledge or experience at that stage which would enable me to re­
examine policy intelligently’.
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became minister also had no knowledge of PNG. However as already noted in 
Chapter One, Lambert was another senior Australian official with a predilection for 
agrarian development as an appropriate response to the effects of the 1930s 
depression and in post-war conditions.17
Two months after being sworn in and accompanied by Lambert, Hasluck made his 
first visit to PNG. Experiences on the trip reinforced some of his predilections, 
including the strong anti-British colonial bias he shared with Ward.18 The 
combination of his political views and what the Minister encountered on the initial 
tour of PNG greatly influenced several of the immediate political and administrative 
changes he was to make. These included ending Murray’s tenure as Administrator, 
the need for which had been previously flagged by Spender. Murray was replaced 
by D.M. (later Sir Donald) Cleland. Hasluck also returned to Australia convinced of 
the importance of obtaining increased funding for PNG from the Commonwealth. 
The removal of Murray produced some personal bitterness, and allegations that 
the former Administrator’s departure represented a continuation of the shift toward 
‘private enterprise’ begun by Spender.19
For the remainder of his term in office, Hasluck’s thoughts about what development 
should constitute for PNG changed little. The changes that did occur in his thinking 
were largely refinements of policy within the parameters laid down by the 
Australian adoption and adaptation of international trusteeship, discussed in
17. Hasluck A Time for Building pp.7-8 explains how upon coming to office one of his first tasks was 
to appoint a Secretary for the Department. He shifted the previous department secretary J.R. 
Halligan into the position of Special Advisor, concerned with the South Pacific Commission and the 
Phosphate Commission, and chose Lambert for Secretary. Hasluck’s reasons for not selecting 
Halligan are instructive: ‘...he looked at the future task as a restoration of the good things in the 
past...’ and ‘he would not help me to break new ground [administratively]’. Lambert remained in the 
position until 1964 throughout Hasluck’s tenure as minister. With his background in designing and 
implementing state action to expand agriculture in Australia, it is unsurprising that Lambert and 
Hasluck forged a lengthy working relationship aimed at bringing agrarian development to PNG.
18. A Time for Building p.14 Hasluck said: ‘...although I trotted around the Territory on my best 
behaviour and trying to smile like an innocent friend, I came away from that first trip revolted at the 
imitation of British colonial modes and manners by some of the Australians who were there to serve 
the Australian government.’
19. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production pp.222-228 canvasses the alternative 
interpretations given for Murray’s departure.
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Chapter 1 above. In 1952 he enunciated what would remain his understanding of 
the relationship between Australia and PNG, as one of ‘guardianship’.20
Hasluck distanced himself from two features of the policy position he had inherited, 
the emphasis upon ‘planning’ and ‘private enterprise’.21 He cancelled the intended 
distribution of a major policy paper prepared at Spender’s direction which mirrored 
the June 1950 statement to parliament.22
Of more immediate consequence for bringing development were the steps taken 
by Hasluck to counter the political tendencies and administrative indecisiveness 
which had arisen, even flourished during Murray’s term as Administrator. Important 
political-administrative changes were required, as well as better defining and 
shaping the policy needed to bring development. However Hasluck’s initial efforts 
to gain more financial and personnel support for the colonial administration 
illustrates how his thought about the importance of the colonial state’s role in 
making development happen was akin to Murray’s view. The two men also 
approached the matter of indigenous political representation in a similar manner. 
Their approach to state coordination and supervision, as well as the political 
advance by Papua New Guineans is now examined.
20. P. Hasluck, ‘A Policy for New Guinea’, Address by the Minister for Territories to the William 
McGregor Club, Sydney 20th November 1951; also cited in South Pacific v.5, no. 11, Jan-Feb 1952 
p. 225, and in Hawksley ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM p.418. The emphasis upon 
guardianship, rather than partnership as Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.165 subsequently 
tried to interpret the Minister’s view, is important. Partly the significance arises because for Hasluck 
a principal task of the colonial government’s trusteeship was to act as guardians, containing the 
ambitions of expatriates, particularly those who sought to acquire more largeholding land and a 
more important place in the colony’s political economy as partners with the ascending class of 
indigenous capitalists (see below and my forthcoming ‘Placing the Planters’).
21. Administrator Murray’s enthusiasm for over-all planning is evidenced in numerous files and 
documents: see NAA A518/1 K927/1 Development Papua and New Guinea. Administration’s Seven 
Year Plan for Development 2/10/50 J.K.Murray Administrator to Secretary, Department of External 
Territories ‘Plans for the Development of the Territory’
22. NAA M335/1 No.2 Australia in New Guinea. The Post-War Task. A Paper prepared in the 
Department of External Territories During the Term of Office of the Hon.P. Spender Dated October 
1951, 6 months after Spender left office. The paper had an earlier title ‘Australia’s Bastion. The 
Post-War Task in Papua and New Guinea’ which disappeared in the process of final preparation. 
Hasluck A Time for Building p128 claims: ‘After early visits to the country, I found some of the 
papers prepared at Canberra for a planned economy and the attraction of Australian enterprise 
somewhat unreal. In economic matters I turned away from the lead given by Spender.’
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Prior to Hasluck taking office there had already been an increase in funding 
allocated for the colony, which by 1950-51 was over £A8.7 million, compared to 
only £A 90,000 in 1939-45.23 Even this increase was regarded as unsatisfactory by 
Murray, who pressed for the establishment of a Territory Development Fund of 
£A100m, to be expended over ten years and supplementary to annual budget 
commitments. Inspired by the UK example of a £120 million colonial welfare and 
development fund, Murray received support in Australia from the Minister,
Spender, and the Secretary of External Territories, Halligan. The request for a 
major funding increase was justified in terms of PNG’s defence purpose for 
Australia, international trusteeship obligations and the inability to fund development 
from local resources.
The Commonwealth Treasury, supported by the Prime Minister’s Department, 
would have none of the proposal, stressing financial stringency, the difficulty of 
managing such a large fund, and political accountability matters, including the 
inadvisability of a government committing its successors in advance. Instead 
Treasury insisted that the existing budgeting terms of three years maximum should 
be maintained.24 But as Murray subsequently noted, in 1951-1952 the grant-in-aid 
rose to £A10.5 million, up about 20% on the previous year’s amount.25
In December 1951 Hasluck persisted with Murray’s proposal.26 Hasluck’s 
reasoning followed Murray’s,27 in particular that the criteria which operated in
23. Murray ‘In retrospect, 1949-1952’ p.206 states, regarding this increase, that it represented ‘(t)he 
change from rhetoric to intent beyond question’.
24. This is a necessarily truncated version of correspondence and contacts which occurred over 
some months in 1950 and early 1951. See NAA A518 J927/1 Development of the Territories. 
Organisational. Development Programme; A 518 K927/1 Development Papua and New Guinea. 
Administration’s Seven Year Plan for Development, A518 L927/1 Financial methods of encouraging 
development-Territories-General. See also newspaper coverage in News (Adelaide) 26/8/50; 
Telegraph (Sydney) 24/8/50; Herald (Melbourne) 26/8/50.
25. Murray ‘In retrospect, 1945-1952’ p.180
26. Hasluck A Time for Building pp. 11-12. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production 
p.215, also notes that Hasluck organised for his Parliamentary Under-Secretary to visit the Colonial 
Office in October 1952 to find out if the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund for British colonies 
was a suitable model for adoption by Australia for its territories.
27. NAA M1776/1 V.1 Minister for Territories Instructions to Department 4/6/1951 to 30/6/1952.
11/12/51 Minister to Secretary ‘Future Development of Territories’ p.2 which proposed the 
establishment of a Territories Development Fund of £100,000,000 to become available at the rate 
of £20,000,000 a year over five years’. As Hasluck subsequently explained: 'I took it for granted 
that, for a generation or so, services, utilities, amenities and the whole economic infrastructure
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Australia should not be applied to funding development for PNG. Nevertheless the 
outcome remained the same: no major development fund was established. For the 
remainder of his term as minister, Hasluck had to operate with the relatively short­
term annual and triennial budgetary cycles, as applied to other Australian 
government ministers and departments. The Minister’s subsequent success can be 
measured by the fact that, despite this restricted process of obtaining funding for 
development, Australian grants-in-aid continued to increase. By 1963, when 
Hasluck left office, £A40 million, approximately two-thirds of total Administration 
expenditure was paid out of Australian-raised revenue. Of the funds raised 
internally, import duties provided the largest component, while less than one third 
came from income and company taxes.28
Murray and Hasluck also agreed that political development required direct 
representation by indigenes in a reformed colonial siate. The iegal basis for the 
Legislative Council was established before Hasluck came to office, by the 1949 
Papua and New Guinea Act. The Legislative Council’s twenty-nine members 
included the Administrator’s representative, the Assistant Administrator as Council 
President, sixteen officers from the Administration, and nine non-official members 
to be nominated by the Administrator. The principal purpose, to continue 
Administration dominance of the legislative process, was transparent. Of the nine 
non-official members, there were three expatriates representing Christian missions, 
three commerce, mining and plantation representatives and three indigenes from 
Papua, the New Guinea mainland and New Guinea islands. Three non-officials 
elected by expatriate voters rounded off the Council’s membership.29
would have to be provided by Australia and not from the earnings of the Territory itself. Perhaps 
eventually the Territory would be able to service the long-term debts for such necessities, but even 
that would require Australian support.’ A Time for Building p.129. See also NAA M338/1, No.1 Visit 
Papua and New Gunea 26th July to 8th August, 1951 26/7/51 Copies of A.B.C. News Broadcasts 
Interview with Minister ‘...efforts would be made to have public expenditure in the Territory viewed 
in a different light from that affecting the mainland of Australia.’
28. Downs The Australian Trusteeship Table 6.2, pp. 122-123. For the long battle from 1957 which 
surrounded the introduction of personal (head tax) and then income tax, see Downs The Australian 
Trusteeship pp. 138-147, 186-195 and Hasluck A Time for Building pp.258-265. I
29. Cf. the claim made by Yash Ghai and Tony Regan The Law, Politics and Administration of 
Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea Monograph No.30 Boroko: The National Research Institute, 
1992, p.7: ‘A legislative council was set up in 1951, but it was dominated by the administrators and 
expatriate interests’.
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Nothing had been done about appointing members of the Council or holding 
elections before Hasluck became Minister. In mid-1951, Hasluck urged the 
Department and Administration to give priority to establishing the Council’s 
membership and setting an inauguration date. When the membership and the date 
of late 1951 were announced,30 a storm of criticism broke. The South Pacific Post, 
which frequently espoused the expatriate settler version of colonial nationalism, 
immediately claimed that it ‘was the Eddie Ward clique that slipped into the Act the 
most objectionable provision that out of a Council of 29 members only three would 
be elected by the general public’. As the editorial made clear, general public was a 
synonym for expatriate ‘private enterprise’.31 Apart from the insufficient ‘private 
enterprise’ representation, the Planters’ Association of New Guinea, based in 
Rabaul, also objected to the presence of three nominated indigenes.32
The Minister shrugged off the objections. He was supported by the chairman of the 
London Missionary Society in Papua, who hoped that this Council was a first step 
toward a more representative structure for which indigenes could elect 
representatives on a District basis.33 Hasluck pointed out that the composition was 
specified under the 1949 Act and before seeking an amendment, it should be given 
‘a trial in its present form’.34
Formulating and Applying Uniform Development
Countering Separatism, Centralizing Power and Strengthening Administration 
Apart from reinforcing his anti-colonialism, Hasluck left the colony after his first visit 
in mid-1951 with serious doubts about the local administration’s capacity to bring 
about development, despite the considerable changes which had occurred 
already.35 Some of this doubt arose from the level of funding available to sustain
30. South Pacific Post 27/7/51
31. 3/8/51
32. South Pacific Post 3/8/51
33. South Pacific Post 3/8/51
34. See NAA M338/1 No.1, Visit Papua and New Guinea 26th July to 8th August, 1951 6/8/51 
Radio summary of talk between Minister and members of Wau Advisory Council. For Hasluck’s 
version of the discussion which took place with Murray over the appointments, see A Time for 
Building pp.40-44
35. In 1949, while the legal distinction remained between Papua as an Australian colony and New 
Guinea as a UN Trust Territory, from July 1, 1949, the Territory of Papua and New Guinea was 
administered under the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949. Under the act, the Administrator was the
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intended activities. The numbers and abilities of the personnel available for the 
Department of Territories and the PNG Administration also caused concern for the 
Minister.
Murray epitomised an even more serious problem for Hasluck, much deeper than 
simply a clash of personalities, or the fact that Murray was not, in the view of 
Spender and Hasluck, a particularly good administrator. On his first visit Hasluck 
had noted ‘...an  underlying spirit of separatism and perhaps in some cases, of 
resentment against Australia...,36 which was ‘also apparent’ in Murray.37 Murray 
had developed a ‘reticence’ about involvement by the Minister and Department in 
the administration of PNG. According to Hasluck, Murray ‘regarded the rule of the 
Territory as a matter for him and not for the Minister to handle’.38 If, as Hasluck had 
deduced, separatism and resentment were more widely held than simply by the 
Administrator, his removal and replacement would not overcome the deeper 
problem of how to define and impose colonial authority along the lines the Minister 
determined were necessary to satisfy international trusteeship conditions.
The first steps taken by Hasluck involved the appointment of a like-minded 
department secretary, and an Administrator (Cleland) with substantial experience 
of PNG. From 1943 until 1945 Cleland had been effectively Chief of Staff of 
ANGAU, the military administration of those parts of PNG not under Japanese 
control. Cleland had also been chairman of the Production Control Board. Upon 
returning to Australia after the war, he again became active in conservative politics.
senior official in the Administration, who acted with the advice of the Executive Council, of nine 
members. The nine were an acting Government Secretary and the Secretary, acting Secretary, 
Director or acting Director for eight departments (Planning and Development, Public Health, 
Education, Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries, Native Labour, Treasury, Lands, Surveys and Mines, 
and Forests). As well there were 11 Committees, Boards and a Rural Production Advisory Council 
‘established to assist the Administrator’. Ten departments and seven branches were also 
established fora public service which had 1,272 personnel. NAA A518 H927/1 Development of the 
Territories. Organisational. Report on Present Conditions in Papua & New Guinea. (February 1950). 
See also David M Fenbury Practice without Policy: genesis of local government in Papua New 
Guinea Monograph No. 13 Second Edition Canberra: Development Studies Centre, ANU, 1980, 
pp.8-59
36. Hasluck A Time for Building p.14
37. A Time for Building p.15
38. A Time for Building p.15. Hasluck further stated (p.16) that Murray ‘developed an argument 
[presented when Hasluck visited PNG in July 1951: SM] for self-government which meant 
government by himself and his staff, who were to be left free to do good as they saw it’.
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He was appointed director of the federal secretariat of the Liberal Party and played 
an active role in building the party machine, which was important for the 1949 
campaign that resulted in the Liberal Party becoming the major partner In the 
governing coalition.39 Cleland was a Western Australian, from the State where 
Hasluck had won a seat.
Cleland, who had been Assistant Administrator since early 1951, and then Acting 
Administrator in June 1952 when Murray left, became Administrator in early 1953. 
Hasluck emphasised that this appointment did not represent a change of policy, 
which was ‘to protect and advance the welfare of the natives’.40 Until 1963, the 
triumvirate of Hasluck, Lambert and Cleland formed a powerful bloc at the head of 
the colonial administration.41
In order to ensure that the authority he intended to impose upon the Department 
and Administration had the appropriate basis in law, Hasluck also obtained advice 
about the constitutional-legal relationship between Australia and the colonial 
territory(ies).42 This advice supported Hasluck’s view that the Minister, under 
delegation from the Governor-General, held ultimate authority over the 
Department, the Administrator and Administration in PNG 43
A change originally proposed to the structure of the Administration in October 1950 
provided another early indication of Hasluck’s determination to assert control. 
Before Hasluck became Minister, two positions as Deputy Administrator had been 
advertised publicly but not filled. Instead the role of Government Secretary was
39. http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/bioqs/A130486b.htin ; H. N. Nelson, 'Cleland, Sir Donald 
Mackinnon (1901 - 1975)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, v.13, Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1993, pp 440-441.
40. A Time for Building p.52
41. Hasluck A Time for Building pp.53-57; Cleland ‘An Administrator Reflects’ in Inglis ed. The 
History of Melanesia pp.209-228
42. Hasluck A Time for Building p.23 contains the Minister’s view that the Papua and New Guinea 
Act 1949 was unsatisfactory, ‘one of the earliest post-war mistakes, not in purpose but in design’. 
Nevertheless the Minister concluded that by mid-951 ‘...I saw no prospect of returning to any other 
starting point... I accepted the Act as one of the facts of the situation.’
43. The advice confirmed Hasluck’s opinion that Murray held an erroneous view on the 
constitutional status of the Administrator, who, according to Hasluck, wanted to receive ‘Instructions’ 
from the Governor-General rather than directions from the Minister and Department. See A Time for 
Building p.16.
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strengthened and one Assistant Administrator, Cleland, appointed and based in 
Port Moresby while Murray’s own position was considered further.
Between Cleland’s appointment as Assistant Administrator and Murray’s departure, 
a request was made by a representative of European planter and commercial 
interests that the Assistant Administrator should be located in Rabaul, the centre of 
expatriate settler political activism. Hasluck rejected this proposal. In response to 
the demands for a degree of decentralisation, the Minister offered ‘devolution of 
responsibility to the District Offices, and a raising of the status and responsibilities 
of the District Commissioners’ .44 As will be shown below, even the elevation of 
District Commissioners (DCs) quickly resulted in consequences which had to be 
checked. Nor was it the last time that the Minister rebuffed attempts to locate key 
officials where they could be subjected more easily to the demands of expatriates 
commercially active in the colony.45
Strengthening Ministerial authority gave the Australian government, as trustee for 
New Guinea under the United Nations, greater capacity to fend off criticisms of its 
rule made in that forum. These criticisms were invariably along the lines that 
expatriate interests were being favoured and insufficient attention and resources 
were being committed to improving indigenous welfare.46 At the same time, the 
Minister saw strengthening the local administration as a major priority, a priority
44. A Time for Building pp.23-25. See also NAA M338/1 No. 17 Notes for Minister’s Visit to Papua 
and New Guinea May-June 1958 9/2/52 Hasluck to W.R. Paul, General Secretary, Planters 
Association of New Guinea, rejecting the suggestion made in a letter of 23/1/52.
45. NAA M338/1 No. 17 Notes for Minister’s Visit to Papua and New Guinea May-June 1958. See 
28/4/58 TM Wilton, President Rabaul Chamber of Commerce to Administrator. In the name of 
decentralising authority away from Port Moresby, Wilton asked for the appointment of a New 
Guinea Islands Regional Commissioner, to whom DCs would report, and a means for dealing with 
‘routine land matters...locally.’ Hasluck rejected this request. Departmental documents prepared for 
the Minister’s visit to PNG in mid-1958 also rebuffed claims that Rabaul, as a major agricultural and 
commercial centre, deserved priority over other ports and towns in the country.
46. See NAA M338/1 No.1, Visit Papua and New Guinea 265th July to 8th August, 1951 6/8/51 
Radio summary of talk between Minister and members of Wau Advisory Council, in which Hasluck 
asserted that the Commonwealth Government and not the United Nations was the constitutional 
authority for the colony. Hasluck ‘considered apprehension by Territory residents regarding United 
Nations interference in the domestic economy of New Guinea was without foundation.’ See also 
W.E.Tomasetti Australia and the United Nations: New Guinea Trusteeship Issues from 1946-1966 
New Guinea Research Bulletin No.36 Canberra and Boroko: New Guinea Research Unit, ANU, July 
1970
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which was maintained during his term of office, even as skilled labour shortages 
continued to plague efforts to improve standards.47
Another reason for strengthening administrative capacity in Australia and PNG 
arose from Hasluck’s view of policy and policy formulation. The Minister wanted the 
colonial administration, in Canberra and PNG, to bo active in further policy 
development. Policy to Hasluck was inseparable from administration.48 Due to this 
close connection, the Minister believed that policy formulation was something 
engaged in by all officials of the Department, and by extension of the colonial 
administration in PNG.49
This was not a populist view of policy formulation, where ‘Jack is as good as his 
master’. A prodigious worker and reader of correspondence Hasluck was ever 
aiert for officials in Canberra or PNG, who whether by personal inclination or as a 
result of immediate experience strayed from the main premises of his development 
policy. If all officials were to be involved in policy formulation, Hasluck had to have 
the capacity to initiate changes and adjudicate conflicts about policy and its 
implementation. Thus, despite his often fulsome praise of officials including 
Cleland,50 Minister Hasluck invariably admonished the Administrator as well as 
subordinate officials for proposing policy which did not follow what he regarded as
47. Hasluck A Time for Building pp.59-76, especially Chapter 7 The Bid for Funds and Staff;
Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.108-125, Chapter 6 ‘Building a more effective administration’; 
Porter Paul Hasluck: A Political Biography pp. 125-132
48. Hasluck’s 1976 explanation of his position in A Time for Building p.23 was that: ‘...the cast of 
my mind and the nature of my training had given me a strong opinion that good policy and good 
administration are inseparably intertwined and cannot grow in a healthy way apart from each other.
I have never seen much value come out of the back-room planning by persons who are not 
engaged in any way in the administrative task and I have seen much misplaced effort when the 
persons who did the thinking had no part in the doing and when those who had the task of doing 
were not encouraged to think.’
49. Hasluck said: “‘Policy development” is something that takes place as the result of a succession 
of acts performed by a wide range of people. Policy is built up by a number of decisions taking 
place over a period of time on a number of submissions, and the development of policy is not a job 
which can be confided to any one person or group of persons. I think one of the most dangerous 
and improper tendencies that is growing up in the Commonwealth Public service is this idea that 
certain officers established in certain positions have a job of developing a policy. I want the 
contribution to policy to come from the activities of every officer in the Dept and the process to be a 
continuous one at all levels.’ NAA M1776/1 ,Vol.1 Minister for Territories Instructions to 
Department^ 1/12/51 Hasluck to Secretary of Department ‘Proposed Staff re-organisation of the 
Department of Territories’
50. A Time for Building pp.53-55
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basic premises. In particular, Hasluck was well aware that certain officials were 
more disposed to encourage private enterprise and respond to expatriate demands 
than he was. All activities undertaken by the colonial administration were assessed 
according to whether, in Hasluck’s view, they helped to maintain household 
attachment to smallholdings at improved standards of living.51
One instance was the major road building programme which commenced soon
after Hasluck took office and played a major part in utilizing indigenous labour.
Speaking in the late 1960s about roads built from late 1952 in the Highlands
utilizing state funds, Cleland claimed: That was the start of the real development of
the Highlands...These roads were not so much for administrative purposes, but
more so to open up the country for development by private enterprise.’52
Subsequently, against Cleland’s version, Hasluck asserted that the initiative to
upgrade existing tracks into roads and highways arose out of a conversation
between Cleland and himself, as a consequence of failed efforts to get any support
in Cabinet for ‘our own loan works programme’.53 ‘[T]he upshot was a ministerial
direction that each district commissioner was to be instructed to encourage and
direct the building of roads in his district’.5'4 By Hasluck’s account, the Highlands
roads were part of a wider programme for the entire colony using local labour and
serving a different purpose from that specified by Cleland. As Hasluck stated:
These roads are being built with amazing cheapness and speed 
because of the help of the natives. Their purpose is chiefly 
administrative and they are developmental roads only in the senses that 
they provide access.55
51. However on occasion Hasluck too contributed to uncertainty about the place of largeholdings by 
seeming to adopt an instrumental approach similar to Spender’s. See A Time for Building p.136 for 
a report of an April 1952 press statement by the Minister which while stressing the importance of 
village agriculture, pointed out that ‘it could not alone meet all the opportunities for agricultural 
development...I was looking both to the individual settler and to the big plantation companies for a 
substantial contribution of capital, enterprise and effort to promote tea, rubber, fibre crops, coffee, 
cocoa and rice’. Within two years the Minister would be forced to face the consequences of this 
seeming ambiguity and decisively resolve development policy in favour of smallholder primacy (see 
below).
52. Cleland ‘An Administrator reflects’, p.223
53. A Time for Building p.147
54. A Time for Building p.148. This account fits more broadly with the uniform development policy 
being formulated for the entire colony, rather than the ‘uneven development’ views of some senior 
officials in PNG to which Hasluck was opposed (see below).
55. A Time for Building p.150. Hasluck’s version of events is supported in the account provided by 
(Dame) Rachel Cleland who describes an October 1951 visit she made to the Highlands with the 
Administrator. In Pathways to Independence; Stories of Official & Family Life in Papua New Guinea
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Hasluck also saw the potential for clashes between villagers, who regarded the 
roads as ‘their roads’ and ‘Europeans [planters and traders] who had done nothing 
to build the roads [and] started to cut them up with vehicles carrying commercial 
loads'.66
Administrative reform and centralizing power in the Minister was intended to 
strengthen Hasluck’s capacity to rule over the Department in Canberra and the 
Administration in PNG, even as each was strengthened. He also wanted to build 
up the capacity of the Administration so it could check the inherent advantages of a 
department located in Canberra, the capital and administrative centre of Australian 
government. He resisted attempts to integrate the Administration with the 
Department, taking what he regarded as ‘perhaps...(a) too classical...approach to 
the structure of government’,57 that is insisting on the separate legal-constitutional 
entities under different acts of the Australian parliament. This separation, and the 
constitutional requirement that both the Department and the Administration in PNG 
reported to and took instruction from the Minister, placed Hasluck in an especially 
powerful position. Nothing exemplifies the strength of the Minister’s position more 
than how during the early 1950s elements of the previous idea of development 
were taken and reformed into government policy. The thesis now turns to the 
detailed policy position, uniform or even development, which more than anything 
else came to define colonial development in the 1950s and early 1960s.
Taking Advice
Despite Hasluck’s dominance, it is important to recognise that the process by 
which policy was formulated as well as its direction involved more than the views of 
the Minister. In the case of the role of local native councils or local government
from 1951-1975 Cottesloe: self-published, 1985, pp.68-69, Rachel Cleland reports how DC Ian 
Downs pressed her husband the Administrator for shovels and money to join the ‘rough roads (that) 
stretched out from many villages....and link them through to Kainantu’. According to her, Downs 
‘was enthusiastically selling his idea for a road system on many grounds: better native 
administration, communications, village development and less reliance on the expensive air 
transport...’ In late 1951, there were no expatriate plantations in the area.
56. A Time for Building p.149; cf. Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.181-184; Ian Downs The 
Last Mountain: A Life in Papua New Guinea St Lucia: University of Queensland Press,
1986,pp.230-251, Chapter 14 The High Road’
57. A Time for Building p.55
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councils, a senior Administration official in PNG, David Fenbury was for a while 
especially influential (see below). Without much personal knowledge of PNG, the 
Minister sought advice from others, including academics at the recently established 
Australian National University. In 1951 and 1953, the Department of Territories was 
provided with two documents prepared by senior ANU academics.58 In October- 
November 1951, Notes on New Guinea was written by Oscar Spate, Jim Davidson 
and Raymond Firth, an economic geographer, historian and economic 
anthropologist respectively after a three week visit to the colony.59 The Notes set 
out many of the themes followed in the later Report of a Working Committee of the 
ANU, prepared by Spate, anthropologist Cyril Belshaw and economist Trevor 
Swan.60
In the Notes, Spate dismissed the prospect of any substantial expansion of 
‘economic soldier settlement’, in case it led to a ‘poor white problem’, and 
dismissed ‘White Melanesia [as] a pipe dream’.61 Spate and Firth both noted the 
extent of the growth of indigenous agricultural production, and its unevenness, just 
six years after the war ended. While Spate pointed to a specific instance of a Tolai 
cocoa grower with 4,500 trees planted, Firth indicated that ‘[t]he native 
entrepreneur-capitalist is beginning to be a recognisable figure’.62 In the Sepik, 
Bougainville and the Gazelle, there were men with reported incomes of £A1,000 a 
year.63
58. I have used the expression ‘the Department’ rather than the Minister regarding the two 
documents, since Hasluck A Time for Building p.140 only refers to the second document, although 
both are held in the Department’s ministerial files. Given that Hasluck was an assiduous reader of 
files, and was happy ‘to call [Spate] a close personal friend’, it seems unlikely that the Minister did 
not also see the earlier Notes. While Hasluck suggests that the delay to March 1953 in preparing 
and presenting the second document meant that ‘it describes a situation at about the time I took 
office [May 1951] rather than at the time the report was dated’ it seems very likely that the views of 
Spate, at least, and most likely Davidson, Firth, Belshaw and Swan as well helped shape uniform 
development almost from the time Hasluck became Minister.
59 NAA M336/1 No. Notes on New Guinea October-November 1951.
60 NAA M1775/1 No.6 SPATE-BELSHAW-SWAN-Report on economic structure of Papua and New 
Guinea. See Hasluck A Time for Building pp. 140-141, for information on the genesis and 
preparation of, as well as the reception accorded to, the Spate, Belshaw and Swan Report in the 
Department of Territories.
61. Notes ‘Resources and Economic Potentialities’ p.9 "’Economic soldier settlement’ is a popular 
cry amongst the non-official European community; it is probably a contradiction in terms, and an 
effort to implement this demand would probably result in the formation of a “poor white problem’” .
62. Notes ‘Some Observations: Native Social and Economic Change’ p.15
63. Notes ‘Some Observations: Native Social and Economic Change’ p. 17, Firth made an important 
point, that the ‘rise of native middlemen, of native petty capitalists, of native entrepreneurs
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Davidson recognised the Australian government’s difficulty in administering PNG, 
as ‘an example of old-style colonial rule - one of the last in the world...in an age of 
non-European nationalism’ .64 He also recommended defining and clarifying the 
authority of the Minister, the Department and Administrator, while stressing the 
need to reorganise and strengthen the central administration in the colony. The 
latter was necessary because of the slowness and difficulty of communications 
between officials spread over the colony.
The Report, described subsequently by Hasluck as ‘a basic document in any study 
of the post-war economic policy in Papua and New Guinea’ ,65 repeated much of 
the direction taken in the Notes. The later document also stressed the importance 
of fulfilling trusteeship obligations and ruled out any substantial expansion of 
largehoidings or ‘economic soldier settlement’. Under the ‘paramountcy’ of native 
interests, the academics instead urged a ‘revolution’ for indigenous agriculture so 
that households went beyond ‘merely feeding] and housing]’ themselves.66 Such 
a change required ‘intensification, diversification, and eventually more regional 
specialization’.6' Swan, who produced the first detailed accounts for the colony, re­
emphasised the need for continuing flows of funds from the Australian government. 
Net private capital formation was very small, perhaps even negative, when 
plantations and mines were depreciating assets with little new planting or 
investment in up-to-date equipment.68
The academics also included a section on ‘Possible Social Dangers’, which 
stressed the need for anticipatory action to secure development, even if the 
dangers had not yet appeared in PNG. As they warned:
Native economic development must be undertaken always with the
prospect in view that specific social evils may emerge and may require
organizing the labour of others’ while just beginning, could be expected to result in competitive 
struggles ‘with one another [and] with the cooperative organizations which aim at applying a 
different principle to economic affairs’.
64. Notes p.2
65. A Time for Building p. 141
66. Report par.7.6
67. Report par. 11.3
68. Report pars.36.4 and 37.4
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counter-action...The emergence of an unproductive rentier group, of 
oriental-style landlordism, of a habit of credit or usury, of community 
leaders becoming local bosses, of sweated labour, and of unprotected 
machinery can be foreseen and avoided. It is important not to be too 
hasty in introducing western property concepts before local society is 
ready with the necessary controls. Payment of cash rents, primogeniture 
in inheritance, and the ability to alienate land individually, would, for 
instance, lead to social chaos if introduced overnight.69
Spate, Belshaw and Swan favoured ‘action’, and avoiding the ‘inhibitory effect’ of 
‘this planning-fixation’, an expression for which they provided no specific reference 
or instance.70 However in December 1952 Hasluck had fulminated against what he 
saw as a tendency of the colonial administration to produce proposals but little 
action so this advice, as well as other recommendations, would have been music 
to the Minister’s ears.71
The Minister was also capable of ignoring advice which did not fit with his view of 
development policy. A specific direction favoured by the ANU academics went 
against the attention already being paid to more marginal areas of the country, and 
was rejected. Using the supposed template of Dutch colonialism in ‘the Indies’ 
especially Java, their Report advocated ‘the full development of two or three 
favourable regions; the introduction and fostering to the full of two or three crops’.
In short, there should be ‘concentration on attainable objectives and firm 
priorities’.72 Nevertheless, the over-all contribution of the ANU academics, 
particularly Spate, toward the formulation of uniform development as colonial policy 
was considerable and is reflected in each of the principal pillars of the evolving 
policy.
The thesis now provides an outline of uniform development and shows how the 
main components arose. It also stresses their inter-connectedness. A project to
69. Report par.25.1
70. Report par.2.5
71. NAA M1776/1 V.2 Minister for Territories Instructions to Department 1/7/52 to 31/12/52 
19/12/52 Minister to Secretary. Hasluck noted on a proposal to expand indigenous rice 
production in the Madang and Sepik Districts: This is lamentable. We keep on drawing up 
proposals and approving them in principle. I want to approve some action. I want people to 
start growing rice. Subject to the availability of funds in the current financial year, action should 
start not later than January 5, 1953’. [Underlining in original.]
72. Report par.2.5
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expand rice and cocoa production for markets could, for example, also satisfy a 
principal priority of agrarian development by stimulating the production of 
immediately consumed crops to such an extent that surplus beyond household 
needs soon appeared in local markets.
Uniform Development’s Pillars
Homogeneity through Law and Order. Justice and Education 
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that after World War II colonial rule 
continued to be challenged by ‘cargo cults’. Because cults often appeared in 
economically more marginal areas, they pushed the colonial administration to pay 
greater attention to the evenness of development efforts. As well, it has been 
previously pointed out that there were areas of the colony, particularly in the central 
highlands, where colonial authority did not yet encompass all of the people. 
Extending coioniai rule to these areas also spread Administration resources more 
widely among populations which were not as commercially or politically advanced 
as other indigenes.73
During Spender’s term as Minister, the goal was established that by 1955 colonial 
authority, specifically law and order, would be extended to all areas of the colony. 
Hasluck retained the objective, which referred primarily to the headwaters of the 
Sepik River and populous parts of the Central Highlands. The establishment of law 
and order could be seen as the precondition for promoting welfare measures,74 an 
objective shared by Spender and Hasluck. However at least as importantly, the 
Minister also saw the absence of colonial authority as an indication of the 
unevenness of development which had to be overcome. Despite opposition within 
the Administration to the policy of extending authority to all areas in a few years,75 
the Minister’s decision prevailed.
73 See also Hawksley ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM Chs.7-10
74. Downs The Australian Trusteeshipjpp.98-99; Hasluck A Time for Building pp.77-79.
75. A Time for Building pp.78-79. Subsequently the Minister acknowledged that in its opposition the 
local Administration had more accurately assessed the extent of the task, which was still incomplete 
at the end of the 1950’s. See Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.268-269, which provides four 
maps showing the location of as well as the reduction in frontier ‘restricted areas’ from 1951 to 
1970. Most of the reduction in area occurred during the 1950’s under uniform development, with a 
further substantial diminution between 1961 and 1966.
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In an early rebuttal of the proposition that Australian policy was aimed at retarding
political development in the interest of maintaining an indefinite period of colonial
administration, Hasluck regarded the diversity of the indigenous population as an
impediment to future independence. Instead, he claimed that:
a sense of unity and some measure of homogeneity among this very 
diverse population was an essential foundation for any viable and 
equitable self-government.76
A similar intent, to secure a greater measure of homogeneity, lay in the design of 
the judicial system, which was intended to combine justice and administration.77 
Courts for Native Matters in Papua and Courts for Native Affairs in New Guinea 
tried to apply local customs and join these with over-arching rules, jurisdiction and 
procedures established centrally. While only applying to Papua New Guineans, 
and thus ‘racially discriminatory’, these courts ‘provided an expedient way of taking 
the law to the people and enforcing the authority of the Administration over a wide 
range of affairs’.78 As the drive to self-government gathered pace in the late 1950s, 
the necessity of replacing such a manifestly deficient judicial system became a 
major priority, but for the moment it served the objective.
The pursuit of homogeneity was also apparent in education, health and agricultural 
extension policies and programmes. During the 1950s the unsatisfactory condition 
of indigenous education and the very limited number of public schools drew official 
attention. Furthering indigenous education had political as well as economic 
purposes. Emphasising the skills suitable for agricultural production and otherwise 
improving the indigenous capacity to labour was central to the expansion of 
primary education across the colony. Expanding primary education was also 
designed to meet the political purpose of ensuring that different people from a wide
76. A Time for Building p.78; Hasluck also stated (p.78) that having been struck by the diversity of 
the people he had ‘a stubborn doubt about either the practical wisdom or the justice of excluding 
perhaps half the population of the country from the benefits of the first intensive effort, although 
some officers of the Administration did try to convince me that the coastal peoples were the most 
enterprising and intelligent part of the population and were the “born rulers” of the land.’ See also 
Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp. 126-128
77. A Time for Building p.78
78. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.148
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range of areas would have near-identical opportunities in a self-governing 
country.79
The colony-wide emphasis on smallholder agriculture also had a homogenising 
effect, given that this priority was designed to improve living standards across the 
colony through increases in household productivity. Securing ‘village life' on the 
basis of relatively undifferentiated family labour processes applied to smallholdings 
was intended to prevent the breakdown of community.80 This was not a policy for 
economic and political stagnation, but of development through administrative effort 
which would increase production and improve living standards.
Administrative action to coordinate and supervise household production 
If a smallholder in the Highlands and a smallholder in the Sepik were to produce 
crops with a similar labour content applied to ‘their land’, state coordination and 
supervision to raise productivity of households while maintaining attachment to 
land was essential. So too was sustaining household family labour processes 
which involve(d) divisions of labour along age, gender, strength, skill and other 
lines. For the late colonial developers who coordinated and supervised the 
scheme of smallholder production, these divisions were preferable to the divisions 
of industrialized production, particularly those requiring a landless proletariat, wage 
labour and a class of capitalists owning and operating largeholdings. Since 
households were already producers of crops for immediate consumption, 
administration attentions were directed at raising this output by providing advice 
about cultivation practices and soil fertility, crops grown -  including the distribution 
of improved strains and new crops -  and marketing. Considerable attention was
79. NAA M1776/1 V.8 Minister for Territories Instructions to Department 1/7/55 to 31/12/55 18/10/55 
Minister to Secretary. When the Department of Native Affairs was being established in the colony, 
Hasluck emphasised that: ‘I have made it an aim of our policy that the people in the outlying areas, 
such as the Sepik and the Fly River delta, have to be brought up to a level of education comparable 
with that of the natives of Port Moresby or New Britain so that they are not left behind in the 
eventual progress towards self-government and placed in a position of subservience to the more 
fortunate of their fellow countrymen. We are not labouring in Papua and New Guinea simply to hand 
over their destinies to a few “smart boys" and “shrewd heads” from Moresby and Rabaul. Similarly 
we have to make sure that the women are not left behind in the general progress’.
80. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production] ‘Contesting community’
116
given to the development of agricultural extension services and designing projects 
for particular crops.
In the earliest phase of uniform development, raising the production of food for 
local consumption, marketed and non-marketed was emphasised. Concern at the 
rapid increase in food imports, especially rice, and the implications for self- 
sufficiency stimulated an ordering of priorities.81 The colonial administration was 
required to give equal importance to the production of non-marketed crops, 
including vegetables for immediate household consumption, as to the production of 
export crops. An early example of the success of this emphasis was provided in 
1954 from the project for the expansion of indigenous production in the Madang 
and Sepik Districts.82
This supervision aiso meant revising the Native Labour Ordinance to deal with the 
undesirable as well as desirable consequences of wage employment for indigenes. 
The Minister emphasised the need for administrative attention to be paid to the 
problem raised by casual employment increasing at faster rate than contract (ie. 
longer-term) employment. Because of the threat that casualisation posed to 
community, the Minister sought to find a means of checking ‘the whole position of 
casual labour and the growing number of natives who are being divorced from 
village life’.83 Hasluck refused to allow ‘native labour policy’ to be subordinated to
81. Hasluck A Time for Building p.130 states: ‘Against this background [of increased food imports: 
SM] I stressed repeatedly that the improvement of agriculture meant in the future a high priority for 
the production of food. This meant primarily better gardening by native gardeners and their use of 
new crops, new methods and new implements.’ Unfortunately, despite the availability of major 
holdings of Departmental and Administration records in Canberra and Port Moresby which could be 
used to document the success or otherwise of Hasluck’s attempts to stress food production, there is 
still no substantial study that utilizes the written sources to assess the effects and effectiveness of 
policy and practice for food production across the entire colony.
82. NAA A518/1 C2/1/1 Advancement of Native Agriculture-Papua & New Guinea 1954-1956 
27/3/54 W.L.Conroy, Acting Chief of the Division of Agricultural Extension to the Acting Director of 
DASF, reported that: ‘In the Amele-Gogol area, which has been the longest under the influence of 
the project, we now have concrete evidence that in spite of the attention to crops, such as rice and 
cocoa, native food production is now at a much higher level than before the project was started.
The Acting District Commissioner, Madang, told me during my visit last month that the market for 
native foods in the Madang area is now completely glutted and that he is exploring outlets for 
exports to other parts of the Territory’.
83. NAA M331/1 Item 74 Native Labour Ordinance Papua and New Guinea 1/12/52 Minute from 
Minister Hasluck to Secretary, Department of Territories. Hasluck was not the only powerful 
Australian concerned with this trend. See NAA A518 B822/1/6 Papua & New Guinea...Finance. 
Establishment of Banking Facilities 1/10/53 H.C.Coombs Governor of Commonwealth Bank to
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the needs of private employers, emphasising the importance of fixed term 
agreements for ‘regulated rotation’ between smallholdings and wage employment. 
He also wanted state provision of technical education to increase the skills which 
would make it possible for Papua New Guineans to move out of low-paid unskilled 
labour positions.8'1
Coordinating and supervising smallholder production also required further 
development of native village councils, subsequently local government councils, 
which had been first established at the end of the 1940s. Their establishment 
followed a major change in British colonial policy after 1947. The Colonial Office 
abandoned what had been termed indirect rule, exerting colonial authority through 
appointed indigenes.85 The change was closely followed by the Administration in 
PNG and especially by David Feinberg, later Fenbury whom Huntley Wright 
appropriately describes as ‘the chief architect of the Local Government Council 
system’ in the Australian colony.80
Fenbury had been present during the formation of the new post-war British colonial 
policy, visiting East Africa and on secondment to the Colonial Office when the 
change was occurring.87 He intended to construct local councils as instruments of 
central administration control, not institutions for training indigenes in self- 
government.88 Nor were the councils representative vehicles to be captured by the 
‘rising class of more astute and realistic entrepreneurs [which] is slowly but surely
Hasluck on the importance of village life following from his observation that a ‘proletariat’ was being 
formed in and around Port Moresby. Coombs recognised the difficulties of formulating 
administrative action, asking for Administration plans for dealing with ‘danger and source of 
deterioration in native standards as well as providing a medium in which difficult and anti-social 
influences could grow. On the other hand, an increasing native population close to major townships 
and “capitalist” enterprises is necessary for their development’.
84. A Time for Building pp. 160-161
85. Hasluck seems not to have been aware of this change, retaining his own undergraduate 
‘prejudice’ against what he termed ‘the Lugard gospel of “indirect rule” as expounded and applied in 
West Africa’. Finding ‘that the British colonial practice in Africa was much quoted [in PNG] by those 
few officers who thought at all about political advancement’, Hasluck’s out-dated view seems to 
have stimulated further his opposition to the British colonial experience as being at all applicable to 
Australian development policy for PNG. See A Time for Building p.165
86. Wright ‘Economic or Political Development’ p.194.
87. Fenbury Practice without Policy p.16
88. Cf. Wright ‘Economic or Political Development’ p. 194; Robert Waddell ‘Local Government Policy 
in Papua New Guinea from 1949 to 1973’ Australian Journal of Politics and History V.XXV, No.2, 
1979, p.186.
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wrestling leadership from the traditional elders’.89 As much as councils had
indigenous members, colonial officials -including DCs and District Officers (DOs) -
supervised their activities closely. Wright’s conclusion regarding the policy under
which these institutions were first established is that:
The primary objective of local government policy was to maintain 
indigenous attachment to land under conditions of intensified economic 
activity.90
The extent to which councils became a forum for tussles between officials and 
members of the rising class of indigenous businessmen was soon apparent. When 
the local government policy had been launched in 1950, the Gazelle Peninsula had 
been chosen as the chief testing ground, where the first three councils had been 
set up. Establishment of the councils was supervised by the Senior Native 
Authorities Officer, who was based in the area. Subsequently, as a start was being 
made to setting up councils in other locations, including Hanuabada in urban Port 
Moresby, the policy to establish councils was extended to other parts of the 
Gazelle Peninsula where Tolai lived. Almost immediately, organised opposition 
appeared, with its leadership including a wealthy Tolai, one of the 
‘entrepreneurs’.91 The continued opposition to councils and the introduction of a 
head tax to pay for their operations eventually led in August 1958 to a violent 
confrontation at Navuneram, where two Tolai villagers were killed.92 Throughout
89. NAA M331/1 No.35 D.Feinberg-Correspondence 17/4/56 D.F. ‘Notes on Native Policy’ to 
Director, Department of Native Affairs, copy to Minister. Cf. Ghai and Regan The Law, Politics and 
Administration of Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea’ p.7, where it is claimed that: ‘Although 
these councils were supposed to provide an exercise in self-government, they had limited powers 
and were seen as an administrative arm of the central government...Denied administrative and 
financial resources, the local councils and the area authorities failed to democratise administration’.
90. Wright ‘Economic or Political Development’ p.200. [Italics in original]. As is noted below, this 
initial objective became less important by the late 1950s, when changes in smallholder agriculture 
and the Minister’s greater concern for councils to play a political role in indigenous development 
shifted the emphasis away from councils being primarily economic instruments.
91. NAA M331/1, No.35 D.Fienberg-Correspondence 17/4/56 ‘Notes on Native Policy’ p.10 
describes ‘the most notorious of the Tolai entrepreneurs, Mano of Nawuneram...(who) has 
bolstered his position by political activity which is essentially anti-administration in character...’ Cf. 
Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.137-147 describes the central role played from 1951 through 
to 1958 by Manoa ‘a leader of the anti-council movement’ at Navuneram. For a more recent 
description of Manoa’s commercial and political roles, see Lowe Smallholder Agrarian Change 
Chapter 6 ‘Social Innovation’
92. Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp. 136-147 discusses in detail the various factors behind the 
opposition, including intra-Tolai cleavages, indigenous ambitions and incipient anti-colonialism. On 
the specific case of opposition at Navunaram, led by Manoa, see also Lowe Smallholder Agrarian 
Change pp. 152-156, where the reasons for opposition included concerns that an additional layer of 
government would further marginalise Tolais from the central administration, a belief that there were
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the 1950s, as councils were set up in other areas, maintaining their economic role 
for the extension of smallholder activity under close official supervision became 
more important, as is shown in the final section of this chapter.
As was the case with local councils, scrutiny and direction was provided for other 
organisations formed to extend commercialisation of household consumption. The 
need to check the rise of indigenous accumulators and limit the extent of anti­
colonial activism were seen as necessary corollaries of higher production on 
smallholdings and improved welfare for the bulk of the population.
From the late 1940s, cooperatives and rural progress societies had also been part 
of official plans for raising household production and consumption.93 As Wright 
concludes:
The post-war model of co-operation adopted in Papua New Guinea
drew extensively from British practice in Africa and Asia.94
This model was central to the doctrine of colonial trusteeship, which rejected 
spontaneous indigenous activity as an adequate basis for cooperative operations 
and stressed the importance of administration efforts. While attempts were made to 
draw parallels between a supposed ‘’’communal type of living common to all village 
life’” , and ‘”the idea of the co-operative effort’” , 95 the point of drawing the parallel 
was to develop another means, co-operatives, by which to increase household 
production and consumption without encouraging migratory labour, which would 
destroy communal living or community.96
insufficient qualified Tolais to run councils efficiently, and the use of the Gazelle Peninsula for an 
administrative experiment. Collection of taxes to run local governments also raised objections.
93. Catherine Snowden ‘Copra Co-operatves’ in Donald Denoon and Snowden eds. A time to plant 
and a time to uproot: A History of Agriculture in Papua New Guinea Port Moresby: Institute of 
Papua New Guinea Studies, undated, pp. 185-204
94. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production p.312
95. State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production p.313, citing the Registrar of Co-operative 
Section within the Department of District Services and Native Affairs C.J.Millar from a February 
1950 document on the Native Co-operative Movement in PNG.
96. A point also made by Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production p.314.
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Co-operatives flourished initially, and their formation helped in checking indigenous 
accumulation while spreading the availability of goods for purchase.97 However 
their role in increasing indigenous production of export quality crops was very 
limited. Co-operatives also contributed little to extending the range of crops grown 
and marketed by smallholders, since most produce marketing was of crops, 
including coconuts and copra, already grown and processed by smallholders. Even 
where co-operatives in rural areas aimed to combine trading, providing consumer 
goods sought by households, with production the former activity invariably 
dominated. As Wright notes, of the 134 rural co-operatives registered in 1953, 123 
purported to be both producer and consumer co-ops.98
Despite an initial important presence, with consumer-producer societies 
contributing to the first post-war increase in the indigenous marketing of copra, the 
societies had difficulties controlling ihe quality of the copra purchased for 
processing and competition from private traders. Consequently cooperatives were 
unable to attain a major position in marketing smallholder copra. When 
international prices declined from 1953, co-operatives became even less important 
for the processing and export of indigenous copra.99 Most came to rely upon selling 
consumer goods to smallholders in order to survive.
Co-operatives were also regarded unsympathetically by key officials, including the 
Minister and Fenbury. Hasluck had a more political-ideological opposition to 
cooperatives and the support these received within the Administration and from 
missions.100 Fenbury, however, was concerned that these organisations could not
97. State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production pp.317-322. Snowden ‘Copra Co-operatives’ 
p.190 describes the blocking role in these terms: ‘By the 1950s it seemed that the Administration 
had set up bureaucratic devices to restrict local business initiative rather than to encourage it.’
98. State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production p.318
99. Cf. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production pp.322-328; Snowden ‘Copra Co­
operatives’ pp. 194-204.
100. A Time for Building p.152 details Hasluck’s ambivalence toward cooperatives, emphasising the 
extent of Administration support for their expansion by the mid-1950s but also his continued ‘doubt 
whether the co-operative movement was the whole answer to native participation in economic 
enterprises’ in the face of the emergence of the ‘exceptional native’ as well as ‘the native 
community produc(ing) its own tycoons, mobilizing their own families or clans..’ See also p.268 
where Hasluck refers to the co-operative movement ‘having an economic effect but may be failing 
to have its full social effect because of the narrowness of the co-operative attack, or may even at
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deal with what had become the central problem of smallholder production, how to 
raise productivity, or levels of per capita production.
The final section of the chapter takes up the late 1950s shift in uniform 
development, a change which in some respects was forced upon the colonial 
government by the successful expansion of smallholder production and 
consumption during the first period of uniform development. However first it is 
necessary to deal with the third pillar of uniform development policy, the emphasis 
upon applying administrative efforts comprehensively and in an egalitarian manner 
across the colony without favouring particular districts and peoples.
Comprehensive development
Uniform development meant, as Wright has indicated, ‘an implicit notion of 
gradualism’. Citing Hasluck from a 1954 statement on iand settlement, Wright 
points out that ‘gradual development’ meant the slowing “down of economic 
development until the indigenous people could share in it on a more equitable 
footing’” .101 The statement was made in the context of reforms to the administration 
of land policy which arose out of the rush by expatriates to obtain land in the 
central highlands, but also represented a broader policy position. As the Minister 
re-emphasised in the mid-1950s, comprehensiveness meant limiting unevenness 
across the colony, which required:
distributing administrative activity widely over the Territory...avoiding a 
concentration of expenditures in the established centres and of 
increasing the pace of welfare work among the women.102
The uniformity of opportunity to which Hasluck referred regarding education policy 
had a liberal basis which also underpinned the intent to make uniform development 
comprehensive. As well as the advice Hasluck had received from the ANU
times be producing undesirable social effects’, that is, by its stifling of individual household 
endeavours.
101. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production p.220
102. See also M331/1, No.2 Discussions with Administrator in Canberra February 1956 Notes on 
Discussions held in the Office of the Minister for Territories, 1st and 2nd February 1956 pp.13-15. 
The Minister directed that the Administration must be conscious at all times of the need for a 
spread of the development effort...The Minister said that he would like to stress the matter of the 
advancement of women’s education to make up a leeway in which women have found themselves 
in Papua and New Guinea. He would like to have a report from the Administrator on the present 
position in this matter and the progress that is being made’.
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academics about the dangers of producing a ‘poor white problem’, he had been 
warned about the drive for economic and political advance by wealthy indigenes. 
The possibilities that administrative support would be provided to either or both 
phenomena struck at Hasluck’s liberal concern for the rights of ‘small property’ 
owners.103 In the PNG context, where the focus of concern was households in 
occupation of smallholdings, development policy intended that administrative effort 
would be applied across the whole colony to secure as well as extend rights to 
these particular Papua New Guineans.
Consequently, even if cocoa was first taken up by wealthy indigenes on the 
Gazelle Peninsula, agricultural extension services were directed to give substantial 
support to smallholder production of the crop in this area and also to the many 
other areas in the colony deemed suitable for growing cocoa. With food production 
for immediate and locally marketed consumption accorded equal importance to 
export crops, comprehensiveness required a similar colony-wide attention by 
DASF and other departments to a wide range of crops.
While one aspect of evenness was positive, to ensure that as much as possible 
households in all areas were provided with comparable services and resources, 
the second was clearly negative. There was an equally comprehensive application 
of state effort and resources to check the advance of particular peoples in specific 
areas. Hasluck’s 1955 concern that education policy should not favour the ‘smart 
boys’ and ‘shrewd heads’ of Port Moresby and Rabaul has previously been noted. 
In the case of agriculture, areas of the country which were more advanced, 
including the Gazelle Peninsula, were not to be more favoured. Instead colonial 
policy was to favour a process of catching up, which meant greater attention by the 
administration to areas which were less developed commercially.
A challenge to uniform development as policy and administration
While colonial policy from the 1940s until the mid-1960s, with few exceptions
systematically prevented further substantial alienation of land for ownership by
103. A Time for Building pp.217-218
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large plantation firms, there was less certainty regarding European settlement by 
owner-occupiers. Considerable official encouragement was given to European 
settlement in the decade after World War II.104 These farmers and would-be 
farmers were often favoured by colonial administrators, from Colonel Murray 
onwards and including Minister Hasluck. While this was in part a response to 
political pressures in Australia, the expatriate owner-occupiers were also 
encouraged in the belief that their presence would have a demonstration effect for 
indigenous smallholder agriculture. While after the war the most important focus 
for further land alienation became the Highlands, comprehensiveness as one of the 
defining elements of uniform development meant that the settler demands in one 
region had implications for over-all colonial policy.
With the prominent exception of freehold largeholdings obtained before World War 
II, and alienated land utilised for administration purposes, the bulk of land in PNG 
was held under customary title, secured by colonial state authority.105 This form of 
title, whose seeming vagueness was initially its principal advantage, met the 
general objective of agrarian development, to protect indigenous land rights 
through the exercise of colonial authority.106 Restraining expatriate settlers’ 
demands for land had two purposes. Present indigenous occupants would not be 
pushed off their land to satisfy expatriate ambitions. There would remain an 
adequate supply of land for future indigenous requirements, including from migrant
104. Timms The Post World War Two Colonial Project and Australia Planters in Papua New Guinea
105. Peter Larmour Land Policy and Decolonisation in Melanesia: A Comparative Study of Land 
Policymaking and Implementation before and after Independence in Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu Unpublished PhD Sydney: Macquarie University, 1987. Figures which are 
often cited for the proportion of land which remained subject to customary title once alienation for 
plantations and government facilities occurred, such as 97%, are of limited use for several reasons. 
Apart from difficulties of precise measurement in often rugged terrain, this figure does not deal with 
such issues as soil fertility, rainfall frequency and volume, accessibility etc. As Peter Quinn 
‘Agriculture, Land Tenure and Land Law to 1971’ in Donald Denoon and Catherine Snowden eds. A 
time to plant and a time to uproot A History of Agriculture in Papua New Guinea Port Moresby: 
Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, n.d. p. 171, notes: ‘(Alienated land) represents roughly 3% 
of all land in the country but includes a much more significant proportion of the best plantation land 
and valuable urban property’. Hence the use of the imprecise expression ‘the bulk of land’ here to 
refer to the amount of land held under customary tenure.
106. Hasluck A Time for Building p.114, notes how the Minister commenced with an awareness of 
the importance of ‘lands policy and administration’ even though he ‘knew little or nothing about 
lands administration except in the setting of the early Australian colonies.’ Nevertheless, he 
‘endorsed without question the long-established policy of protecting native land rights’.
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workers who left the highlands to work in coastal and islands regions and 
subsequently wanted to return home to take up coffee growing.
By the early 1950s, as land pressure increased particularly where cash cropping 
was taking hold, it became obvious that erecting barriers against removing land 
from customary tenure, providing ‘safeguards against unlimited alienation of native 
lands’ in Hasluck’s terms, required further legal and administrative changes. In 
1952 the Native Lands Commission was established under the previous year’s 
Native Land Registration Ordinance to determine ‘land rights as between natives 
themselves...[and to protect] native lands from encroachment by non-natives’.107 
Problems immediately arose from the complexity of indigenous ownership and 
occupation of land.108 The administration of alienation in circumstances where a 
measure of decentralised authority over land negotiations and purchase already 
applied aiso caused difficulties. The terms of indigenous smallholding ownership 
and occupation remained a running sore (see below), but alienation for expatriate 
settlement required an immediate solution.
A ‘land rush’ took place, particularly between Goroka and Kainantu in the Eastern 
Highlands District. Between 1952 and 1954, nearly 3,500 acres was alienated for 
European settlement in the District. Comprising about three quarters of the total 
area alienated between 1949 and 1960, the major expansion occurred at precisely
107. Both quotes are from Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production p.408, citing an 
internal Department of Territories memo of April 16, 1953 from Hasluck. Cf. Quinn ‘Agriculture,
Land Tenure and Land Law to 1971’ p. 174 who suggests that the Native Land Registration 
Ordinance, as well as the Commission established under the Ordinance ‘would seem to have been 
part of [ External Territories Minister] Spender’s “overhaul” rather than a Hasluck initiative’. Thus 
according to Quinn, the Ordinance’s principal purpose was to assist in meeting planter and ex­
soldier demands for more alienated land, which Spender supposedly supported, by settling the 
limits of customary land so that unclaimed land could be declared Crown Land, and in turn made 
available for ‘non-native development’. Quinn produces neither evidence nor argumentation to 
support this interpretation. Cf. Hasluck A Time for Building pp. 114-118, where Hasluck 
acknowledges that the Ordinance was passed before he became Minister, but he appointed the first 
Chief Native Lands Commissioner as well as the Commissioner of Titles. Hasluck also indicates 
that while he immediately adopted ‘the long-established policy of protecting native land rights’, 
realizing ‘how much was required as well as a policy’ took longer.
108. Hasluck A Time for Building p. 117, notes that Murray pressed Hasluck for the registration of 
indigenous ownership, while both were still unaware of the ‘the immensity and complexity of the 
work that would be involved.’ The relationship between ownership, usufructuary and use, cultivation 
rights was one source of difficulty, and disputation.
125
the time indigenous production also was increasing.109 The early 1950s rise in the 
international price of coffee provided much of the impetus for the expatriate drive to 
secure land suitable for coffee growing, although land speculation was also a 
motive. With little previous agricultural experience and limited finances, many of 
the settlers had no success, failing even to plant a substantial proportion of the 
land they acquired.110 By the late 1950s, when international prices had fallen 
considerably from their earlier peak, centralisation and concentration of holdings 
had begun. Plantations moved from being operated by owner-occupiers into the 
hands of firms conducting operations as agricultural capital.* 111
This early 1950s land rush exposed the underlying conflict between spontaneous 
and intentional development, particularly but not solely, over land policy. The 
conflict had to be resolved if the agrarian doctrine was to prevail. Resolution was 
necessary even though the movement of Europeans into the Highlands was not 
large in number, with only 26 ‘established on dispersed coffee farms in the 
[Eastern Highlands District] between 1952 and 1954’, and ‘another eighteen farms 
...later established in the Western Highlands District, mainly in the Wahgi 
Valley’.112 Nevertheless, the timing of the drive to acquire land by expatriates as 
well as the procedure by which land was being alienated from customary 
ownership forced Hasluck to re-emphasise his authority, including through the 
establishment of a new institution to oversee all future such transactions in the 
colony.
Before the land rush occurred, the procedure by which land was identified for 
alienation and subsequent sale/purchase had opened the way for considerable 
decentralisation of decision-making to the district level. Part of this decentralisation
109. Diana Howlett A Decade of Change in the Goroka Valley New Guinea: Land Use and 
Development in the 1950s Unpublished PhD Canberra; ANU, 1962, p.222, Table 4; Downs The 
Australian Trusteeship pp. 174-186; James Sinclair The Money Tree: Coffee in Papua New Guinea 
Bathurst: Crawford House, 1995, pp.66-210
110. Howlett A Decade of Change in the Goroka Valley, New Guinea p.235 notes that in 1959 
‘many plantations had not begun to develop large portions of their land’. By Howlett’s calculations, 
five years after the rush ended, undeveloped land accounted for 42.5 per cent of the holdings.
111. Cf. Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp. 179-181; Downs The Last Mountain pp.261-274 Ch. 
16 ‘Coffee and Politics’; Sinclair The Money Tree pp.228-296 ; MacWilliam ‘Placing the Planters’ 
forthcoming
112. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.179
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arose out of the Minister’s own early decision, discussed above, to devolve more 
authority to district level officials, including DCs. According to one DC, Ian Downs, 
by October 1952:
there were already enough potential European settlers in the highlands 
(some of them government officers developing land in their spare time) 
to make the fagade of settlement restrictions threadbare of either moral 
virtue or administrative effect.113
The first phase of expatriate settlement in the region, beginning in the 1930s and 
1940s, had taken place through individual transactions between expatriates and 
indigenes. In May 1952, with Cleland Acting Administrator while Murray was on 
pre-retirement leave, restrictions on applications by expatriates were lifted by the 
Executive Council. Applications for not more than 200 acres were to be submitted 
to the Council, which would send these to the district office in Goroka for advice 
and formal application. ‘Among applications later rejected by the (DC) at Goroka 
and not approved for further investigation were applications from Administration 
staff, real estate promoters and members of parliament in Australia’.114
Downs explained that much of the land offered for lease was in areas where 
ownership was disputed and the cause of fighting between indigenous claimants. 
He justified the sales by indicating that from 1952 until 1975, there was no case ‘of 
a ground dispute between highland people and a settler occupying a “buffer”’ 
zone.115 However much this ‘dispersed settlement preserved the social and 
ecological balance’ and made it possible for ‘a few Australians to give widespread 
assistance to thousands of people’,116 the process as well as the outcome 
immediately raised concerns in Australian academic and political circles.117
113. The Australian Trusteeship p.178. In October 1952 Downs was appointed DC of the Eastern 
Highlands District where most of the initial expatriate attention was concentrated.
114. The Australian Trusteeship p. 178
115. The Australian Trusteeship p.179
116. The Australian Trusteeship p. 179
117. K.E. Read ‘Land in the Central Highlands’ South Pacific October 1952, pp.440-449, 465; for 
more general concern over European settlement, see James McAuley ‘White Settlement in Papua 
New Guinea’ South Pacific V.5, No. 12, 1952, pp.250-255.
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At first these expressions of concern were pushed aside in the rush for land. 
However it was not long before the Minister too became involved.118 Hasluck 
lauded what on ‘the one side seemed good’ but ‘(t)he real problem came over land 
and then over roads’.119 Hasluck located ‘the problem’ as the side-stepping of the 
local land settlement board, established in 1952 to coordinate the actions of all 
departments involved in land development. In this version, out of the inabilities at 
the administrative centre decision-making had been devolved to the Highlands, 
where according to Hasluck, the DC took over.120
While not impugning Downs’ personal motives,121 Hasluck was determined to put a 
stop to the localisation of decision-making on land alienation. He wanted to prevent 
DC Downs -  and by implication all DCs - from being a ‘local ruler’ of the district. 
Decentralisation of responsibility would be limited. The Minister introduced a series 
of administrative reforms against ‘the weighi of advice both from the Department 
and the Administration favouring an easier policy in respect of the acquisition of 
native lands in order that agricultural development by Europeans might be 
facilitated.’122 The Lands Department was strengthened and the formula by which 
lands could be assessed as surplus to indigenous requirements at present and in
118. I have been unable to discover exactly what stimulated Hasluck to pay greater attention to the 
alienation of land in the Highlands. His own published explanation is that between his first visit to 
the region in mid-1951 and early 1953, he was pre-occupied ‘with other urgent matters (and) did not 
give close first-hand attention to changes in the highlands’ (A Time for Building p.120). However 
Hasluck also at the time referred to events in the highlands as a “Kenya situation": see A Time for 
Building p.122. An interview with Hasluck on January 8, 1985 in his Perth office produced no more 
information. In particular, he denied that events in Kenya, where the Mau Mau revolt was gathering 
pace which would soon lead to the declaration of an Emergency, were any influence ‘at all’. In 
neither his writings nor the interview, did Hasluck mention the ANU academics’ caution against the 
possible emergence of ‘a poor white’ problem in PNG, discussed above.
119. A Time for Building pp. 120-121
120. Cf. A Time for Building p. 121 in which Hasluck claims that Downs, ‘with the best of intentions 
and with an undoubted idea of bringing benefits to the native population, had become a promoter of 
settlement. He was urging his officers to buy land, which really meant inducing natives to sell land, 
as one of their main duties, he was making a rule-of-thumb decision of his own on how much land 
the natives needed for their own use, and then he also decided which of the European land-seekers 
should have this or that block. This inevitably meant the encouragement of “good types” and the 
discouragement of “the sort of chap we don’t want”. Downs was the “father” of the highlands’: with 
Downs’ version of how he acted in The Australian Trusteeship pp. 178-179.
121. Cf. A Time for Building p. 121 where Hasluck states: ‘Downs was not one of my admirers. 
Although I thought of him something of a prima donna, I valued very highly his services. He was 
one of the few senior people with energy. He had a real dedication to his work. He was closely in 
touch with the native people and kept their interests at heart. He was a good first-contact district 
commissioner.’
122. A Time for Building p.123
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the future more tightly defined. Through a newly constituted Lands Board, the 
Director of Lands based in Port Moresby became responsible for receiving all 
applications, assessing and purchasing land for expatriate settlement.123
While applications previously accepted and in the process of being dealt with were 
allowed to proceed, and become part of the 1952 to 1954 increase of European 
farming in the Highlands noted above, there was no subsequent rapid expansion of 
largeholdings. Despite vociferous criticism, especially within PNG, the Minister 
stood his ground, and rejected proposals to devolve land matters back to DCs.124
If checking the ambitions of particular Europeans was a relatively easy matter, the 
production and consumption increases of the first post-war decade raised more 
general and thus more intractable problems for uniform development. As well as 
trying to devise means to further increase smallholder output, especially by 
stopping fragmentation of holdings as populations increased, the colonial 
administration was under pressure from another anticipated direction. In particular, 
institutional arrangements intended to restrain local, particularly indigenous, 
capitalists were under challenge in those areas where cash cropping was most 
advanced. Uniform or even development was economically and politically 
threatened. While the problem of maintaining the rate of growth while checking the 
advance of local, especially indigenous capitalists first appeared in the early 1950s, 
after the middle of the decade it became greater.
Picking Up the Pace
Not ‘going fast enough’
In January 1958, Territories Minister Hasluck publicly assessed the colonial 
administration’s performance during the previous seven years during which he had 
held office. Summarising the discussion which had followed presentation of his
123. Howlett A Decade of Change in the Goroka Valley, New Guinea pp.223-224 provides the 
criteria by which from 1955 a mathematical formula was applied for land alienation as well as the 
detailed information which all applicants for leasing alienated land had to provide.
124. For some of the controversy, and Hasluck’s 1954 statement denying a change in land policy, 
but in methods and procedures for obtaining alienated land, see NAA M331/1, No.58 Lands Policy 
(Papua and New Guinea). See also Anon. ‘Land Systems Come Under Fire In NG’ Pacific Islands 
Monthly January 1955, p.19, p.138
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paper to the Australian Institute of Political Science summer school, Hasluck 
suggested that comments had been based around an implicit question: ‘Are we 
going fast enough?” He concluded:
Broadly speaking, we are not and there are many things that ought to be 
done which we are not doing. ...the limitation has not been on the 
intention to do more but has been based on the capacity to do more.125
While dissatisfaction with what was occurring was a constant feature of Hasluck’s 
ministerial persona, from the mid to late 1950s the Minister’s sense of urgency 
became more pronounced. This was despite the fact that there had already been 
major extensions of plantings, including of coffee, cocoa and copra bushes and 
trees, with harvesting and processing increases becoming significant.126 As Tables 
1 and 2 indicate, for the three most important agricultural exports, coffee, cocoa 
and coconuts the post-war increases of smallholder growing and processing were 
spectacular. Coconuts had been grown in substantial quantities for local 
consumption and made into copra by smallholders for many years prior to World 
War II. However the widespread adoption of cocoa and coffee by household 
growers is entirely a post-war phenomenon.127 From the early 1950s until 1975 
total production for each of the three crops rose and household output became 
proportionately more significant. In each case, though at varying speeds, 
households became the most important producers, relegating plantation production 
to second position. The acreage planted to coffee on smallholdings exceeded that 
on plantations by the late 1950s, and output from these bushes surpassed the crop 
harvested from largeholdings by the mid-1960s. Cocoa production on 
smallholdings did not exceed that from plantations until after Independence, as 
Table 1 indicates, but its success as a smallholder crop began during the 1950s.
125. ‘Present Tasks and Policies’ in J.Wilkes ed. New Guinea and Australia Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, p.136.
126. There is no colony-wide information available on the extent of production increases for 
immediately consumed and locally marketed crops. However, as noted below, both academic 
opinion and the World Bank survey mission of the early 1960s agree that the increase since the end 
of the war was substantial.
127. The experience on Karkar Island, Madang District is probably typical of indigenous cocoa 
growing during the inter-war years. Shand and Straatmans Transition from Subsistence pp.65-66 
note that: Three islanders developed sizeable plantations (coconuts, or coconuts with cacao); one 














COCOA 485** n/a 15,561* 6 26,077* 31 38,580* 36
COFFEE 33* n/a 10,665* 64 26,536* 72 35,042* 67
*Tons/Tonnes Total Production from Plantations and Smallholders 




CROP 1954-55 S/H % 1969-70 S/H% 1974-75 S/H%
COPRA 99.2* 20 129.4* 34 131.9* 42
*(‘000) Tons/Tonnes Total Production from Plantations and Smallholders
The long-standing commitment to securing economic advance as a precondition 
for self-government was under growing pressure internationally. This advance, in 
the form of financial and other indicators of self-sufficiency, required even more 
attention to increasing agricultural production while retaining smallholder 
primacy.130
128. J.P. Munnull and D.R.J.Densley Coffee Agriculture in the Economy A Series of Review Papers 
Port Moresby: Department of Primary Industry, c.1978, Table 4, p.28; D.R.J.Densley and
M.A.Wheeler Cocoa Agriculture in the Economy A Series of Review Papers Port Moresby: 
Department of Primary Industry, c.1978, Table 1, p.3.
129. Wheeler, Sackett and Densley Coconuts Table 2, p.5
130. The extent to which into the early 1960s development policy for the colony continued to 
include the objective of ‘primary production self-sufficiency’ can be gauged from the materials 
provided to senior officers of the Administration in training courses. See The Australian School of 
Pacific Administration “Indigenous Economic Development and Its Relationship to Social and 
Political Change” No.7 Course for Senior Officers of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea 
Mosman, Sydney 1st April -26th April 1963, p. 15 Chapter 6 pars.62-63 ‘Although most Papuans 
and New Guineans are subsistence farmers, food imports, to the extent of six million pounds 
annually, make a large proportion of the total import bill. Self-sufficiency in food production must be 
an early goal to reduce this drain of outgoing finance.... A largely agricultural economy should be 
able to supply the bulk of the food requirements of its own workers, and major effort must be 
directed to this end’.
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The extent of the commercial change over the first ten years since the war ended,
and particularly in the first half of the 1950s, had already been considerable.
Between 1948/49 and 1954/55 imports increased by two and a half times, while the
value of exports almost trebled.131 The production of copra, at the time the main
agricultural export, had returned to its pre-war export level of just under 1000,000
tonnes by 1952-53. While smallholders only produced about twenty per cent of the
copra output,132 an undocumented but substantial amount of coconuts was
consumed by households. Replanting and new plantings boosted smallholder
output as they did on plantations. In 1957, Spate pointed to the rapidity of change
in indigenous agriculture. He stated:
The most significant feature in the native economy is that the trend 
towards production for the market seems to be both more rapid and 
more firmly based in the second [1951-55] than in the first post-war 
quinquennium [ie 1946-50].133
There were also indications that the previous emphasis upon ‘village’ agriculture 
would not form an adequate basis for further growth. While households retained 
security of land tenure under customary title, and the colonial administration 
remained ever alert to further attempts to accumulate iand as largehoidings, 
preventing fragmentation of smallholdings into ever smaller parcels was near 
impossible. Colonial officials, including the minister, became more and more aware 
of the complexity of indigenous ownership, occupation and farming patterns.
Wright locates 1956 as the seminal moment when the object of development 
shifted from expanding household production of marketed crops utilising ‘traditional 
patterns of land and labour usage’. Subsequently, without rejecting ‘the assumption
131. NAAA518/1 CR 800/1/1 Summary of Government Achievements During Each Year The 
Record of the Menzies Government 1950-1955’ November 1955 p.9. The money amounts are: 
Imports £A7.5m (1948/49) £A18.7m (1954/55; Exports £A 4.1m (1948/49) £12.0m (1954/55). The 
main increases in recorded marketed produce, by price, occurred in sawn timber, plywood, copra, 
rubber, cocoa, coffee, rice, peanuts, and passionfruit juice.
132. Wheeler, Sackett and Densley Coconuts p.5. See also NAA M335/1, Item No. 3, Departmental 
Brief on Agriculture and Land. January 1954 ‘Papua and New Guinea. Agricultural Production and 
Marketing’ p.2 The document also noted the substantial potential for further increases in copra 
production from ‘native coconut palms’, including ‘as a result of an intensification of extension work 
amongst natives’.
133. ‘Problems of Development in New Guinea’ South Pacific V.9, No.7, 1957, p.453. In his 1958 
speech noted above, Minister Hasluck too stated with reference to external as well as domestic 
forces ‘that the rate of change is accelerating’. See ‘Present Tasks and Policies’ p.84. He also 
expressed concern (p. 88) at ‘the unevenness of the progress of the people’, because of the 
opportunity this presented for the ‘native demagogue’.
132
that labour effort remained fixed in land’, attention turned to formulating means of 
lifting the ‘low returns to labour’ and to altering ‘a system of land tenure perceived 
as incapable of ensuring the retention by households of minimum economic 
areas'.134
As is shown in more detail in Chapter 6, the highly successful expansion of 
indigenous cocoa growing in the Gazelle Peninsula and smallholder coffee 
production in the Highlands provided a template for colonial development policy. 
Although some substantial indigenous growers appeared early as planters of these 
crops, determined administrative action as well as the increasing attraction of cash 
incomes to purchase consumption goods also spurred major smallholder plantings. 
In the Highlands, out-migration to coastal and islands areas for wage employment 
became less attractive as households gained cash income from coffee. On 
plantations in the Eastern Highlands many wage workers came from adjoining 
areas where less smallholder coffee was grown.135
During the mid-1950s, officials recognised these changes and intensified their 
pursuit of uniform development. Emphasising the ‘need for a spread of 
development effort’, the Minister told Cleland during discussions in February 1956, 
that while:
some local groups would outstrip all other groups in development; whilst 
there should be no conscious effort to hold back the rate of development 
in rapidly advancing areas the major effort should be concentrated on 
accelerating progress in other areas; and there always had to be kept in 
mind the responsibility which we had, to try to ensure uniform 
development.136
Two months later Fenbury reported that: ‘A slow ferment is discernible in native 
society in most of the areas visited’. The ferment included the drive by the ‘average 
villager’ to find ‘accelerated ways of bridging the obvious gap between his living 
standards and those of non-natives’. There was also a changing of the guard in 
indigenous leadership, with the ‘native entrepreneurs’ taking over from ‘the
134. All quotations in this paragraph are from Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder 
Production p.334.
135. Howlett A Decade of Change in the Goroka Valley, New Guinea pp.231-234
136. NAA M331/1, No.2, Discussions with Administrator in Canberra February 1956 pp.13-14
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traditional elders and achieving a grip on the native economy’ .137 While applauding 
the ‘existence of [a] reasonably effective administrative machinery with an 
economic bias [that] has largely resulted in the entrepreneurs confining their 
activities to the immediate field of production’ among Tolais on the Gazelle 
Peninsula, Fenbury warned against entrepreneurs engaging in other activities. He 
illustrated the danger by reference to a particular Tolai leader who strengthened his 
position ‘by political activity which is essentially anti-Administration in character and 
against both the long-term economic and social interests of the people he 
dominates.’138
Fenbury sought a solution to the problem of how to retain the primarily economic 
role of local authorities in intensifying supervision of household production, while 
shifting the focus of local government from a village to an area basis. For the 
architect of the iocal government policy, the principal objective was to stress the 
important role of the ‘native local government system’ in ‘fulfilling (the) need for an 
integrating and implementing mechanism at native area level’. In order to put 
‘policy into effect’, to raise living standards through increased smallholder 
production, Fenbury asserted that there was a need for ‘some form of permanent 
area organisation’. This need was to be filled by local councils as the future 
embodiments of the ‘hard headed practical administration’ which had resulted over 
the previous three years ‘in systematic progress’ .139 Villages, as the previous focus 
of administrative attention, were too small and an inadequate basis for moving the 
indigenous population beyond the mythical ideal of ‘the sturdy peasant farmer’, 
unrealised ‘anywhere in the world’ according to Fenbury.140
Against Fenbury’s preferred position, the Minister wanted to emphasise the political 
representative role of councils as a training ground for indigenous politics. That 
Hasluck held such a view, despite the increasing evidence that these and other
137. NAA M331/1, No.35 D.Fienberg-Correspondence 17/4/56 Fienberg to Director, Department of 
Native Affairs, copy to Minister, ‘Notes on Native Policy’ p.10
138. NAA M331/1, No.35 D.Fienberg-Correspondence 17/4/56 Fienberg to Director p.10
139. Practice without policy p.279
140. NAA M331/1 No.35 D.Fienberg-Correspondence 17/4/56 Fienberg to Director p. 12.
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local organisations including cooperatives141 were often an important base for the 
indigenous bourgeoisie, is further testament to the contradictions inherent in 
development, spontaneous and intentional, as a process. As the numbers of local 
government councils in the colony continued to increase during the 1950s and into 
the early 1960s,142 the tension between these organisations’ economic and political 
roles increased further, especially in areas where indigenous accumulation was 
most pronounced.
While 1956 may have been the seminal year when the colonial administration 
made a decisive shift ‘towards a policy of individual household production, as 
opposed to the development of communal ventures’,143 the outcomes which 
provoked the shift had been intrinsic to the establishment of smallholder export 
crop production, particularly cocoa on the Gazelle Peninsula, since the early 
1950s. By 1952, indigenous growers had planted more than half a million cocoa 
trees in that area.144 While the case of cocoa is considered in more detail in 
Chapter Six below, here it is sufficient to note that from the early 1950s there had 
been official efforts to shape the rapid expansion of cocoa planting and processing 
on an individual household basis. These efforts included legislation specifying a 
minimum number of 500 trees to be planted in one continuous grove as an attempt 
to prevent further fragmentation of indigenous land holdings and to make state 
supervision of plantings through agricultural extension services easier.
141. Jackman Copra marketing and price stabilization p. 117 states of the decline of rural 
cooperatives: ‘In retrospect, it is clear that the emergence of Papua New Guinean individual 
entrepreneurs from the late 1950s on has been the main cause of the gradual demise of the copra 
marketing and other cooperatives’.
142. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.136 documents the expansion. From 4 councils, with 72 
councils covering an approximate population of 15, 400 people in 1951, by 1963 there were 50 
councils, with 1,518 councillors covering over half a million people. Other figures Downs cites from 
a debate in the Australian parliament in May 1963, suggest an even greater increase to 78 councils 
with closer to 700,000 people. As more and more emphasis was placed on political development, 
the councils became an important forum for ambitious Papua New Guineans as well as a means of 
tying local populations of rural smallholders to electoral politics (see Chapter 4 below).
143. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production p.333. The shift was highlighted in a 
paper prepared by Department Secretary C.R.Lambert ‘Native Economic Development in Papua 
and New Guinea’ which emphasized the change in ‘developmental approach from village 
agriculture to individual household production’ (Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder 
Production p.345). See also R.J.Cheetham ‘The Development of Indigenous Agriculture, Land 
Settlement, and Rural Credit Facilities in Papua and New Guinea’ The Papua and New Guinea 
Agricultural Journal v.15, nos.3-4, December-March 1962-1963, pp.67-78
144. NAA M335/1, Item No. 3, Departmental Brief on Agriculture and Land. January 1954 ‘Papua 
and New Guinea. Agricultural Production and Marketing’ p.6
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If low productivity smallholder production on increasingly fragmented, smaller plots 
of land was undesirable, intentional development required even more substantial 
state coordination and supervision to raise productivity of households across the 
colony. In order to extend the developmental role of the colonial state, a further 
increase in state expenditure was required. The low proportion of revenues raised 
in the colony limited expenditure from this source and was an impediment to 
pressing the Australian government for further funding.
Funding and the increased administrative effort
Pressure to increase locally raised revenues had begun in 1955, as the result of 
Hasluck’s continuing but unsuccessful efforts to obtain substantial forward 
commitments for development funds from the Menzies government and 
Commonwealth Treasury. He was directed by Cabinet to increase the revenues 
raised in the colony, including by taxing expatriates resident there. The target set 
for the colonial administration was that ‘local revenues would be about 30 per cent 
of the total annua! expenditures in the Territory.’145 In 1956 Treasury and the 
Department of Territories collaborated in preparing income tax legislation for PNG. 
Delays occurred in drawing up the legislation, which also provided time for the 
opposition to the measure to become organised. Only in July 1959, after attempts 
by the Administration to raise revenues by other means, was the income tax 
legislation passed by the Legislative Council in PNG.146 Between 1959 and 1963, 
when Hasluck ceased to be Minister for Territories, Administration expenditure 
increased from over A$11 million to nearly A$17.5 million.147 Locally raised 
revenues as a proportion of total revenues had begun to increase. As the next 
chapter shows, however, it was also in 1959 that Hasluck and the Department 
began to consider the possibility of obtaining World Bank advice on how to lift the 
rate of growth even further.
145. A Time For Building p.261.
146. As well as Hasluck A Time for Building pp. 258-265, Ch.23 The Row Over Income Tax’, see 
Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp. 186-195
147. Downs The Australian Trusteeeship p.257, Table 9.1
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Despite the limits placed on further alienation of land for largeholdings, as 
discussed above, the extent of land shortages as a barrier to the continuous 
extension of smallholder agriculture rapidly became apparent. In 1956, Minister 
Hasluck instructed the Department, and through it the Administration to give 
‘urgent attention to future land policy’.148 Attention soon turned to acquiring unused 
or under-utilised freehold land on largeholdings which had been established prior 
to World War II on alienated land. The possibility of compulsory acquisition was 
considered but not pursued.149
In order to increase the supply of land necessitated by the drive towards 
individualisation of indigenous smallholder agriculture which the colonial 
administration favoured, a series of settlement schemes had been and continued 
to be constructed. These aimed to reduce the growing landlessness which followed 
from the expansion of smallholder agriculture in some areas. In 1952 the 
Administration had given the Rabaul Local Government Council a 99 year lease for 
one thousand acres of land at Keravat, to provide a partial solution to increasing 
landlessness among Tolai. The schemes were subsequently extended in 1956 to 
800 acres purchased for the Amenob LGC in the Madang area, to 390 acres 
obtained by the Vunamami LGC, on the Gazelle Peninsula, for land in the 
Warangoi Valley. The schemes were a deliberate attempt to combine household 
production of immediately consumed food crops with marketed produce, and were 
largely predicated on the premise that little or no wage labour would be employed 
on a continuing basis. From the late 1950s, some individuals were provided with 
loans.150 These schemes were continued into the 1960s in other areas.
As was obvious from the relatively small acreages provided and the few individuals 
who obtained land,151 resettlement had a minimal impact on the increasing
148. A Time for Building p.320.
149. A Time for Building p.322
150. Cheetham The Development of Indigenous Agriculture...’ ;Quinn ‘Agriculture, Land Tenure 
and Land Law to 197T pp.176-179; Sumer Singh A Benefit Cost Analysis of Resettlement in the 
Gazelle Peninsula New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 17 Canberra and Port Moresby: New Guinea 
Research Unit, ANU, September 1967; Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production 
pp.379-388
151. Singh A Benefit Cost Analysis p.3 states that by 1967, there ‘are already forty-nine land 
resettlement schemes in existence in different parts of the country. These schemes include 1,768
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landlessness. So too did the attempts to reform land tenure, which came up 
against continuous indigenous resistance as well as the ineffectiveness of 
administration efforts. Quinn noted that in the ‘10 years of operation [of the 1951 
Native Lands Registration Ordinance] no systematic registration of ownership was 
undertaken and of 472 applications for individual registration 176 only were 
determined and none registered’.152 A more damning conclusion was reached by 
Robin Hide, who stated that with constant disputes about land ownership and 
occupation ‘the Native Land Registration ordinance might as well not have existed 
as far as the Chimbu region was concerned, until after 1957’.153 Even after this 
year, little changed, except for the occasional presence of a Native Lands 
Commissioner, based in Goroka, to whom major land disputes were referred but 
who rarely settled them.154
In any case, as was recognised by officials in Canberra and the colony, not only 
did formalisation of ownership have the potential to undercut community, it did not 
necessarily lead to increased productivity. Individual titles could just as easily lead 
to further fragmentation and declining productivity as to consolidation of holdings 
and higher output per unit of labour. Impoverishment and landlessness, along with 
destruction of ‘village life’ could arise out of individualisation of land tenure, even in 
the unlikely event that popular support could be gained for such a major reform.155 
In any case, as Wright notes, as long as the Native Lands Commission followed 
the earlier instruction to register landholdings in the name of clans and not 
individuals, there was a conflict between the process of registering indigenous
blocks of varying sizes and 1,256 of the blocks had been allocated to settlers by the end of 1965’. 
Cheetham The Development of Indigenous Agriculture...’, p.72, Table 1, indicates that between 
September 1959 and March 1963, 634 leases were made available in 12 locations.
152. ‘Agriculture, Land Tenure and Law to 1971’, p. 176, citing Theo Bredmeyer The registration of 
customary land in Papua New Guinea’ Melanesian Law Journal v.Ill, no. 2, 1975, p.269. For the 
introduction of this Ordinance, and the dispute over its objective, see fn.110 above.
153. The Land Titles Commission in Chimbu: An Analysis of Colonial Land Law and Practice, 1933- 
68 New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 50 Canberra and Boroko: New Guinea Research Unit, ANU, 
1973, p.25
154. The Land Titles Commission pp.25-28;
155. Quinn ‘Agriculture, Land Tenure and Land Law to 1971’, pp.176-179, captures the sense of 
floundering during the mid- to late-1950s among officials, including Minister Hasluck, over the 
appropriate direction to be taken in land reform.
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ownership and the post-1956 shift in official practice to encouraging 
individualisation of land tenure.156
The shift to individualisation as the basis for increasing household production, and 
the increasingly political rather than economic role for local government councils, 
resulted in a heightened need for another section of the colonial administration to 
take up the coordinating and supervisory role of smallholder agriculture. 
Accelerating uniform development required a colony-wide mechanism: the 
agricultural extension services gained further importance under the turn to 
intensification after 1956.
In 1927 a Division of Agricultural Education had been formed within the 
Department of Agriculture. Soon after a Native Agricultural School began 
operations at Keravat, with a focus on teaching indigenes about ‘the cultural 
practices of economic crops’.157 Patrols by officials commenced in 1932, with the 
aim of ‘improv(ing) the maintenance of copra groves and to introduce new food 
crops, thus improving the native diet and preventing famine.’158 Religious missions 
too ‘played a direct agricultural extension role in encouraging local people to 
engage in cash cropping and by providing market services’.159
After the war, when the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries was 
formed, Agricultural Extension became one of five divisions, with an establishment 
of 54 agricultural officers. With post-war reconstruction the foremost task, the 
Division focused on trying to raise food production by smallholders. Activities to 
support this direction included importing improved pig and poultry strains to raise 
protein levels.160 Extension officers, prodded by Department head W Cottrell- 
Dormer, became involved in rice growing projects in the Mekeo, Madang and
156. State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production p.408
157. Dick and McKillop A Brief History of Agricultural Extension and Education in Papua New 
Guinea p.14, see also pp.17-18
158. A Brief History p. 14
159. A Brief History p. 16
160. A Brief History pp.20-22; Robin Hide Pig Husbandry in New Guinea: A Literature Review and 
Bibliography Canberra: Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, 2003, pp.8-9. As 
Hide notes (p.8), although there are substantial archival sources available, there is as yet no 
account of the major post-war program to upgrade the stock of village pigs.
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Sepik. This involvement was an attempt to build upon the initial enthusiasm of 
prominent indigenes for the crop and operated through Rural Progress Societies 
(see Chapter Two above and Chapter Five below).
During the early 1950s, agricultural extension officers were instrumental in the 
expansion of immediately consumed food production as well as marketed crops by 
smallholders. Most attention has focused upon the responsibilities of specific 
officers for the very rapid increases of cocoa and coffee production on the Gazelle 
Peninsula and in the central Highlands.161 However activities to extend export 
crops to other areas,162 and promote greater levels of food cropping were no less 
indicative of the comprehensive ambitions underlying intentional development. 
Contrary to the claim that during this period agricultural policy focused upon 
‘plantation crops’, and a few more advanced areas,163 the promotion of village 
agriculture across the colony lay at the centre of ministerial and eventually 
departmental concerns.164
Attention has been drawn previously to how in the early 1950s extension activities 
in Madang operated to successfully integrate export crop production with food 
growing for immediate consumption and local markets. Here it is only necessary to 
point out that these efforts did not stop at the main population centres, or where 
agricultural conditions were especially favourable. The comprehensiveness 
required under uniform development meant a colony-wide focus. In July 1954, for 
instance, the Administration issued a press release noting the work being done on 
a coffee planting project near Lae, on the mainland, as well as on the Mortlock and
161. A Brief History pp.22-26. See also Chapter 6.
162. For the extent of cocoa projects coordinated and supervised by extension officers beyond the 
Gazelle Peninsula, see: PNGNA Accession No. 12, Box 16,706, Files No.23-3-1 c, g, h, I, j, k, I- 
parts 1 and 3, m, n, o, p. These files deal with projected cocoa projects over a twenty year period 
from the early 1950s in non-Tolai areas of New Britain District, and in the Districts of Morobe, 
Bougainville, New Ireland, Manus, Sepik, Madang, Northern, Milne Bay, Central and Gulf.
163. Dick and McKillop A Brief History p.22-26
164. Hasluck A Time for Building pp. 133-136. The Minister noted how improving pig strains, 
introducing cattle into village areas and beginning fish ponds in the Highlands were also part of 
administration efforts. According to the Minister, in the early 1950s, there was not unanimous 
support for the preferred direction: The weight of departmental opinion and advice was on the side 
of producing crops for export and, to that end, embarking on planned development with white 
settlement and white ownership’. While not opposed to export crop production, Hasluck’s ‘obstinacy’ 
[his term:SM] was directed at giving primacy to food production.
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Tasman Islands, 250 to 500 kilometres east of the main Bougainville island. Having 
a total population of just 437 people, the atolls with a maximum height of fourteen 
feet above sea level had little soil for growing crops. Shipping contact was rare 
prior to 1952-1953 during which period there were visits by three Administration 
patrols. Subsequently, under strict health requirements for ship crews, ‘a trading 
vessel is now making periodic calls to buy copra and trochus shell.,1GG
A central feature of extension activities was distribution of improved seed and 
planting material, either from stations or when officers went on patrol. In 1952- 
1953, to take just one example, smallholders were provided with cocoa and coffee 
seedlings, sweet potatoes, cowpeas, a range of vegetable seeds, rice, maize and 
sorghum seed, tree seeds and cinchona seedlings.166 Expanding the planting of 
coconuts as a food crop and for copra production was a constant pre-occupation of 
extension officers. The importance of what were termed native subsistence foods 
was also central to these activities, ‘both to improve the quality and yield of existing 
food crops and to encourage the natives to grow new crops which will be of value 
to their diet.’167 Peanuts, initially distributed for locally consumed food, increasingly 
filled this role as well as becoming a minor export crop.168 Unsuccessful efforts 
were made too to find markets in Australia for the expanding local production of 
betel nuts, used in powder form as a cleansing drug for intestinal worms in 
animals, in dyeing and tanning of hides and in the preparation of dentrifices.169
165. NAA A518/1, C2/1/1, Advancement of Native Agriculture-Papua & New Guinea, 1954-1956, 
12/7/54 Administration Press Release ‘Diversity in Native Economic Development’. See also A.D. 
Boag and R.E. Curtis ‘Agriculture and Population in the Mortlock Islands’ Papua and New Guinea 
Agricultural Journal v. 12, no.1, 1959, pp.20-27
166. NAA A518/1, C2/1/1, Advancement of Native Agriculture-Papua & New Guinea, 1954-1956 
R.E.P.Dwyer, Director, DASF Agricultural Extension and Native Production A Report to the 
Administrator of Papua and New Guinea in August 1953 on the activities of the Division of 
Agricultural Extension in regard to Native Agricultural Production , p.3
167. Agricultural Extension and Native Production p.5
168. Agricultural Extension and Native Production p.4; NAA A518/1, H927/4, Economic 
Development of the Territories-Commodities-Peanuts 1950-1958; NAA A452/1, 1957/3952 Peanut 
Industry in Australia-Territories-Marketing in Australia 1951-1960; NAA A452/1, 1959/647 Visit of 
Queensland Peanut Marketing Board 1959-1959. Hasluck A Time for Building pp.294-295 criticises 
the opposition of Australian farmers to the importation of PNG peanuts, stating that: ‘Our attempts 
to promote the growing of peanuts in the Markham Valley were resisted as a threat to Australian 
peanut growers’.
169. NAA A518/1, GZ812/1/7, Betel Nuts-Market for 1954-1956
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In late 1953, extension service officers were located at fifteen stations.170 
Patrolling to extend the reach of extension services beyond district and sub-district 
agricultural stations was a continuous feature of the division’s work. Estimates of 
the amount of time spent patrolling varied from 90%, for the officer-in-charge of the 
native cocoa project on the Gazelle and at Dagua, where there was no fixed 
station, down to 20% where officers had to combine patrolling with running a one- 
man agricultural station.171
Such was the importance attached to extension work among indigenous 
households, that by 1954, a staffing level of 114 European officers had been 
approved for the Division, more than double the figure eight years earlier. However 
the international shortage of skilled agriculturalists was so great that filling these 
positions was estimated as likely to take a further six years. As the head of the 
Division noted in a memo to the Administrator: ‘No matter how successful our 
recruiting programme is, it will be at least five years before agricultural services can 
be provided to natives in many areas of the Territory’.172 Yet again, development 
goals for the colony came up against international conditions which were the 
principal determinant of the market for another commodity, skilled labour power.
As one means of trying to overcome the shortages, Minister Hasluck insisted on 
closer cooperation between staff from the Division of Agricultural Extension 
Services and the Department of District Services and Native Affairs. At the same 
time, Hasluck increased the work-load for DASF officials by insisting upon a six 
monthly report on progress in indigenous extension work and its relationship to 
annual district indigenous agricultural development plans. In March 1955, the first 
six monthly report on extension activities was provided, covering the period July to 
December 1954. Subsequently the Minister was an avid reader of and 
commentator upon these reports.
170. Agricultural Extension and Native Production p.5. The stations were Maprik, Dagua, Bogia, 
Madang, Finschaffen, Kainantu, Goroka, Mt Hagen, Rabaul, Lorengau, Sohano, Samarai, Port 
Moresby, Inauaia and Beipa.
171. Agricultural Extension and Native Production p.1
172. A518/1, C2/1/1, Advancement of Native Agriculture-Papua & New Guinea, 1954-1956 29/3/54 
F.C.Henderson to Administrator
142
Intensified extension efforts had to conform to what was acceptable internationally. 
The Minister and Department ensured that local policy recommendations did not 
stray from what would be approved under UN trusteeship terms. Thus a proposal 
generated at the District Commissioners’ Conference held at Lae in September- 
October 1953, and supported in principle by the Administrator, was quashed. Local 
extension officers and other officials wanted to re-introduce the pre-war policy of 
compulsory planting of crops by indigenes, but this could not be permitted.
As local government councils became less and less useful for area administration 
of smallholder agriculture, extension activities became more important. By mid- 
1959 there were 66 qualified expatriate extension officers and around 120 Papua 
New Guinean assistants.173 In late 1959, the Minister announced a three year plan 
for a further substantial increase in agricultural extension personnel, to strengthen 
the Extension Division within the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries. 
As well as the establishment of an additional 22 agricultural extension centres, an 
extra 74 European officers and 120 indigenous agricultural assistants were to be 
recruited. With the extra personnel and facilities, a further 1,000 indigenous 
farmers were to be trained annually in improved agricultural methods. The Minister 
anticipated a major increase in indigenous production of both food for immediate 
consumption and local sale, and export crops.174 In 1962, there were forty-five 
extension centres operating and since the 1959 announcement of Hasluck’s three 
year plan, around 3,000 Papua New Guineans had received agricultural training at 
the centres.175 By 1962, the Department of Territories was requiring preparation of
173. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.132
174. ‘Minister Announces Major Increase in Extension’ The Papua and New Guinea Agricultural 
Journal W.12, Nos.2-3, September-December 1959, p.48. See also NAA A452/1, 1957/356 
Agricultural Extension Policy-Objectives and Administration Action -  P and NG, 1956-1960 which 
includes two maps of planned extension expansion across PNG, as well as a 114 page document 
prepared in April 1957 by J.O.Smith, the officer in charge of the Agricultural Section in the 
Department of Territories, headed ‘Agricultural Extension-Papua and New Guinea Objectives of 
Policy and Proposals for Lines of Administrative Action to Achieve Objectives’. This and other 
documents in the file stress, once again, the importance given to the improvement of what was 
termed ‘subsistence village farming’, as the basis upon which increases in marketed production 
would occur.
175. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.132. See also NAA A452/1, 1962/8276 Agricultural 
Extension Work in Papua & New Guinea, 1961-1967, which includes a memo 23/12/60 
Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories, reviewing progress with agricultural extension 
work, in which Cleland notes that the main hold-ups to implementation of planning are shortages of 
personnel, and bottlenecks in shortages of housing and other facilities, as well as land, which were
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a five year plan for further expansion of extension activities, and Hasluck was still
urging the Department to keep a close watch on the Administration to see that
extension work was a priority. In October 1962, the department released a
Ministerial Press Statement announcing the approval of the five year plan:
which would mean that the emphasis now being given to agricultural 
extension work among the indigenous people of Papua and New Guinea 
will be greatly intensified.176
Conclusion
During the 1950s, while the emphasis on the military significance of PNG for 
Australia’s security waned,177 colonial development was given greater priority and 
a more precise definition. Through the policy of uniform development major 
increases in production occurred. Despite substantial challenges to what was 
intended to happen, by the end of the decade the bulk of the population remained 
attached to smallholdings and probably had considerably higher living 
standards.178
holding up capacity to increase extension activities. Hasluck’s impatience with what had been 
achieved is also apparent from a hand written note on a subsequent memo of 19/1/61 to another 
official in the Department regarding providing needed resources for extension personnel. The 
Minister urged: ‘It should be impressed on the Administrator that this work is at the forefront of 
Government policy. What is approved is the minimum. Every encouragement should be given to the 
Agricultural Department to improve on the minimum requirement and no opportunity of doing so 
should be overlooked.’
176. NAA A452/1, 1962/8276 Agricultural Extension Work in Papua & New Guinea, 1961-1967. The 
statement emphasised an intended increase in the number of professional extension staff, including 
indigenes, more indigenous agricultural assistants, ‘establishment of two additional sub-diploma 
agricultural institutions’ for indigenous youths and the ‘establishment of approximately 50 
agricultural extension centres from which extension staff can operate’ and conduct agricultural 
demonstrations. As part of the extension work, in November 1962 the Department of Agriculture 
had imported 200 day-old chicks to improve village poultry flocks.
177. However Australia’s role in PNG’s security remained part of the official conception of 
trusteeship for the colony. As Hasluck pointed out in a 1958 speech: The trust to the people of 
(PNG) can only be carried out if there is peace, with freedom from enemy invasion of their country. 
The defence of (PNG) means defence by Australia. The power of Australia to defend all her territory 
depends in part on the security of (PNG)’. ‘Present Tasks and Policies’ in J.Wilkes ed. New Guinea 
and Australia Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1958,pp.78-79
178. Up until 1965, at least, as the area of the colony which came under colonial authority was 
extended, the precise size of the indigenous population could not be known. Subsequent censuses 
have faced other, no less important, difficulties. The best indicators of improvements in welfare are 
probably those which suggest declining mortality rates from 1949 onwards for adults and children in 
different areas. See R.F.R.Scragg ‘Historical epidemiology in Papua New Guinea’ Papua New 
Guinea Medical Journal v.20, no.3, September 1977, pp. 102-109; Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and South Pacific Commission Population of Papua New 
Guinea Country Monograph Series No.7.2 New York and Noumea: United Nations and South 
Pacific Commission, 1982, p. 167 Table 106 ‘Department of health field surveys of mortality, 1949- 
1952 to 1971-1976’. I am indebted to Robin Hide for drawing my attention to these sources and for
144
The continuing tussles to raise revenues and improve the effectiveness of the 
colonial administration suggested that further increases in smallholder production 
would be difficult to achieve. International and domestic pressure for political and 
administrative reforms would create more space in which the representatives of 
indigenous capital and its allies could challenge colonial policy. While recruiting 
more Papua New Guineans into state employment, especially managerial 
positions, and changing the Legislative Council’s membership to include a 
significant number of elected indigenes would satisfy critics of Australian rule at the 
UN, the changes could also reduce the power of the Minister and his officials which 
had been crucial for uniform development.
advice on the difficulties involved in providing conclusive evidence on population increases and 
health improvement during the 1950s.
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Chapter Four
From Accelerated to Threatened Development
Introduction
By the late 1950s it had become clear that the gradualism of uniform development 
could not satisfy international or internal PNG demands for rapid economic growth 
and major political reforms. Minister Hasluck’s 1958 acknowledgement, noted in 
the last chapter, that the colonial administration had an increased role to perform in 
bringing development did not indicate anything but a desire to maintain the current 
priorities at a higher level of application. It was uncertain just how the policy 
direction which gave primacy to smallholder agriculture as the basis of improved 
living standards could be further changed, while the colony moved toward the 
ultimate objectives of trusteeship, self-government and a substantial degree of 
economic self-sufficiency.
This chapter initially shows how a further phase of development thought was 
shaped and then implemented as state policy. In the mid-1960s the need to obtain 
greater financial assistance to increase the developmental capacity of the colonial 
administration led to a change away from uniform to accelerated development.
This change gave spontaneous development, in the form of increased investment 
and other commercial activities by private firms, a renewed importance, including 
because the economic growth would provide for higher taxation revenues.
Subsequently, as faster growth occurred during the mid- to late 1960s and the 
colonial administration planned to lift the rate even further, accelerated 
development was subject to criticism. The second section of the chapter details the 
phase in which accelerated development was dominant, and the start of sustained 
opposition to it. While the gathering pace of the move to self-government provided 
a focus for some criticism, other objections were raised. These criticisms combined 
anti-colonial nationalism with concerns about increasing landlessness and 
unemployment, which had become especially prominent in major urban centres 
under the policy of accelerated development. The objections coincided with a shift 
occurring in international thinking about development, which focused attention 
upon how growth could be associated with redistribution.
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The period between the formation of the Michael Somare-led coalition government 
in April 1972 and formal independence in September 1975 was noted for the 
unresolved political conflicts among indigenes. These conflicts often centred on 
what redistribution was to mean, especially for land being vacated by deporting 
expatriate plantation owners. The third section of the chapter shows how 
development thought in and for PNG during the transition retained the emphasis 
upon the primacy of ‘village life’, even as securing smallholders upon land at 
increasing levels of marketed production had become a less certain component of 
state policy. One important dimension of the conflict which gave rise to the 
uncertainty about development policy was the growing political and economic 
ascendancy of indigenous capital. The political and economic power of this class 
made it unlikely that independent PNG governments would design policies which 
gave smallholder agriculture primacy.
Changing Development Priorities
Criticism of Australian colonial policy at the United Nations in 1959, again in 1961, 
and domestically from Australian Labor Party Federal MPs,1 began to reflect 
growing unease about key aspects of the Federal Government’s development 
policies for the colony. Although Australian colonial policy became more definite 
about the objective of self-government, changing from anticipating that the 
movement to self-government might take decades to instead favouring ‘sooner, not 
later’,2 there remained considerable uncertainty about how and when this might 
occur.
1. Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.232-234
2. Upon returning from the 1960 Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference, held in London, the 
Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies made a statement which included the sentence: 
‘Whereas at one time many of us might have thought it was better to go slowly in granting 
independence so that all the conditions existed for a wise exercise of self-government, I think the 
prevailing school of thought to-day is that if in doubt you should go sooner, not later’. Almost 
immediately afterwards, partly to ease concerns raised by expatriate settlers and representatives of 
international firms that this meant a major change in policy, both Menzies and Hasluck emphasised 
that no speedy moves towards self-government and independence would occur for PNG. See 
Minister for Territories Papua and New Guinea: Some Recent Statements of Australian Policy on 
Political Advancement Canberra: Government Printer c. 1960
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The Minister for Territories responded publicly to the increasing criticism.3 Hasluck 
did so in terms which suggested that he remained attached to the premise that the 
rate of change could be lifted within existing policy parameters. Policy continued to 
focus on maintaining communities and improving standards of living, through 
increased production of immediately consumed and marketed crops by 
smallholders.
The Minister was supported by the views of academics at the ANU’s Research 
School of Pacific Studies, where the Australian government funded a major 
expansion of research capacity. During the 1960s and 1970s, the university 
conducted a continuous research programme on aspects of development in South­
east Asia and the South Pacific,4 most prominently by economist E. K. Fisk and his 
associates.5
3. See Address delivered on October 20, 1961 to the Economic Society of Australia and New 
Zealand, N.S.W. Branch, subsequently published as The Economic Development of Papua and 
New Guinea’ in Australian Outlook v.16, no.1, April 1962, pp. 5-25
4. Of particular importance for the research on PNG was the New Guinea Research Unit, 
established during 1961 in Port Moresby as part of the Research School of Pacific Studies. See 
R.J. May. The New Guinea Research Unit: 1961-1975’ in May ed. Research Needs and Priorities in 
Papua New Guinea Monograph No.1 Port Moresby: Institute of Applied Social and Economic 
Research, 1976, pp.7-14, which includes a list of the publications of the New Guinea Research 
Unit.
5. See Fisk The Economy of Papua-New Guinea’ in D.G. Bettison et.al. The Independence of 
Papua-New Guinea: What are the Pre-requisites? Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1962, pp.25-43; 
‘Planning in a primitive economy: special problems of Papua New Guinea’ Economic Record v.38, 
no.84, 1962, pp.462-478; ‘Planning in a primitive economy: from pure subsistence to the production 
of a market surplus’ Economic Record v.40, no.90, 1964, pp. 156-174; The Development of Trade 
and Specialization in a Primitive Economy’ Economic Record v.41, no.94, 1965, pp. 193-206; The 
Economic Structure’ in E.K.Fisk ed. New Guinea on the Threshold: Aspects of Social, Political and 
Economic Development Canberra: ANU Press, 1966,pp.23-43; ‘Economic Bases for an 
Independent New Guinea’ in John Wilkes ed. New Guinea...Future Indefinite? Proceedings of the 
34th Summer School, Australian Institute of Political Science Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1968, 
pp.5-15; ‘Labour absorption capacity of subsistence agriculture’ Economic Record v.47, no.119, 
1971, pp.366-378; ‘Development goals in rural Melanesia’ in Marion Ward ed. Change and 
Development in Rural Melanesia Fifth Waigani Seminar Canberra and Port Moresby: ANU and 
University of Papua New Guinea, 1972, pp.9-23; 1972 ‘Cold Comfort Farm: The wonderful world of 
subsistence affluence’ New Guinea v.7, no.1, pp.28-39; ‘Rural Development’ New Guinea v.9, no.1, 
1974, pp.51-60; The neglect of traditional food production in Pacific countries’ Australian Outlook, 
V.29, No.2, 1975,pp. 149-160; The response of nonmonetary production units to contact with the 
exchange economy’ in L.G.Reynolds ed. Agriculture in development New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1975, pp.53-83; The subsistence component in national income accounts’ The Developing 
Economies v.13, no.3, 1975, pp.252-279; Hardly ever a dull moment History of Development 
Studies No.5 Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, ANU, 1995, esp. Part III ‘A 
broader canvas’; with R.T.Shand The Early Stages of Development in a Primitive Economy: The 
Evolution from Subsistence to Trade and Specialization’ in Clifton R. Wharton Jr. ed. Subsistence 
Agriculture and Economic Development London: Frank Cass and Co. 1970,pp.257-274; see also: 
Shand, R.T. The Development of Trade and Specialization in a Primitive Economy’ Economic
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According to the academics, the principal development problem remained how to 
increase the output of marketed production, while retaining the attachment of 
households to land. No radical break with past policies was required.6 Instead an 
intensified program needed to be implemented which shifted the available ‘surplus 
labour’, especially of males, not currently engaged productively due to the 
existence of ‘primitive’ or ‘subsistence’ affluence, into productive activities. 
Household labour attached to smallholdings could be commercialised further by 
raising output of marketed crops. The income acquired from the sales of produce 
would make it possible for households to purchase more consumption items, and 
so raise standards of living.
Fisk’s reasoning shows, once again, how development thought included 
anticipating problems and framing solutions. He foresaw that growth would have 
damaging consequences for village life, and that there was a need to anticipate 
these effects by suitable policies. He concluded that by abolishing warfare and 
improving health services to indigenes, there would soon be ‘increase(d) 
population pressure on land resources’ which would ‘undermine the very basis of 
their present affluence’ .7 Development policies were required in advance of the 
population increases to prevent separation of the greater numbers of households 
from smallholdings and to improve living standards.
The World Bank and Accelerating Development
With the administration’s role central to increasing household production, any 
program to speed up economic growth required a further major injection of state
Record v.41, no.94, 1965, pp. 193-206; Trade Prospects for the Rural Sector’ in Fisk ed.New 
Guinea on the Threshold pp.80-102; Shand and Straatmans, W. Transition from Subsistence: Cash 
Crop Development in Papua New Guinea Research Bulletin no. 54 Pt Moresby and Canberra: New 
Guinea Research Unit and ANU, 1974. It seems likely that much of this research was informed by 
W. Arthur Lewis’s early 1950s formulation of the policy required to bring development in countries 
which had substantial rural smallholder populations and therefore ‘disguised unemployment’ (see 
Tignor W. Arthur Lewis pp.79-108, Ch.3 ‘Unlimited Supplies of Labor’). However it is difficult to 
trace the link because, according to the custom of the period, there are few references in Fisk’s 
published material. Fisk later acknowledged reading the works of Lewis, Benjamin Higgins and 
other ‘development economists’ before coming to ANU. See Hardly ever a dull moment p.167, 
p.193.
6. Fisk Hardly ever a dull moment pp.237-238
7. Hardly ever a dull moment p.233
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funds. The political difficulties associated with substantially lifting the amounts 
provided from Australian revenues were apparent to the Minister and his 
Department even before the early 1960s, when the ANU academics began their 
research. Fortuitously, there was a further source of authoritative advice available 
which was prepared to accept the primacy of smallholder agriculture and aid the 
Minister’s case for increased funds. That this advice would also lead to the end of 
the policy of uniform development was unanticipated.0
By the late 1950s the Minister and the Administration had just fought the bruising, if 
ultimately successful, battle to introduce direct, mainly income, tax in PNG. Under 
the 1955 Cabinet directive the share of total revenues levied in the colony as a 
proportion of all revenues was to increase as the latter rose. However even this 
shift was insufficient if there was to be a major increase in the colonial 
administration’s role in making development happen. During 1959, the Minister and 
the Department began to consider requesting a World Bank study of PNG.8 9 While 
the final Report of a mission to PNG did not arrive in Australia until 1964, after 
Hasluck ceased to be Minister, the process of commissioning the study was 
completed while he held office. This move beyond domestic sources for support 
indicated the urgency of Hasluck’s need to increase funding for a heightened 
commitment to intentional development driven by the colonial state.10
8. Fisk later condemned the advice as leading to ‘a compromise approach’, which ‘produced a very 
rapid growth in GNP and in government financial activity, but the growth took place in pockets and 
enclaves, and left the majority of the population stagnating in the subsistence sector.’ Hardly ever a 
dull moment p.238. See also Oscar Spate’s criticism of the World Bank study as ‘highly 
accomplished technically’ but ‘somewhat detached from the realities of New Guinea life’ because 
‘its reliance on increased expatriate investment [in the agricultural sector] was backward-looking 
and very dubiously realistic’. On the Margins of History p.96
9. Subsequently published as International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank 
The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press for the IBRD, 1965, hereafter Report.
10. Hasluck’s version of how the World Bank’s view was sought appears in his A Time for Building 
pp.302-303. Hasluck attributes the origins of the Bank’s involvement, in January 1959, to 
Departmental Secretary Lambert’s awareness of ‘reports published by the (IBRD) on Nigeria and 
Thailand.’ Initially Lambert proposed ‘organizing a group from Australian resources to do a similar 
job for us’ but the ‘people we thought about, both academic and administrative were already very 
busy’ and unable to commit themselves full-time to the task. Hasluck denies that a 1962 United 
Nations visiting mission, led by British diplomat Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon), was responsible 
for initiating the move to involve the Bank, and points to a December 1960 memo to Lambert 
requesting further consideration of obtaining the Bank’s assistance as supporting his argument.
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Ian Downs explains why the discussions within the Department led to a detailed
proposal for Bank assistance. In order to obtain agreement from a reluctant
Cabinet and Treasury for major increases in funding for the colony, Hasluck
needed the support of a more prestigious and powerful agency than his own
Department and the Administration in PNG. Citing personal communications from
senior government officials, Downs concluded that:
Hasluck required convincing arguments for expansion based on the 
economic opinion of a prestigious source that the Commonwealth 
Treasury could not ignore. This was the main reason for his decision to 
secure the services of an economic survey team from the World Bank.11
While the Australian government announced in its 1961-62 annual report to the 
United Nations that arrangements had been made for a World Bank survey, it was 
not until mid-1963 that the survey team reached Australia, and then subsequently 
worked in PNG. The Australian government received a draft report in mid-1964, 
and the final report was eventually tabled in the first PNG House of Assembly on 
May 18, 1965. In the meantime, the 1962 UN mission, headed by Foot visited PNG 
prior to preparing a highly critical report of the pace of development, political and 
economic. While the UN mission seems to have played little, if any part in the 
Australian government’s decision to look to the World Bank, Downs’ assessment 
that the ‘effect of the [mission’s] report was to accelerate change and persuade the 
bureaucracy that the time factor was now working against them’ probably also is 
valid.12
11. The Australian Trusteeship p.253. Downs’ point might have been strengthened further by noting 
that in 1961 the importance of gaining external support for PNG became even greater. There was a 
brief credit squeeze induced recession in Australia. On December 9, 1961 the Menzies’ government 
was narrowly returned at a national election, with what remains the smallest majority in all the polls 
conducted since Federation in 1901. In such circumstances, demands for a major increase in grants 
for PNG were even less likely to receive Treasury support. A line of inquiry that I have not yet been 
able to pursue is that Treasury, which provided the direct administrative link between the Australian 
government and the Bank, also favoured the Bank’s involvement as a means of obtaining IBRD 
loans because this would reduce pressure on the Australian budget, at least in the short term. 
Hasluck A Time for Building pp.302-303, does not mention the domestic circumstances of 1960-62.
12. The Australian Trusteeship p.241. Hasluck ceased to be the Minister responsible for the 
Department of Territories, as of December 1963, that is prior to the Bank’s Report being received. 
Downs’ assessment of the significance of the UN visiting mission is that it assisted in obtaining 
Cabinet support for political reforms for which Hasluck had been unable to obtain Government 
backing in August 1960. See A Time for Building pp.396-398 for Hasluck’s account.
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Before examining what became colonial government policy, a detailed look at the 
Report is necessary. The purpose of the analysis is to show how although the 
Report seems to support a view of development in which smallholder production 
has primacy nevertheless there was sufficient ambiguity to permit the development 
of another policy direction, which could retain the Bank’s authority for the shift.13 
The alternate interpretation, in which expatriate plantation and commercial 
operations rather than smallholders became the focus for development efforts, was 
used to support the preferred direction of the colonial administration under a new 
minister. Subsequently attacks on the new policy direction tended to conflate the 
World Bank survey team’s views with what became colonial policy from 1964 to the 
early 1970s.14 The politics surrounding the conversion of the Report into policy for 
the late colonial administration of PNG disappears in the conflation.
The first chapter of the Report set out the dilemma of how to raise revenues for an 
expanded development programme in a colony which the mission construed as 
‘truly underdeveloped’.15 Chapter 2 ‘A Program for Economic Development’ makes 
clear why in addition to paying ‘special attention to the rapid expansion of 
production by native planters,’ the survey team recommended a further increase in 
largeholding production and other areas of expatriate enterprise. This was 
because:
The continuing participation by the European, both in the private sector 
and in the Administration, is vital for the objectives of the advancement 
of the indigenes and economic development to be realized.16
13. The Australian Trusteeship p.241. As Downs recognised: ‘Like the Bible, the report of the IBRD 
survey team was capable of more than one interpretation...Some critical themes in the Foot report 
of 1962 and the World Bank report of 1964 are strikingly similar. Both reports made fair and 
convincing criticisms of Hasluck’s policies. Nevertheless, the Foot report tended to be discounted in 
the Territory while the IBRD report was generally respected, possibly because the Foot report 
proposed radical political solutions while the IBRD survey recommended conventional economic 
policies.’ For a contrary view on how the Report was received by the Administrator Cleland, see 
Rachel Cleland Pathways to Independence pp.325-326.
14. See Mark Turner Papua New Guinea; The Challenge of Independence a nation in turmoil 
(Ringwood, Vic.: Penguin Books, 1990), p.13 where it is claimed that the Report advocated 
‘continued advantage for the whites’, and John Connell Papua New Guinea: The Struggle for 
Development (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p.22 who asserts that the Report 
‘assumed that economic development would follow expatriate initiatives and increased government 
services’. As Fisk notes, during 1973 he recruited Connell from the University of Sussex to work on 
the ANU’s forthcoming research program on Bougainville: Hardly ever a dull moment p.216.
15. Report p.1 and p.23.
16. Report p.40. While indicating the strong emphasis the Report gave to indigenous economic 
development, Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.253 notes: The private sector in Papua and
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Where agricultural growth was a central target, the Report proposed moving 
indigenes:
away from purely subsistence agriculture into the production of 
commercial crops, largely on a smallholder basis, at as fast a rate as the 
availability of the staff needed to direct and guide the program will 
permit. It proposes to make the maximum practical use of European 
producers to aid the Territory toward a more viable economy. 17
Furthermore:
The comparative need for the European in other sectors of the economy 
[than agriculture] is even greater...In commerce, industry, banking and 
the professions, the European must continue to supply his skills and 
capital if further development is to be achieved.18
By this reading, the Report provides a primarily instrumental purpose for expatriate 
plantation agriculture and other commercial activities. At a time when the colonial 
administration required increased revenues to expand administrative support for 
smallholder agriculture, these businesses would also provide more taxes.
It was possible to reduce the previous policy emphasis upon households producing 
for immediate consumption and shift priorities to increasing production of marketed 
food because ‘the peoples of the Territory are not short of food ’ .19 With no 
substantial land shortages, existing land-use methods of households are generally 
‘conservative rather than destructive in character’ .20 The Report was unambiguous 
in its emphasis upon the increases which had already occurred in household 
production of marketed crops.21 Presenting evidence on less impressive growth in 
some plantation production,22 the language used to describe the change from the 
pre-war situation, where indigenes contributed little to commercial farming is
New Guinea gained comfort from World Bank endorsement of the role of the European as the 





21. See for instance, the acknowledgement in the Report Chapter 1, p.27 that ‘the rapid expansion 
in production of cash crops by the indigenes has brought a fivefold increase in income from this 
source since 1950/51, a growth rate much above that in the non-indigenous sector.’
22. The description of expatriate coconut plantation operations acknowledges that these do not 
utilise all available unplanted land on largeholdings and have adopted a ‘stand-still’ attitude toward 
replanting where palms were senile or near-senile. Report p.89
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striking.23 Furthermore, the change was expected to continue, including in new 
plantings of export crops.24
Indigenous farmers were the sole producers of what the Report terms ‘dual- 
purpose crops', that is those produced for immediate consumption as well as for 
markets, including coconuts, peanuts, rice and vegetables. The Report concluded 
that the quantity of dual-purpose crops exchanged through what it terms barter was 
unknown.25 While the Report provides no evidence of stagnation in household 
production, existing production was not regarded as sufficient to meet the principal 
economic goal of ‘standing on its own feet’ or national self-sufficiency required to 
accompany the political objective of self-government.
In order to achieve increased output, the Report proposed a break with one of the 
central components of uniform development policy. It urged redirection of effort 
toward the most advanced areas of the colony, where marketed crop production 
was especially substantial. For the Bank’s team, accelerated development in these 
areas could occur without other areas and peoples sliding into poverty given the 
achievements made under uniform development. The Report proposed three 
‘broad principles or policies’ to further expand production and advance ‘the 
indigenous people’ .26
The first principle advocated was that ‘[government] expenditures and manpower 
should be concentrated in areas and on activities where the prospective return is 
highest’ .27 Acknowledging that ‘political factors’ might impinge upon this 
redirection, the Bank Mission nevertheless ‘strongly recommends against an
23. Report pp.82-83 ‘Since the war and particularly since 1956, the change has been 
phenomenal....With peace, the Administration engaged in a progressive policy of encouragement of 
native farming for cash...By 1962, native participation in commercial production reached impressive 
levels. They held nearly 50% of the area in coconuts and produced about 25 per cent of the copra 
production. They controlled 60 per cent of the land in coffee and produced over 40 per cent of the 
coffee output. They farmed 17 per cent of the cocoa areas and produced some-what less than 25 
per cent of all cocoa.’
24. Report pp.82-83. The ten-year planting program of new trees envisaged by the Mission makes it 
clear that in the main crops of coconuts and cocoa where further planting could occur, indigenous 
plantings were anticipated to increase at a greater rate than non-indigenous. Report p.4,Table 1.
25. Report p.83.
26. Report p.35. Emphasis added.
27. Report p.35
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across-the-board policy which distributes scarce manpower and finance throughout 
the Territory without due regard to the benefits to be derived in comparison with 
those realizable elsewhere’ .28
Secondly, the ‘standards of Administration services and facilities should be related 
to Territory conditions, if the maximum numbers of people are to benefit from the 
money spent on the program ’ .29 In other words, instead of applying standards 
which had become established in industrial, developed countries, colonial officials 
were instead to utilise appropriate local measures for the provision of services. 
Thirdly, if ‘benevolent paternalism’ was the appropriate description of previous 
Administration efforts, the future required ‘a shift in emphasis toward policies giving 
greater responsibilities to the people’ which was ‘essential and, indeed, 
inevitable’ .30
The Report was presented to the Australian Government at a significant moment. 
The departure of the three most important colonial officials, Hasluck, Cleland and 
Lambert, were critical for how the Report was subsequently interpreted to form the 
basis for a major break in colonial development thought and policies.
The Politics of Introducing Accelerated Development
The Bank Report gave largeholdings and other commercial enterprises a largely 
instrumental role in what was intended to be a rapid commercialisation of 
smallholder agriculture underpinned by a major expansion of the colonial 
administration’s place in coordinating and supervising the growth. However, 
changes concurrent with the receipt of the Report elevated the importance of 
largeholdings and other commercial enterprises even further. While smallholder
28. Report p.35. This principle, of concentrated effort to maximize resources and produce faster 
growth, was readily adopted by some government officials. For a strong defence of the direction 
proposed in the Report from a senior official of the Department of Territories, though with the usual 
disclaimer that he was not giving the official view, see G.O.Gutman ‘Aspects of Economic 
Development in Papua and New Guinea’ The Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics v.10, 
no.2, 1966, pp.128-141.
29. Report p.36. As will be seen below, this direction jarred with the ambitions of the indigenes who 
increasingly filled many public service positions and fuelled the anti-colonial nationalism which 
gathered pace from the mid-1960s.
30. Report p.37
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production of marketed, particularly exported, crops continued to increase,31 the 
colonial administration gave greater attention to revitalising largely expatriate- 
owned and operated plantations,32 establishing the new crops of oil palm and tea 
based on nucleus estates,33 and a major copper-gold mine at Panguna on 
Bougainville.34
In December 1963, Hasluck’s tenure as Minister came to an end. A Country Party 
MP Charles Barnes became Minister for what had again become the Department 
of External Territories. Soon after Hasluck’s departure and Barnes’ appointment, 
long-serving Department Secretary Lambert, who had been another of the 
important advocates of uniform development, retired. Lambert was replaced by 
George Warwick Smith, previously Deputy Secretary of the Department of Trade 
and Industry.35 Both changes increased the chance that colonial policy would move 
in favour of Australian plantation and other commercial interests, and give these 
more than an instrumental role for lifting smallholder output.
31. See below; and Thompson and MacWilliam The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea
pp. 126-129, for details of coffee, cocoa and copra exports. See also Maxine Dennis ‘Plantations’ in 
Denoon and Snowden eds. A time to plant and a time to uproot pp.219-245, who notes (p.239) that 
in 1975 ‘peasant production of export crops...had reached parity with plantation production for 
export, each having 50% of the total’.
32. As the Report notes (p.74), of the more than one million acres alienated for expatriate 
largeholdings, in 1962 approximately 70% of the land was undeveloped. Also cited in Robin Hide ‘A 
most just cause of Warre: A lesson to be learned at Merani...’ New Guinea v.3, no.1, 1968,pp.25- 
42, who provides an instance of an attempt by one expatriate rubber plantation owner to settle 
indigenes on smallholdings sub-divided out of his undeveloped land at Cape Rodney in Papua.
33. See D.R.J.Densley Agriculture in the Papua New Guinea Economy Konedobu: Department of 
Primary Industry, n.d., p.15; W.A.Arthur Tea Konedobu: Department of Primary Industry, n.d., pp.2- 
3;J.Christensen and D.R.J.Densley Oil Palm Konedobu: Department of Primary Industry, n.d., pp.3- 
10; Bob Densley ‘Rural Policies: Planning and Programmes, 1945 to 1977’ in Denoon and 
Snowden a time to plant and a time to uproot pp.285-286; Downs The Australian Trusteeship
pp.293-294
34. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.340 asserts that: The discovery of copper in Bougainville 
in 1964 was the greatest single event in the economic history of Papua and New Guinea’. For other 
descriptions, see F.F.Espie ‘Bougainville Copper: difficult development decisions’ in R.J.May ed. 
Priorities in Melanesian Development Papers delivered at the Sixth Waigani Seminar Canberra and 
Port Moresby: RSPAS, ANU and UPNG, 1973, pp.335-342; Don Vernon The Panguna Mine’ in 
Regan and Helga Griffin eds. Bougainville before the conflict, pp.258-273; James Griffin 
‘Movements Towards Secession 1964-76’ in Regan and Helga Griffin eds. Bougainville before the 
conflict pp.291-299; Donald Denoon Getting under the skin: the Bougainville copper agreement and 
the creation of the Panguna mine Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2000.
35. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.274 notes how Smith’s appointment was arranged 
between the Deputy Prime Minister (Sir) John McEwen, also Minister for Trade and Industry and 
leader of the Country Party in the Menzies Liberal-CP coalition government, and his colleague 
Barnes.
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Barnes was less inclined than Hasluck to exercise tight control over the colonial 
administration, except where overseas investment was involved, such as in the 
negotiations with Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia (CRA) regarding the Panguna mine 
exploration and operations.36 The loosening left greater room for the colonial 
administration to follow the swing toward rapid economic growth favoured by the 
Minister.37 Prime Minister Menzies also became personally involved, urging 
Australian businessmen and fellow politicians to be more commercially active in 
the colony.38
The change to focusing upon some areas and peoples while down-grading the 
resources provided to others opened the colonial administration to two possible 
charges. Firstly, that its trusteeship obligations were no longer being met equally 
for all the indigenous population.39 By encouraging immigration of Europeans as 
investors and skilled workers, the administration was exposed to a second 
objection, that it was down-grading trusteeship obligations to the indigenous 
population.40
36. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.349; also cited in Griffin ‘Movements towards Secession’ 
p.292
37. The Australian Trusteeship p.276 summarizes the policy change from Hasluck to Barnes in 
these terms: ‘Charles Barnes sought to restore and maintain Hasluck’s early restraint on political 
progress in order to preserve a favourable climate for “investment security” that would encourage 
economic development and make investors from Australia and overseas feel “safe”’. Further, as 
Downs also notes, there was sufficient in the Report for the new Minister and administration which 
‘wished to move in the direction of economic independence’ to ‘choose its own courses of action.’
38. For a specific instance of investment propelled by Menzies’ exhortations, see the case of ANG 
Holdings and its affiliated companies, owning and operating Highlands coffee and tea plantations, 
timber milling, road and house construction, and Port Moresby commercial property. Apart from 
Registrar of Companies files, I am indebted to Mr John Millett for advice on the firm established in 
1963-64. See also MacWilliam ‘Placing the Planters’ forthcoming.
39. Instead of trying to provide extension services as widely as possible, by late 1965 the earlier 
five year plan was being ‘recast entirely taking account of the new approach involved in the 
agricultural and livestock development plans’. See NAA A452/1 1967/5758 Agricultural Extension 
Work in Papua & New Guinea, 1964-1970 9/12/1965 E.J. Wood, Assistant Secretary, Industry and 
Commerce Section, Department of External Territories, ‘Notes on Discussions with Messrs. [Frank] 
Henderson and [Bill} Conroy [Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries, PNG: SM]’. This 
meeting followed a July instruction from Department Secretary, G. Warwick Smith to the 
Administrator ( contained in the same file) that ‘extension officers should be concentrated in areas 
with promising combinations of developmental resources, both physical and human, with proper 
attention to accessibility and markets’ while dispersing ‘extension effort’ to the Western District ‘is 
unnecessary’.
40. The Australian Trusteeship p.277.
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The shift to accelerated development, as the new policy direction came to be 
known, began in especially propitious political circumstances, not least in the 
absence of a vociferous and strong indigenous nationalism expressed in 
representative institutions. Indigenous representative politics had begun the move 
from local government councils at the margins of state power to the Legislative 
Council at the centre. However initially this had little effect except to reinforce the 
Administration’s authority when Papua New Guineans in the Council did little more 
than vote along the official line.41 Although the fifth Council elected in 1961 had 
more indigenous members chosen by a substantial indigenous electorate through 
a complex indirect process, there was little change in the nature of their political 
participation, with only one, John Guise, becoming ‘a major figure in Council 
business.’42
Further constitutional reform leading to the establishment of the House of 
Assembly in 1964 had raised the possibility that indigenous representative politics 
would become more focused upon central institutions, rather than on local 
government councils. At the 1961 Legislative Council elections, only six indigenes 
had been elected through an indirect process. The 1964 House of Assembly, by 
comparison, had forty four members from Open electorates and ten from Special 
(expatriate only) electorates, with adult suffrage and a common roll for the former 
constituencies. The House now had more elected than nominated and official 
members. However the official political education programme for voters, the 
election campaign, and the voting by an overwhelmingly rural smallholder 
electorate reinforced what has been described as a ‘’’certain timidity” among the
41. Colin A Hughes The Development of the Legislature: The Legislative Councils’ in David G 
Bettison, Hughes and Paul W van der Veur eds. The Papua-New Guinea Elections 1964 Canberra: 
ANU, 1965, pp.8-27. Hughes’ assessment (p.10) is: ‘In the first four Legislative Councils between 
1951 and 1961 the indigenous members played a very minor part....None of the indigenous 
Members were prepared to criticize the Administration, and often their interventions in Council 
discussion simply re-stated established Administration policy. When they offered positive 
suggestions these usually followed what might be termed a “conservative line”. There can have 
been few colonial legislatures in which indigenous Members, even when nominated, provided so 
little criticism of the work of the administering power as they did in the Papua and New Guinea 
Legislative Council during those years.’ For the fragmented and nationally marginal forms of 
indigenous politics prior to the 1960s , see the essays in Ronald M Berndt and Peter Lawrence eds. 
Politics in New Guinea Traditional and in the Context of Change Some Anthropological 
Perspectives Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1971
42. Hughes The Development of the Legislature’ p.22. Guise was subsequently knighted and in 
September 1975 became independent PNG’s first governor-general.
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indigenous population about political activism’.43 That is, indigenous anti­
colonialism or even just strong opposition to colonial rule was not yet a prominent 
force.
On occasion dissenting MPs were able to defeat the Administration. Nevertheless 
colonial officials continued to dominate most proceedings. Domination of the 
legislature as well as control of the executive, the Administrator’s Council, later 
Administrator’s Executive Council, combined with ministerial and departmental 
authority exercised from Canberra. For most of the 1960s, this strong hold on state 
power ensured that the intensive program of economic development was able to 
proceed largely unchallenged.
Faster Economic Growth
During the 1960s, and particularly the second half of the decade, there was a 
major boost in public revenues and overseas investment, as well as a rapid inflow 
of expatriates taking up skilled and semi-skilled managerial and wage positions. 
Between 1964 and 1968, the rise in the Administration’s receipts was especially 
pronounced. While the Commonwealth grant increased from $56 million to $78 
million, locally levied revenue jumped from $28 to $50 million, so that the share of 
total receipts raised within the colony went from thirty one to almost thirty seven 
per cent. In the four years from 1964-65 to 1967-68, total receipts rose by almost 
fifty per cent.44 Direct expenditure by Commonwealth departments operating in 
PNG, which was not included in grants, increased considerably.45 In 1970-71 
locally raised revenue exceeded the Australian grant for the first time. By 1972, 
with self-government imminent, the Commonwealth grant had increased to almost 
$70 million, while locally raised revenue reached $95 million.46
43. R.S.Parker and Edward P. Wolfers The Context of Political Change’ in A.L.Epstein, R.S.Parker 
and Marie Reay eds. The Politics of Dependence Papua New Guinea 1968 (Canberra: ANU, 1971), 
p.19. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.487, charts the changes between 1951 and 1972 in the 
balance between official members, appointed members and elected members in the Legislative 
Council and House of Assembly. In the first House, elected in 1964, there were ten official members 
and 54 elected, with 37 of the latter indigenous.
44. The Australian Trusteeship p.320, Table 10.3
45. The Australian Trusteeship p.289
46. The Australian Trusteeship p.397
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Loans by trading banks, branches of banks based in Australia, to fund commercial 
expansion rose substantially. From seven million dollars in January 1964, the 
amount advanced for term loans, overdrafts, farm development loans and personal 
instalment loans reached eighteen million four years later. By July 1971, total 
advances were over $100 million.47 Indigenous savings also increased,48 giving 
rise to the criticism that these funded an expanded loan programme for expatriate 
commercial activities and private consumption.
In 1967, the Papua and New Guinea Development Bank was established in order 
to further boost investment. Over the first four years funding of $11 million was 
provided out of Territory budgets and direct supplementary grants from the 
Australian Treasury. This amount reached in excess of $25 million by 
Independence.49 While the Bank was insufficiently capitalised to attract requests 
for iarge ioans from international firms, it became the centre of a tussle between 
expatriates and indigenes seeking funding for small enterprises.50
The Development Bank facilitated the expansion of indigenous agriculture, 
including providing credit for the first palm oil project which also commenced in 
1967. A nucleus estate and oil mill was established at Hoskins, West New Britain, 
through a 50/50 joint venture between the colonial administration and Harrisons 
and Crosfield (ANZ), a subsidiary of the major international agriculture firm based 
in the UK. Between 1967 and 1972, nearly 1,600 loans for approximately $3.2 
million were made to smallholders growing oil palm trees.51 This project and
47. The Australian Trusteeship p.321, Table 10.4
48. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.290 states: ‘By 1968 (Papuans and New Guineans) were 
also investing in savings and loans societies and savings clubs organised by the Reserve Bank. In 
the case of the savings and loans societies and savings clubs, membership rose to 24,042 and 
savings increased to $994,000 in 1966-67. As at June 1967, indigenous savings bank deposits 
amounted to $11.1 million out of a total of $29.8 million.’
49. Government of Papua New Guinea (1967-1975) Development Bank Annual Reports and 
Financial Statements Port Moresby: Government Printer; MacWilliam ‘International capital, 
indigenous accumulation and the state in Papua New Guinea: the case of the Development Bank’ 
Capital and Class no.29, Summer 1986, pp. 150-181
50. For conflicting accounts of the Bank’s activities before and immediately after Independence, see 
M. Donaldson and D. Turner The Foreign Control of the Papua New Guinea Economy and the 
Reaction of the Independent State Political Economy Occasional Paper No.1 Waigani: University of 
Papua New Guinea, December 1978; and MacWilliam ‘International capital’.
51. For planting and production estimates from 1967 until 1975 for oil palm and cattle, see Downs 
The Australian Trusteeship p.324, Table 10.7 and p.326, Table 10.9 and 10.10
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smallholder cattle projects were allocated more than half of all agricultural loans up 
until Independence.52
There was a major influx of immigrants into the colony, for the employment and 
commercial opportunities opened up by the shift to accelerated development. 
Between 1963 and 19/1, the non-indigenous population doubled to 53,000, out of 
a total PNG population of 2.1 million people.53 The reaction produced by this 
sudden increase became part of the opposition to colonial rule and the changed 
development policies.
From the mid-1960s, the establishment and early operations of the enormous 
copper-gold mine at Panguna in Bougainville District dwarfed all other activities 
during a period noted for rapid growth.54 The company outlaid expenditure of $40 
million to prove the viability of the project, and $400 million to $500 million to make 
the mine operational.55 As Downs notes:
52. MacWilliam ‘Internationa! capital’; J. Longayroux Hoskins Development: The Role of Oil Palm 
and Timber Research Bulletin No.49 Canberra and Port Moresby: New Guinea Research Unit, 
ANU, 1972; P.F. Philipp, L.L. Langness, F.von Fleckenstein and M. Evans Four Papers on the 
Papua New Guinea Cattle Industry Research Bulletin No.63 Canberra and Port Moresby: New 
Guinea Research Unit, ANU, 1975. For an objection to the ‘rural elite’, or ‘wealthy farmer’ bias in 
‘the cattle boom’ from 1962 until 1972, see R.F. McKillop Problems of Access: Agricultural 
Extension in the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea Presented at a Seminar, University of Papua 
New Guinea November 1974; Dick and McKillop A Brief History of Agricultural Extension and 
Education in Papua New Guinea pp.30-35. Between 1965 and 1973, tea was also established on a 
nucleus estate basis in the Western Highlands, with approximately 450 indigenous smallholders 
settled on about 2,000 hectares. See W.A. Arthur Tea Konedobu: Department of Primary Industry, 
n.d., pp.2-5; see also Marie Reay ‘But Whose Estates? The Wahgi smallholders’ New Guinea v.4, 
no.3, 1969, pp.64-68.
53. The Australian Trusteeship pp.319-320 Table 10.2
54. According to one official estimate, between 1960 and 1966, the cash economy grew by 12.5% 
per annum in current prices, with a decline in the predominance of primary production and a ‘very 
steep increase in private capital formation’ since 1963-64. Territory of Papua and New Guinea 
Programmes and Policies for the Economic Development of Papua and New Guinea Pt Moresby: 
Government Printer, 1968, p.8
55. While the company which began the project was a joint venture between the Australian 
subsidiary of multinational Conzinc Riotinto, CRA Ltd, and New Broken Hill Consolidated Ltd, 
another Australian-based firm, over the next ten years major changes took place in the corporate 
form which owned and operated the mine as Bougainville Mining Ltd (BML). In 1967, Bougainville 
Copper PL was established as a partnership between the colonial administration and the joint 
venture partners. In 1970, equity shareholding in Bougainville Copper was set at 80% owned by 
BML, with two-thirds of these shares owned by CRA, and 20% by the colonial administration. 
During the next year, BML made a public offer of shares in PNG and Australia, which resulted in 
one million shares being taken up ‘by indigenous organizations and individuals’, totaling 9,000 
Papua-New Guineans. In 1973, BML was replaced by Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) as the 
public company owning and operating the project. With issued capital of $133,687,500 and
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The project was so big that it would compromise the use of Papua and 
New Guinea manpower for years to come and influence all wage rates. 
Bougainville would absorb commodities and equipment like a giant 
sponge and require services of every kind beyond the capacity of all 
local sources to produce.56
The mine also shifted the focus of development toward the Bougainville District, 
which had not been given priority in previous administration efforts. Gaining access 
to sufficient land for the mine, residential land for housing of mine workers and 
associated commercial enterprises, as well as for transportation of semi-processed 
minerals and waste disposal, threatened many aspects of colonial policy, 
especially for land. While the Minister Barnes insisted on sticking to mineral 
ownership principles with which he and other officials were familiar,57 demands 
from indigenous owners for compensation threatened to move land prices 
substantially upwards throughout the colony. However, projections which showed 
the scale of the expected exports, revenue in the form of royalties and taxes and 
employment dwarfed all considerations of difficulties to be faced .58
As the sharp end of the program of accelerated development, planning and early 
construction at Panguna went ahead despite continuous local opposition, which 
struck a chord with those raising wider objections to late colonial development 
policy. These objections had begun to appear as soon as the Report was
267,375,000 50 cent shares in 1973, the firm was by far the largest operating in PNG. Twenty per 
cent of the shares were held by the PNG Government- owned Investment Corporation, over 26% by 
individual and organizational shareholders, and the balance by CRA. The bulk of the operating 
capital was borrowed internationally, making the firm and the colonial administration extremely wary 
of the effects of any political unrest. See Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.340- 362; Denoon 
Getting under the skin-, Espie ‘Bougainville Copper’; Vernon The Panguna mine’.
56. The Australian Trusteeship p.341.
57. These principles were that while ownership of the land was secured under various forms of 
private title (eg leasehold, customary title), ownership of minerals extracted from underneath the 
surface belonged to the (colonial) state. The assertion of state ownership caused not only confusion 
but also became the source of dispute and grievances, not satisfactorily resolved by the provision of 
compensation to individuals, lineages and associated organisations. See Griffin ‘Movements 
Towards Secession 1964-76’ p.292, who notes, citing The Australian Trusteeship pp.346-349, that: 
‘Under Warwick Smith, Canberra assumed detailed day-to-day control by telephone and telex 
where experienced, delegated authority should have been exercised. Even psychologists were sent 
in to analyse the putative mental ills of people who would not understand why they did not own the 
sub-surface of their land’.
58. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.341 calculates that: ‘...the projected value of copper and 
gold to be exported would far exceed the value of all other Territory exports. The average annual 
profit of the company would become equal to half the Territorial revenue. Before that profit was 
declared the royalties and taxes paid to future Papua New Guinea governments would equal or 
exceed the declared profit.’
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presented locally, in mid-1965, and became more prevalent over the next three 
years as official plans that drew upon the Report were prepared and presented in 
the colony. The most important subsequent documents were the 1967 Economic 
Development of Papua and New Guinea and the 1968 Programmes and Policies 
for the Economic Development of Papua and New Guinea 59
The ‘Programmes and Policies’ document provided the colony’s first
comprehensive development plan. Covering 1968 to 1973, the plan continued the
emphasis on rapid growth. Both documents drew upon the World Bank Report for
their founding premises, including the need to improve the colony’s domestic
revenue base in order to hasten the move to self-government. Increasing
indigenous agricultural production and accelerating ‘the movement of indigenes
from subsistence to commercial production’ was to be a major objective of the
revised agriculture, livestock and fisheries programme. But the 1968 ‘Programmes
and Policies’ plan went even further than the Report, stating that:
For many crops, the proposals advanced in this paper place 
proportionally more stress on development by the indigenous people 
than did the 1964 Bank Mission’s programme. About half the land under 
commercial agriculture is already cultivated by indigenes, and 
indigenous holdings contribute about 40 per cent of the total value of 
crop production. These proportions will be substantially increased under 
the proposed development programme. At the same time the trend 
towards larger holdings in indigenous hands is expected to continue.60
Accelerated Development under Fire
While the criticism of accelerated development did not become very politically 
important until later in the 1960s, an initial indication of the direction that objections 
would take appeared at a 1965 seminar held in Goroka in the Eastern Highlands. 
This first public forum at which the 1964 World Bank Report was discussed in PNG 
produced controversy. University of Sussex academic Bernard Schaffer outlined
59. Territory of Papua and New Guinea Economic Development of Paua and New Guinea Port 
Moresby: Government Printer, Prepared by direction of the Administrator and Tabled in the House 
of Assembly June 1, 1967; Territory of Papua and New Guinea Programmes and Policies for the 
Economic Development of Papua and New Guinea Port Moresby: Government Printer, Prepared by 
direction of His Honour the Administrator, September 1968
60. Programmes and Policies p. 19, for this statement and the previous shorter quote.
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objections which he subsequently developed in a lengthy journal article.61 Schaffer 
asserted that indicative of the ‘general attitude’ underpinning the Report were three 
major conclusions and recommendations. These could be summarised as: a need 
to increase the immigration of skilled labour from Australia; a focus upon increasing 
cash crop production, primarily from ‘Australian plantations in copra, coffee, cocoa, 
and rubber'; and indigenous advance through ‘more participation in production and 
education’.62
Schaffer drew attention to what he regarded as an opposition between the 
increased levels of skilled immigration and plantation production on one hand, and 
indigenous advance. The crux of Schaffer’s criticism was that the former were 
long-term strategies for growth whereas rapid short-term change was needed to 
satisfy indigenous ambitions. Schaffer concluded that ‘the economic policy is 
incomplete as economics and unwise as politics’, not least because the Report did 
not consider ‘the dimensions of the indigenous response [to the proposals for 
accelerating growth, including in agricultural production and education].’63
The Governor of the Reserve Bank, Dr H.C. Coombs, and the Labor Leader of the 
Federal Opposition in Australia, Gough Whitlam also attended the seminar. While 
Whitlam gained most public attention by asserting that PNG should be independent 
by 1970,64 Coombs presented a paper which ‘expressed dissatisfaction with the
61. Thoughts at Goroka, Sins of the World Bank team’ New Guinea v.1, no.2, 1965, pp.72-79; 
‘Advising about Development: The Example of the World Bank Report on Papua and New Guinea’ 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies v. IV, no.1, March 1966, pp.30-46. See also Downs The 
Australian Trusteeship pp.276-277. As Ron May notes, the Goroka seminar and one held in 
Melbourne with the same purpose, to discuss the Report, were organized by the Council on New 
Guinea Affairs, for which the Reserve Bank of Australia provided funding. Nugget, Pike et.al. The 
Role of the Reserve Bank of Australia in Papua New Guinea’s Decolonisation Discussion Paper 8 
Canberra: ANU, North Australia Research Unit, 1998, p. 10.
62. ‘Advising about Development’ p.30
63. ‘Advising about Development’ p.36
64. See Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.279. As May notes (p. 11), at Coombs’ direction, in 
early 1964 (ie before Whitlam’s provocative statement) the Reserve Bank had prepared a ‘Plan of 
Work for TPNG’ which assumed self-government within the next few years and how this would 
affect the Reserve Bank’s structure and operations. Apart from playing a role in the establishment of 
a comparable banking institution in PNG, the Reserve Bank emphasised the importance of 
indigenization in employment and commerce Nugget, Pike et.al.
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(Report’s) “lack of precision in dealing with the task of stimulating indigenous 
enterprise’” .65
The Report had distinguished between the positions occupied by expatriates and 
indigenes, and recognised the presence of indigenes in plantation production.66 
However the Bank mission did not foresee the economic or political consequences 
of encouraging further the emerging class of ‘native capitalists’, which the colonial 
administration had long tried to contain. Urging that ‘greater responsibilities 
[should be given] to the [indigenous] people’, where ‘the people’ were largely seen 
as an undifferentiated mass, the Bank Report did not envisage that the ambitions 
of indigenes to substantially increase their presence in largeholding agriculture 
could threaten the scheme of smallholder production. In the early 1970s, during the 
transition to Independence, and subsequently this threat became central to the 
PNG political economy.
From late 1965, the journal New Guinea, and Australia, the Pacific and South-east 
Asia (best known by the abbreviated title New Guinea) became a leading forum for 
criticism and some defence of the action and planning which followed the Report. 
The journal was published in Sydney from 1965 until 1976 by the Council on New 
Guinea Affairs, and generally adopted a strongly anti-colonial nationalist stance. 
Edited by journalist Peter Hastings, New Guinea had University of Sydney 
academic Professor Henry Mayer, who also attended the Goroka conference and 
criticised the World Bank Report, as editorial adviser. In the late 1960s, Hastings 
was a regular visitor to the Port Moresby office of the ANU’s New Guinea Research
65. May Nugget, Pike et. at. p.10. See also the assessment by the Reserve Bank’s most influential 
official in PNG which foresaw a conflict between economic growth in general and that which 
specifically placed the indigenous presence foremost: P.W.E.Curtin The World Bank report. A 
review’ New Guinea v.1., no.1, 1965, pp.52-58, and a paper by Henry Roberts, an economics 
student at the University of Sydney, who subsequently as Henry ToRobert became Governor of the 
Bank of Papua New Guinea and later knighted, pointed to the growing importance of an ‘educated 
elite leadership’ which was poised to displace ‘most of the present indigenous parliamentarians,’ 
representative of ‘traditional leadership’. See ‘New Guinea’s Leadership: Problems of the Prestige 




Unit, where Ron Crocombe, leading expatriate critic of colonial policy, was 
executive officer67
The public exchanges about the Report, the two subsequent planning documents 
of 1967 and 1968, and accelerated development in general tended initially to be 
dominated by expatriate officials and academics, including several from the ANU 
who had been involved in the preparation of the colonial administration’s plans.68 
Younger educated indigenes, with commercial as well as representative political 
aspirations, also injected an increasingly strident note into the criticism of colonial 
policy by.69
Their criticism was strengthened by the growing numbers of expatriates in local 
employment and commerce as well as the continuing overseas ownership of the 
largest enterprises.70 Crocombe pointed to the substantial presence of expatriates 
in small commercial operations, taxis, shops, hairdressing and the like.71 Kaputin 
also flagged the growing ambition by indigenes to acquire largeholdings utilising
67. Personal communication, Dr Robin Hide, December 3, 2008.
68. The principal expatriate contributors to the public debate included: P.W.E. Curtin ‘But Whose 
Development? How to be inconsistent’ New Guinea v.3, no.1, 1968, pp. 19-24; Crocombe That 
Five Year Plan: For New Guineans-token development’ New Guinea v.3, no.3, 1968-69, pp.57-70; 
Heinz Arndt ‘An Answer to Crocombe-I: Too many invidious and invalid comparisons?’ New Guinea 
v.4, no.2, 1969, pp.54-59; Ric Shand ‘An Answer to Crocombe-ll: In defence of nucleus estates’ 
New Guinea v.4, no.2, 1969, pp.60-63; E.K.Fisk ‘An Answer to Crocombe-lll: How fast do you go?’ 
New Guinea v.4, no.2, 1969, pp.64-71; Crocombe ‘Crocombe to His Critics: The debate goes on...’ 
New Guinea v.4, no.3, 1969, pp.49-58; Crocombe ‘Australian Planning in the New Guinea 
Economy’ in F.S.Stevens and E.P.Wolfers eds. Racism: The Australian Experience v.3 Colonialism 
and After Sydney. ANZ Book Co., 1977, pp. 148-162; T.Scarlett Epstein The Plan and its 
assumptions...’ New Guinea v.4, no.3, 1969, pp.59-63; Reay ‘But Whose Estates?’.
69. John Kaputin ‘Australia’s Carpetbaggers: After the apple - a miserable core?’ New Guinea v.4, 
no.1, 1969, pp.35-42. See also T.S.Epstein The Plan and its assumptions’ p.60 who warned: ‘If 
some of the expert economic planners or administrators had closer personal contact with groups of 
indigenes they would soon begin to share some of Dr Crocombe’s premonitions about political 
unrest. Recently when I had a chance to spend an evening with some Tolai friends I was left in little 
doubt about their grievance in regard to the dominance of local expatriate economic interests.
These young men are not only budding entrepreneurs but they are also ambitious and potential 
political leaders. It is, therefore, not too difficult to predict that as the opportunity arises, these men 
will give political expression to their economic dissatisfactions.’
70. Downs The Australia Trusteeship p.288, notes the significance of relative disadvantage in 
fuelling indigenous objections. He states: ‘In the course of [the 1968 program] many nationals made 
money and became as profit conscious as expatriates. Others, less fortunate, did not have the land 
assets to take part and they became embittered. Economic plans were prepared without politics 
being in mind, but they became the basic cause of unrest and disorder’.
71. ‘Crocombe to His Critics’ pp.52-53
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more accessible bank loans.72 (This direction mirrored Kaputin’s personal 
commercial trajectory on the Gazelle Peninsula - see below and Chapter 6.) The 
critics’ depiction of the Australian colonial presence began to resemble 
international trends of the period where ‘underdevelopment’ was no longer an 
absence of development. Instead, as with the formulation for Latin America and 
Africa of ‘the development of underdevelopment’, anti-colonial critics in PNG 
described a condition of continuing exploitation, a reciprocal process between 
metropole and colony.73
Anti-colonial nationalism from expatriate academics, indigenous would-be 
bourgeois and their political allies gained greater traction as popular dissatisfaction 
increased, particularly over access to land by a growing population. The 
establishment of the Panguna mine raised a new local front which provided further 
ammunition for the wider opposition to the colonial regime and the drive to 
accelerate development.74 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the politics of 
opposition shifted, so that the local protest against specific circumstances was 
joined to national and international arenas where anti-colonial politics was 
especially powerful.
72. ‘Australia’s Carpetbaggers’ p.40
73. Andre Gunder Frank’s The Development of Underdevelopment New York: Monthly Review 
Press, and The Development of Underdevelopment’ Monthly Review v.18, no.4, September, were 
published in 1966, with Frank’s Capitalism & Underdevelopment in Latin America Historical Studies 
of Chile and Brazil distributed from the same publisher a year later. It is difficult to tell how much 
influence these founding texts of what became known as dependency thought, sometimes neo- 
Marxism, had during the late 1960s on the growing critique of Australian colonialism in Papua New 
Guinea. I can find no references to Frank or related texts in any of the publications of this period, 
although during the 1970s and 1980s Frank, Walter Rodney and Samir Amin became prominent in 
numerous accounts of PNG. Instead during the 1960s, several intellectual strands, mostly liberal 
and Fabian, underpinned the criticisms. See Ron May’s assessment of Dr P.W.E. (Pike) Curtin, of 
the Reserve Bank’s Papua New Guinea Division from 1965 onwards: ‘He was an unorthodox 
economist of Fabian persuasion’. Nugget, Pike et.al. p.7. However younger Papua New Guineans 
who had studied in Australian and other universities were influenced by the radical intellectual 
currents of the period. The experience and subsequent political-commercial activities of John 
Kasapwailova are instructive. In 1969 as a university student Kasapwailova ‘participated so deeply 
in the New Left Movement at the University of Queensland that he failed to receive a scholarship to 
continue as a student. He returned home fired with ideas for radical change in the Trobriands’. Jerry 
W.Leach ‘Socio-historical conflict and the Kabisawali Movement in the Trobriand Islands’ in R.J.May 
ed. Micro-nationalist movements in Papua New Guinea pp.249-289, esp. p.264. Leach states that a 
particular influence on Kasapwailova was Kaputin, who had also studied overseas.
74. Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.340-362; Griffin ‘Movements Towards Secession’
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Central to the shift in PNG was the transformation of indigenous leadership, 
subject both to domestic pressures and the growing Australian determination to 
hasten the transition to self-government. Under the banner of anti-colonialism, this 
leadership began to challenge components of the colonial power’s development 
policy. They worked to displace the stratum of indigenous chiefs and others who 
held power and remained supporters of colonial authority. Attention now turns to 
the politics of their challenge and its implications for development policy.
Anti-colonial politics
The initial reforms of the Legislative Council and then the first House of Assembly 
did not immediately produce a major shift in indigenous representative politics.75 
Instead it was outside the legislature that a more aggressive anti-colonial 
opposition appeared.
As anticipated and intended by both the colonial government and the World Bank, 
accelerated development was pursued through a considerably enlarged colonial 
administration. The World Bank Report contained two distinct recommendations 
regarding public employment. Firstly, in anticipation of the need to staff an 
administration for a self-governing country, the Report urged that standards of 
services and facilities should be related to Territory conditions. Secondly, for the 
short term needs of accelerated development, the Report encouraged substantial 
overseas recruitment of skilled personnel.
This recruitment came on top of a major change which had occurred in the number 
of Papua New Guineans in state employment. As a direct consequence of the 
rapid expansion in state positions, and increased employment of Papua New 
Guineans, there were substantial numbers of indigenous employees. By 1968 
‘upwards of 12,000 [indigenes] had found ....employment in government service’ 
but ‘only a handful were yet in positions of any seniority’.76 The higher levels were 
filled with either long-serving or newly recruited expatriates. The increased 
availability of secondary, then tertiary education for indigenes with the
75. Parker and Wolfers The Context of Political Change’ pp.20-30
76. Parker and Wolfers The Context of Political Change’ p.14
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establishment of the Administrative College and subsequently the University of 
Papua New Guinea contrasted with the barriers to their advance in the colonial 
administration.
The most important early clash between indigenous aspirations and existing public 
service employment came in a colony where most waged and salaried employment 
was at some distance from rural homes. With regard to wages and conditions for 
public employees, the World Bank recommended that there be a difference 
between expatriates and indigenes. This was already practised, with the difference 
in wages and salaries being paid as an expatriate allowance, and expatriates 
engaged in an auxiliary division, outside the Territorial service. However in August 
1964, following the direction favoured by Hasluck the Administration decided that in 
a reorganised integrated public service, there would be different pay rates for 
overseas and local employees. But all would be employed as part of the same 
colonial service.
Less than a fortnight later, the Public Service Commissioner made a statement on
his wage and salary determination for a dual salary classification system to the
House of Assembly. Anger was immediate.77 Outside the legislature, Papua New
Guineans active in the Public Service Association and other representative bodies
were provoked into action. Michael Somare, an office-holder in the PSA and the
Workers’ Association branches in Wewak, later claimed:
There was probably no other single issue that made Papua New 
Guineans more aware of the injustices of colonialism.78
The battle over the terms of employment for indigenous public employees spurred 
legal action. In April 1966, the advocate for the Australian Council of Trade Unions, 
R.J.L (Bob) Hawke, later Labor Party Prime Minister, appeared for the PSA in an
77. As Downs, himself an MHA, notes: ‘Expatriate and local members were shocked by the low 
basic level for local officers in the classification and disturbed by the delayed announcement which 
had the appearance of being deliberately arranged to trick them’. The Australian Trusteeship p.315. 
See also Rachel Cleland Pathways to Independence pp.303-322, esp. p.315 and 319.
78. Sana: An autobiography of Michael Somare Port Moresby: Nuigini Press, 1975, p.43. Cf.Downs 
The Australian Trusteeship p.317, who asserts that ‘the dissatisfaction was confined to the Port 
Moresby ‘"elite” without real following in the villages’. Downs also concedes that the grievance 
lingered and had subsequent consequences. Cf. Rachel Cleland Pathways to Independence p.319, 
on Downs’ response to the political actions taken by Papua New Guinean state employees.
169
arbitration case over improved wages and salaries. In May 1967, the arbitrator 
granted small increases which provoked a large demonstration in Port Moresby.79
Opposition to existing public service conditions was soon extended to a wider 
criticism of colonialism. Educated Papua New Guineans and sympathetic 
expatriates formed the Bully Beef Club in Port Moresby which brought leading 
opponents of colonial rule together on a regular basis. Also in April 1966, a group 
based at the Administrative College in Port Moresby startled the Administration and 
local conservatives by calling for a major reform of the colonial executive and 
limited self-government within two years. A more extensive submission to the 
previously established Select Committee on Constitutional Development called for 
a rapid program through which expatriates would be replaced by indigenes in 
public employment, and promotion of indigenes to senior positions within the 
Administration. The submission and the reaction to the demands of what were 
popularly dubbed the Thirteen angry men’ led directly to the formation of the 
Pangu -  Papua and New Guinea Union -  Pati, which included MHAs dissatisfied 
with colonial rule.
The 1968 Elections and the Triumph of Parliamentarism 
The 1968 election campaign suggested that the dissatisfaction with colonial 
authority among some of the formally educated urban Papua New Guineas did not 
have a national reach in a country where the bulk of the population remained 
attached to smallholdings. The 1967-68 House of Assembly election for an 
enlarged legislature in which the expatriate presence was reduced even further,80 
reinforced the weight of rural electorates and local demands. By and large
79. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.317. See also Sana p.43 where Somare extends the 
objection beyond public employment conditions. ‘I knew that some expatriates were making a lot of 
money in our country. But they paid their employees poorly. In all towns Europeans reserved the 
best land for themselves in so-called “high covenant” areas. Papua New Guineans were isolated in 
their poorly built compounds. With the new salary scheme it became practically impossible for any 
Papua New Guinean to move into one of the more comfortable houses.’
80. Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.487, shows that while the first House had 54 elected 
members (44 Open, and 10 Special electorates), the second had 84 elected members (from 69 
Open and 15 Regional electorates). In both there were 10 appointed Official members. From one 
hundred per cent of the 3 elected members in the first Legislative Council, formed in 1951, the 
expatriate proportion declined to 20 per cent in 1968, and 8.6 per cent of a further expanded House 
of Assembly in the 1972 election which preceded self-government.
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conservative in terms of any pronounced drive for self-government and national 
independence, most candidates and elected MHAs were closely tied to the 
concerns of rural electorates for more state facilities and economic growth.81
Even in rural areas where the opposition to colonial authority was long-standing, 
enlarging of the legislature for the 1968 election channelled many of the most 
important critics into electoral politics. This effect was especially noticeable on the 
Gazelle Peninsula. In this area popular dissatisfaction had begun in the early 
1950s, then continued and strengthened during the 1960s. Discontent was being 
fuelled by a rapid population increase and growing land shortages, where the pre- 
World War II alienation of land for plantations had been especially substantial.82 
Large areas of undeveloped and partly planted land on these largeholdings invited 
organised as well as spontaneous occupation by squatters.
The demands for land from the landless were easily joined politically to claims for 
more largeholding areas by Tolai bourgeois and would-be bourgeois. Members of 
the indigenous capitalist class had become wealthy through cocoa growing, 
processing and trading, as well as other commercial activities. However their 
ambitions were restricted in one of the colony’s most economically advanced but 
land scarce areas (see previous chapter and chapter Six below). The nationalist 
anti-colonial appeals, directed against ‘foreigners’ helped to cover the inherent 
opposition between the two forms of claims for land by indigenes, as smallholdings 
or plantations, on the Peninsula. Nationalism assisted in the transformation of 
direct action, squatting, unauthorised planting of vacant land and other measures, 
into electoral politics.
81. Of. Edward Wolfers The 1968 Elections’ New Guinea v.3, no.3, 1968, pp.50-61, who concluded 
(p.53): ‘For many Papuans and New Guineans the quadrennial House of Assembly elections are no 
more than a device, or the occasions, for the expression of traditional rivalries in their areas.’ 
However, as Parker indicates, there was some difference between attitudes of electors and 
candidates towards the Administration and expatriates, with further variation in different parts of the 
country. See ‘From Dependence To Autonomy?’ p.324. Also T.G.Harding and P.Lawrence ‘Cash 
Crops or Cargo?’ in A.L. Epstein, Parker and Reay eds .The Politics of Dependence pp. 162-207
82. T.Scarlett Epstein The Mataungan Affair’ New Guinea v.4, no.4, 1969-1970, pp.9-14, claims 
(p.9): ‘About 30% of all the Gazelle Peninsula land is in non-indigenous hands’. See also Ann 
Chowning, A.L. and T.S.Epstein, Jane Goodale and Ian Grosart ‘Under the Volcano’ in A.L.
Epstein, Parker and Reay eds. The Politics of Dependence p.52
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Long-standing grievances united generations of Tolai. The Varzin claim regarding 
the ownership of a plantation by an expatriate planter which ran from 1952 until 
rejected in 1964 by a decision of the High Court of Australia was seminal in this 
respect.83 From the mid-1960s, ‘more and more plantation boundaries came into 
dispute and unoccupied portions of European plantations were invaded by 
Tolals’.84 By 1966 there were over one hundred and fifty appeals by Indigenes 
waiting to be heard by the Supreme Court against Land Titles Commission 
decisions. Most appeals concerned land on the Peninsula.85
When in September 1967 squatters occupied and planted a portion of Raniola, a 
W.R.Carpenter and Co. plantation, the Administration was forced to act in support 
of the firm. Previously instructed by the Department of External Territories’ 
Secretary Smith to take police action in support of the legal owners, the 
Administrator passed on this advice to the DC, East New Britain. The ejection of 
squatters from Raniola, conducted by unarmed police, pushed the land claimants 
into electoral politics. One of the squatters’ leaders, Oscar Tammur won the 
electorate of Kokopo Open at the 1968 House of Assembly elections.86 Educated 
at a Roman Catholic seminary, he was a schoolteacher, ‘the son of a prosperous 
cash cropper and former luluai [administration appointed headman].87 At 26 
Tammur became the youngest MHA. His success and that of Matthias ToLiman, 
the sitting Member for Gazelle Open seat, who campaigned on the need to settle 
Tolai land claims, took local grievances to the House of Assembly. The Rabaul 
Open seat too was taken by a regular government critic, Epineri Titimur.88
83. The Australian Trusteeship pp. 170-174
84. The Australian Trusteeship p.335
88. The Australian Trusteeship p.335. Downs also notes: ‘Patrol officers were overburdened with 
investigations and surveys in response to Tolai incursions. Sometimes survey pegs were moved, 
gardens planted within plantations or palms cut down. The people invaded estates to stage mass 
protests by simply squatting on the ground. The properties of Coconut Products Limited, a 
subsidiary of the island colossus W.R.Carpenter (Holdings) Ltd., were a major target.’
86. Epstein The Mataungan Affair’ pp.9-10
87. Chowning et.al ‘Under the Volcano’ p.63
88. Chowning et al. ‘Under the Volcano’ caution (p.72) against any simple explanation of the 
outcome. They point to a reduced voter turnout from the previous 1964 election, evidence that 
voters did not necessarily connect selecting an MHA with solving their immediate concerns, as well 
as an ambiguity in attitudes towards the Administration. Nevertheless, they also note (p.76) that in 
Gazelle and Kokopo, ‘land was pre-eminently what many people had on their minds.’
172
On Bougainville, the 1968 election also had the effect of further channelling 
opposition to planning and initial construction of the Panguna mine into 
parliamentary politics. Paul Lapun, who in 1964 had been elected to the House of 
Assembly for the South Bougainville Open electorate, strengthened his position 
between the two elections by successfully pushing for an amendment to the Mining 
Ordinance which increased the royalty paid to local landowners at the mine site. 
Appointed as Under-Secretary for Forests, Lapun’s ‘superior education and 
articulateness enabled him to take a much greater role [in the House] than less 
sophisticated members from the Highlands’.89 While separatist sentiments had 
already begun to appear among Bougainvilleans, Lapun was easily re-elected, 
despite associating himseif with the mainland-dominated Pangu Pati. 80
Prior to the 1968 election, the ten Special electorates reserved for non-indigenous 
members were abolished, replaced by fifteen Regional electorates. An educational 
qualification, the Territory Intermediate Certificate or equivalent, applied instead of 
the racial qualification which had been in place for the Special electorates. No 
qualification was required for Open seats. The election campaigns for the Regional 
and Open seats largely mirrored the manner in which a generational and 
educational shift was tied to local demands in most of the colony’s 
electorates.91The shift in the educational attainments of some elected MPs would 
soon have implications for national politics.92 The distance was rapidly widening 
between the earlier ‘traditional’ holders of authority and the people who would take
89. Eugene Ogan ‘Charisma and Race’ in A.L.Epstein, Parker and Reay The Politics of 
Dependence p.143
90. Ron Crocombe ‘Bougainville! Copper, C.R.A. and secessionism’ New Guinea v.3, no.3, 1968, 
pp.39-47, notes that Bougainvilleans and (British) Solomon Islanders discussed the possibilities of 
uniting, instead of the former remaining in Papua New Guinea, at a South Pacific Conference held 
in 1965 at Lae. This meeting was held well before the full significance of the mine’s economic scale 
was understood.
91. Wolfers The 1968 Elections’ p.58.
92. Wolfers The 1968 Elections’ p.58 concludes that with the appropriate qualifications for the 
difficulty of comparing formal education across the country, the most systematic study available 
suggested that: ‘By and large, the (indigenous) men elected [for the Open seats: SM] represented 
something of an educational elite in each area.’ Cf. Parker ‘From Dependence To Autonomy?’ in 
Epstein, Parker, and Reay eds. The Politics of Dependence p.320, who notes that:’(T)he Western- 
style qualifications and capacities of non-European elected members rose appreciably’ and
(pp.320-321) Traditional “big men” had become less significant for various reasons, and there was 
a steady increase in the number of people coming out of Australian-sponsored schools and training 
institutions and into Australian-generated types of employment and enterprise’.
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power within a few years, even while the bulk of the electorate continued to reside 
on smallholdings.
The parochialism of electoral contests among rural populations was reflected in the
fragmentation of parties and the predominance of unaffiliated and/or only loosely
allied candidates.93 As the assessment by Parker concludes:
(T)he ‘parties’ were so unorganised and so unpopular that in practice all 
alliances, including common party membership...(were) essentially 
personal associations between individuals who felt they had common 
political views and aspirations.94
Even expatriates, representing concerns about the prospect of self-government 
and the rise of indigenous nationalism, were unable to form more than loose 
personal alliances. Where parties were formed these tended to be locally based. 
The seven parties, including Pangu, which had candidates who identified even 
loosely with their titles and programmes were established in just four out of the 
colony’s eighteen administrative districts, East Sepik, Central, Madang and East 
New Britain.95 Only the Pangu Pati ‘proved able to field candidates -  officially or 
informally -  in most regions of the Territory at the 1968 elections’.90 Yet Pangu too 
was like other parties largely ‘irrelevant at the popular level’ .97
In part, the absence of parties reflected the limited role of the legislature, where 
colonial officials still dominated. According to Parker, ‘except over very restricted 
areas no political voice had yet been heard which could rival that of the 
Administration’.98 It was not until after 1968 when the incorporation of PNG as a
93. On the beginnings of parties, see Edward P. Wolfers The Political Parties’ New Guinea v.2, 
no.3, 1967, pp. 10-31; Wolfers The Emergence of Political Parties in Papua and New Guinea’ 
Journal of Pacific History no.3, 1968, pp. 155-159; Parker and Wolfers The Context of Political 
Change’ pp.30-35; David Stephen A History of Political Parties in Papua New Guinea Melbourne: 
Lansdowne Press, 1972; Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp .381-391. Somare Sana p.47 
emphasises that while discussions on the need to form parties began soon after the first House of 
Assembly met: The educated members of the House felt frustrated. More and more people argued 
in favour of political parties, many of us arguing that, if we wanted democracy, political parties were 
a necessity. But the Administration seemed to regard political parties as some sort of threat to their 
monopoly rule and actively discouraged them.’
94. Parker ‘From Dependence To Autonomy?’ p.333
95. Parker and Wolfers The Context of Political Change’ p.34
96. Parker and Wolfers The Context of Political Change’ p.33
97. Wolfers The Elections’ New Guinea v.2,no.4, 1967, p.68
98. Parker ‘From Dependence to Autonomy?’ p.340
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state within the Australian federation was formally rejected, and July 1970, when 
during a visit to PNG Australian Prime Minister John Gorton insisted upon a greater 
measure of indigenous responsibility for the government of the country, that 
approaching self-government consolidated representative blocs into colony-wide 
parties.
The loosely organised blocs, faced with the increasing determination of the 
Australian government to hasten the transition to self-government, were split over 
the speed and terms of this move. Although subjected to increasing criticism, 
accelerated development remained influential in colonial policy during and 
immediately after the 1968 election. The initial brushing aside of opposition on 
Bougainville and the Gazelle Peninsula from 1969 and into the early 1970s showed 
the continuing power of this variant of development, and its effects on colonial 
officialdom. Subsequently the push to bring about self-government was associated 
with a reaction against some aspects of accelerated development. The next 
section shows that while the certainty of national independence was joined with a 
continuing attachment to the idea of agrarian development, there was less certainty 
about how it would be effected."
The Indigenous Attachment to Development
A commitment to intentional development and the agrarian focus of thought about 
development passed easily from the Australian authorities to the Papua New 
Guineans who gained power during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Speaking in 
the House of Assembly on March 3, 1969, two of the most important indigenous 
politicians signalled the importance of ‘bringing development’ as the appropriate 
objective for a representative holding state power. Moving a condolence motion on 
the death of Kaura Duba, newly elected Member for the Jimi Open Electorate, Tei 
Abal, Ministerial Member for Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries, said:
He wanted to develop his own electorate and he also worked for
national development...
99. For two other accounts which deal with agricultural policy during the move to national 
independence, see R.F.McKillop ‘Agricultural Policy-Making’ and H.K. Colebatch ‘Policy-Making for 
Rural Development’ in J.A.Ballard ed Policy-Making in a New State Papua New Guinea 1972-77 
St.Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1981, pp.238-256, 257-279
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Opposition party leader Somare, Member for East Sepik Regional, reiterated
Abal’s description in seconding the motion:
He was the elected representative of his people; he came here both to 
bring development to this country and to his people...100
Further, for indigenous representatives as well as for colonial officials and 
expatriate advisers, the preferred direction of development efforts remained the 
rural areas, as the primary base for the productive endeavours of the majority of 
the people as well as the most desirable means for dealing with rising 
unemployment and disorder.101
Unemployment, Underemployment and Disorder
In October 1970, when visiting Washington D.C., Pangu Pati leader and MHA
Somare compared children at play in slum conditions in the US capital with those
‘to be seen at home in the slums that have started to grow on the periphery of our
larger towns’. In his autobiography, PNG’s first prime minister asked rhetorically:
Will we at home have to go through the same experience [as evidenced 
by black impoverishment in US cities]? I hoped that we would be able to 
get rid of our slums and help our people live better.102
The Prime Minister’s concern continued. Shortly after Independence in September 
1975, Prime Minister Somare visited China to explore the possibilities of 
diversifying foreign aid sources away from Australia, and finding ways to reverse 
the increasing drift of the population from the countryside to towns.103
100. See PNG House of Assembly Debates Second House V.2, Nos.4-5 March 3 to June 27, 1969, 
p.825, for both statements.
101. Marion Ward ‘Urbanisation-Threat or Promise?’ New Guinea v.5, no.1, 1970, pp.57-62 points 
out that in August 1969, a ‘motion was passed in the (House of Assembly) indicating that a majority 
of its members [nearly all of whom were indigenes] saw urbanisation as a threat to village life and 
as a cause of unemployment, and requested the Administration to reintroduce restrictions on 
movements to towns except where employment was assured or for short visits’. Reprinted in Ron 
May ed. Change and Movement: Readings on Internal Migration in Papua New Guinea Canberra: 
PNG Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research in association with ANU Press, 1977,
pp.52-57. Ward’s thesis, that ‘urbanisation should be regarded far more positively than appears to 
be the case in Papua New Guinea at present’ was exceptional in the circumstances. See, as well 
as Garnaut’s statement cited in The Continuing Virtue of Village Life’ at the start of this thesis,
J.D.Conroy ‘Urbanisation in Papua New Guinea: A Development Constraint’ in May ed. Change 
and Movement pp.59-70
102. Sana p.82
103. Ralph Premdas ‘Papua New Guinea in 1976: Dangers of a China Connection’ Asian Survey 
v.17, no.1, January 1977, pp.55-60. Somare’s visit had been preceded in January 1975 by Sir 
Albert Maori Kiki who went to China with the announced aims of promoting PNG, looking for a
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The late colonial concern of indigenous leaders with increases in the urban
population and the related effects of unemployment, impoverishment and disorder
arose from a major change which had begun in the mid-1960s, concomitant with
rapid economic growth.104 Population increases in the most important centres were
especially striking, and changed completely the character of the main towns. They
had previously been primarily expatriate enclaves, with the indigenous presence
confined to the perimeters in peri-urban settlements, except during daylight
working hours. From the mid-1960s there was a rapid indigenisation of most urban
residential areas. As Garnaut notes:
Between 1966 and the second census in 1971, the indigenous urban 
population grew at the phenomenal compound rate of 17 per cent per 
annum...By 1971, the towns held almost 10 per cent of the national 
population, having grown much faster than the village and non-rural 
village populations. The towns accommodated almost half of the 
national population increase and over half of the increase in the male 
population...105
As a consequence of the over-all movement to urban centres, the main political- 
administrative town, soon-to-be national capita! contained a reduced proportion of 
the country’s total urban population. Nevertheless, by 1971 Port Moresby had an 
indigenous population of 60,000, almost double the 1966 number. Lae, the main 
manufacturing centre with 32,000 indigenes resident, was the second largest 
town.106 This rapid increase in urban populations, without substantial 
improvements in the availability of housing and urban services was linked initially 
with a major expansion of various forms of wage employment.
market for coffee and cocoa, and to study Chinese programs especially in village development 
and small-scale industries...”’. Cited in James Griffin ‘Papua New Guinea’ Australian Journal of 
Politics and History v.21, no.3, 1975, p.129.
104. Concern with unemployment, and the associated disorder, did not commence in the 1960s 
however. As noted in Chapter Two, the immediate post-war colonial administration was alert to the 
possibility that post-war reconstruction would lead to increases in leisure activities at the expense of 
productive labour, which applied to urban as well as rural areas. In the late 1950s, colonial officials 
focused attention upon the increased migration to and associated unemployment/underemployment 
in major urban centres. See NAA A452/1, 1963/8164, Native Unemployment in Urban Areas in 
Papua and New Guinea 1958-1967.
105. Ross Garnaut ‘Urban Growth: An Interpretation of Trends and Choices’ in May ed.Change and 
Movement p.74. See also Garnaut, Michael Wright and Richard Curtain Employment, Incomes and 
Migration in Papua New Guinea Towns Monograph No.6 Boroko: IASER, 1977, pp.3-5, including 
qualifications regarding the data.
106. Garnaut ‘Urban Growth’ pp.75-79
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Between 1962 and 1964 there had been a forty per cent increase in indigenous 
workers in public administration, and growth continued at a rapid rate into the 
1970s. Later, especially after the beginning of construction work at Bougainville, 
private employment also expanded sharply. That work, primarily in urban jobs 
associated with tourism, commerce and manufacturing, as well as mining and 
construction, involved fewer employment agreements. Unlike the earlier substantial 
use of formal agreements for many plantation workers, throughout the 1960s 
private employment was increasingly accompanied by casualisation. By the early 
1970s, a substantial majority of workers outside the public administration had little 
employment security.107 A downturn in the rate of growth of wage employment of 
the early 1970s coincided with weak commodity prices for farm crops, which in turn 
‘reduced rural incomes and demand for urban goods and services’.108 Urban 
unemployment increased, although more sharply for working-age males than 
females, and especially in Port Moresby.109 National politicians were concerned 
about this change.
Although the bulk of the urban population increases had occurred through people 
from peri-urban settlements and proximate rural areas moving into the towns, 
substantial migration from the heavily populated Highlands also began to make a 
significant contribution to urban populations. While in 1971 a majority of the 
indigenous population in towns were migrants, and the proportion of migrants born 
nearby remained greatest, an important change was underway. In Port Moresby, 
Lae, Madang and Wewak ‘the most notable development in the origins of migrants
107. Garnaut ‘Urban Growth’ pp.72-74. Contra the concerns of national politicians for the effects of 
urbanization, Garnaut (p.72) describes the ‘marked decline in the relative importance of formal 
employment agreements’ and the increase in casual employment as indicating ‘growing self- 
confidence and mobility in the workforce’ which ‘paved the way for the migration of family groups, 
which became increasingly important through the 1960s.’
108. Garnaut ‘Urban Growth’ p.87
109. Garnaut ‘Urban Growth’ pp.75-81. Garnaut also argues (p.72), against criticism of the first 
years of the Michael Somare-led government, that between mid-1971 and 1977 there was no 
increase in the proportion of men in Port Moresby who did not have wage or salaried employment: 
see also Garnaut The Neo-Marxist Paradigm in Papua New Guinea’ in R.J.May ed. Social 
Stratification in Papua New Guinea Working Paper No.5 Canberra: Department of Political and 
Social Change, RSPAS, ANU, August 1984, pp.63-81. However between 1971 and 73/74, at least, 
the proportion of all people in wage employment fell, as more and more women and children moved 
into Port Moresby, Lae, Rabaul, Madang and urban centres on Bougainville. See Garnaut, Wright 
and Curtain Employment, Incomes and Migration pp.23-25
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to these towns was the greatly increased flow from the highlands Provinces’.110 By 
1972, one estimate suggested that for a Port Moresby population of around 75,
000, there were approximately 10,000 migrants, or just under ten per cent, from the 
Highlands.* 111 As the proportion of coastal (ie. not including the Southern 
Highlands) Papuans in the main highlands towns of Goroka and Mt Hagen fell, 
Highlanders began to migrate in substantial numbers to urban centres outside the 
region. A key component of uniform development, keeping smallholders on land in 
the Highlands to grow coffee and other crops, had begun to unravel. Out-migration 
was a consequence.
To make matters more difficult for the incoming indigenous government, rising 
unemployment and underemployment was also occurring in the rural areas. 
Squatting continued on Gazelle plantations,112 and separatist even secessionist 
demands were being pressed in Bougainville and among Papuans.110 There was a 
major re-appearance of ‘tribal fighting’ in the Highlands. On the smallholdings 
where coffee was grown, a substantial generation gap was beginning to emerge, 
with most growers older, less well educated, dependent on extension services.114
Opposition to self-government was especially powerful in the Highlands by 
comparison with other regions of the colony. There were increasing tussles among 
smallholders, as well as between these and the indigenous capitalist class over the 
largeholdings being vacated by expatriate owner-occupiers and firms.115 There was
110. Garnaut ‘Urban Growth’ p.81
111. See James Griffin ‘Movements for Separation and Secession’ in A.CIunies Ross and 
J.Langmore eds. Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1973, p.109. This was not a census year and the figure was supplied to Griffin by Councillor N.D. 
Oram.
112. Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.424-437 and pp.510-525 details the continuing revolt on 
the Gazelle Peninsula.
113. James Griffin notes that prior to Independence separatist demands, or at least demands 
couched in the language of separatism, were not confined to Bougainville political leaders, and 
included Papuans, led by Josephine Abaijah. See ‘Movements for Separation and Secession’
pp.99-130. A. Clunies Ross ‘Secession without Tears’ in Alternative Strategies pp. 131-138 provides 
some justification for as well as mechanisms appropriate for achieving secession. See Downs The 
Australian Trusteeship pp.525-529 on Papua Besena.
114. David Anderson An Economic Survey of Smallholder Coffee Producers-1976 Port Moresby: 
Department of Primary Industry, Planning Economics Marketing Branch, p.9
115. MacWilliam ‘Smallholder Production, the State and Land Tenure’ in Larmour, Peter (ed.) 
Customary Land Tenure: Registration and Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea Boroko: IASER, 
pp.pp.25-26m where it is documented that in 1974 ‘the apparently rising incidence of unsavoury
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also concern among Highland leaders and university students from the region that 
a too-rapid departure of the colonial administration would result in coastal and 
island politicians dominating the national government. 116
Coffee from the Highlands had become the country’s most important agricultural 
export. Fighting threatened both smallholder production, which yielded around 
seventy per cent of the national output with up to eighty per cent of households 
growing the crop, and plantations. The committee set up by the first Somare 
government to examine the fighting rejected a mono-causal explanation for the 
increase in the scale and degree of violence associated with the fighting. 
Nevertheless it concluded that ‘most of the fights are connected with disputes over 
land’. New cash crops had made land more valuable, and impending self- 
government had encouraged claimants of disputed land to try to obtain possession 
in the belief that ‘possession at that date [that is, of self-government] will be the 
basis of future legal ownership’ .117
Academics debated whether there was indeed unemployment, with some urging 
measures to encourage further expansion of smallholder agricultural production to 
reduce under-employment.118 Important indigenous politicians had no doubt about
and openly hostile attitudes towards plantation owners and expatriate workers (was) prompting a 
number of owners to place their properties on the market’ in the Western Highlands. These 
incidents were not, of course, confined to the Highlands: see more generally Jim Fingleton ’Policy- 
Making on Lands’ in Ballard ed. Policy-Making in a New State p.237, who notes that in 1974 a 
Division of District Administration list showed ‘that around the country some sixty properties were 
illegally occupied, either totally or partly, and anther forty properties were threatened with 
occupation’.
116. Bill Standish ‘Elite Communalism: The Highlands Liberation Front’ in May ed. Micronationalist 
movements in Papua New Guinea pp.359-392
117. Government of Papua New Guinea Report of the Committee Investigating Tribal Fighting in 
the Highlands Port Moresby: Government Printer, May 1973, pp.2-5
118. For a summary of the positions taken in the early 1970s by academics regarding 
unemployment and underemployment, see Garnaut, Wright and Curtain Employment, Incomes and 
Migration pp.7-13. Fisk repeated his earlier argument that rural Papua New Guineans were not so 
much unemployed as underemployed, lacking the incentive to produce more, because of the 
prevailing condition of ‘primitive’ or subsistence affluence. See Fisk ‘Cold Comfort Farm’; Fisk 
‘Labour absorption capacity of subsistence agriculture’ and Fisk ‘Development goals in rural 
Melanesia’. Fisk was in turn cited favourably by Conroy ‘Urbanization in Papua New Guinea: A 
Development Constraint’ pp.64-66, in his attack on Marion Ward’s support for urbanization, as well 
as the position adopted by R.G.Ward ‘Internal Migration and Urbanisation in Papua New Guinea’ in 
Research Bulletin No.42 Population Growth and Socio-Economic Change Papers from the second 
demography seminar, Port Moresby 1970 Canberra and Boroko: New Guinea Research Unit, ANU, 
pp.81-107, reprinted in May ed. Change and Movement pp.27-51, which urged policies for both
180
the seriousness of conditions being faced in towns and rural areas by substantial 
numbers of indigenes.119 Consequently, an urgent problem facing the colonial 
administration and then the self-government coalition was what policies were most 
suitable for a national government directing an independent nation-state.120 Before 
Independence, three important reports provided advice on post-colonial 
development policy. The 1973 Faber report and the 1973 report of the Commission 
of Inquiry into Land Matters, followed in 1974 by the Constitutional Planning 
Commission report, pointed away from the colonial administration’s favoured 
accelerated development policy.
The Search for a New Direction 
The Faber Report
In the turmoil and uncertainty of the early 1970s, during which the 1972 election 
produced an unexpected outcome with the victory of the Somare-led coalition 
government, the reaction against colonial authority and policies became 
particularly powerful. The strength of the reaction was made obvious when in June 
1972, one of the first acts of the newly formed Somare government was to present 
a white paper, intended to provide the basis for a sequel to the 1968-1973 five year 
plan Programmes and Policies for the Economic Development of Papua and New 
Guinea. Prepared by the Office of Programming and Coordination (OPC) within the 
administration but introduced into the parliament by the new government, the 
program proposed in the white paper supported a continuation of accelerated
urban and rural ‘improvement’ as complementary and necessary. Conroy ‘Urbanisation in New 
Guinea: a development constraint’ had initially been presented at the Sixth Waigani Seminar, on 
which more below.
119. Indigenous politicians were not the only ones concerned with the rapidly developing 
inequalities among indigenes: as Downs The Australian Trusteeship p.537 notes Australian Minister 
for External Territories Andrew Peacock was also aware ‘of the dangers of developing an unstable 
society with an unhealthy gap between impoverished peasants and a prosperous isolated elite’.
See the Minister’s Opening address to the Sixth Waigani Seminar at UPNG, held from April 30 to 
May 5, which begins with the sentence: ‘Development will clearly be one of the main interests of the 
new government and the House of Assembly’. The address appears in Ronald J. May ed. Priorities 
in Melanesian Development Canberra and Port Moresby: RSPAS, ANU and University of Papua 
New Guinea, 1973, pp.3-6. See also Ross Garnaut ‘Problems of Inequality: The social organisation 
v. the state’ New Guinea v.7, no.3, 1972, pp.52-62
120. Some indication of the intellectual ferment and uncertainty of the period can be gained from 
other papers presented to the Waigani Seminar. See May ed. Priorities in Melanesian 
Development, Ivan lllich ‘Design for a Convivial Society?’ New Guinea v.7, no.2, 1972, pp.2-7;
Oskar Spate ‘Problems and Priorities: Summing up the Sixth Waigani’ New Guinea v.7, no.2, 1972, 
pp.50-62
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development policies. This direction was rejected by the parliament as unsuited to 
the economic and political circumstances.
These circumstances included alternate advice which had begun to flow to the 
incoming government from a number of international and domestic sources.121 The 
rejection of the five year plan was couched in terms which showed the influence of 
ideas promulgated by an advisory group which from March to May 1972 had visited 
PNG. This group conducted a study arranged by the Australian Government 
through the World Bank as executive agent for the UNDP. The Bank 
commissioned consultants from the University of East Anglia to provide advice on 
development strategies for the five years from 1973.122 Over the next few months 
the group began to circulate their draft report, before its final submission in 
September to the World Bank and the Australian government.123
121. Once again, it is necessary to caution against a too precise delineation of these boundaries: as 
will be seen some of the most important domestic politicians were bearers of international ideas, 
including about the most appropriate forms of development which should become policy, while 
there were many international, including Australian, advisers working on developing policy for the 
national government. John Ballard ‘Policy-Making as Trauma: The Provincial Government Issue” in 
Ballard ed. Policy-Making in a New State pp.95-132, notes (p. 131) how influential non-Australian 
consultants, including Canadians, were especially important ‘in any kind of radical administrative 
reform’ such as decentralization (on which more below).
122. Peter Fitzpatrick, a government adviser during the transition, concludes (p.22) that the 
Overseas Development Group of the University was ‘then the most radical centre for development 
studies in the UK’, with some members of the consultancy team known internationally. Team leader 
Mike Faber had been instrumental in the nationalization of the copper industry in Zambia. Another 
member of the team Keith Hart was influential in the formulation ‘informal sector’. Fitzpatrick also 
notes the international shifts underway, including in the views of the World Bank. See The Making 
and Unmaking of the Eight Aims’ in Peter King, Wendy Lee and Vincent Warakai eds. From 
Rhetoric to Reality? Papua New Guinea’s Eight Point Plan and National Goals After a Decade 
Waigani: University of Papua New Guinea, 1985, pp.22-31. Other important documents charting the 
shift, listed by Fitzpatrick, include International Labour Organisation Employment, Incomes and 
Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya Geneva: International Labour 
Organisation, 1972 and Hollis Chenery et.al. Redistribution with Growth London: Oxford University 
Press, 1974. For a later account of the shifting ideas about development, see Martha Finnemore 
‘Redefining Development at the World Bank’ in Cooper and Packard eds. International 
Development and the Social Sciences pp.203-227. See also Downs The Australian Trusteeship
pp.537-538.
123. Fitzpatrick The Eight Aims’ p.24, suggests that the administration-prepared plan was ‘an effort 
to outflank Faberism which offered lots of principles and lots of choices but, in the end, there 
remained one priority: maximum growth in the formal economy fuelled by foreign investment’. The 
importance of other international sources of ideas should not be underestimated: the Sixth Waigani 
Seminar in April-May 1972 had not only heard Peacock’s cautionary words, noted above, but also 
from Rene Dumont, French agronomist and Ivan lllich, educationist. Dumont ‘Some reflections on 
priorities in Melanesian development’ in May ed. Priorities in Melanesian Development pp.7-19, 
emphasised (p.7) ‘that it is imperative at the beginning to foster a more rapid growth of agriculture’, 
citing a phrase (Agriculture is the base of the economy, industry the engine of development) which
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Although not finally published until February 1973, the Faber report was highly 
influential well before publication.124 The views of the Mission’s members 
influenced the December 1972 announcement by Chief Minister Somare of the 
government’s economic plans and the establishment of a small planning 
secretariat answerable to a Cabinet committee of the governing Coalition parties’ 
leaders. As a result of Finance Minister Julius Chan’s resistance to the term 
‘Development Programme’, the plans were initially described as an ‘Improvement 
Programme’.125 The Programme would become better known as the Eight Aims, 
foremost of which were indigenization of the control of the economy, equalization 
of economic benefits, and decentralisation of economic activity. Over the next 
three years, the Eight Aims were at the centre of intense political tussles among 
indigenous leaders and government critics. The debates over design and 
implementation continued after Independence.'26
Just as the colonial administration transferred authority, changes to the manner in 
which policy was designed and asserted by the newly elected government fuelled 
domestic opposition. As the Faber report’s recommendations were being 
considered, the government deliberately abolished the previous administration’s 
OPC and later established a Central Planning Office (CPO).127 The government 
kept a tight rein on the formulation of the Eight Aims, including by relying on 
sympathetic and thus reliable expatriate advisers.128 While this was done in part to
he claimed was the basic formula of Chinese development since 1960. See also lllich ‘Design for a 
Convivial Society?’
124. Officially A Report on Development Strategies for Papua New Guinea Report Prepared for the 
IBRD/World Bank by a Mission from the Overseas Development Group, University of East Anglia, 
February 1973.
125. Fitzpatrick The Eight Aims’ p.24
126. For the second Somare government’s sensitivity to criticism over the effectiveness of 
government programs to implement the Aims during the first seven years after Independence, see 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Planning Paias Wingti ‘Standing By Our Principles 
in Tough Times’ in King, Lee and Warakai eds. From Rhetoric to Reality pp.15-21
127. Garnaut ‘The Framework of Economic Policy-Making’ in Ballard ed. Policy-Making in a New 
State pp. 157-211 discusses the formation and subsequent operation of the CPO. Garnaut was a 
research fellow at the New Guinea Research Unit from 1972 to 1975, during which time he acted as 
consultant and adviser to the government, including to the Finance Minister. See Ballard 
'Contributors’ in Policy-Making in a New State p. xiv, for an extended statement on Garnaut’s official 
roles during and immediately after self-government.
128. Garnaut ‘The Framework of Economic Policy-Making’ in Ballard ed. Policy-Making in a New 
State pp. 157-211
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pre-empt anticipated opposition from the remaining colonial officials, objections
were also expected from some ministers and other members of parliament.129
Subsequently the Eight Aims were further shaped by a number of committees, and
specific programmes submitted to the CPO. Voutas, MHA from 1966 and 1972,
founding member of Pangu Pati, and principal research officer in PM Somare’s
office from 1972 to late 1974, explains that:
The powerful Constitutional Planning Committee boosted the process of 
commitment to agreed national aims even further by developing the 
Eight Aims and having them incorporated in Papua New Guinea’s 
Constitution as a bipartisan statement of the philosophy behind the new 
state.130
Voutas may well be correct that the lineage of the National Goals and Directive 
Principles included in the preamble to PNG’s constitution leads from the Eight Aims 
through the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) to the Constitution.131 But 
the expression ‘bipartisan statement’ avoids more fundamental questions about 
what was the ‘philosophy behind the new state’. Major disputes surrounding 
‘philosophy’ were becoming apparent, especially over two matters, land and the 
structure of the new nation-state’s governing institutions.
The Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters
As noted previously, since the late 1950s the need to change land tenure 
arrangements in order to lift smallholder productivity began to affect policy 
deliberations. The complexity and difficulty of making the desired changes was 
also recognised. In the last days of the colonial administration an attempt was 
made to introduce legislation which would make it possible to substantially extend 
adjudication and systematic registration of land held under customary title in
129. Tony Voutas describes (p.36) how drafting on the aims was done with ‘almost no consultation 
...with senior public servants’ and little circulation of the final Cabinet paper on the Eight Aims 
beyond government ministers. Voutas justified this process by the subsequent response from 
departmental heads who ‘were aghast that outsiders with little public service experience should 
have put a proposal to Cabinet on overall development philosophy without it first being vetted, 
modified, and agreed upon among departments.’ See more broadly his ‘Policy Initiative and the 
Pursuit of Control’ in Ballard Policy-Making in a New State pp.33-47 for an insider’s view of the 
‘development of a broad policy framework’.
130. ‘Policy Initiative and the Pursuit of Control’ pp.36-37
131. For the Constitution and the source of specific sections, see: Brian Brunton and Duncan 
Colquhoun-Kerr The Annotated Constitution of Papua New Guinea Waigani: University of Papua 
New Guinea Press, 1984
184
selected areas. Encumbrances on registered titles, including those which limited 
the powers of mortgagees, were to be removed and control of dealings in land 
decentralised to land control boards, where local landowners would exercise 
authority.
One result of this late colonial attempt at legal and institutional reform was the 
formation of a powerful coalition, which included indigenous politicians, expatriate 
academics and lawyers, opposed to the proposed legislation. The growing squatter 
revolt and generalised lawlessness underpinned a nationalist opposition to any 
such late expression of colonial authority. The fear that the moves promoted by the 
legislation would accelerate what one critic termed ‘an agrarian revolution’ which 
increased landlessness strengthened the opposition.132 The proposed legislation 
was withdrawn and in February 1973, the same month that the Faber report was 
published, the Administrator appointed the Commission of Inquiry into Land 
Matters (CILM). Its report was submitted in October 1973.
There is no need to revisit here the CILM’s composition, its activities or report: the 
literature on each subject is extensive and comprehensive, some of it by committed 
participants and some by subsequent commentators.133 One of the former, Jim 
Fingleton has assessed the CILM report as a threat not only to the ‘privileges of 
dominant commercial entities in the country’ but also to the aspirations ‘of the 
emerging Papua New Guinean class of entrepreneurs’.134 For this account, it is 
sufficient to note that as a consequence of the CILM report and the political tussles
132. A. D. Ward ‘Agrarian Revolution: Handle with care’ New Guinea v.6, no.4, January 1972, 
pp.25-34. See for an exchange between Ward and Ron Crocombe over Ward’s article, ‘Letters’ 
New Guinea v.7, no.1, 1972, pp.63-64.
133. Alan Ward and Jim Fingleton were supporting staff for the CILM: see Fingleton ‘Policy-Making 
on Lands’ in Ballard ed. Policy-Making in a New State pp.212-237; Fingleton ‘Plantation 
Redistribution among the Tolai’ Melanesian Law Journal v. 11, 1983, pp.99-123; Ward ‘Customary 
Land, Land Registration and Social Equality’ in Denoon and Snowden A time to plant pp.249-264; 
Ward The Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters 1973: Choices, Constraints and Assumptions’ 
Melanesian Law Journals/ .11, 1983, pp.1-13; Ward Time to Make a New Start’ in Peter Larmour 
ed. Customary Land Tenure: Registration and Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea Monograph 
No.29 Boroko: National Research Institute, 1991, pp. 177-194. See for an academic assessment, 
Peter Larmour Land Policy and Decolonisation in Melanesia Ph.D. Thesis Sydney: Macquarie 
University, 1987; Larmour ‘Registration of Customary Land: 1952-1987’ in Larmour ed. Customary 
Land Tenure pp.51-72.
134. ‘Policy-Making on Lands’ p.216
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surrounding land reform, four Acts were passed in 1974 and a fifth, the Land 
Disputes Settlement Act, in the following year.135
The fourth piece of legislation which followed the direction proposed by the CILM 
report, the Land Trespass Act, blocked the movement by squatters on to 
largeholdings. In their entirety the five Acts meant that takeover could only be 
sanctioned by the state and made illegal any other forms of occupation and 
ownership. The legislation also provided the basis for an important compromise 
between two distinct forms of contestants for the land. The takeover of 
largeholdings provided for the continued operation of some as plantations but the 
Acts also opened the door for some break-up of largeholdings to meet smallholder 
demands. The legal compromise was crafted by a committee, whose official 
members were Papua New Guineans with supporting staff ‘entirely expatriate’.136 
Linder the legislation a short-term resolution of the tussle between indigenes, for 
plantations and smallholdings, was made possible by the departure of European 
settlers who had been the owner-occupiers of estates, the surrender of unplanted 
acreages by major plantation companies, and the release of large areas held as 
government land.137
As a further effect of the legislation, the ownership and occupation rights of large 
and small holders alike were now dependent upon post-colonial state power and 
made subject to the holders of this power, the indigenes who held national 
executive and administrative authority. With regard to Voutas’ proposition 
regarding the development of a ‘philosophy behind the new state’, the compromise 
over transferring land ownership from expatriates to indigenes was critical in the 
process of establishing a central element of the philosophy. Indigenous 
governments wielding post-colonial state power would enshrine and defend private 
property rights, whether of largeholding or smallholding owners, and would not 
provide support for squatting or any other forms of illegal occupation.
135. The 1974 legislation consisted of the Lands Acquisition Act, Land Redistribution Act, Land 
Groups Act and Land Trespass Act. Fingleton ‘Policy-Making on Lands’ in Ballard ed. Policy- 
Making in a New State p.231 concludes these acts ‘furnish(ed) the government with the legislative 
basis for its plantation redistribution policy’.
136. Fingleton ‘Policy-Making on Lands’ in Ballard ed. Policy-Making in a New State p.215
137. MacWilliam ‘Smallholder Production, the State and Land Tenure’ p.20
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As much as this compromise dealt with ownership and occupation, it often left 
unresolved the more important matter of how to make productive what had become 
or threatened to become unproductive, land and labour. After Independence, as 
the compromises over land ownership were worked out in different areas of the 
country,138 the critical question became ‘What Do We Do About Plantations?’139 As 
one contributor to a 1981 conference devoted to this question asked, regarding 
plantations which were subject to redistribution to indigenes as largeholdings ‘Who 
wants to be the Labourer?’140
If reformed land legislation provided the basis for an initial solution to the tussles 
between owners and would-be owners of largeholdings and households, a more 
serious matter was still to be settled which could not be done by mere legislative 
reform. This was because while planning was proceeding for the new nation-state, 
a struggle was taking place which in its most serious form raised important 
questions about development as national development. What would be the 
territorial parameters of PNG and what would be the governing institutions that 
reflected these boundaries? When including or excluding particular areas of the 
country had important implications for government revenues, and in turn the 
capacity of the state to bring development, attempts to remove or separate 
particular districts from the new nation-state were critical.
Such fundamental questions were the concern of the Constitutional Planning 
Committee, the most important of the numerous bodies established in the early 
1970s to chart the direction of the independent nation-state. The CPC’s 
deliberations as well as its final report presented in August 1974 to Chief Minister 
Somare were pivotal for future development policy.
138. See, for instance, Fingleton ‘Plantation redistribution among the Tolai’
139. Michael A.H.B.Walter ed. What Do We Do About Plantations? Monograph No. 15 Boroko: 
Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, 1981. Minister for Finance, former Mataungan 
Association leader Kaputin, opened the conference, stating: ‘Sadly, results of localization of 
plantations have in many cases proved disappointing. Productivity has greatly declined...’
140. Bob McKillop ‘Managing Plantations in Papua New Guinea Today: Who Wants to be the 
Labourer?’ in Walter ed. What Do We Do About Plantations? pp.25-32
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The CPC
The 1972 elections which preceded the formation of the self-government coalition 
had ensured that the opposition to accelerated development would have 
substantial parliamentary representation. During 1969 the Mataungan Association 
and Napidakoe Navitu had been formed to coordinate and represent opposition to 
important aspects of the accelerated development programme on the Gazelle 
Peninsula and in Bougainville respectively. Both organisations were electorally 
successful, and the most important anti-colonial indigenes were elected. Of the 
prominent critics of Australian colonialism, only the radical Bougainvillean student 
leader Leo Hannett failed to win endorsement to stand for a seat.141 Once elected, 
however, the Mataungan Association’s leaders began to play a mediatory role, 
between plantation owners and squatters,142 while the successful Bougainvilleans 
concentrated initially upon improving compensation for land taken by the mine and 
acquiring a larger share of lease monies for landowners. For the colony over-all, 
the generational change noted above at the 1968 elections continued, if in a form 
mediated by ‘tradition’.143
A conservative coalition headed by the United Party had been expected to win the 
election and form the government. Flowever the surprise victory and formation of a 
coalition government led by Pangu Pati and Somare advanced the co-optation of 
the anti-colonial nationalists. This coalition brought the strongest critics of the 
administration’s plans to continue with accelerated development into positions of 
influence. Although the Mataungan leaders Tammur and Kaputin did not initially 
accept ministries, they supported the Pangu Pati-led coalition. The senior 
Bougainvillean MHA Paul Lapun became Minister for Mines, while Father John
141. See Ian Grosart and Christine F.McColl ‘East New Britain’ and Thomas Anis, Ephraim Makis, 
Theodore Miriung and Eugene Ogan Toward a New Politics?-The Elections in Bougainville’ in 
David Stone ed. Prelude to Self-Government: Electoral Politics in Papua New Guinea 1972 
Canberra: RSPAS, ANU and the University of Papua New Guinea, 1976,pp.373-399, 442-468; 
James Griffin ‘Napidakoe Navitu’ and Ian Grosart ‘Nationalism and micronationalism: the Tolai case’ 
in R.J.May ed. Micronationalist movements in Papua New Guinea pp. 113-138, 139-176
142. See MacWilliam ‘International Companies and Nationalist Politics in Papua New Guinea’ p. 19, 
where a May 1973 statement from Burns Philp’s general manager plantation division based in 
Rabaul is cited, noting that: ‘Matanguans (sic) have become a reformed capitalist organization, and 
have been of very great assistance to me in settling land disputes.’
143. Cf. Bill Standish ‘New Men for an Old Society: the Chimbu Regional Campaign’ and Leo 
Kuabaal ‘Sinasina Open Electorate’ in Stone ed. Prelude to Self-Government pp.308-349 and 350- 
370
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Momis became deputy speaker of the House and then effectively de facto chair of 
the CPC. A third Bougainvillean, Donatus Mola as Minister for Business 
Development was one of four People’s Progress Party MPs, including Chan as 
Finance Minister, who took senior economic ministries.144 The most important 
Bougainvillean politicians had a strong grip on power at the centre of the soon-to- 
be independent state.
The inclusion in the government coalition of most of the strongest critics of colonial 
rule and policy also meant that the government was to an extent dependent upon 
their support to maintain a parliamentary majority. The radical nationalists, 
represented especially by Momis and Kaputin, pushed this dependence, 
particularly in the formation and operation of the CPC. To balance their presence, 
and aided by the June 1972 parliamentary endorsement, Somare ensured that the 
CPC included what he termed ‘the most skilled backbenchers’, to formulate ‘a 
home-grown constitution’.145 If the composition of the CPC was an attempt to be 
inclusive, locking major radical nationalists into the process of devising a 
constitution, it also gave the same critics an institution through which they could 
exert political leverage. The result was especially important for the structure and 
operations of the national government, as well as in settling that all areas of the 
colony would remain within the new nation.
Although Somare was the formal ex officio chair, much of the direction taken by the 
CPC was determined by Momis and Kaputin -  who first joined the government as 
Justice Minister in August 1973 and then was dismissed in October 1974, two 
months after the final CPC report was presented. Utilising a number of permanent 
and visiting consultants, between May and August 1973 members of the CPC 
travelled widely within PNG. Visiting ‘almost every sub-district’ and ‘holding over
144. Downs The Australian Trusteeship pp.488-490, and Somare Sana p.93 provides a list of the 
ministry, while Somare Sana pp.83-94, Griffin, Nelson and Firth Papua New Guinea pp. 178-186, 
and David Stone The Political Turning Point: The Birth of the National Coalition Government’ in 




one hundred public meetings attended by an estimated 60,000 people’ the 
committee also called for and accepted ‘well over 2,000’ submissions.146
For this study three features of the CPC’s activities and final report are significant. 
Firstly, the very public process through which the CPC operated gave full vent to 
the radical nationalist position, in nearly all its aspects. This position sometimes 
caused concern and discomfort for the Australian and PNG governments, even to 
the extent that the date for Independence was delayed from 1974 to 1975.
However with support from the opposition parties, especially the United Party, the 
government was able to defeat the radicals in parliament and strengthen its 
authority. Chief Minister Somare and his close ally Guise tabled a minority report 
‘Government Paper on Constitutional Proposals’, which skilfully captured majority 
parliamentary support. Forcing conservative nationalists, cautious about self- 
government and strengthening the central government machinery, to back the 
Chief Minister against the radicals provided room for manoeuvre when the more 
substantial challenges appeared. As had been the case for most of the late colonial 
expatriate officials, including Hasluck, development continued to have national 
development through a strengthened state machinery, nation-building at its 
centre.147 What remained to be resolved was the structure and operation of this 
machinery.148
Secondly, the CPC re-enforced the move against accelerated development, when 
this was conceived primarily as increases in gross domestic product regardless of 
the consequences for land occupation and impoverishment. Instead the Committee 
emphasised three ‘ideas’, equality, self-reliance and rural development. The
146. Government of Papua New Guinea Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee 
1974 Part 1 Port Moresby: Government Printer, 1974 p.1/1
147. See Somare Sana pp.95-108, especially p.99 for Somare’s summary of his relations with 
Momis ; Diana Conyers The Provincial Government Debate: Central Control Versus Local 
Participation In Papua New Guinea Monograph No.2 Boroko: IASER, 1976, pp.40-50; Downs The 
Australian Trusteeship pp.491-495, 499-510.
148. Indigenisation of the public service, especially at the senior levels, was a critical component of 
strengthening: before Independence the expatriate presence both in the permanent positions and 
as advisers to ministers was considerably reduced. Some of this reduction was in response to 
government actions taken to deal with criticisms by CPC members; the departure of Voutas from 
the PM’s office in late 1974 was a striking example of the power of the CPC radicals and the place 
of indigenization of senior public service positions within the idea of indigenous development.
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National Goals which it recommended to follow from the Eight Aims were 
subsequently incorporated into the Constitution. The first goal, of the five 
recommended for inclusion, was ‘Integral Human Development-Liberation and 
Fulfilment’:
All activities of the state should be directed towards the personal 
liberation and fulfilment of every citizen, so that each man and woman 
will have the opportunity of improving himself or herself as a whole 
person and achieving integral human development.149
Further, the CPC’s members did not take:
development to be synonymous with material progress. For us the only 
authentic development is integral human development. This means that 
we use the term development to mean nothing less than the unending 
process of improvement of every man and woman as a whole 
person...integral human development must reach out and enrich Papua 
New Guineans in every part of the country.150
The third outcome of particular relevance, alongside strengthening the government 
and cementing the ideological shift against accelerated development, was the 
Committee’s role in checking separatism. This claim may appear to be at variance 
with the politics of key CPC members. Its most important members Momis and 
Kaputin continued to be associated with movements on the Gazelle Peninsula and 
Bougainville which variously espoused separatist and in the latter case 
secessionist sentiments.151 However through widespread consultation, and the 
dominant nationalist views of the CPC’s membership, the committee’s 
deliberations kept attention focused upon how the national state could be 
constructed to include -  rather than exclude -  representatives from all areas which 
had been part of the colonial territory. As Somare noted, despite his radicalism, 
CPC ideological leader Momis was above all a [PNG] nationalist.152
The national state and the Somare government were strengthened by other means 
as well. A substantial rise in international copper prices, and the determination of 
government officials to renegotiate the agreement with RTZ/CRA/ Bougainville
149. CPC Final Report v.1, p.2/3
150. CPC Final Report v. 1, p.2/3
151. Griffin ‘Movements for Separation and Secession’ distinguishes between the sentiments of 
separatism and secessionism, as well as the forms of opposition to the national government on the 
Gazelle Peninsula, Bougainville and Papua.
152. See Somare Sana p.99 for Somare’s description of the CPC leader as a ‘true nationalist’.
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Copper Limited, secured a major increase in revenues at an especially critical 
moment.153 The accession to power of the ALP in Australia and the willingness of 
the new PM Gough Whitlam to make a three year commitment on aid from 1974- 
75 further assisted planning.154 Soon after Independence, an extensive frost in the 
main coffee growing areas of Brazil resulted in a very substantial price increase for 
PNG’s major agricultural export which further boosted government revenues, 
commercial activity and grower incomes.
The CPC’s linking of state activities, nation-wide comprehensive development and 
individuality may seem, at first sight, to have much in common with the earlier 
uniform development pushed so determinedly in the 1950s by the Hasluck-led 
colonial administration.155 However beneath the change in the racial and national 
identities of those who held state power, from Australians to Papua New Guineans, 
a more fundamental shift was under way.
The shift expressed major changes in the character of state and class power. 
These changes ensured that beneath the superficial similarities there was little in 
common between uniform development and the development policy which 
characterized the first Somare government. This was largely because instead of 
being marginalised, as was a central objective of the initial post-war development 
policy, during the transition to independence the indigenous capitalist class gained 
a substantial hold on state power. This hold was utilised for commercial advantage 
and also to shape the post-colonial state, most notably in the establishment of 
provincial governments which could be utilised to open up further arenas for 
commercial operations. Political power exercised by and on behalf of indigenous 
capital became a major feature of representative politics. In turn, it became less
153. Somare Sana pp. 121-122; Garnaut The Framework of Economic Policy Making’ pp. 193-195; 
see also Griffin ‘Movements Towards Secession’ pp.295-296; Downs The Australian Trusteeship 
pp.540-545.
154. Somare Sana p. 97; Whitlam The Whitlam Government 1972-1975 Ringwood, Vic.: Penguin 
Books, 1985, pp.98-99. This commitment turned out to be less important when in November 1975 
the Labor Government was dismissed by the Governor-General and the aid programme had to be 
renegotiated with the incoming Malcolm Fraser-led Coalition Government.
155. See, for one more instance, the CPC Report statement (p.2/3) ‘No particular area or grouping 
of people should be developed at the expense of another, materially or in other ways. There should 
always be an equitable distribution and balanced sharing of all the benefits and opportunities the 
nation has to offer.’
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possible for those who represented the leading commercial figures to claim that 
they were also acting on behalf of smallholders and other indigenes. The possibility 
that the government of the newly independent state could exercise trusteeship was 
diminished. Consideration of this political advance of indigenous capital and their 
allies shows in an especially clear manner the way the political economy of the pre- 
Independence phase differed from that of the late 1940s and 1950s.
Indigenous capital - class and state power
For a substantial part of the post-war period Australian officials, who were not 
themselves members of the capitalist class either in the metropole or the colony 
acted as trustees for the particular form(s) of development detailed in this thesis. 
Their ability to do so was enhanced by regulations which prevented straddling 
between state employment and private accumulation. Public officials were 
specifically barred from engaging in commercial activities, including farming and 
trading.156 None of the Australian Ministers had any commercial interests in the 
colony, and only Barnes -  Minister in the accelerated development period - could 
be regarded as having close ties with private businessmen who had operations in 
PNG. Ward and Hasluck were closely attached to the means and goals of late 
colonial trusteeship, particularly securing smallholder attachment to land.
Especially during the 1950s, the Australian government’s hold on state power had 
been highly centralized to ensure that international firms, expatriate owner- 
occupiers and the emerging indigenous bourgeois could not exercise unacceptable 
leverage against the colonial administration. Whether or not the colonial state of 
the Ward-Hasluck period conforms to the descriptions of a bureaucratic state or
156. There were expatriate state officials who, barred from this form of straddling, left senior 
positions to start or join existing commercial enterprises in PNG. George Greathead and Downs are 
just two. (For the case of Greathead, see Hasluck A Time for Building pp.119-120.) Australian 
public service regulations precluded officials from also engaging in commercial enterprises, 
although by the 1960s and early 1970s means of surmounting this barrier were regularly employed. 
C. Lesley Andrews Business and Bureaucracy: A Study of Papua New Guinean Businessmen and 
the Policies of Business Development in Port Moresby Research Bulletin No.59 Port Moresby and 
Canberra: New Guinea Research Unit, ANU, 1975, p.55 details the case of a Port Moresby steel 
furniture manufacturing business, in which of the five expatriates who floated the firm, several were 
public servants. In order to take up shares in the firm, the public servants were required to obtain 
the permission of the Administrator. Approval ‘was granted only in view of the intention to foster 
indigenous participation’. In 1969, the leading expatriate promoter of the firm financed a seventy 
five per cent buyout by a Papua New Guinean, with the Development Bank taking a one quarter 
ownership share. Other expatriate state employees used spouses, relatives and friends to run 
private enterprises.
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administrative colonialism,157 neither of these characterisations adequately capture 
the principal objective of colonial rule, to bring development as the basis for self- 
government, nor the deliberate marginalising of particular forms of accumulation.
During the 1960s, while power was still exerted in a form of colonial trusteeship, 
accelerated development opened space for not only the well-known and obvious 
forms of international enterprise, including the Panguna mine, but other forms of 
commerce as well. While some of these commercial activities were a focus for the 
anti-colonial nationalist criticisms raised by Crocombe, Kaputin and others, 
important moves by indigenous capitalists and would-be capitalists were also 
occurring. The critics’ attention to the clash between expatriates and indigenes 
over petty commerce (taxis, shops, hairdressing salons etc.) often indicated 
thwarted ambitions. At the same time, there was also a substantial shift of ‘big men 
into major businessmen’ to extend Ben Finney’s description of what was occurring 
in the Eastern Highlands, around Goroka, to other parts of PNG.158 As 
indigenisation of colonial administration employment occurred, legal and other 
barriers to straddling between state positions and private commercial activities 
were lowered.
Much of the political running against colonial rule was made by disgruntled civil 
servants, academics and would-be businessmen, including Mataungan leader 
Kaputin, who hoped to become owners of largeholdings and other commercial 
enterprises.159 As expatriates in small and more substantial businesses departed,
157. Hawksley ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM
158. The academic literature of the 1970s and 1980s is replete with studies which documented the 
growing presence from the 1960s at least of indigenous entrepreneurs. See, for example, Finney 
Big-Men and Business Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the New Guinea Highlands 
Honolulu: East-West Center, University of Hawaii, 1973, and works listed in Finney’s Bibliography 
pp. 189-199. See also Andrews Business and Bureaucracy for the establishment since the early 
1960s of indigenous enterprises in the largest urban centre. In this literature, the pre-Independence 
presence of Papua New Guineans in commerce was widely acknowledged but in the confused 
descriptions of the period, including ‘new elite’, ‘big peasants’, ‘rich peasants’, ‘middle peasants’, 
‘(educated) petty bourgeoisie’, ‘national bourgeoisie’, ‘rural capitalists’, and ‘rich rural classes’. For a 
lengthy list of the accounts which employ one or more of these characterizations, see Thompson 
and MacWilliam The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea pp.85-119, Chapter 3 ‘From 
Acquisition to Accumulation: The Formation of an Indigenous Class of Capital’, esp.p.87, fn.4.
159. There is as yet no substantial colony or country-wide study of the formation and advance of an 
indigenous capitalist class, as has appeared for other former colonies which became nation-states, 
including Kenya and Nigeria. See Nicola Swainson The Development of Corporate Capitalism in
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many indigenous politicians extended their commercial holdings. By the early 
1970s, political leaders, as well as the main parties, Pangu, United Party and 
Peoples’ Progress Party, represented indigenous commercial ambitions in a range 
of individual and corporate forms.160 These ambitions had quickly out-grown their 
local origins. Papuan separatist loader Josephine Abaijah claimed ‘New Guineans 
were taking over the indigenous business affairs of Port Moresby’.161
The principal arena for the initial advance of indigenous capital, however, was the 
countryside, in agriculture. The Tolai movement into largeholding cocoa growing, 
processing and trading, which began in the late 1940s, is documented in Chapter 
Six. A parallel advance also occurred in the central Highlands, where Papua New 
Guineans had extensive coffee plantings, and other enterprises. As a result of the 
major expansion of smallholder coffee production from the 1950s, processing and 
trading smallholder produce and household consumption goods, as well as 
growing other marketed crops provided a starting point for indigenous commercial 
operations. As a consequence of their earlier expansion, members of the
Kenya 1918-1977 London: Heinemann, 1980, esp. Ch.5; Tom Forrest The Advance of African 
Capital: the Growth of Nigerian private enterprise Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994. 
Finney’s mid-1986 follow-up study Business Development in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea 
Research Report Series No.6 Honolulu: Pacific Islands Development Program, East-West Center, 
1987, p.1 notes the rapidity of the pre- and post-Independence advance of indigenes in Goroka 
commerce. See also Paula Brown ‘New Men and Big Men: Emerging Social Stratification in the 
Third World, A Case Study from the New Guinea Highlands’ Ethnology v.26, no.2, April 1987,pp.87- 
106;Thompson and MacWilliam The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea ‘From Acquisition to 
Accumulation’; John Finch ‘From proletarian to entrepreneur to big man: The story of Noya’
Oceania v.68, no.2, December 1997, pp. 123-133.
160. Two observations from the period will suffice to illustrate the conjunction of electoral -  
parliamentary politics and commerce: David Hegarty The Territory of Papua and New Guinea’ 
Australian Journal of Politics and History v. 18, no.2, August 1972, pp.295-296 notes regarding the 
number of candidates who contested the February-March election, that: 'The heaviest concentration 
of candidates occurred in the Highlands which may still reflect the persistent solidarity of the 
traditional clan-based political units in the region. It may also reflect, however, the emergence of a 
new entrepreneurial type or group in the Highlands which sees its economic success as being a 
basis for political support’. Hegarty also states (p.297) that ‘...close to 40 per cent of (the elected) 
MHAs are classified as businessmen (planters, traders, farmers, store-owners, etc), about 30 per 
cent as government officials (interpreters, clerks, senior officials) and about 17 per cent as school 
teachers’. The second instance is the late 1975 case in which ‘the business arms of Pangu party 
(the leading party of the national coalition [government]) and of the United party (the only party on 
the opposition side) were jointly proposing to enter the lucrative field of motor car sales [a field 
dominated by subsidiaries of the major Australian South Pacific firms Burns Philp and 
W.R.Carpenter]’. James Griffin ‘Papua New Guinea’ Australian Journal of Politics and History v.22, 
no.1, 1976, pp.126-127 and Donald Denoon ‘Papua New Guinea’ Australian Journal of Politics and 
History v.22, no.3, 1976, p.437
161. Hegarty ‘Papua New Guinea’ Australian Journal of Politics and History v. 19, no.3, December 
1973, p.441
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indigenous bourgeoisie and would-be bourgeoisie were anxious to takeover 
plantations being vacated by departing expatriate owner-occupiers and 
international firms. However the smallholder agricultural increases of the 1950s 
and 1960s also contributed to the land shortages and triggered clashes over the 
former expatriate-owned largeholdings.
If the unplanted land on many largeholdings attracted squatters and other 
indigenous households seeking to extend their holdings, by the 1960s and 1970s 
its existence often signalled that the expatriate owners and operators of the 
plantations were uncertain about their future. In 1974, during an especially torrid 
tussle over the need for compulsory acquisition of ‘foreign-owned’ plantations, 
Burns Philp as a major firm could package a substantial area of unplanted and 
under-utilised land as a political offering to the Somare government in exchange for 
a guarantee of continued ownership and operation of its profitable holdings.162 
Other largeholding owners were not in as strong a position as Burns-Philp and 
were forced to adopt different strategies to sell entire properties as plantations.163
An especially prominent form of indigenous business organisation established to 
facilitate the takeover of largeholdings was rural development corporations. Their 
formation had two principal purposes. The first was to ensure that previously 
expatriate owned and operated businesses continued as forms of centralised and 
concentrated property. This meant blocking the ambitions of smallholders and 
other indigenes for a form of redistribution which would have divided the assets of 
the departing settlers and small businessmen. The second purpose was to include 
households in the ownership of the plantations and other enterprises as 
shareholders. Instead of acquiring separate parcels of assets, including small 
blocks of land carved out of the plantation, shareholders were offered the prospect 
of increased consumption out of share dividends, if and when these eventuated.
162. MacWilliam ‘International companies and nationalist politics in Papua New Guinea’
163. See MacWilliam ‘Smallholder Production, the State and Land Tenure’ pp.25-26 for a 1974 
proposal by an expatriate coffee plantation owner that a District Investment Authority be established 
to fund the takeover and continued operation of largeholdings in the Highlands. Andrews Business 
and Bureaucracy documents the beginnings of the takeover of expatriate businesses during the 
early 1970s in Port Moresby and the provision of PNG Development Bank finance for the 
indigenous businessmen. She details the strategies employed by expatriates to secure their 
enterprises, including forms of joint venture, during the transfer to Papua New Guinean ownership.
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Including indigenous smallholders as shareholders assisted in raising money for 
purchases, and made it easier to obtain loan funds. The development corporations 
also dampened smallholder dissent, holding out the possibility of higher levels of 
consumption funded by share dividends. Central to the formation and operation of 
many of these enterprises were powerful politicians, who could attract investors 
from among local populations and facilitate access to state resources.164
While the development corporations were critical for fulfilling the ambitions of 
Papua New Guineans aiming to take over and maintain plantations, agricultural 
operations did not represent the extent of the indigenous bourgeoisie’s ambitions. 
Members of this class moved into crop processing and export, transportation, 
trade, urban real estate and other areas of commerce. These moves were 
invariably connected with representatives of the class and its small business allies 
gaining political power. While some of the political advance took place through 
gaining representation on boards, state agencies which allocate licenses and 
finance, a more substantial basis involved restructuring the post-colonial state 
itself. An especially significant instance of major changes was the establishment of 
provincial governments, which in the most advanced provinces were quickly 
captured by leading indigenous businessmen and their political representatives.
164. The case of New Guinea Development Corporation, formed by Kaputin and claimed to be the 
first of this form of enterprise, is discussed in more detail in chapter 6 below. For some of the 
extensive literature on other firms which employed the development corporation and related 
templates, see Rolph Gerritsen Aspects of the Political Evolution of Rural Papua New Guinea: 
Towards a Political Economy of the Terminal Peasantry Canberra Marxist Discussion Group 
Seminar, 26th October 1975; Gerritsen Groups, Classes and Peasant Politics in Ghana and Papua 
New Guinea Ph.D.Thesis Canberra; ANU, 1979; Mike Donaldson Class Formation in Papua New 
Guinea: The National Bourgeoisie Paper Presented at the Sociological Association of Australia and 
New Zealand Conference, Canberra, July 1979, esp. pp.26-29; Donaldson and Kenneth Good 
Class and Politics in the Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea History of Agriculture Discussion 
Paper No.9 Waigani and Konedobu: University of Papua New Guinea and Department of Primary 
Industry, March 1978; Donaldson and Good The Eastern Highlands: Coffee and Class’ in Denoon 
and Snowden A time to plant and a time to uproot pp.143-169, esp.pp.167-168; Good and 
Donaldson The Development of Rural Capitalism in PNG: Coffee Production in the Eastern 
Highlands Boroko: Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, n.d.; Donaldson and Good Articulated 
Agricultural Development esp. pp.127-146 Ch.6 'Coffee Consolidation, the Development 
Corporations and the Rich Rural Classes’.
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Provincial governments and indigenous capital
The end of colonial rule was accompanied by moves to decentralise administration 
at the district and local government levels.165 The CPC provided an important 
policy direction for decentralisation. The CPC recommended a reduction in the 
power of the central administration through the establishment of political means by 
which citizens could participate in decision-making. According to Ghai and Regan, 
this was an attempt by the CPC to formulate a new ‘paradigm of development’, 
which was heavily influenced by ‘(e)vents in and demands for autonomy or 
secession by leaders from Bougainville...since the 1960s.’166 While Ghai and 
Regan, and Conyers correctly identify the ‘centrality of the Bougainville experience’ 
for the decentralisation push and formation of provincial governments, neither of 
these accounts adequately explains what was critical about that ‘experience’ for 
late colonial and post-Independence development policy in PNG.
Decentralisation and the formation of provincial governments extended the means 
by which indigenous capitalists were able to combine class and state power to 
enlarge their opportunities for accumulation. The case of Bougainville was centra! 
because the establishment and operation of the Panguna mine, after and in 
addition to the well-established commercial agricultural base in the district, created 
more room for the local bourgeoisie. The willingness of the Bougainville 
bourgeoisie to play separatism in an aggressive secessionist form showed how 
rapidly the class was advancing and the extent of their ambitions. The creation of 
provincial governments became a seminal moment during which policy was 
pushed away from agrarian development as state revenues were captured to 
support the ambitions of indigenous capital.
Once established, provincial governments in many districts were led by local 
businessmen-politicians who pushed for the formation of business arms. While 
sometimes justified as a means for securing revenues which would permit the 
provision of public services, these businesses also made the takeover of
165. See Conyers The Provincial Government Debate Chapters 1-3; Ghai and Regan The Law, 
Politics and Administration of Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea Monograph No.30 Boroko: 
IASER, 1992, Chapter 1
166. The Law, Politics and Administration of Decentralisation p.16
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plantations and other enterprises from departing expatriates possible. 
Subsequently, after Independence, this form of public enterprise became a shell as 
the assets were transferred to private ownership.
Nevertheless, the formation of the Bougainville provincial government was distinct. 
This was because of the very substantial commercial development which had 
already taken place around the Panguna mine, and the popular opposition to its 
establishment which could be mobilised into a political movement. The reaction 
was driven by the immediate effects of the mine’s establishment, including land 
alienation and rapid migration into the area from other parts of PNG. 
Bougainvilleans who had previously eschewed working as plantation labourers 
found themselves in competition with, and in the presence of considerable 
numbers of people from other parts of PNG seeking wage employment in ‘their 
district’. Specific events, including the 1974 deaths of two Bougainvilleans in a pay­
back killing in the Highlands added to popular disaffection. The physical difference 
between black-skinned Bougainvilleans and ‘red-skinned’ Papua New Guineans, 
the distance of the district from the rest of PNG, especially Port Moresby, its 
proximity to Solomon Islands ‘kin’, and the failure of the colonial administration to 
‘bring development’ to the district were used to provide further support for 
secessionist demands as a particularly aggressive form of separatism.167 
Secessionism became the means by which a section of indigenous capital gained 
a hold on and played a part in reconstructing state power to advance their 
accumulation. In particular, key members of the indigenous bourgeoisie held 
managerial positions in the Bougainville Development Corporation (BDC) while 
also occupying the most important elected and managerial offices in the provincial 
government. This linking of private and public office was used to strengthen their 
commercial position.
167. A detailed account of the formation of provincial governments, and the importance of 
Bougainvillean secessionist politics is provided in Conyers The Provincial Government Debate. For 
the Prime Minister’s personal involvement, see Somare Sana esp.ppl 14-122. See, as well as the 
accounts cited above by Griffin, Denoon and others, Thompson and MacWilliam The Bougainville 
Rebellion’ in The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea pp. 14-48, Chapter 2.
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Officially registered in 1975, the Development Corporation was established to carry 
out a business strategy framed the previous year.168 The firm had the provincial 
government and the local diocese of the Roman Catholic Church holding 75% of 
the issued share capital. The provincial government’s shares were held in the form 
of a royalty trust, indicating that the source of the funds was royalties from the 
mine. Over the next ten years BDC became the most important indigenous 
commercial entity on Bougainville. Until 1984, Hannett and his group also 
controlled the provincial government. Hannett was both company chairman and 
provincial premier. This close connection between political and economic power in 
what had become the most prosperous province in the country, provided a 
template for developments in other provinces, where provincial governments 
established business arms.169
Phase 1 of the BDC’s business strategy was to own and operate service industries 
around the Panguna mine.170 BDC acquired the wet canteens at the mine. With a 
largely migratory male work-force, these were highly profitable. In the 1980s, the 
closure of the canteens in response to the changing drinking habits of a more 
permanent workforce reduced BDC’s income and pushed it into other activities. 
These included forcing BCL to use lime from the BDC-owned mine, rather than 
CRA-RTZ’s cheaper international sources. Phase 2 involved utilising this 
commercial base to move into plantation agriculture, smallholder cocoa marketing 
and exporting. In the third phase the firm extended operations beyond the North 
Solomons in shipping and manufacturing. In 1985-1986, while still espousing the
168. Thompson and MacWilliam ‘From acquisition to accumulation’ p.104 notes how in 1979, BDC’s 
management pin-pointed 1974 as the year the strategy of the firm was first set.
169. Thomson and MacWilliam ‘From Acquisition to Accumulation’ p. 118, fn. 80 provides a specific 
instance of the importance of the coupling of political and economic power in the personae of 
Hannett. On April 10, 1984, during a flight between Port Moresby and Arawa, a senior partner of an 
international commodity trading firm boasted to me that he was going to the North Solomons to sign 
a joint venture agreement with BDC. He was visibly impressed by the prospect of being met at the 
airport by “the Prime Minister [ie. Provincial Premier Hannett], who is also a shareholder in person".
170. James Griffin ‘Papua New Guinea’ Australian Journal of Politics and History v.21, no.3, 
December 1975, p.124 notes how rapidly the provisional provincial government, the major 
shareholder in the Bougainville Development Corporation, invested copper royalties in transport 
and commerce, including Bougainville Airways. Donald Denoon ‘Papua New Guinea’ Australian 
Journal of Politics and History v.22, no.3, December 1976, p.442, notes the March 1976 takeover of 
a nearby tourist resort frequented by highly paid mine workers, and the ambitions expressed by Leo 
Hannett, planning officer for the provincial government, that the firm ‘"had the potential to grow into 
a multimillion kina enterprise’” .
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firm’s role in providing funds which could be utilised by the provincial government 
to provide services, directors privatised BDC by increasing its share capital and 
themselves acquiring the issued shares.171
The firm’s formation and activities became an important indicator of just how 
extensive were the commercial ambitions of indigenous capital. BDC’s operations 
were also an acknowledgement that commercial advance in post-Independence 
PNG required holding considerably more political power than had been permitted 
under colonial rule. By playing the politics of separatism to the limit, leading 
Bougainvilleans won substantial commercial benefits for the Development 
Corporation. The commercial opportunities provided by the enormous mine were 
critical for the ambitions of this section of the Bougainville bourgeoisie. But without 
political power there was no guarantee that the opportunities could be taken and 
rivals from other parts of PNG kept out, for the honey-pot of the giant mine had 
excited the ambitions of indigenous labour and capital alike across the country. 
The route taken by Bougainvilleans with commercial ambitions but politically 
marginal to remedy the latter changed the structure of the state.
As noted previously, at the 1972 national elections, radical student leader Leo 
Hannett had failed to win endorsement to run for a seat. Subsequently, his political 
marginalisation and the cooptation of leading Bougainvillean politicians Lapun, 
Momis and Mola into the central political and administrative machinery of the new 
government gave the impetus for the secessionist politics which were to be so 
important in reshaping late colonial and post-Independence state power. While co­
optation of the most out-spoken of the younger generation who were using 
separatism as a political tactic became one of the important achievements of the 
first Somare government, this strategy was less successful in dealing with the 
ambitious Bougainvilleans, including Hannett, who had been marginalised.
171. BDC’s post-Independence advance and subsequent decline following the 1988 revolt on 
Bougainville are charted in Thompson and MacWilliam The Political Economy of Papua New 
Guinea pp. 103-109
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In February 1973, Hannett had been appointed special adviser to PM Somare on 
Bougainville affairs. Dissatisfied with the pace of the move to district/provincial 
government, Hannett subsequently launched a public attack on the two 
Bougainvillean ministers in Somare’s government, Lapun and Mola. Somare 
dismissed Hannett from the advisor’s position. The latter proceeded to further 
develop his political base on Bougainville, with a continuous escalation of demands 
and threats. In January 1974, the first meeting of the Bougainville Constituent 
Assembly was held, with an appointed not elected membership. Five months later, 
Bougainville was provided with a special financial allocation by the national 
government in lieu of royalties from the mine. Hannett and another critic of the 
central government, Moses Havini became planner and executive officer of the 
newly established Provincial Government, with considerable power over the 
province’s finances.
The government’s handling of the CPC and its report included measures to reduce 
the powers of the proposed provincial governments. Specifically, the Somare 
government was concerned that ‘the CPC proposals could result in an undue 
concentration of power at the provincial centre’.172After a prolonged and often bitter 
tussle over the powers of provincial governments and their constitutional standing, 
a compromise was reached. Provincial governments gained power to make laws 
including on agriculture and rural development, business, rural and urban land use, 
and transport, providing these did not contravene national laws. However in giving 
constitutional and administrative effect to the compromise, through which provincial 
governments were removed from the Constitution but included under a special 
organic law, negotiations between the new Bougainvillean political leadership and 
the central government broke down.
At different times, both Somare and Hannett agreed that decentralisation provided 
the best prospects for national unity.173 However by May 1975 Bougainvillean 
officials, including Hannett, were threatening that the province would secede from
172. Conyers The Provincial Government Debate p.45, citing PNG Government Government paper: 
proposals on constitutional principles and explanatory notes Port Moresby, August 1974
173. Conyers The Provincial Government Debate p.55; Somare Sana p.122
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PNG. Demands for increased royalties and capital works funds continued to 
escalate, particularly after a renegotiation between BCL and the PNG government 
substantially lifted the royalties paid by the firm. On September 1, 1975, two weeks 
before PNG’s Independence Day, the Bougainvilleans led by Hannett declared 
their independence. However this action did not prevent Bougainville being 
included in the territory of the nation which came into being at independence.174 
Instead the demands and threats secured an important and potentially powerful 
political and administrative structure in the new nation-state. While the North 
Solomons Provincial Government was the most developed initial form of this 
structure, similar arrangements followed for PNG’s other remaining districts. These 
became eighteen provinces and a nineteenth administrative unit, the National 
Capital District which was created based on Port Moresby and its immediate 
surrounds. After Independence, indigenous businessmen -  politicians held office in 
several provinces, particularly those most commercially advanced, including the 
Eastern Highlands.
Conclusion
By Independence, the phrase which had captured the essence of post-war colonial 
policy, ‘the paramountcy of native interests’ had acquired a distinctive meaning, 
becoming synonymous with indigenization and local ownership of commercial 
properties. As documented in Part II of this thesis, smallholder production of export 
crops had either become dominant or was gaining the ascendancy and would soon 
surpass largeholding production. The indigenous population had probably doubled, 
from about one and a quarter million in 1949 to over two and a half million at 
Independence, which suggested successful rehabilitation after the war and a 
subsequent improvement in living standards for many.175 An indigenous
174. Conyers The Provincial Government Debate pp.55-64
175. From 1949 until 1970, the population figure increased in part simply by the extension of 
colonial authority to more areas and peoples. While the 1949 figure does not include people in the 
‘restricted areas’, not completely under colonial rule, from the 1966 census a more comprehensive 
count begins to emerge. In 1966, the colony had a population of 2.12 million, which five years later 
had risen to 2.43 million. See M.Bathgate ‘Basic composition of the population’ in Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and South Pacific Commission ed.Population of Papua 
New Guinea Country Monograph Series No. 7.2 New York and Noumea, United Nations and South 
Pacific Commission, 1982, pp. 13-47.
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government had come to power in a newly independent nation-state, fulfilling one 
of the central terms of Australia’s trusteeship obligations.
The population increase, improved living standards, and the continued attachment 
of the majority of the population to smallholdings occurred under policies 
constructed in the name of agrarian development. The outcome appears to confirm 
not only the power of the idea of development but the capacity of the colonial 
administration to implement what was intended. Even if there were signs that the 
terms of the household occupation of smallholdings were shifting, with a rapid 
increase in some urban populations and unrest in the rural areas, ‘village life’ 
retained much that was attractive. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, conditions suggested 
considerable optimism was warranted about the government’s capacity to continue 
to make development happen. 176
However, with the coming to power of Papua New Guineans who were major 
beneficiaries of the production increases and political reforms to hasten self- 
government, state power took on a schizophrenic character. Official planning and 
key government officials continued to applaud, and to try to strengthen means of 
maintaining the centrality of household production and village life.177 Pushed by 
international advice and domestic aspirations, the national government was still 
intent upon keeping development centred upon rural areas, in accord with the 
National Aims.178
176. Ron May ‘From Promise to Crisis: a Political Economy of Papua New Guinea’ 
http://eDress.anu.edu.au/ssDna/mobile devices/ch. 15.html captures the sense of optimism which 
pervaded governing and administrative circles at Independence.
177. H.K.Colebatch ‘Policy-Making for Rural Development’ in Ballard ed. Policy-Making in a New 
State p.257-279 documents one ‘field of governmental activity -  the Rural Improvement Programme 
(RIP) -  whose proclaimed aim was to link central financial resources with local initiative in order to 
improve the way of life of rural people...The National Coalition government placed great stress on 
this programme, particularly in its early years in office, as a means of translating into action its 
concern for improving the lives of rural people (as opposed to what it saw as a narrow concern for 
economic growth).’
178. In 1974, under the direction of the National Planning Committee of Cabinet, the Central 
Planning Office prepared two documents. Under the general heading Strategies for Nationhood the 
documents Programmes & Performances and Policies & Issues were intended to give effect to the 
Eight Aims. This was to be done by relating items of departmental and other government 
expenditure specifically to the Aims. Both documents are testament to the continuing pull of these 
Aims and the idea of development, with its indigenous and rural focus, contained in the Aims. Thus: 
‘Development of a Papua New Guinean society also means increasing the capacity of village
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On the other hand, accelerated development and the political reforms had given a 
major boost to the position of indigenous capital. This class’s representatives 
sought to use their new found political power to reshape state power to extend its 
accumulation. While a series of political and commercial compromises made a 
temporary solution possible, nationalist euphoria disguised the contradictory 
ambitions of indigenous capital to accumulate and other classes and strata for 
increases in consumption.
In order to develop in more detail the general argument presented here, the thesis 
presents two case studies of particular commodities, rice and cocoa, which were 
central to agrarian development with its emphasis on smallholder production. Rice 
growing was intended to meet domestic demand, and cocoa production was aimed 
at international markets.




The Practice of Intentional Development:
Two Case Studies
The scheme of smallholder agriculture, the centrepiece of the agrarian doctrine 
of development which informed late colonial policy for PNG, guided efforts to 
increase the output of produce for immediate household consumption and 
markets, local and international. The efforts were directed at a wide range of 
crops and livestock, including poultry, pigs and cattle. In selecting for closer 
study two crops, rice and cocoa, it is not suggested that these were the only 
focus of official attention, or that they represented the success and/or failure of 
intentional development. Indeed, as the previous chapters have shown, 
particularly during the 1950s the colonial administration’s attention extended to 
growing many different crops and rearing a range of animals across the colony.
Rice and cocoa are considered here as exemplars of much that was intended 
and did occur. Both crops illustrates the relationship between spontaneous and 
intentional development, showing how the colonial administration tried to assert 
the latter in order to constrain what was seen as negative, or potentially so, in 
the former. The two case studies show in detail how local and international 
conditions affected outcomes and what could be attained through official policy 
and practices. In the immediate post-war years, international shortages of food 
initially favoured plantation rehabilitation despite what the colonial 
administration planned by way of smallholder predominance. These same 
shortages created room for indigenes with access to larger land holdings and 
the ability to mobilise labour to start expanding plantings of export crops.
Against this initial advance of largeholding agriculture, employing labour under 
wage and other terms, during the early to mid-1950s colonial administration 
efforts to make smallholders substantial producers took effect. However from 
the late 1950s, when the post-war shortages were over and international prices 
began to reflect the global increases of food crops, continuing to expand 
household production became more difficult. Raising household living standards 
by increases in smallholder production required shaping policy to deal with 
conditions the colonial administration had less ability to affect. Through the
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examination of rice and cocoa production it is possible to demonstrate the 
extent of colonial administration efforts as well as the circumstances which 
shaped, constrained the effectiveness of official activities.
Chapter Five shows how substantial were the attempts to increase rice 
production, and their lack of success. Rather than minimizing efforts to increase 
the local production of rice in the interest of Australian producers and their 
export company, the colonial administration probably committed more 
resources in its attempts to secure colonial self-sufficiency in rice than were 
provided to coordinate and supervise growing of other crops. However against 
what was intended by one dimension of colonial policy, imports rather than local 
production of rice became central to improved welfare. At the same time, 
increased exports of copra, coffee and cocoa produced by smallholders 
satisfied other key objectives of the late colonial agrarian doctrine of 
development, including the aim of keeping households attached to the land.
Chapter Two indicated the immediate post-war moves to rehabilitate cocoa 
plantation production using Trinitario seeds and seedlings, as well as the first 
plantings by wealthy Tolai on the Gazelle Peninsula. In Chapter Six the further 
expansion from the uniform development phase until Independence is 
examined. Initially, administration efforts to promote and direct smallholder 
production were pronounced, including in areas of the colony beyond East New 
Britain where the first burst of indigenous plantings occurred. This distribution of 
effort and resources subsequently brought considerable success, particularly 
through the expansion of smallholder cocoa growing in Bougainville, later North 
Solomons.
The increases in cocoa output from smallholdings also created room for the 
growth of indigenous capital in processing and trading. The ambitions of 
members of this class to move into largeholding production and other areas of 
commerce, became central to late colonial politics. Redistribution of plantations 
and under-utilised land to provide the basis for a further extension of 
smallholding production and the resettlement of landless people came up 
against these ambitions. The resultant uncertainty over the future direction of 
agrarian development came to characterise the transition to independence,
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particularly on the Gazelle Peninsula where cocoa had first become prominent 





As already indicated in Chapter Two, since the 1920s attaining rice self-sufficiency 
in the colony had been an objective of authorities in Papua. This emphasis 
continued for fifteen years after World War II. During the uniform development 
phase of the 1950s, Minister Hasluck repeatedly stressed the centrality of rice 
production to plans for bringing development.
Despite the official attention and considerable commitment of resources, between 
1946 and 1975 the gap between domestic production and consumption grew. In 
1950/51, in the context of post-war international shortages and high prices, PNG 
consumption was approximately 13,100 tons, of which more than 12,700 tons was 
imported. While international supplies increased, and despite an intensified effort 
by the colonial administration, guided by the 1954 Rice Action Plan, by 1956/57 
total consumption had reached nearly 18,000 tons, of which almost 17,000 tons 
was imported.1 Between 1966 and 1975 PNG production was often less and never 
more than 2.7% of total consumption requirements. By Independence, about 
55,000 tonnes were being consumed, with PNG production only providing about 
1.5% of this total.2 This chapter examines the considerable but ultimately 
unsuccessful efforts to close the gap, and the priority the colonial administration 
placed on smallholder production, particularly during the 1950s.
The account commences by showing how the conditions of rice production 
internationally changed over the thirty years after World War II. The first section of 
the chapter lays out how these changes acted to undermine attempts to increase 
production in PNG, at the same time as the increased availability of imported rice 
for domestic consumption lifted living standards for households, rural and urban. 
Wet, irrigated rice production by smallholder agriculture in countries of south-east 
Asia was also being challenged by irrigated production on medium to large farms in
1. NAA A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Pan-Papua and New Guinea 22/1/58 Folio 68 ‘Figures and 
Notes on Rice Requested by the Minister at Folio 57’
2. Hale Rice p.47, Table 5.
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industrial countries, including Australia. The international shift to industrial 
production resulted in an increase in the availability of rice for export, including 
from Australia, and held down prices, possibly even reduced them in real terms. 
The section shows how international as much as domestic conditions in PNG 
determined rice’s contribution to development in the colony. Capital’s external 
authority over development held for the production and consumption of this 
commodity, as well as more generally.3
The second section of this chapter discusses the first substantial official efforts 
from the late 1940s to increase rice production in the Mekeo area, about 120 
kilometres north-west of Port Moresby. In the Mekeo the tensions between dry and 
wet rice production, family labour processes and industrial processes with 
mechanisation first became pronounced. Even including rice grown at Epo 
agricuiturai research station and on nearby expatriate owned and operated farms, 
the total area planted probably reached a peak of around 800 acres in the 1953-54 
season. Despite continuing efforts to improve the Project, initiated by senior local 
officials,4 total plantings, did not ever exceed 1,000 acres before the Project finally 
folded in 1959.5
The early failure to increase rice production in the Mekeo despite the substantial 
application of resources also encouraged the colonial administration and the 
Minister to look elsewhere, particularly the Madang and Sepik districts, for more 
suitable circumstances in which to maintain the emphasis upon smallholder dry 
rice growing. The third section of the chapter considers how, from the early 1950s,
3. Cowen and Shenton Doctrines p.xv. For another instance of the relationship between 
metropolitan and PNG production, see Shand and Straatmans Transition from Subsistence p.100. 
The authors note that after an initial expansion during the 1950s, there was a subsequent reduction 
in peanut production for export in Maprik. 'In 1959 there was a record crop in Australia and prices 
[paid to PNG growers for peanuts sold to be exported] fell sharply ...Agricultural officers reported 
discouragement among growers who virtually ceased production for the export market after 1960. 
The small quantities subsequently produced were consumed by growers themselves or were sold in 
the small market in Maprik township.’
4. NAA A452/1, 1958/628 Mekeo Rice Project P & NG ‘ May 1954 Extract from Monthly Report of 
Territory of Papua and New Guinea’. For an enthusiastic and overly optimistic account of the future 
of the Project after some reforms to the Project had been initiated, see James McAuley ‘Economic 
Development Among the Mekeo’ South Pacific January-February 1956, pp.217-220
5. Jeffreys The Mekeo Rice Project pp.42-63 provides a more detailed account of the project’s 
revitalization in 1953-54, a brief period of increased production and then subsequent decline until 
finally terminated in 1959.
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colonial policy continued to give priority to dry rice growing even as the focus 
changed to other areas and populations. Extension services continued to focus 
upon rice, including research efforts to find the most suitable varieties and growing 
conditions, but without providing the degree of mechanisation which had facilitated 
cultivation in the Mekeo. While there was greater long-term success, especially in 
the Sepik with smallholder production for Immediate consumption and local 
markets increasing into the 1960s, the changed focus did not bring total production 
any nearer to meeting the objective of colonial self-sufficiency. The section closes 
by noting that up until Independence, there were sporadic efforts to increase 
production, including in a few cases by households using irrigation, which never 
became substantial. This specific form of intentional development was 
unsuccessful, even as household occupation of smallholdings was maintained, 
living standards rose and the consumption of imported rice became more 
widespread.
Post-war Changes in International Production and Marketing
Post-war production and export of Australian rice is significant for any 
consideration of PNG’s post-World War II reliance on rice imports for two main 
reasons. Firstly, the expansion of the rice industry in Australia closely followed the 
international template of industrial countries from which the export of rice increased 
substantially.6 The template adopted by these countries, irrigated rice grown on 
medium to large farms with mechanised production processes, lifted labour 
productivity and export volumes. Consequently rice became more readily available 
internationally so that prices, which had risen sharply after the war and peaked in 
the early 1950s, steadied and probably even fell in real terms until the early 
1970s.7
6. See Khin San May The Australian Rice Industry in Relation to the International Rice Trade and 
its Implications for Southeast Asian Rice Exporting Countries Development Studies Centre MADE 
Research Series 5 Canberra: ANU, 1981 ,pp.15-22; and Julian Roche The international rice trade 
Cambridge, Eng.: Woodhead Publishing, 1992, pp.27-30 for a brief account of increased production 
and export of rice from the USA.
7. Alice C.Palacpac World Rice Statistics Manila: Department of Agricultural Economics, The 
International Rice Research Institute, April 1976, Table 28, p.58
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Secondly, because consumers in PNG provided an important market for exports 
from Australia, the terms of post-war production in Australia were rapidly 
transmitted to and immediately affected efforts to produce more rice in the colony. 
PNG’s imports of rice from Australia rose from around 7,000 tonnes in the late 
1940s to 54,847 tonnes of Calrose, a medium grain protein enriched white rice in 
1975-76.8 The greater availability of rice internationally also made possible higher 
living standards for PNG households, rural and urban, assisting to fulfil an 
imperative of colonial policy that indigenous welfare should be improved. As more 
and more rural households became consumers of rice, whether purchased with 
income gained from selling other crops or as immediately consumed ‘subsistence’ 
produce, the scheme of smallholder agriculture at the centrepiece of late colonial 
policy for PNG was strengthened. That is, when the terms of trade between rice 
and other sources of income were favourable toward rice, increased imports of rice 
from Australia did not reduce the capacity of smallholders to reproduce existence 
at higher levels of need. Household occupation of smallholdings was extended 
even if colonial self-sufficiency in this particular crop was undermined.9
The effect of the international shift in production conditions, with consequences for 
supply as well as prices, was increased within PNG by the use of imported rice at 
official Administration stations to feed government employees, prisoners and other 
associated people.10 In addition to the general effect which the Administration’s use 
of imported rice had in setting prices for locally marketed rice, the terms under 
which many stations obtained imported rice supplies acted as a further disincentive 
to local rice growing. Prices paid by all Administration stations for their supplies
8. Hale Rice p.3. Paddy rice is harvested rice, with grains separated from stalks but with the husk 
remaining around each grain. Brown rice is rice from which the husk has been removed, while 
removing the pericarp and other fine parts from brown rice results in the production of white rice. 
Depending upon whether the rice is short or long grain, the proportion of the rice which is husk 
varies between 18 and 26%. An additional substantial reduction in weight and volume occurs in the 
transformation of brown rice into white rice. Rice p.6
9. For a comparable instance, with the crops of coffee and maize grown by smallholders in another 
country, see Michael Cowen ‘Change in State Power, International Conditions and Peasant 
Producers; the case of Kenya’ The Journal of Development Studies v.22, no.2, 1986, pp.355-384
10. Hasluck A Time for Building p.135 notes the disincentive effect for local production of increased 
supplies from Australia: ‘It was easier both for the officers of the Administration and for the native 
people to get Australian rice by the ton in bags than to grow and process it. If an officer’s main 
interest is in feeding people, tons of bagged rice in a shed are more convenient than a few hundred 
acres of unfilled land capable of growing rice.’
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were averaged to reduce the effect of transportation costs to the most remote 
areas, a practice which fitted with the 1950s uniform development policy. A Sepik 
station paid the same price for purchases of imported rice as was paid in Port 
Moresby. This practice further exaggerated the price advantage of imported rice 
and discouraged local growers who might have hoped to sell their produce to the 
Administration, invariably the most substantial user or rice in areas, including the 
Sepik, where there were few or no plantations needing to feed their labour forces.11
Changes in Production Methods
Unlike the USA, from which there have been substantial exports of rice since the 
iate seventeenth century,12 exports from Australia only commenced in 1930. From 
the early 1920s, rice production in Australia had been supported by tariffs on 
imports -  mainly from South-East Asia - and through the provision of irrigated 
water harvested, channelled and controlled through a state agency which charged 
growers for water at prices below long-term replacement cost.13 Supplying troops 
and allied civilians in the Asia-Pacific area during World War II gave a major boost 
to rice growing in NSW, initially the only producing state. From the late 1960s, 
climate and irrigation made possible double cropping, summer and winter, in the 
Burdekin River Basin near Townsville, northern Queensland.14 Exports quadrupled 
from the beginning of the 1960s, so that in 1976-77, total exports from Australia 
amounted to around 250,000 tonnes of rice, or about three percent of world 
exports.15
11. NAA A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan 19/12/57 EJ Wood, Asst. Sec, Industry and 
Commerce to Minister, ‘Rice-Papua and New Guinea’ p.1. This was despite the policy adopted 
under the 1954 Rice Action Plan, at the recommendation of the Rice Development Advisory 
Committee, for the Administration to ‘derive its supplies from local production wherever possible 
and wherever this can be done at prices competitive with overseas imports and, thereby, to provide 
a market which will assist local producers both European and native’. 26/7/1956 R.W. Wilson, 
Acting Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories. A principal task of the Committee was 
to determine adjustments in prices paid locally for rice purchases, which meant movements 
downwards as well as upwards in line with the price of imported rice.
12. D.H.Grist Rice 6th edition London: Longmans, 1983, p.499 notes: ‘Whereas before the war 
practically all exports were the produce of small farms in Asian developing countries, at the present 
time (1971) nearly half the exports derive from larger scale production units in developed countries’. 
Also cited in Roche The international rice trade, p.22. In 1967, exports from the USA surpassed 
those of the previous largest exporting country, Thailand.
13. On the levels of domestic protection, and other subsidies for Australian rice growers, see B.R. 
Davidson Australia Wet Or Dry Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1969
14. May The Australian Rice Industry Ch.3
15. May The Australian Rice Industry p.3 and Ch.3
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Rice in Australia has been grown as wet rice, which if efficiently done with suitable 
strains generally reduces costs of watering, weeding, control of some pests and 
birds, fertilizing and harvesting.16 The wet, flooded or paddy-field method, by far 
the most common and utilised for over ninety per cent of rice growing throughout 
the world, is higher yielding than the dry or upland rice cultivation favoured by the 
colonial administration for PNG production.17 Significantly, after World War II the 
major areas of expanded industrial rice production which occurred in the USA, 
Australia and British Guiana each utilised irrigated methods.18 The wet method also 
makes possible a greater standardisation of the production process, extending the 
possibilities for mechanisation on larger holdings.19 Instead of the hand-sowing, 
weeding and harvesting methods employed by many small-holders in the principal 
rice growing areas of Asia, each stage of production became mechanised in post­
war Australia. The enlarged scale of production in Australia combined with greater 
mechanisation made it possible to continually increase export volumes.
In 1951, Rice Growers’ Co-operative Mills Ltd., a company owned by NSW rice 
farmers, was formed and from the 1960s held a monopoly position buying paddy 
from the Rice Marketing Board. The firm milled, packaged and sold the crop within 
Australia and overseas. Prior to 1973, the firm sold rice on a wholesale basis to the 
large Australian-based trading firms which dominated retail trade in PNG. After the 
1972 elections which brought to power the PANGU-dominated Coalition 
government headed by Michael Somare, the Rice Growers’ Co-operative Mills
16. On the principal rice growing area, the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area, see 
http://www.mirrigation.com.au/AboutUS/Water_for_Life.htm. See also PNGNA A/N12, Box 
No.3,901, F/N 1-2-6(D) Mekeo Rice Project 31/12/52Cottrell-Dormer to Director DASF p.4-5.
17. The so-called ‘Green Revolution’ which commenced among Asian rice-growers in the 1960s, 
utilising new higher yielding strains of rice, was most successful where farmers ‘were endowed with 
adequate irrigation facilities and who could afford to purchase the complementary inputs necessary 
to reach the yield potential of the new strains.’ Edmund K Oasa The International Rice Research 
Institute and the Green Revolution: A Case Study on the Politics of Agricultural Research 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1981, p.2
18. NAA A518/1, AY 927/4, Rice in British Colonial Territories, Conference of Directors of 
Agriculture, September 1953 Rice Production in the Colonial Territories by Production and 
Marketing Department A, Colonial Office.
19. The Green Revolution too was associated with increased mechanisation: Oasa The 
International Rice Research Institute and the Green Revolution pp.29-35.
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formed a marketing subsidiary, Rice Industries P/L to import and distribute rice in 
PNG.
In 1974, the PNG Government concluded a five-year agreement with the Rice 
Marketing Board of NSW and the Rice Growers’ Co-operative Mills Ltd, under 
which the latter was assured of a minimum market of 45,000 tonnes per year. The 
PNG Government reserved the right to limit imports from NSW to 55,000 tonnes 
and seek any additional imports from other countries, although the Australian firm 
had first option to supply an equivalent or better quality rice at competitive prices.20 
While the price of the imported rice was set in Australian dollars and at the price 
prevailing when the agreement was signed, provision was made for ‘price 
adjustments depending on world market prices and changing freight rates.’21 That 
is, while efforts were made to limit the effect of international fluctuations on prices 
received by Australian growers these attempts too were subject to price 
determinations from beyond Australia. As the Somare government took power in 
PNG, rice growing in the country faced not only competition from Australia growers 
but the further effect of wider international conditions upon the price of rice 
imported.
One further consequence of the agreement between the PNG government and the 
Australian-based rice marketing firm should be noted. A specific term of the 
contract provided for the PNG Government to acquire up to half the equity capital 
of the distributing subsidiary Rice Industries P/L. In June 1976, less than a year 
after Independence, the PNG Investment Corporation took a 26% shareholding in 
the firm. As a government-owned agency, the Investment Corporation’s profitability 
was directly affected by the level and price of rice imports, a product which 
competed directly with efforts to expand domestic rice production, which for around 
six decades had been considered an important indicator of colonial, then national 
self-sufficiency.22 The tensions surrounding the meaning and conditions of self-
20 Hale Rice p.25
21 Hale Rice p.25
22 Hale Rice p.25, notes ‘a possible conflict of interest with national rice production goals as a 
result of profit seeking investment’ by the PNG Investment Corporation.
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sufficiency in rice production and consumption continued to affect the newly 
independent nation-state.
With this information about the most important changes in international production 
and marketing conditions, it is now appropriate to return to the colonial 
administration’s efforts to increase the production of rice in PNG. Colonial policy 
favoured dry upland rice using family labour processes with minimal mechanisation 
at the cultivation and harvesting stages. This meant that the costs of production 
were higher than for alternative crops and imported foods, including Australian 
grown rice. The alternatives, greater mechanisation of dry upland rice or producing 
wet rice utilising irrigated methods were regularly considered for the Mekeo and 
other areas of the colony. However these possibilities were invariably rejected as 
not fitting the wider scheme of smallholder agriculture which emphasised the 
importance of family labour processes.
The Mekeo Rice Project and colonial policy
After World War II there were efforts to increase rice production in many areas of 
the colony. Often led by indigenes who tied rice growing and marketing to other 
commercial activities and their political endeavours, these plantings were 
encouraged by the first moves of the administration to establish extension centres 
and activities. Despite the efforts, the absence of any major increase in local 
production across the late colonial period usually draws the criticism of insufficient 
commitment to development. Accordingly, it is necessary to look at what colonial 
policy attempted and its results.
In April 1952, the former Director of Agriculture who had resigned to concentrate 
his considerable energies on the Mekeo Project, as Regional Agricultural Officer, 
neatly summed up a central tension underlying colonial policy toward rice 
production in this area. The tension, as already suggested, was between the 
objective of increasing rice output by any means and growing rice in a manner that 
supported the scheme of smallholder agriculture with its associated purpose of 
improving indigenous living standards and maintaining community. In a 
memorandum for the new Director, Larry Dwyer, the RAO William Cottrell-Dormer
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fulminated against the popular description of what was occurring in the Mekeo as a
‘rice project’. Said Cottrell-Dormer:
...the project is a many-sided one....In fact it is an experiment in 
civilising a native people, and the lack of interest of other Departments, 
i.e. of practical interest, never ceases to astonish me.
Merely growing rice will civilize no one -  the past has already proved 
that.23
Geography and Topography of the Mekeo
Hale neatly captures the remarkable attraction which rice growing in the 
Mekeo had across much of the colonial period. Flat plains instead of broken, 
mountainous terrain and proximity to Port Moresby encouraged attention. He 
states:
Overall there is the recurring theme that [in the Mekeo] rice can be 
easily grown because rice has been grown, and superficial 
examination(s) of the climate and terrain have not driven home the 
unpredictability of the rainfall.24
Predictability of rainfall is possibly the single most important climatic condition 
necessary for dry or upland rice cultivation. Growing can only commence once 
there is sufficient moisture in the soil for land to be tilled and seed to be planted. 
Relatively shallow-rooted food crops, including rice require regular rain, but only 
sufficient to ensure that fields do not become water-logged during the growing 
season. Soils need to hold moisture content through this phase and then dry out as 
harvesting takes place. In ‘good’ seasons the north-west monsoons provide the 
Mekeo plains with rainfall approximately according to this pattern, falling from 
November-December until May-June. ‘Bad’ seasons frequently occur(red) with late 
starts to rains, massive deluges and prolonged droughts alternating to severe 
effect. During the deluges, nearby rivers and streams overflow(ed) their banks, 
covering the surrounding countryside with water which could take some time to dry 
out sufficiently.25 Roads and bridges were frequently washed away and land travel
23. PNGNA A/N 12, Box No.3,901, F/N 1-2-6 (D) Mekeo Rice Project 4/4/1952 Development of 
Mekeo Project -  Wavs and Means
24. Hale Rice pp.13-14. Jeffreys The Mekeo Rice Project p.156 also concludes that: ‘Evidence 
supports the view that the “geographical” traits” of the Mekeo locality were not suitable for 
mechanized dry rice production’.
25 PNGNA A/N 12, Box Number 3,901, F/N 1-2-6(D) Mekeo Rice Project 23/2/53 W.Cottrell- 
Dormer to Secretary, DET provides a more substantial description of the area, and emphasises the 
tendency to flooding for short periods, which could make irrigation possible.
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became extremely difficult, if not impossible, for indigenes and expatriate officers 
alike.
Although there were minor experiments using irrigation at the agricultural research 
stations located near the main rice growing centres in the Mekeo, these had no 
substantial long-term effect upon rice output.26 The most sophisticated industrial 
machinery which came to be employed for ground preparation, planting, harvesting 
and milling always operated within the uncertainty of local rainfall. Relatively short 
distances away there was no shortage of fresh water in the major water courses of 
the area but these were not utilised. In addition to the initial costs of constructing 
irrigation, the labour supply needed to maintain dams and channels, the absence 
of any irrigated agricultural tradition among the area’s indigenous population 
ensured that colonial policy was based on the assumption that rice would be a dry 
land crop.
Rice Growing
Dry rice production in the Mekeo took two principal forms, the first involving 
indigenous growers, many of them with increasing state support. The second form 
involved more substantial plantings at the Epo Lowlands Agricultural Research 
Station, near Bereina, and two other administration controlled agricultural 
extension centres at Inauaia and Beipa. (There were also minor efforts by 
expatriate planters to grow rice commercially which proved unsuccessful.) In 
November 1950, the Melbourne Herald neatly encapsulated the scale of the 
plantings underway, emphasising the predominantly experimental nature of the
26. Mike Bourke’s emphasis upon rice’s significance in agricultural research conducted across the 
late colonial period has already been noted (see Chapter 2, p.83, fn.101). While Dr Bourke has 
subsequently indicated (Personal Communication 3/3/2009) that about three-quarters of the trials 
on rice were conducted during the 1960s and 1970s, after the Mekeo project ceased, rice breeding 
and selection trials to improve varieties began in the 1950-51 season under Cottrell-Dormer. These 
were expanded in the next year when the Bereina farm ‘was converted into the Epo Agricultural 
Experiment Station and a full time agronomist appointed’. By 1952-53 there were 1,200 varieties 
and selections under ‘rod row observation, a number in the seed increase plots and 19 under 
replicated trials’. Trials expanded further in 1953-54. See NAA A518/1, AR927/4 Development. 
Papua & New Guinea. Rice-Research 1952-1956 7/9/54 T.Sorensen Agronomist-in-Charge, Epo to 
DASF, Port Moresby ‘Rice Improvement in Papua and New Guinea’ Paper initially prepared for 
presentation in October 1953 by the Australian delegation to a meeting of the International Rice 
Commission held in Tokyo.
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project ‘Don’t Expect Rice from N.G.-Yet’.27 Five months later, the Administrator 
J.K. Murray reported to the Secretary, Department of External Territories, that 
there was approximately 220 acres of rice being grown at the research station, 
which contained around 2,300 acres, and a further eighty acres distributed among 
six villages.28
In December 1951, the local South Pacific Post reported a ‘Good Yield in First 
Mekeo Rice Season’, from the crop planted at the end of 1950. ‘A total of 105 tons 
were harvested in this first season of production and seventeen tons of this were 
absorbed locally. The crop yielded an average of 12 hundredweight per acre. Of 
the (eighty-eight tons of) rice which will come to Port Moresby, fifty three tons were 
produced by the Rural Progress Society and thirty five tons by the government 
station.’29 However already in its early stages, the project was affected by the 
weather, for as the newspaper reported ‘a further 180 acres specially planted for 
the Mt Lamington [volcanic eruption] relief was wiped out by floods’. The report 
ended with an optimistic prediction that in the next season 500 acres would be 
planted, yielding an anticipated 350 tons, half of it from the Epo/Bereina Research 
Station. As already indicated, optimism about the Project’s long-term success 
turned out to be unwarranted, but even before the eventual collapse, the methods 
used to produce rice in the Mekeo had begun to turn away from the labour 
intensive form intended by colonial policy.
Labour Shortages and Mechanisation
Closer attention to the ANGAU war-time experience, in which labour shortages had 
to be dealt with through use of indentured labour and mechanisation of planting 
and harvesting (see Chapter Two), should have prepared the colonial 
administration for the recurrence of this difficulty. The total population of the 
principal rice growing area was only about 4,000 people, with around one half of 
these being involved in producing the crop at the peak. The proximity of Port
27. 21/11/50; cutting in NAA A518/1 ,G927/4, Economic Development of the Territories
28. NAA A518/1, C927/9, Rice Mechanisation-Papua and New Guinea 10/5/50 JK Murray, 
Administrator to J. Halligan, Secretary, Department of External Territories
29. 28/12/51; cutting in NAA A452/1, 1958/628, Mekeo Rice Project. It was not, however, the first 
season of post-war production, for rice had been grown commercially and experimentally for at least 
the two previous years on smaller acreages in the Mekeo.
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Moresby’s markets, for labour and food, exerted an increasing pull after the war 
and into the 1950s.30 In an area known for the ready availability of locally grown 
food and other produce, the prospects for rice growing dependent upon family 
labour processes might have seemed slight. Add to this the preference for leisure 
over manual labour preparing soil, planting, weeding and harvesting which was a 
noted feature of male, especially young male, behaviour among the Mekeo,31 and 
the need for rapid mechanisation soon became apparent.
In his May 1950 summary of the project for the Secretary of the Department in 
Canberra, Administrator J.K.Murray had listed the principal machinery being used 
as five international Harvester Crawler tractors with attachments, ploughs and 
mowers, processing equipment including thresher/winnowers, hullers and 
polishers, rotary hoes, reapers, trucks and trailers as well as unspecified stationary 
engines, sawbench, dusters and pumps.32 The summary was to support the 
argument advanced by Murray one month earlier, that the Department of External 
Territories employ an agricultural engineer to survey and report on the ‘valuable 
agricultural machinery...obtained...and in use’ in the Mekeo project.33 In June 
1950, Mr A.J. Ashton, the manager of a NSW engineering company visited the 
Mekeo and subsequently presented his report.
Ashton commenced the report by criticising the capacity of much of the existing 
equipment, especially the tractors which he claimed were far too light and only 
suitable for the smaller indigenous holdings, rather than the more extensive 
plantings at the Epo/Bereina experimental station. He also claimed that harvesting 
methods were out of date, but acknowledged that the state of roads and tracks 
would make it difficult to transport a larger harvester to some of the small farms.34
30. Epeli Hau-ofa Mekeo: Inequality and ambivalence in a village society Canberra: ANU Press, 
1981, p.24; Jeffreys The Mekeo Rice Project Ch.1. McAuley ‘Mechanization, Collectives and Native 
Agriculture’, p.278 notes Cyril Belshaw’s observation of 1951 that ‘the return on rice does not so far 
offer an opportunity equivalent to work(ing) for wages in Port Moresby’.
31. See Jeffreys The Mekeo Rice Project Ch.1
32. NAA A518/1, C927/9 Rice Mechanisation -  Papua and New Guinea 10/5/50 Murray to 
J.R.Halligan
33. NAA A518/1, C927/9 Rice Mechanisation -  Papua and New Guinea 21/4/50 Murray to 
Secretary ‘Mekeo Rice Project: Agricultural Equipment’
34. In mid-1951, when Ashton visited, harvesting of the crop was being completed. Only nineteen 
acres out of a total of 381 acres planted were non-mechanised, with 192 acres of indigenous crop
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His report then provided an extensive list of recommended machinery purchases, 
including tractors, ploughs, harrows, graders, harvesters, trailers and mills,
Ashton’s recommendations were favourably received by the Administration.35 On 
August 23, 1950 Acting Administrator F.B. Phillips wrote to Canberra, advising of 
the success of Ashton’s visit and the Immediate ordering of five Australian made 
headers.36 Ashton’s recommended machinery, sheds and other buildings could 
mainly be supplied by manufacturers located in Australia, and only required 
Australian currency for their purchase. However one item, the 30HP International 
Harvester T6 Crawler tractors made in the USA recommended to replace the 
previously used John Deere wheeled tractors made in the UK, posed a special 
problem. The difficulty raised was how to pay for such major dollar items when 
sterling bloc countries, including Australia, were committed to limiting purchases 
requiring US dollars.37 The resolution of this particular difficulty, which involved 
diverting US dollars from other uses, showed to what extent increasing 
mechanisation of rice production at Mekeo was agreed upon at the highest levels 
of the colonial government.38 If, as has been claimed, Cottrell-Dormer did disagree 
with the ordering of heavier equipment, it would have been a fairly futile exercise to
mechanised and a further 170 acres of European controlled plantings, most of which were at the 
experimental station. NAA A518/1, C927/9 Rice Mechanisation -  Papua and New Guinea AJ 
Ashton ‘Rice Project at Bereina, Papua’
35. Bob McKillop has claimed that the subsequent large orders for mechanical equipment ‘which 
resulted in heavy overcapitalization of the project’ occurred while the DASF Director, soon to be 
RAO in charge of the Mekeo Rice Project, Cottrell-Dormer was absent on leave. He cites a personal 
communication of 19/12/75 from Cottrell-Dormer to support the claim. See ‘A Brief History of 
Agricultural Extension’ in Dick and McKillop A Brief History of Agricultural Extension and Education 
in Papua New Guinea p.21. McKillop does not provide any details of the subsequently ordered 
machinery which was unsuitable, according to Cottrell-Dormer. Nor have I found any evidence that 
at the time Cottrell-Dormer objected to Ashton’s recommendations or their implementation. Instead 
there is Cottrell-Dormer’s general support for ‘full mechanisation’ cited in Chapter Two, p.86, in his 
criticism of Spate.
36. NAA A518/1, C927/9 Rice Mechanisation -  Papua and New Guinea 23/8/50 FB Phillips, Acting 
Administrator to Secretary, Department of External Territories ‘Mekeo Rice Project’
37. At approximately the same time, a more opportunistic response to an international shortage of 
caterpillar treaded crawler tractors was being demonstrated in East Africa. Illustrating the 
reversibility of the adage, from swords into ploughshares, ex-Sherman tanks which had been 
converted into earth clearing machinery by British firm Vickers, and called Sherviks, were being 
auctioned in Nairobi, Kenya. Previously used for the failed Tanganyika groundnuts scheme, closed 
in late 1948, the Sherviks were bought by the Israelis and turned back into tanks, much to the 
disgust of the British government when the buyers became known. I am indebted to the late Mike 
Cowen (Personal Communication 24/7/1998) for drawing my attention to this further use of crawler 
machinery.
38. See also MacWilliam ‘Fungibility in Fashion’ forthcoming.
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do so publicly.39 Even if some within the Port Moresby based administration were 
cautious about lifting the level of machinery employed, at this early stage the view 
was widely held in PNG and Canberra that funds should be provided and no stone 
left unturned in the search for the means to buy expensive, superior equipment 
which could have multiple uses, including land clearance and road building. The 
commitment by Australian officials to attaining PNG self-sufficiency was 
predominant.
The extent of the mechanisation, pushed by the shortages of labour as well as 
climatic and topographical conditions, was such that in late 1953 the Agronomist- 
in-Charge of the Epo Experiment Station pronounced that as far as rice production 
in the Mekeo was concerned ‘the impetus has...shifted from peasant to 
mechanised production’.40 That is, when peasants were seen by the colonial 
administration as producers mainly for immediate consumption, utilising relatively 
undifferentiated family labour processes with hand-held tools, under the envisaged 
scheme of smallholder production households in the Mekeo were not peasants 
(see Chapter Introduction above). Instead household production of rice had 
become dependent upon the use of more and more sophisticated machinery, 
necessitating a more complex division of labour. This shift merely brought to the 
fore another dimension of the labour question. No less substantial than the 
insufficient supply of household labour, there were shortages of skilled drivers and 
mechanics to operate and repair the increasingly complex and sophisticated 
machinery. This problem arose when there were similar shortages elsewhere in the 
colony also formed a major barrier to increasing rice production.
39. Had Cottrell-Dormer been opposed to further mechanization, or even specific purchases of 
machinery recommended by Ashton, he could have been expected to be more supportive of a 
Treasury report into the Mekeo Project produced in October 1950. The Report anticipated the 
objection made public by McAuley two years later, that little labour was being provided by 
indigenes, and also that the scale of mechanization then being obtained for just one project could 
not be justified in terms of the Territory’s over-all budget. Instead Cottrell-Dormer lashed not only 
the method employed by Treasury, conducting an investigation into the operation of a (his) 
Department without notifying or consulting DASF, but Treasury Sub-Accountant R.M. Duncan’s 
conclusions as well. See PNGNA A/N 12, B/N 3,902, F/N 1-2-6 ( R ) Administration Organization 
Divisional Report by Treasury Inspector Duncan on Mekeo Rice Project 20/10/50 H.H. Reeve, 
Treasurer and Director of Finance to Administrator ‘Mekeo Rice Project-Duncan Report’, and 
Correspondence, including the surviving two pages of Cottrell-Dormer’s letter to the Administrator 
on the Report.
40. NAA A518/1, AR927/4 Development. Papua & New Guinea. Rice-Research 7/9/54 T.Sorensen 
‘Rice Improvement in Papua and New Guinea’
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Damage to Machinery
By the early 1950s, damage done to tractor engines and brakes by untrained 
drivers was compounded by the competing demands for mechanics, indigenous 
and expatriate, who could service and repair the newer forms of equipment. It was 
not unusual for expensive machinery to be out of action for months at crucial 
periods while waiting for parts and competent repairers.41
The fate of a TD9 crawler tractor, part of the DASF order which the Administration 
had provided to the Department of External Territories in January 1951 for supply 
from the USA and for use in the Mekeo is especially instructive. In mid-1952, the 
Department of Works took over the tractor for its own purposes. A joint inspection 
by a DASF area mechanic and a civil engineer from Works revealed that the 
tractor’s engine needed a valve grind, top overhaul and replacement oversize 
piston rings. The hour meter on the engine indicated that it had only been running 
for 389 hours, when with ‘normal operating conditions, it is rarely necessary to 
remove the cylinder head under 2,000 operating hours’. The DASF Area Mechanic 
speculated that the premature overhaul was necessary due to several factors. 
These included infrequent or no change of oil filters, the wrong lubricating oil being 
used, and/or a lack of care during the required running in period. The frequency of 
filter changes was related to their availability, or in this case, unavailability.
The master clutch, which under ‘normal conditions’ would not need adjusting 
before 480 hours running time, had been adjusted ‘several times’. The Area 
Mechanic had only reconnected the steering brakes once it was known that the 
tractor was to be taken over by the Department of Works, and a skilled operator.42
41. This point was made by DASF Director Cottrell-Dormer in his letters to the Administrator and 
Treasurer of October 1950, cited above, in response to the report of Inspector Duncan. It should be 
noted that shortage of parts was a particularly common problem in the colony which affected more 
than the Mekeo project. In the early 1951 Territory order for equipment, discussed above, the 
Department of Forests requested parts priced at £3,135 for 7 IH TD18 tractors. An internal memo 
[NAA A518/1,P927/2 PART 1 Dollar Loan ] of 16/2/51 to the Minister for External Territories noted 
that: ‘Great difficulty is experienced in obtaining spare parts for tractors. At present 6 out of 7 
tractors allocated to Department of Forests are out of action for want of spare parts and work of the 
Department is seriously hampered.’
42. PNGNA A/N 12, Box No. 3,901, F/N 1-2-6(D) Mekeo Rice Project 5/8/52 Area Mechanic to 
RAO, Inauaia T.D.9 Bulldozer: Experimental Station, Epo’
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Area Mechanic A.G. Donaldson added that he could not comment on the fact that
the tractor’s electrical system was inoperative, since it had been so upon his
arrival. Having removed the generator and sent it to Port Moresby for repairs, its
return was still awaited. Donaldson concluded that:
...it cannot be too highly stressed that without the supply of these 
essential spare parts, within a reasonable time, this machine will be, as 
are the majority of prime movers in this area, prematurely 
unserviceable.'13
When one skilled European operative walked out and refused to return because of 
the state of his accommodation, the lack of attention to equipment maintenance 
when he was recently on leave, and the inadequate facilities for housing and 
maintaining equipment, the project threatened to lurch to a halt.44 With such 
difficulties, and a limited amount of rice grown despite considerable expenditure, 
the colonial government was easily persuaded that an external consultant should 
be employed to advise on rice growing in the colony, with specific reference to the 
Mekeo project.
The Attraction of Irrigation
While the difficulties of dry, upland, rice growing by indigenous smallholders were 
being so precisely exposed, attempts to encourage largeholding growing of rice by 
Europeans in the Mekeo also failed. With irrigated production in industralised large- 
holding forms becoming more important internationally, the possibility of 
introducing irrigated production to PNG and the Mekeo was also gaining attention. 
In the early 1950s as post-war enthusiasm for indigenous dry upland rice 
production faced the reality of declining output, the alternative of irrigated 
production continued to germinate in the minds of key figures, including Cottrell- 
Dormer. In December 1952 and early 1953, he visited the Murrumbidgee Irrigation
43. PNGNA A/N 12, Box No. 3,901, F/N 1-2-6(D) Mekeo Rice Project 5/8/52 Area Mechanic to 
RAO, Inauaia T.D.9 Bulldozer: Experimental Station, Epo’
44. PNGNA AN 12, Box No. 3,901, F/N 1-2-6(D) Mekeo Rice Project 16/7/51 W Cottrell-Dormer to 
Director, DASF ‘Mekeo Rice Project: Care of Equipment’ details the case and ends with the plea: 
‘We are about to undertake a 300 acre planting programme at Epo and some 500 to 600 acres in 
other parts of the area. All of the tractors need normal overhaul and maintenance and will 
deteriorate if this is not done. If our own department cannot provide an officer who is prepared to 
wait until better housing can be made available, could [Department of Works and Housing] provide 
someone? I most seriously insist that a qualified man is essential to continued activity in the 
Mekeo.’
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Area and other rice growing areas in Australia. He held talks with various officials, 
including in Canberra. He also spoke with Walter Poggendorff, of the Division of 
Plant Industry, New South Wales Department of Agriculture, an authority on rice 
and especially the irrigated production method employed in Australia.
An immediate outcome of his visit to Australia was that Collrell-Dormer urged a
major shift to irrigated production.45 As Treasury officers in Port Moresby
continued to object to the costs of the Mekeo project and the disproportionate
share of the budget allocated to activities which were producing so little rice,46
Cottrell-Dormer made a pitch for the utilisation of another form of mechanised
production to enable the growing of irrigated rice. To make this possible, when
rainfall was generally unreliable but the nearby St Joseph River flowed
continuously, Cottrell-Dormer proposed building:
...a diversion weir...to raise the river ievei...to a sufficient height to 
supply irrigation water into two main canals (which) would be tapped 
where required to irrigate rice and other crops by gravitation. In addition 
the weir might provide a sufficient head to develop electric power for 
domestic purposes.47
Support for the direction being urged by Cottrell-Dormer was soon to be expressed 
publicly by Poggendorff, who had been appointed in mid-1952 to conduct a review 
of rice production in PNG. Prior to Cottrell-Dormer’s visit to Canberra, Poggendorff 
had travelled to PNG and toured several rice growing areas but not Bougainville. 
His visit was intended to and did concentrate heavily on the Mekeo.48
45 PNGNA A/N 12, Box No. 3,901, F/N1-2-6(D) Mekeo Rice Project 23/2/53 Cottrell-Dormer to 
Lambert, p.1.
46 PNGNA A/N 12, Box No. 3,901, F/N1-2-6(D) Mekeo Rice Project 30/7/52 Director, DASF to 
H.H.Reeves, Treasury
47 PNGNA AN 12, Box No. 3,901, F/N1-2-6(D) Mekeo Rice Project 23/2/53 Cottrell-Dormer to 
Lambert, p.3
48 Connell Taim bilong mani pp.81-82 is highly critical of Bougainville’s omission from the 
consultant’s itinerary, as a further instance of Administration neglect of the district. He states: 
‘Bougainville, and especially south Bougainville, was always remote from administration interest 
and concern. Thus in 1952 when the administration were making concerted attempts to develop rice 
farming in Papua and New Guinea a team of experts visited twelve different areas in the country, 
including some like Kavieng and Mount Hagen where no rice was grown (and even the area around 
Honiara in the Solomon Islands), without even mentioning the relatively substantial developments in 
Bougainville.’
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Poggendorff s 46 page report was presented to the Department of Territories later 
in the year and published in 1953. The irrigated rice specialist had been requested 
to investigate the development of commercial production ‘on an economic basis’, 
and ‘the development of self-sufficiency production by natives’. Unsurprisingly, his 
report came down heavily against the latter. Remarking on the ‘complete absence 
of flooded (“sawah") swamp or lowland rice culture’ in the Territory, he began the 
report by arguing that while indigenous production of dry rice could be one source 
of food:
...it is flooded rice culture that must be looked to to make adequate use 
of the vast areas of land in the Territory either seasonally flooded or 
capable of being flooded...The eventual means of really large-scale 
commercial rice production in the Territory must inevitably be fully 
mechanised flooded culture on the Australian and American system.49
Furthermore, when there were still world-wide shortages, the object of this
expanded production would be exports of surpluses beyond the rice required for
colonial self-sufficiency. This expansion would be possible utilising:
...the vast resources of land and water represented by the effectively 
untouched Ramu-Sepik river system, the Papuan coastal plains and the 
vast Western D istrict.. .for flooded rice culture.50
In October 1952, prior to the printing of Poggendorff s report, the Minister issued a 
press statement expressing his ‘deep appreciation to Mr Poggendorff for the 
valuable report’.51 However in the final paragraph of the statement, Minister 
Hasluck rejected the possibility that the Administration would devote any resources 
to trying to increase large-scale flooded rice growing for export production. He 
concluded:
The first goal must be to make the Territory self-sufficient in rice, at the 
same time expanding local consumption as part of general measures to 
raise nutritional standards. The second and more remote stage [my 
emphasis] would be the production of rice for export to meet the great 
demands of countries to the north.52
49 W.Poggendorff Rice Production in Papua and New Guinea Canberra, Department of 
Territories, 1953, p.6
50. Rice Production in Papua and New Guinea p.46.
51. Hasluck A Time for Building p.134 describes Poggendorff’s report as ‘a basic document in the 
post-war history of agriculture in Papua and New Guinea’
52. NAA A518/1, AQ927/4, Development. Papua & New Guinea. Rice Production-W Poggendorff- 
Printing of-, 13/10/52 Press release ‘Rice production in Papua and New Guinea’
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Unfortunately for both Cottrell-Dormer and Poggendorff, their vision of the future 
represented almost the antithesis of the position which Territories Minister Hasluck 
was in the process of formulating for rice production.
The thesis now turns to examining what Hasluck intended and how his view of 
what should occur by way of increased rice production was shaped. In particular it 
will be shown that while the Minister placed ever greater emphasis upon 
administrative action to lift smallholder growing of dry upland rice, Hasluck was 
also committed to greater attention being given to rice growing in the Madang and 
Sepik areas. Promoting smallholder growing of rice in the north-east and north of 
the colony, areas which were less central to previous agricultural growth, also fitted 
Hasluck’s emphasis upon the comprehensiveness of uniform development across 
PNG. However how he came to give such importance to these areas also 
illustrates the extent to which the Minister’s direct experience of conditions in PNG 
played in shaping policy. While the failure to substantially expand production in the 
Mekeo had some influence on what subsequently occurred, including the 
formulation of the first Rice Action Plan in 1954, there were more important factors 
at work.
The Shift to the North
A central feature of Hasluck’s behaviour was a continuous willingness to respond 
to the empirical conditions which he encountered either directly or through advice 
received. During the second half of 1951, as the Minister found his feet at the head 
of a department not noted for its vitality,53 there was considerable concern in 
Canberra and Port Moresby at the failure to increase food production, including 
rice, in the Territory. Simultaneously, the first and most concentrated attempt to 
raise rice production in the colony, the Mekeo Project, was making only hesitant 
progress despite the devotion of substantial resources to mechanisation. Few 
pictures could have appealed less to the new Minister than the stagnation of 
indigenous production and the emphasis upon highly mechanised Administration- 
dependent production which had become dominant in the Mekeo.
53. Hasluck a Time for Building pp.7-10
227
Although Hasluck concurred with the mid-1952 appointment of NSW rice authority 
Poggendorff to review rice production, his experiences in PNG ensured that he 
could assess any recommendations from a more informed vantage point. In late 
April 1952, Hasluck made a second visit to the colony. On the first trip, from July 26 
to August 8, 1951 he had mainly been to major commercial and administrative 
centres, including Port Moresby, Lae, Rabaul, Goroka and Wau. The second visit 
concentrated upon the north coast westward from Lae to the Dutch border. He 
toured the Sepik, Ramu and Markham valleys, as well as the Garaina agricultural 
station, south-east of Lae.
In a press statement following the trip, the Minister conceded that village rice
production alone could not meet the Territory’s domestic requirements. Thus he
was ‘looking to the individual settler and to the big plantation companies for a
substantial contribution of capital, enterprise and work to increase [rice]
production’.54 Nevertheless, the press release left no doubt that what had really
caught Hasluck’s attention was the expansion already underway in smallholder
agriculture, as well as what seemed to be its potential for further growth.
The Minister said he was greatly impressed by the way in which the 
villages, under encouragement from and with the assistance of officers 
of the administration, were becoming interested in the planting of new 
crops, particularly rice, and with the use of new implements and 
processing machines. In the Sepik and Madang district(s) the biggest 
immediate increase in production of foodstuffs would come from the 
efforts of the natives... Rice production in native villages for local use 
could expand over the next few years from a few hundred tons a year to 
some thousands of tons.55
54. NAA M338/1, 3, Visit to New Guinea, April 1952, 29/4/52 ‘New Guinea-Ministerial Visit. 
Statement by the Minister for Territories, Mr.Paul Hasluck’. On April 22, at the beginning of the visit, 
Hasluck had given an additional twist to the role he expected from increased largeholding 
production of locally consumed food. He told three Europeans, members of the Madang Advisory 
Council, that he was most anxious to see mono-crop coconut plantations diversify by planting other 
crops. In particular, said the Minister: ‘Plantation costs could be reduced by local production of rice 
and meat.’ NAA M338/1, 3, Visit to New Guinea, April 1952, Report of 22/4/52 Meeting.
55. NAA M338/1, 3, Visit to New Guinea, April 1952, 29/4/52 ‘New Guinea-Ministerial Visit. 
Statement by the Minister for Territories, Mr.Paul Hasluck’. Nearly twenty five years later, in his 
autobiographical A Time for Building, pp. 133-134 Hasluck would again stress the effect upon him of 
this visit to Madang and the Sepik.
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Within days of his return the Minister issued a directive to the Department, with a 
request that it also be sent to Port Moresby so that there could be joint preparation 
of a project ‘that could be pushed ahead vigorously and urgently.’ He urged 
immediate attention by the Administration to a ‘special project of expanding village 
rice production to some thousands of tons in the Madang and Sepik districts (and 
any other district if prospects are equally favourable) within the next three or four 
years’.
Most importantly, Hasluck directed that the expansion occur through an increased
Administration presence, including ‘extension officers of the right type to work in
conjunction with District Service officers in encouraging, instructing and supervising
village rice production’. The presence could be expanded, without transgressing
the Minister’s particular antipathy toward co-operatives, since there was not:
any great necessity for organizing village co-operatives on any elaborate 
scale as the natives already seem to be capable both of engaging in rice 
growing and rice selling as individuals and of co-operating as village 
communities in the purchase and operation of mills.56
Hasluck was not alone in his enthusiasm for the agricultural potential of 
smallholders in the Sepik and Madang Districts. Production increases already 
underway also fuelled the enthusiasm of important local officials. However as was 
the case throughout Hasluck’s tenure, Administration personnel were unable to 
satisfy the Minister’s demands for the rapid provision of all possible supervision 
and assistance in order to increase rice production. This was particularly the case 
for the new Director of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries, R.E.P. (Larry) Dwyer, 
promoted from acting director in September 1952. Dwyer had lengthy colony-wide 
experience, favoured smallholder expansion including in dry land rice but almost 
immediately faced a Minister determined to increase rice production more rapidly.57
56. Hasluck A Time for Building, pp. 133-134
57. Hasluck A Time for Building, p.132 describes the circumstances of Dwyer’s appointment on 
September 10, 1952 as DASF Director. The promotion occurred after a lengthy period as acting 
Director following Cottrell-Dormer’s resignation from the position in 1950. Hasluck also devotes a 
paragraph to his assessment of Dwyer. While recognising his ‘considerable technical knowledge’ 
Hasluck noted that Dwyer ‘was very weak in expressing himself and in directing others...His 
appointment was made with a recognition that he would need a great deal of support from time to 
time in developing action plans.’
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Hasluck soon left the newly appointed official in no doubt about the direction to be 
followed.
Planning for Rapid Expansion
In October, 1952, soon after becoming Director of DASF, Dwyer sent a lengthy 
memorandum to the Administration Secretary, Port Moresby, which he described 
as an ‘action document’. In the memo Dwyer emphasised the importance of DASF 
action.58 Fie claimed that through the 1946 and 1947 establishment of agricultural 
stations at Madang, Wewak and Aitape, where experimental crops of rice were 
grown, and later patrolling by District Service officers who distributed seed and 
encouraged rice growing, there was ‘a wide extension of small village plots’. 
Flowever these were initially ‘largely a curiosity and natives generally showed little 
interest in hand preparation of their harvest’.59
As had happened in the Mekeo, the introduction of forms of mechanisation, which
reduced the labour time necessary to perform elementary tasks, began to change
attitudes in favour of rice production according to Dwyer.
It was during [1948 and 1949] that the machinery was put in motion for 
the establishment of milling centres and the conclusion of the necessary 
financial and staffing arrangements, which have subsequently resulted 
in the successful Amele and Dagua projects and their various off-shoots.
The first rice to be milled by power apparatus in the actual village was 
produced at Amele early in 1951 after a Cadet Agricultural Officer of the 
Department had spent some 6 months there organising the planting of 
village rice gardens and the construction of housing and storage 
facilities for the mill plant which was subsequently installed with the 
assistance of this Department’s only mechanic, who was especially 
detailed for this purpose.60
The process employed at Amele and Dagua was subsequently extended to Aitape 
and Bainyik stations.
58. NAA Department of Territories A518/1, AM927/4 Development of the Territories - Agricultural 
Village Rice Production 21/10/52 REP Dwyer to Government Secretary, Port Moresby ‘Native 
Agriculture-Village Rice Production. Madang and Sepik Districts.’
59. 21/10/52 REP Dwyer to Government Secretary, Port Moresby ‘Native Agriculture-Village Rice 
Production. Madang and Sepik Districts.’, p.2
60. 21/10/52 REP Dwyer to Government Secretary, Port Moresby ‘Native Agriculture-Village Rice 
Production. Madang and Sepik Districts.’, p.2
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However the forms of mechanisation bore little resemblance to those utilised on
the Mekeo project, being primarily limited to providing elementary processing in
villages where small five to fourteen horsepower engines were available. DASF
officials were anxious to check the introduction of machinery for clearing, soil
preparation and planting. This was because:
(T)he bulk of the native population is centred in hilly or mountainous 
country with a high proportion of steep slopes and we are completely 
uncertain of the effect that any degree of machine cultivation would have 
in this country under the environmental conditions which prevail. It is felt 
that we should deal thoroughly with the mechanisation of the processing 
phase before worrying about the mechanisation of cultivation at all. The 
difficult land involved has held up quite well under the light usage given 
by the natives in their bush fallow rotation system.61
But it was more than the terrain and soil types which restrained mechanisation. For
while Dwyer and DASF could find areas of land and some people for whom light
cultivating equipment was suitable, the greater concern was the uncertainty of the
demonstration effect. As the Director indicated:
The question which has to be asked is, would the sight of this sort of unit 
working here, discourage nearby hill and mountain dwellers pressing 
ahead with their cultivation which, for the time being, at least, must 
perforce be by hand. This matter has already been discussed with 
Simogun of Dagua, who can see the difficulty.62
Mechanisation was instead to be reserved for the lightly populated but extensive 
Sepik valley plains where future European development was being proposed. Here 
heavier tractors and ploughs, and possibly even managed irrigation could be 
considered. The DASF Director also proposed caution and further experimentation 
with the rice strains to be distributed.63 He urged further investigation before 
recommending specific varieties to growers.
Dwyer’s cautious and modest proposal involved a further increase in the year’s 
budget for expenditure totalling £35,400. Over five years, the DASF establishment 
for the project was to be increased from six to twenty nine extension and scientific
61.21/10/52 REP Dwyer to Government Secretary, Port Moresby ‘Native Agriculture-Village Rice 
Production. Madang and Sepik Districts.’, p.2
62. 21/10/52 REP Dwyer to Government Secretary, Port Moresby ‘Native Agriculture-Village Rice 
Production. Madang and Sepik Districts.’, p.3
63. 21/10/52 REP Dwyer to Government Secretary, Port Moresby ‘Native Agriculture-Village Rice 
production. Madang and Sepik Districts.’ p.3
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officers, including three members of a land use survey team. Six ‘regular 
construction’ houses and seventeen of ‘native construction’ would be required, as 
well as seven motor vehicles. Roads and bridges would need to be constructed 
and extended. Total expenditure, including recurrent, capital and recoverable, of 
machinery and tools to be sold to indigenes, with the money repaid later, amounted 
to nearly £170,000.
The fourteen page proposal was forwarded to Canberra with a brief covering letter 
from the Acting Administrator Cleland. Cleland commended the proposals and 
requested the Territories’ Secretary ‘to lay the papers before the Minister for his 
approval in principle of the scheme’.64 Upon receipt of the Department’s summary 
of the Dwyer proposal and the recommendation to ‘approve in principle’ with minor 
reservations,65 Hasluck exploded. While approving the project for the further 
encouragement of village rice growing in Madang and Sepik, Hasluck made no 
secret of his belief that vigour was exactly what he felt was missing. In accepting 
departmental advice, to reject Dwyer’s suggestion that a research station be 
established at Marui, where trials could be conducted ‘in the mechanised 
management of the Sepik Plain soils.. .and (to) test the possibility of growing 
flooded rice under these conditions’, Hasluck confirmed his predilections. The 
Minister emphasised that: ’This task [of expanding upland dry rice production] is 
mainly a task of agricultural extension and encouragement of native enterprise.’66
Dwyer had tried to hedge, between his own preference to concentrate upon 
indigenous dry rice growing and Poggendorff’s recommendation to expand 
research on wet rice production. As a result, he found himself the object of the 
Minister’s antipathy to the development of mechanised, largeholding irrigated 
production. In short, there was to be no Mekeo project on the northern, New
64. NAA Department of Territories A518/1, AM927/4 Development of the Territories-Agricultural 
Village Rice Production 12/11/52 Acting Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories 
‘Native Agriculture: Village Rice Production-Madang and Sepik Districts’
65. NAA Department of Territories A518/1, AM927/4 Development of the Territories-Agricultural 
Village Rice Production 4/12/52 JE Willoughby, Assistant Secretary, Industries and Commerce to 
the Minister ‘Native Village Rice Production-Expansion in Madang and Sepik Districts of New 
Guinea’
66. It needs to be re-emphasised that by native enterprise, Hasluck principally meant smallholders 
employing family labour processes to increase production rather than indigenous employers of 
wage labour. See also Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production.
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Guinea side of the colony, a conclusion which fitted Dwyer’s own beliefs on how to 
proceed.
However the newly appointed Director of DASF also had erred in proposing a 
modest project, whereas the Minister was trying to get the Territory Administration 
to shape a more substantial plan. Following his April visit, and the subsequent May 
5 letter noted above, Hasluck had been closely watching the effect of his directive. 
The Department of Territories had been pressing Port Moresby officials to ensure 
that extension activities received the full support of the Department of District 
Services and Native Affairs, and not just DASF. The former was required to ‘play a 
full part in the encouragement of development of native rice production’,67 
development which was to take place in as much of the colony as possible.
The First Rice Action Plan Ignored
The initial Rice Action Plan for the entire colony took another eighteen months after 
the presentation of PoggendorfFs report to design. It was approved on June 30, 
1954, and was the forerunner for other crop Action Plans (see Chapter Six for the 
case of cocoa). The Plan, which bore all the hall-marks of PoggendorfFs 
recommendation to prioritise commercial production and encourage irrigated, wet 
rice production, had little effect. The proposed direction, including the priority the 
Plan gave to irrigated wet rice growing and the Mekeo area, was soon 
marginalised. Instead the Madang and Sepik areas, plus other smaller rice growing 
and processing projects around the colony were given priority.
If the development of the first Plan was in part a consequence of the Minister’s 
demands for urgent action, conveyed to local officials in unmistakeable language, 
the response to the Plan in Canberra and PNG showed exactly how little colonial 
policy was influenced by PoggendorfFs recommendations to prioritise irrigated
67. NAA Department of Territories A518/1, AM927/4 Development of the Territories-Agricultural 
Village Rice Production 4/12/52 JE Willoughby, Assistant Secretary, Industries and Commerce 
section to the Minister ‘Native Village Rice Production-Expansion in Madang and Sepik Districts of 
New Guinea’
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production 68 Instead of efforts to stimulate irrigated production, the Minister’s 
preference, which was supported by local officials, prevailed.
For a year or so after the formulation of Dwyer’s proposal of late 1952 to commit 
further resources to rice growing in the Madang and Sepik Districts, there were 
encouraging signs hinting at possible success. As Hasluck noted optimistically in a 
press statement of March 1954, after approximately one year of the rice project in 
the two districts.-
Over 300 villages in the Madang and Sepik districts, comprising 
approximately 25,000 natives were brought under the project last year 
and it is planned to include an additional 112 villages this year. These 
natives produced about 450 tons of milled rice iast year. The estimated 
production for the current year is 815 tons.69
In a relatively short period, including the first year of operation of the Rice Action 
Plan which had down-played their importance, the two districts came to dominate 
rice production in the colony. As the Administrator’s report provided to Canberra in 
November 1955 noted, of a year marked by floods and drought in various parts of 
the colony:
Total rice production was estimated at between 1200 to 1500 tons. Of 
this 200 tons from the Sepik, 300 from Madang, 40 from Morobe and 30 
from the Mekeo district were sold on the open market. The remainder of 
the native crop was consumed in the villages.70
Drought had especially severe effects upon European rice growing in the Markham 
valley, Morobe District where twelve planters ‘put in 617 acres during the year and 
produced 187 tons of rice’.71 That is, inclusive of large-holding production, 
smallholdings in Madang and Sepik districts were the most important producers of
68. Cf. Hale Rice p.40 correctly captures the optimistic tone of Poggendorff’s report, which matched 
the enthusiasm of many Administration officials, as well as its importance for the first Rice Action 
Plan. However Hale misses how marginal this Plan, and thus the direction proposed by 
Poggendorff was in subsequent developments because of near-unanimity between the Minister and 
the most important senior officials in PNG that dry upland village rice production was to receive 
greatest priority.
69. NAA Department of Territories A518/1, AM927/4 Development of the Territories-Agricultural 
Village Rice Production 18/3/54 Press Statement ‘Rice in New Guinea Villages. Statement by 
Minister for Territories-Mr.Paul Hasluck’
70. NAA Department of Territories A452/1,1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
3/11/55 DM Cleland, Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories ‘Rice Action Plan’
71. NAA Department of Territories A452/1,1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
3/11/55 DM Cleland, Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories ‘Rice Action Plan’
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marketed and also almost certainly of non-marketed rice in the colony. Further, this 
primacy appeared to have arisen precisely because of the successful coupling of 
smallholder production and state supervision which the minister advocated.72
However a closer examination of three reports on the native village rice project in
the two districts, prepared for the period from 1954 to 1956, should have led to a
less optimistic conclusion. While at first sight an increasing number of households
in more villages were being contacted by project officers, also more in number,
other changes were underway which would check and then undercut rice growing.
DASF had concluded in its second annual report that while:
The original proposal provided for about 4,000 tons of rice to be 
produced per annum in five years, [that is by the beginning of 
1958]...because of lack of recruitment of staff this level could not be 
reached before I960.73
While the programme outlined in October 1952 by DASF Director Dwyer estimated 
that about twenty agricultural extension officers would be needed, by June 1954 
only two full-time and four part-time staff were employed. Less than two years later, 
eight DASF officers were working part-time on rice, supplemented by seven 
Department of Native Affairs staff.
The fact that no officers have been working full-time on the project is 
attributed to the increase in other forms of cash cropping being taken up 
by the natives in the two Districts.74
Thus rice no longer:
...held pride of place in the area as a cash crop for village 
producers...their enthusiasm has tended to become more widely 
distributed in a quite logical way but resulting in a reduction in the overall 
attention paid to rice cropping. Crops which are competing with rice in 
the native interests, are coconuts, cacao, coffee and peanuts.75
72. NAA Department of Territories A518/1, AM927/4 Development of the Territories-Agricultural 
Village Rice Production 18/3/54 Press Statement ‘Rice in New Guinea Villages. Statement by 
Minister for Territories-Mr.Paul Hasluck’
73. NAA Department of Territories A452/1. 1958/2847 Native Village Rice Production-Madang and 
Sepik Districts 3/5/55 EJ Wood Assistant Secretary, Industries and Commerce, Dept, of Territories 
to the Minister
74. NAA Department of Territories A452/1. 1958/2847 Native Village Rice Production-Madang and 
Sepik Districts 11/10/56 EJ Wood to the Minister
75. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/2847 Native Village Rice Production-Madang and 
Sepik Districts Report on Native Village Rice Production-Madang and Sepik Districts (undated, 
covering period from July 1, 1955 to 30 June 1956), p.1
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Peanut production had accelerated in the coastal strip around Wewak, while 
between 1954 and 1956 copra production doubled in Madang district.
The demand for agricultural, especially extension, staff from all districts continued 
to outstrip supply. Further, despite the Minister’s continued emphasis upon the 
priority to be given to rice growing, field staff often encouraged planting of 
permanent bush/tree crops which provided higher returns instead of promoting rice 
growing/0 For 1955/56, estimated production of marketed milled rice for the two 
districts was only 570 tons, from fewer than 5,000 families with small stocks of padi 
(unmilled rice), about 170 tons, held by ‘various native societies’.
Despite the limited increase in production which had occurred since 1953, the 
official report for the latest year gave a carefully qualified endorsement of the target 
of 4,200 tons of milled rice by 1960. That is, officials were advising a seven-fold 
growth in output could be attained in the next four years. Unsurprisingly Minister 
Hasluck, who continued to regard increased production of rice as critical, urged his 
staff to ‘keep the pressure on’.77
Obtaining Further Advice
While the 1954 Rice Action Plan, based upon the recommendations of Australian
adviser W Poggendorff had limited effect in switching the emphasis from dry
upland growing to irrigated production, Hasluck’s approval of the Plan contained a
proviso which suggested some uncertainty in the Minister’s mind. On June 30,
1954 Hasluck had accepted the Plan:
...subject to further consideration being given to the best means of 
investigating the water problems associated with rice growing with a
76. In July-August 1957, E.J.Wood from the Department of Territories went to PNG to discuss 
progress under the first Rice Action Plan. In addition to hearing senior local officials re-emphasise 
their commitment to smallholder production of dry upland rice rather than irrigated production, he 
was also informed that in Madang Co-operatives officers ‘actually discouraged rice growing by the 
former Rural Progress Societies because (they) believe natives should go in for permanent tree 
crops, not annual crops.’ NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan- 
Papua New Guinea 1954-1960 Report on Visit to PNG
77. NAA Department of Territories A518/1, AM 927/4 Development of the Territories-Agriculture 
Village Rice Production 1952-1957 16/8/1955 A/Assistant Secretary, Department of Territories EJ 
Wood to First Assistant Secretary, copy of submission to Minister reporting on Village Rice project, 
with Minister’s minute of 3/8/1955
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view to the submission of prop 
the use and control of water.78
Hasluck and Department Secretary Lambert intended the establishment of a water 
authority along the lines proposed for a similar organisation in the Northern 
Territory of Australia. They continued to press the Administration in Port Moresby 
to establish such an authority ‘which can include the water problems associated 
with rice development in its activities’.79 But in northern Australia, the organisation 
was to superintend water usage for a major project utilising irrigated large scale 
production. As the Administrator Cleland pointed out fifteen months later in his 
reply to Lambert’s June 1954 memo, there were substantial differences between 
rice growing in PNG, predominantly of dry, upland rice by smallholders and that 
occurring in the Northern Territory. These differences made the establishment of a 
water authority less urgent in PNG.80
In December 1957, due to the continuing dissatisfaction of the Minister and 
Department officials at the lack of progress, another advisor was employed to 
investigate and recommend means for increasing rice production. The advisor was 
required to ‘suggest a practicable plan whereby the Territory might produce its own 
requirements of rice within a reasonably short period of time’.81 To this end the 
advisor was to examine the existing approach taken under the 1954 Action Plan 
and advise on its suitability as well as consider the fit between the over-all plan and 
the plan for development of village rice production in Madang and Sepik Districts. 
That is, given the commitment of the Minister, senior departmental and PNG 
administration officials to smallholder production, the appointed advisor Mr C.S. 
Christian, Chief of the Division of Land Research and Regional Survey from the 
Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
78. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 16/6/1954 Secretary, Department of Territories to Administrator
79. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 16/6/1954 Secretary, Department of Territories to Administrator.
80. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 8/9/1955 Administrator D.M.Cleland to Secretary, Department of Territories
81. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 17/2/1958 Secretary, Department of Territories to Sir Ian Clunies-Ross, Chairman, 
CSIRO
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(CSIRO), had to devise a means of linking irrigated rice growing with family labour 
processes.
With the initiative to appoint Christian having been taken in Canberra,82 senior 
officials in the colony doubtful of his suitability were forced on the defensive. The 
Acting Administrator Dr Gunther was aware that Territories’ department officials 
knew the priorities of extension staff advising mainly smallholder dry rice growers. 
Their needs were for more research on improved rice varieties, best cultivation 
practices and increased supplies of better seed. Accordingly Gunther emphasised 
the importance of an additional appointment to that of Christian. With little 
European farming interest in dry land rice growing, no adequate means of water 
control and thus no real prospects for wet rice cultivation by large or small holders, 
Gunther concluded that Christian was not sufficiently informed about the principal 
form of production, dry upland rice growing utilising family labour processes, which 
remained predominant in PNG.83
Gunther’s plea for an additional advisor went unanswered by the Department in 
Canberra.84 Three weeks later, Minister Hasluck approved the appointment of 
Christian, and in April, after speaking with W.L. (Bill) Conroy, then chief of the 
extension division of DASF and from 1964 Director of the Department, the CSIRO 
officer accepted. His visit was to take about one month, and include the Mekeo, 
Markham Valley, Madang, Sepik and any other areas considered appropriate. 
Days in Port Moresby at the beginning and end of the visit completed the
82. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Pian-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 17/2/1958 Secretary, Department of Territories to Sir Ian Clunies-Ross, Chairman, 
CSIRO. Significantly in this letter, Secretary Lambert repeated government policy on the need for 
local production to offset the amount of rice imported, and praised Christian as ‘a suitable authority 
on (the subject of rice growing), who knows both rice cultivation techniques and the Territory’.
83. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 3/1/1958 Acting Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories.
84. Oasa The International Rice Research Institute and the Green Revolution pp. 85-273 describes 
in detail how from the 1950s, the international emphasis in rice research and the development of 
extension services for small farmers was heavily aimed at irrigated production among Asian rice 
growers. Given this international emphasis, it is unlikely that much expertise was available in 
Australia or in the Asia-Pacific region along the lines proposed by Gunther. However I found no 
evidence that a search was conducted by Department of Territories officers for such a person.
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itinerary.85 Two senior officials from DASF, including Conroy were appointed to 
accompany Christian on his travels. The New Guinea Islands region was 
specifically excluded, according to Administrator Cleland when confirming the final 
itinerary, because ‘it is not considered necessary to visit them (sic) in order to 
achieve coverage of the provisions of the action plan’.86
As Christian’s assessment, and the subsequent response to it shows, the CSIRO 
official was pushed in a direction which lay outside his expertise because of the 
depth of commitment in the Department of Territories in Canberra and among 
relevant senior officials of the administration in PNG to smallholder production of 
rice. Even if some local agricultural officers were not putting sufficient emphasis 
upon smallholder rice growing, despite being required to do so by Government 
policy, their seniors remained committed.
Christian’s five volume Report was presented in November 1958, and was almost 
immediate described as ‘long and not easy to follow’.87 (The next month the Soviet 
Union’s representative on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations made a 
wide ranging attack on the Australian Government for not making the colony 
independent of agricultural imports. Rice in particular was cited as a case of a crop 
which was neglected in the interests of Australian rice growers.)88 The Christian 
Report was turned into a revised action plan within the Department of Territories 
and submitted to the Administrator. This plan was in turn incorporated within the 
response sent back to Canberra in August 1959 by Administrator Cleland and 
made the basis for a revised, second Rice Action Plan. This Plan was approved in 
early 1960.
85. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 2/4/1958 CS Christian to Secretary, Department of Territories
86. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 18/4/1958 Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories
87. For summaries of the Report, including the ‘not easy’ comment made by EJ Wood, Assistant 
Secretary, Industry and Commerce on February 2, 1958 and subsequent correspondence, see NAA 
Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 1954-1960. 
Hale Rice p.39 concludes that: The report is the most detailed done on rice in Papua New Guinea. 
After twenty years it is still relevant....Unusually for such a report, there is great sensitivity to social 
values among the farming communities.’
88. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 5/12/1958 South Pacific Post' Russia Alone in Criticism of Agriculture’
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The Christian Report - Irrigation and Centralisation of Production 
It was soon officially agreed that the Christian Report could be considered under 
two headings, analysis and recommendations on existing rice growing, and a 
proposal for a major re-settlement project, utilising sparsely populated heavy 
tropical forest in Madang District. The two directions were joined, however, by a 
common premise adopted by Christian that existing efforts were too scattered and 
that in order to increase the output of rice grown by smallholders, production 
should be centralised in a large irrigated rice project, with a further major 
commitment of funds to underpin this new direction.
Christian’s advice to give limited but continuing encouragement to smallholder 
production for non-marketed household consumption was treated sympathetically, 
especially when some of his recommendations could be seen as supporting views 
held in PNG. In particular, his observations on the weaknesses of the 1954 Plan, 
including soil and other deficiencies of areas chosen for increasing production in 
the Sepik and Madang districts, as well as the scattered distribution of limited 
personnel and other resources, were easily accepted. So too were his 
recommendations on the importance of research and trials on plant biology, 
cultivation, soil and climatic conditions preceding decisions about selection of 
areas for rice growing to be encouraged. DASF officials in PNG were able to 
concur, while pointing out that in some cases knowledge about these matters 
utilised by Christian had been advanced by research conducted since the 1954 
Plan was constructed.89 The Sepik grass plains, marked out for rice growing 
earlier:
...suffer from extreme soil deficiency which has come to light as a result 
of experimental work at (the) Yambi (research station). In the Ramu the 
slope of the valley floor has proved to be too great for satisfactory
89. Christian generously acknowledged in his Report that with the knowledge available in 1954, the 
first Action Plan was adequate, and its inadequacies had become obvious subsequently, a point 
recognised in Canberra. See NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan- 
Papua and New Guinea 1954-1960 29/3/60 EJ Wood for the Minister ‘Action Plan for the 
Development of the Rice Growing Industry-Papua and New Guinea’
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mechanised irrigated development, while the Markham soils are 
generally too porous for irrigation with standing water.90
Christian’s recognition that the extent to which commercial rice growing, by
European large farmers and indigenous small-holders alike, was a very marginal
proposition by comparison to other crops could be easily supported by the
Administration. Other recommendations had been in the pipeline for some time, as
in the case of properly testing selected rice varieties in a wide range of
environments. Further, the Administration and DASF had already begun to extend
its research on wet rice cultivation for small holders.91 Christian’s recognition that
staff shortages had played a critical role in limiting the capacities of extension and
research staff was easily accepted, with Cleland forwarding to Canberra the
additional DASF observation that:
He (Christian) does not appear to have been fully aware that a few 
years ago technical staff was so thinly spread that little could have been 
done to alleviate the shortage of staff for work on rice, which could not 
be regarded as more than a crop with possibilities, except by totally 
abandoning work on other crops which were already proved and had 
passed the ‘possibility’ stage. The Department would have been subject 
to very strong public criticism had it taken staff away from crops like 
coconuts and cocoa to work on rice. It should also be appreciated that 
there was an agronomist working on rice before coconuts and that only 
recently has more than one man been engaged full-time on cocoa.92
However in a confidential letter to the Department of Territories, Christian noted 
that there was:
...general apathy within Administration departments towards the whole 
question of rice growing. This arises, mainly...from the fact that rice is a 
difficult crop because each situation requires a different variety or 
change in method. Far less success has been achieved with it than with 
the other major economic crops. It requires far more technical 
background to make a success of it and there is far less technical
90. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Pian-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 5/8/1959 Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories ‘Christian Report on Rice 
Development and Production in the Territories’ ‘Comments by the Department of Agriculture, Stock 
and Fisheries’ p.3
91. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 5/8/1959 Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories ‘Christian Report on Rice 
Development and Production in the Territories’ ‘Comments by the Department of Agriculture, Stock 
and Fisheries’ p.4
92. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 5/8/1959 Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories ‘Christian Report on Rice 
Development and Production in the Territories’ ‘Comments by the Department of Agriculture, Stock 
and Fisheries’ p.3
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information concerning it. All this has resulted in a very definite lack of 
confidence concerning the crop, although within the Extension 
Services...there is a Divisional attitude favouring its spread and 
development. 93
In short, there was little in his Report to offend PNG-based officials, especially 
as he supported the need for increased resources and a further shift along 
lines already being investigated for extending commercial production to wet, 
irrigated rice. Most importantly, Christian’s doubts about the attainability of 
self-sufficiency in marketed production generally were in accord with official 
views in Port Moresby.
The Christian Report -  Irrigated Rice and Resettlement 
However where Christian’s recommendations were most out of step with 
Administration planning was regarding his proposal for a major re-settlement 
project to be located on about 63 square miles in the Nuru - Gogol River area of 
Madang. The site and some adjoining Crown land with consistent heavy rainfall 
and heavy forest cover needing clearing had been suggested to Christian by 
Administration officials. But the detail of the project was his own work with 
supplementary advice provided by another CSIRO Land Research and Regional 
Survey Division officer with ‘experience of native settlements in Africa’ but no ‘first 
hand information on New Guinea (sic).’94
Christian proposed the establishment of an experimental station in what became 
known as the Gogol Valley Scheme, Madang District, for investigating agronomic 
and other issues relevant to wet rice production. Subject to satisfactory results 
being obtained, the Administration would encourage the resettlement of people 
from the over-populated Bagasin and Suman areas nearby, to commence 
production of dry rice on ten acre holdings surveyed and marked out as forest 
cover was cleared. Subsequently smallholders would switch to wet rice production,
93. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 4/11/1958 C S Christian, CSIRO to Secretary, Department of Territories
94. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 C S Christian, CSIRO to Secretary, Department of Territories
242
in a project requiring an additional £350,000 capital costs and extra annual costs of 
approximately £94,000.95
The response to the Department of Territories from Administrator Cleland, 
incorporating advice received from the Department of Agriculture, Stock and 
Fisheries (DASF), threw doubts on Christian’s claim that ho had discussed the 
project with relevant senior Administration officials across a range of Departments, 
with no ‘serious objections being raised’.96 Instead, Cleland and DASF expressed 
‘fundamental disagreement’,97 concluding that the proposed new direction was too 
expensive and adventurous for a colonial administration unwilling to divert 
resources from other already successful crops and regions.
Once again, the Administration was able to call upon international experience to 
support its opposition, noting that:
(T)he colonial world is littered with the debris of unsuccessful post-war 
development schemes, particularly in Africa, and to tie the first complex 
resettlement scheme in the Territory to rice would be unwise, especially 
where the initial emphasis would be on dry rice.98
Re-settlement on sparsely populated land by migrants from other areas of the 
country as a means of tying households to smallholdings for expanded production 
of other crops was becoming acceptable for other locations in PNG (see Chapters 
Three and Four). But it was a relatively easy matter to reject this proposal on cost 
grounds as well as specific features of the Gogol Valley site. The Administration 
was able to point out the difficulty of mechanised clearing of the heavy forest and 
cultivating rice under prevailing weather conditions. As an alternative, the
95. In file correspondence, there are different costing figures given for the proposed project, varying 
from £280,000 establishment costs and £60,000 annual costs to the larger amount cited here. The 
larger amount was calculated by a Department of Territories’ official, while Administration officials in 
PNG generally adopted the lower figures.
96. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Pian-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 4/11/1958 C S Christian, CSIRO to Secretary, Department of Territories
97. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Plan-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 5/8/1959 Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories ‘Christian Report on Rice 
Development and Production in the Territories’ ‘Comments by the Department of Agriculture, Stock 
and Fisheries’ p.4
98. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/1327 Rice Action Pian-Papua and New Guinea 
1954-1960 5/8/1959 Administrator to Secretary, Department of Territories ‘Christian Report on Rice 
Development and Production in the Territories’ ‘Comments by the Department of Agriculture, Stock 
and Fisheries’ p.5
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Administration proposed a more gradual, long-term project through which settlers, 
already in the process of moving into the area, could be encouraged to further 
clear forests, incorporate dry rice growing into their existing ‘fell and burn’ 
agriculture. At the same time, research would be continued into the prospects for 
wet rice growing on a more substantial scale in the area.
As with the earlier recommendations proposed by Poggendorff, supported by
Cottrell-Dormer, Christian underestimated the strength of the official commitment to
meet the growing demand for marketed rice through smallholder production of dry
rice as well as to encourage households to grow rice for immediate consumption.
Even as Christian was undertaking research and preparing his Report, Conroy had
poured cold water on any prospects for the early adoption of irrigated rice
production. While declaring the Administration open to the possibility of major
investment in large scale production, along the lines of the Humpty Doo project in
the Northern Territory of Australia, the chances of this occurring in PNG seemed
slim. According to Conroy, who as already noted accompanied Christian on his
visit to rice growing areas, this was because, although suitable land and supplies of
water were available in both the Sepik and Madang Districts:
(T)he cost of clearing the bush would be prohibitive for a large capital 
investment in rice. Other crops such as cocoa and coffee would pay off 
much better...A better plan is to encourage the native to clear the bush 
for himself for his own village gardens. After he has finished with his 
gardens he can then plant rice. By clearing the bush this way the native 
avoids the large capital expenditure that would be necessary for an 
immediate project."
If there was limited scope for large scale wet rice production, there was even less 
for immediate household adoption of irrigated rice growing, so completely outside 
the agricultural experience of indigenous smallholders. Also weighing heavily upon 
Conroy and the Administration was the continuing lack of increased production 
from the Mekeo Rice Project. Despite the substantial resource commitment to the 
Project, there had been little interest in investment in the area by expatriate or 
international investors. While the Administration retained machinery in the area for 
rice growing and continued to employ three part-time staff on experimental work,
99. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1958/2847 Native Village Rice Production-Madang and 
Sepik Districts 26/9/1958 South Pacific Post ‘Rice Project Welcome’
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all other aspects of rice production were now in indigenous hands with limited 
marketed rice being produced (see above).100
Conclusion
Despite his continued efforts to Increase smallholder production of dry, upland rice 
in PNG, Hasluck became aware that Departmental pressure forcing Australian 
producers to accept lower prices for their exports to PNG would reduce the 
incentive for rice production in the colony.101 As efforts to substantially raise 
marketed production in PNG failed and domestic consumption of imported rice 
increased in conditions of greater international production and lower prices, the 
importance of increasing rice growing diminished for the Minister and the colonial 
administration. Despite the international shortages and high prices, there were no 
indications that private firms would make the necessary investments to produce 
rice for export.
While the drive to increase production across the colony probably contributed to 
small amounts of rice growing for immediate household consumption in many 
districts,102 it seems to have had little tangible long-term effect upon marketed rice 
production in the two districts where greatest effort had been concentrated. During 
the accelerated development phase, the importance of rice growing faded: 
production of rice was not given any encouragement in the 1964 World Bank 
Report.103 It was not until the early 1970s, when self-sufficiency became a
100. 26/9/1958 South Pacific Post ‘Rice Project Welcome’.
101. Hasluck A Time for Building p.135 notes how efforts by Secretary Lambert and himself 
‘lessened one of the arguments for replacing imports with home production’. He was referring to 
negotiations with Australian rice growers, and ‘a threat we made to buy rice wherever we could get 
it in Asia’ which ‘resulted in a fairer price and a better delivery’ thus ‘improving the terms by which 
the Territory purchased about 15,000 tons of rice a year from Australia’. The Minister also noted 
that ‘as the years went by, one of the nutritional arguments for village rice, namely that it was left 
brown and unpolished, lost its force when, for reasons of status, the native people who advanced to 
cash incomes coveted white rice as a status symbol because it was what the white people ate.’ 
While there was a move away from brown rice, the Minister’s explanation for the attraction of white 
protein enriched rice is an over-simplification. There were more than status reasons involved, and 
these included cooking ease, reduced amounts of fuel and water needed, as well as the association 
of eating brown rice with sickness and attendance at government hospitals where patients were 
served rice. I am indebted to Emily Dirua for emphasising the last of these reasons.
102. Hale Rice p.9 states: ‘At one time or another rice has been grown in every coastal (ie. 
including island: SM) province, and in several highlands provinces as well.’
103. Hale Rice p.8
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prominent feature of discussions about future development policy for the 
independent nation-state, that increasing rice production became important once 
more (see Chapter Four above).
A possible exception to the general decline in the importance of rice growing during 
the 1960s and 1970s remained Maprik in what became, after Independence, the 
East Sepik District. During the 1950s three commercial crops -peanuts, rice and 
coffee -  gained a more important position in smallholder agriculture in Maprik. As 
already noted, peanut growing flourished initially but became insignificant as an 
export crop from the early 1960s.104 Instead, robusta coffee became the most 
important smallholder crop. But from the late 1950s through the 1960s rice 
production maintained an upward trend in the area, from about 78 tons of paddy in 
1957-58 to an estimated 1,600 tons in 1969-70. The latter amount was produced 
by about 1600 growers, an increase from 78 in 1958,105 suggesting no change in 
labour productivity.
While the policy emphasis on dry, upland rice production played a major part in the 
colony-wide failure to significantly expand production, other factors -  international 
and local -  also contributed to this outcome. Increased international availability and 
relative price reductions for rice ensured that households were better off growing 
other crops or engaging in wage employment, while purchasing rice for domestic 
consumption. Weather and soil conditions, although varying across PNG, often 
detrimentally affected smallholder production. Irrigation and greater mechanisation 
of production, which might have mitigated some of the variability in local conditions, 
were regarded as incompatible with important terms of the scheme of smallholder 
production, including the priority of utilising family labour processes.
104. Shand and Straatmans Transition from Subsistence pp.97-100
105. Transition from Subsistence p. 101, Table 5.3 provides the statistics, while pp.100-115 
discusses rice growing and processing in the sub-district in greater detail. See also Allen The North 
Coast Region’ p. 119 for the conclusion that: Today [in the late 1970s] small amounts of rice are 
produced in the West and East Sepik Provinces, generally where coffee plantings are lowest and 
road transport poorest; in the Madang Province, mainly by migrant squatters who are allowed to 
grow rice on land which they clear for customary landowners; and in Morobe Province, where 
private enterprise and missions grow small amounts of rice’.
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In the case of the Mekeo Rice Project, the most prominent early attempt by the 
colonial administration to increase rice production, all the above factors combined 
to result in failure. When the project ‘[was] given away’ by the Department of 
Agriculture, the spokesman for the department explained ‘that the Mekeo natives 
had lost interest in rice as a cash crop because of the hard work involved and the 
low returns’ by comparison to fruit, copra, cocoa and vegetable crops. The local 
legacy of the Project was that some rice continued to be produced by households 
for non-marketed consumption in the area.106 As Epeli Hau’ofa noted, in the early 
1970s there also were a few highly profitable commercial growers selling rice 
locally through village trade stores and at Bereina.107
However, while the efforts to increase production largely failed and the availability 
of rice produced by industrial methods in Australia contributed to this outcome in 
PNG, colonial development policy was aided by the growth of rice imports. As 
Hasluck noted, there was merit in ‘expanding local consumption [of rice] as part of 
the general measures to raise nutritional standards’,108 even 
though his preferred means of attaining the expansion, native agriculture in villages 
was unsuccessful. One aim of development policy, securing households upon 
smallholdings at higher standards of living, was facilitated by the availability of rice 
imports and commercialisation of production of other crops, even though another 
objective, self-sufficiency of rice production in PNG, was not.
Over-shadowing all the attention and effort applied to rice production were the 
successes with other crops. The thesis now turns attention to one of these, cocoa 
which also brought to the fore conflicts between the objectives and outcomes of 
colonial development policy.
106. A Department of Territories’ Summary of May 1959 devotes more than a typed page to 
explaining the ‘credit side’ of the Project. As well as the spread of tractor use and the growing 
number of trained indigenous operators, the summary notes that ‘rice has become firmly 
established as part of the Mekeo subsistence regime and is to be found growing in all food gardens 
and in regular household use.' Rice had also been adopted ‘as a crop in less favoured areas to the 
north and west of the Mekeo plain’. NAA A452/1, 1958/628 Mekeo Rice Project p.4.
107. Mekeo p.19





While imports assisted in overcoming the shortage of domestically grown rice and 
other storable foods, greater production of immediately consumed and marketed 
food lifted living standards without forcing households off their smallholdings. The 
rapid increase in the production of export crops, coconuts (copra), coffee and 
cocoa, fitted neatly within the agrarian doctrine of development and contributed to 
its success. However because cocoa and coffee growing and processing was 
concentrated in a few areas, their success also threatened a central tenet of the 
1950s policy emphasis upon uniform development. As well, the crops opened 
further space for indigenous capital’s advance, which challenged colonial policy 
too.
This chapter outlines the course änd consequences of the colonial administration’s 
promotion of smallholder cocoa production. The first section of the chapter outlines 
how favourable international conditions for increased production of cocoa made it 
possible for colonial officials to strengthen the general position of local producers 
while giving primacy to smallholders.1 Official plans and subsequent actions 
became a principal determinant of the direction taken in cocoa growing, processing 
and marketing over the late colonial period.
Part of the attraction of cocoa for the colonial administration’s agrarian 
development doctrine lay in the wide range of suitable climatic and soil conditions 
found in many parts of PNG where smallholder agriculture was already 
predominant. The second section of the chapter provides an overview of how 
cocoa growing and processing assisted in meeting important development 
objectives, including decentralization. Emphasis is placed on how the export crop 
encouraged households to remain attached to land. Smallholder cocoa growing 
also limited the movement of indigenous capital into largeholding agriculture. 
Bougainville became the exemplar for administration efforts to spread cocoa
1. R.E.P. Dwyer Cocoa Production Territory of Papua-New Guinea Part 1 The Economics of Cocoa 
Production Port Moresby: DASF, July 3 1948
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growing as widely as possible and for the crop’s role in securing households upon 
smallholdings.
On the Gazelle Peninsula, where plantation production of cocoa had occurred 
before the war and which was an area favoured by the availability of seed after 
1945, wealthy Tolais growing and processing the crop challenged official plans for 
smallholder primacy (see Chapter Two above). Section 3 describes the rapid 
expansion of cocoa growing during the 1950s and early 1960s in the area, as well 
as the growing opposition to colonial authority from indigenous capitalists and 
would-be capitalists. On the Peninsula, the export crop of cocoa became central to 
the politics of self-government.
International Conditions and the Official Response
The immediate post-war shortage of cocoa continued into the early 1950s.
Demand was further increased, with corresponding high prices, when in 1953-54 
rationing of chocolate consumption ended in Britain.2 Reduced production from 
West Africa, due especially to disease among trees and political unrest in Ghana, 
pushed international firms to seek out new sources of supply. Rebuffed and 
discouraged from establishing largeholdings in PNG, the firms were nevertheless 
keen to encourage production in what was a sellers’ market. The colonial 
administration, led by officials in PNG, used the circumstances to set down 
important markers for the future expansion of cocoa growing in PNG.
These markers included the selection of Trinitario rather than Forastero genotype 
trees and the associated choice of fine and flavour rather than bulk cocoa 
produced for a wider international market than Australia. An initial focus was the 
rehabilitation of plantations where Trinitario was already grown . However the 
deliberate choices of tree variety and cocoa flavour by colonial officials keen to 
stimulate replanting and new plantings affected all PNG production, whether on
2. F.Helmut Weymar The Dynamics of the World Cocoa Market Cambridge, Mass, and London, 
Eng.: The M.l.T.Press, 1968, p. 13. Shand and Straatmans Transition from Subsistence p.81, Table 
4.11 provides an index of cocoa export prices (f.o.b) from 1947-68. With a 1947-50 base of 100, 
prices were highest between 1952 and 1955, and again in 1958 and 1959. In 1955, the index 
reached 307.
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largeholdings, owned by international firms, expatriate owner-occupiers and 
indigenous bourgeois, or on smallholdings farmed by indigenous households.
When global production was increasingly dominated by smallholders,3 4selecting 
higher yielding Trinitario rather than Forastero came to have additional benefits for 
household growers in PNG.'1 In aiming smallholder production at the fine and 
flavour market the Administration was also attempting to secure higher returns for 
households in this colony by comparison to smallholders elsewhere, especially in 
West Africa.
The tussle between Administration officials in PNG and Department of Territories’ 
officers in Canberra extended beyond policy regarding the type of cocoa to be 
grown by plantations and smallholders. Throughout the 1950s, while the former 
sought to encourage further expansion and recognised their iimited capacity to 
check increased smallholder plantings, in Australia officials worried about the 
implications of producing more cocoa than could be utilised by manufacturers in 
the metropolitan country. The latter recalled that in 1926 the Australian 
Government had passed a Papua New Guinea Bounties Act and a Customs Tariff 
(Papua and New Guinea Preference) Act to encourage production, including of 
cocoa, in the colony. After World War II, Australian officials were concerned that 
too much stimulation of fine and flavour cocoa production with a more specialised 
market would inevitably result in declining prices. In such circumstances, growers
3. It is incorrect to claim regarding cocoa’s production that in 1940 or at any period in the first half 
of the twentieth century cocoa was solely or even primarily ‘the product of a plantation economy 
using native labour’ .Robert Dixon Prosthetic Gods: travel, representation and colonial governance 
St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 2001,p.9. While the description did hold for pre- 
World War II New Guinea cocoa production, this output formed a very small proportion of the cocoa 
utilized by Australian-based manufacturers for that country’s drinking cocoa and chocolate 
consumption. Most cocoa imported into Australia came from Ghana where smallholder production 
was already dominant. The classic accounts of smallholder expansion in Ghana are by Polly Hill 
The Gold Coast Cocoa Farmer: A Preliminary Survey London, Accra, Ibadan: Oxford University 
Press, 1956; and The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A study in rural capitalism 
Cambridge: At The University Press, 1963.
4. Dand The international cocoa trade pp.222-223, makes the point that Forastero, by virtue of its 
particular cocoa butter quality and lower price was suited to the manufacture of milk chocolate. Due 
to the almost total dominance of this form of chocolate, and the fact that by the early 1990s less 
than five per cent of total cocoa production in the world was fine and flavour, fine and flavour cocoa 
had largely become irrelevant to supply and demand conditions on international markets. However 
when cocoa production was being reconstructed and extended after WWII in PNG, the distinction 
was regarded as of significance in international markets.
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would be likely to demand financial support and a preferential arrangement into the 
Australian market from the colonial government.
This fear continued to manifest itself as the 1954-55 and 1958 Cocoa Action Plans 
were produced by the PNG Administration but under colonial government advice 
transmitted from Canberra. Each time officers in the colony set production targets 
which aimed beyond the Australian market, in order to ‘prevent the Australian 
manufacturer taking advantage of being the only outlet for New Guinea 
production’,5 Department of Territories’ officials sought to restrain these ambitions.
One exchange neatly encapsulates the division between officials. In April 1955 the 
Administrator D.M.CIeland wrote to the Secretary of the Department regarding an 
early draft of the first Plan, with suggested amendments. After acknowledging that 
the comments came originally from the Director of Agriculture Dwyer, who opposed 
production targets, Cleland said:
The rate of planting is largely outside Administration control and is 
affected by too many factors, such as availability of land and labour,
Extension staff, and the ability to provide supervision and finance of 
native processing centres. Our aim should be to develop as rapidly as 
possible and, as we are producing a crop marketable throughout the 
world, there is no need only to consider Australia’s requirements. In fact, 
it may be in the interests of Australia for the Territory to market its cocoa 
in hard currency areas and for Australia to buy its requirements in soft 
currency areas.6
In other words, let manufacturers in Australia continue to buy lower priced ‘Accra’ 
bulk cocoa grown in Ghana and Nigeria, while producers in PNG tried to grow and 
sell as much higher priced fine and flavour as they could, including in markets 
outside the Sterling area.
The response from Canberra indicated the extent of the disagreement with Port 
Moresby officers. In May 1955, E.J.Wood, OIC, Agricultural and Pastoral Branch in 
the Department responded with an internal memo. He went directly to the question
5. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1957/3874 Cocoa Action Plan Undated Note Extract from 
Report by F.C. Henderson ‘Future of Papua and New Guinea Cocoa Marketing’
6. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1957/3874 Cocoa Action Plan 14/4/1955 Administrator to 
Secretary, Department of Territories
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of production targets, specifically for total PNG output to reach 3,000 tons by
1957/58 and 5,000 tons by 1961/62. Said Wood:
It is agreed that the ultimate target need not necessarily be related in the 
plan to Australia’s level of requirements, but it is considered unwise to 
encourage cocoa plantings much beyond the level of production that 
can be absorbed in the Australian market.7
The nature of the official’s concern soon followed. While world demand was
currently in excess of supply, this might not continue. With declining prices,
demand for assistance from the Australian government would re-appear.
While New Guinea production is less than or only at about the same 
level of the Australian demand, Government consideration of assistance 
of this nature to the New Guinea industry would be feasible. When the 
cocoa plantings have reached the stage where production from them, 
when in full bearing, would be about the level of the Australian 
requirements, the policy can be reviewed in the light of world market 
prospects and a decision made as to whether further plantings should 
be officially encouraged.8
In other words, caution should be exercised about the extent of official 
encouragement of cocoa. Over the next two years, the division between Canberra 
and Port Moresby-based officials over targets and the objectives of cocoa 
production in the colony changed little. In December 1957, during the preparation 
of the second Cocoa Action Plan, while still ostensibly tying PNG production to 
Australian demand, Minister Hasluck attempted to stick to the targets of the first 
Plan but conceded a target of 12,000 tons ‘thereafter’ 1961/62.9 However less than 
a year later, in October 1958, the Minister and Department were forced into a 
major concession. Paragraph 1a) of the second Plan over-turned the earlier 1955 
Plan’s output goal:
7. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1957/3874 Cocoa Action Plan 5/5/1955 E.J.Wood OIC 
Agricultural and Pastoral Industries Branch on Cocoa Action Plan
8. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1957/3874 Cocoa Action Plan 5/5/1955 E.J.Wood OIC 
Agricultural and Pastoral Industries Branch on Cocoa Action Plan
9. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1957/3874 Cocoa Action Plan 17/12/1957 Press Release 
Minister for Territories ‘Cocoa Industry in Papua and New Guinea’. Ten years later, imports of 
cocoa into Australia amounted to little more than the Minister’s ‘thereafter’ target, while PNG 
produced just under twice as much. Exports had grown to other countries, in particular the USA and 
the Australian market had become much less important. Densley and Wheeler Cocoa Tables 17-18, 
pp.37-39
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The immediate target to be about 25,000 tons of cocoa beans per 
annum. When anticipated potential production approaches that level, 
future policy to be reviewed in the light of world market prospects.10
The precise point at which the revised position became acceptable in Canberra is 
not immediately apparent.* 11 It is clear that the local Administration was more 
attuned to the speed with which production was expanding, as well as the difficulty 
of limiting smallholder plantings once indigenous growers adopted the crop. The 
latter point had been central to the Administrator’s memorandum to Canberra of 
April 1955, cited above, which was composed as very substantial increases started 
to occur in indigenous smallholder as well as largeholding plantings.
The colonial administration’s ability to regulate cocoa output by household growers 
was limited. Short of adopting authoritarian measures to restrict production, such 
as banning further planting and tearing out trees, the most that could be done was 
cutting back on extension activities and limiting forms of price support. Through 
direct experience coordinating and supervising household plantings, including in 
the first important area of indigenous growing the Gazelle Peninsula, the political 
implications of any official practices were becoming more obvious to local officials.
The difficulty for Canberra-based officials in understanding the fast emerging 
problem of how to restrain production lay partly in the nature of the evidence they 
were using to measure the success of the post-war policy to expand cocoa 
production. Export tonnages, impressive as these were in showing rapid 
expansion, constituted a limited, rear-vision mirror view of what was happening. 
The output measure indicated a successful lifting of production in line with over-all 
policy. The measure also obscured the important difference between a 
considerable ability to limit largeholding expansion, primarily by preventing further 
alienation of land, and a negligible capacity to constrain smallholder increases, 
even if the latter had been intended. As the importance of the Australian market
10. NAA Department of Territories A452/1, 1957/3874 Cocoa Action Plan Cocoa Action Plan 
Amended October 1958
11. Hasluck A Time for Building pp.293-294, sheds no light on the matter, only referring to the 
competence of the officers in Canberra and Port Moresby, and ‘in this area [of agriculture policy] 
perhaps more than any other...seemed to be able to work together to good effect, supplementing 
each other.’
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declined for PNG cocoa exports, so too did the expatriate owner-occupiers and 
Australian-based plantation firms become even less significant cocoa producers. 
The shift to smallholder predominance, however, took some time.
It has already been noted that along with the use of the Trinitario genotype, PNG 
cocoa growing is atypical in another respect. It is one of the few countries where 
inter-planting with coconuts is practised.12 Inter-planting has particular advantages 
for households who can grow an immediately consumed food crop in close 
association with an export, cash crop.
In 1958, while Acting Director of DASF, Frank Henderson gave a review of 
technical work being done and plans affecting the cocoa industry. The overview 
was presented at the Rabaul Cocoa Conference convened by Australian and local 
officials upon the urging of the local Planters’ Association. He summarised the 
principal conclusions reached after a 1948-49 study of the Ghanaian cocoa 
industry made by DASF.
...the Department had concluded that many of the difficulties 
encountered in the industry of that country had their roots in the policy of 
“laissez faire” adopted when the industry was in its infancy.
The policy was then formulated [by DASF] that the Native industry in this 
country should be based on three concepts: that of: a) minimum areas 
[to be planted by each grower]; b) registration [of growers]; c) central 
fermentaries. This policy has not changed, and the Administration still 
aims at grafting the advantage of plantation methods on to peasant 
production methods to give a quality product.13
Whether ‘laissez faire’ adequately describes British colonial policy toward cocoa 
growing in Ghana or not is unimportant here.14 What matters for this account is that 
a senior official in Australia’s colony was spelling out an immediate post-war 
rejection of ‘laissez faire’ for PNG. Instead Henderson emphasised the importance
12. One estimation made soon after Independence suggested that while in some areas, including 
Buka Island in Bougainville District, sole planted cocoa is the norm, for the country as a whole 
‘about half the area under cocoa... is interplanted usually with coconuts.’ Densley and Wheeler 
Cocoa p.7
13. PNGNA Department of Primary Industry A/N. 12, Box No. 16,497, F/N 1-4-99 Report of the 
Cocoa Conference -Rabaul 16?h to 18th April 1958 p.15
14. Cf. Jeff D. Grischow Shaping Tradition: Civil Society, Community and Development in Colonial 
Northern Ghana, 1899-1957 Leiden: Brill, 2006
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of the colonial administration’s role in coordinating and supervising household 
production.15
The objective of ‘grafting the advantage of plantation methods’ still left open a
number of important issues for policy determination. One direction which never had
substantial support for cocoa or indeed any other crop was that favoured by the
first post-war Director of Agriculture, Cottrell-Dormer. Opposed to Papua New
Guineans becoming ‘a race of wage earners dependent upon European industry’ ,16
Cottrell-Dormer instead favoured the development of the cocoa industry through:
...the development of Government plantations on behalf of the natives, 
ie. on the natives’ land and for the purposes of handing over to native 
ownership in the shape of co-operative societies in the future. In this 
way the people will never become landless and their employment on the 
plantations can be controlled in such a way that their village life is not 
unduly interfered with . . . 17
As was to occur later with his preferred method of mechanised and irrigated wet­
land rice growing, Cottrell-Dormer had not judged the dominant official attitude at 
all well. Establishing government plantations received no support, either from the 
Minister or other senior officers. Instead the search for an official policy direction to 
graft ‘the advantage of plantation methods ‘ on to ‘peasant production methods’ 
was accelerated by the rapid spontaneous increase of indigenous plantings. 
Colonial officials were forced to respond, particularly because of the early 
prominence of indigenous largeholdings and the need to have cocoa processed at 
internationally acceptable quality standards.
At the same time as the expatriate owners of largeholdings returned to PNG and 
began plantation reconstruction, indigenous cocoa growers began to prepare land 
and plant trees. The chapter now emphasises how while the direction indigenous
15. As shown in greater detail in previous chapters, there is more than irony in the fact that 
contemporary accounts continue to assert that ‘laissez faire’ best describes Australian colonial 
policy during the post-war years towards PNG. See, as well as Connell Papua New Guinea, p.20, 
the more recent uncritical repetition of this position by Frederick Errington and Deborah Gewertz 
Yali’s Question: Sugar, Culture and History Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
2004, p.27
16. NAA A518/1, A58/3/3, Commodities-Cocoa Papua and New Guinea Proposals for Development 
undated W Cottrell-Dormer, Director, DASF to Secretary, Department of External Territories p.1
17. NAA A518/1, A58/3/3, Commodities-Cocoa Papua and New Guinea Proposals for Development 
undated W Cottrell-Dormer, Director, DASF to Secretary, Department of External Territories p.1
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production initially took was often the result of the spontaneous action of wealthy 
individuals, almost immediately the colonial administration responded to coordinate 
and supervise household production. Cocoa growing and processing by ambitious 
Tolai on the Gazelle Peninsula was important in stimulating the official response.
The Cocoa Ordinance's Limited Application
An early legal expression of the drive to shape household production away from 
what were seen as low productivity, low quality, unregulated peasant farming was 
the 1951 Cocoa Ordinance. Passed through the colony’s Legislative Council, the 
Ordinance included two of the terms specified above by DASF official Henderson. 
That is, there were to be minimum areas planted by each grower, which given the 
proper spacing effectively meant a 500-tree minimum number per grower, and 
registration of growers to make supervision of conditions, including diseases, 
easier.18
The Ordinance provided a largely ineffectual legislative underpinning for the work 
of Administration officials trying to supervise new plantings. One official was 
Francis Xavier Ryan, the officer who in 1949 led the agricultural extension services 
introducing cocoa to Vunamami on the Gazelle Peninsula near Rabaul.19 Ryan 
encountered considerable difficulty and criticism instructing growers, households 
and largeholders, on the spacing and other cultivation requirements demanded by 
the legislation. In an undated letter, probably written shortly after the Ordinance 
came into effect in 1952, Ryan gave some indication of the possibility for even 
more substantial opposition, if growers were unwilling to cooperate.20 Ryan’s letter 
also acknowledged the objection of the District Commissioner J.K. McCarthy to 
pulling out trees, and that concern over.cultivation practices and standards was not
18. Cf. Connell Taim bilong mani, p.143.
19.Salisbury Vunamami p.56
20. PNGNA Department of Primary Industry AN12, Box No. 16,706, File No.23-3-1 (C) Cocoa 
Projects Other Than Tolai-New Britain District F.Ryan, DASF,Rabaul to Chief of Division, Plant 
Industry, Port Moresby p. 1, states that he had: ‘pulled out trees in areas where they are neglected 
over a period, isolated trees, small areas which cannot be enlarged to 500 [trees minimum], areas 
planted since the Ordinance and not in accordance with the Ordinance. The position has been 
explained to each group before cutting out commences and we have had the approval of the 
owners before pulling out.’
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confined to indigenous plantings. ‘Bad plantations’ were also ‘cleaned up’ and 
complaints from one planter against another acted upon.21
Most importantly of all, in listing the number of non-specific and unsubstantiated 
objections to his work, Ryan made clear just how difficult it would be to police the 
Cocoa Ordinance’s regulations once planting of trees became widespread and 
extended beyond the growers of substantial numbers of trees. In Vunamami and 
nearby villages where large-scale planting was constrained by shortages of land 
and labour this was to be less of a problem: a saturation level was reached in the
early 1960s with somewhere around twenty per cent of the population growing
22cocoa.
Even in parts of the District where the potential for widespread planting of cocoa 
trees was more substantial, the average number of trees planted per grower 
remained below the legal 500 tree minimum. A 1955 estimate was that ‘the 
average Tolai grower cultivates less than half an acre of cocoa’.23 In such 
circumstances, the tussle between an Administration determined to control cocoa 
growing and the possibilities of a crop which could be grown so easily from seed 
obtained either through official or unofficial channels soon became apparent.
Despite the legal requirement that all growers be registered, and registration be 
restricted to growers of ‘not less than five hundred cocoa trees in continuous grove, 
planted as prescribed’, by 1954/55 ‘an agricultural survey of cocoa listed 487,174 
trees registered under the Cocoa Ordinance, and 697, 285 additional trees 
reported’, giving over 1.1 million trees in five Native Local Government Council 
areas populated by Tolai.24 That is, the number of unregistered trees already 
exceeded registered trees, and tree numbers per head were about 35. In 1960, an
21. Ryan to Chief of Division p.2, noting that: ‘Steps are being taken to clean Mr Blake’s plantation 
as a protection for Mrs Coote, who has made a verbal complaint through her daughter’.
22. The twenty per cent figure is my own ‘guesstimate’ drawn from the confusing picture presented 
in Salisbury Vunamami p.137, par.1
23. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production p.354 cites DC J.K.McCarthy, DC 
Rabaul from a paper ‘Managerial Staff for Native Economic Development Projects’, 20 August 
1955.
24. Epstein Capitalism, Primitive and Modern p. 115, citing K.R. Williamson The Tolai Cocoa 
Project’ South Pacific V.9, No. 13, p.595. For further consideration of why growers did not register 
plantings, see below.
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estimate suggested that a total Tolai population of 40,000 people had planted 
almost three million trees, or about 74 trees per head.25
Extensive pulling out of unregistered trees and fining unregistered growers fifty 
pounds as specified by the Cocoa Ordinance was never a serious option for 
Administration personnel, even had official policy supported such action.20 In any 
case, the small number of available agricultural extension and other officers who 
might have policed offences against the Cocoa Ordinance were at the same time 
struggling to deal with the growing demand for advice, information and improved 
seed stock from large and small holders alike. Instead of fighting an unwinnable 
battle against smallholders planting relatively small numbers of trees among 
coconuts, vegetables and other crops, the emphasis was placed on trying to 
maintain quality standards through centralising processing at a limited number of 
fermentaries.27
Processing Smallholder Cocoa
Cocoa pods can be left on trees for several weeks after they ripen but the risk that 
disease or pests will damage the ripe pods increases. A long delay in harvesting 
may also lead to beans starting to germinate inside the pod. Once cocoa pods are 
harvested, they need to be opened within a few days and the wet beans removed 
so that curing, which removes the mucilage surrounding the bean and much of the 
moisture content of the bean itself can take place. Curing involves two stages, the
25. Epstein Capitalism, Primitive and Modem p. 115. As Epstein also shows (p. 131), as plantings 
continued to increase in the early 1960s, the proportion of registered trees continued to decline.
26. PNGNA Department of Primary Industry Box No. 16,706, File No. 23-3-1 (G) Cocoa Projects 
Morobe District 18/1/1963 Agricultural Officer, DASF Extension, Finschhafen to District Agricultural 
Officer, Lae notes: ‘Cacao was established by the natives themselves before DASF became active 
in the area but these were subsequently cut out because of the incorrect methods which had been 
employed, so in 1953 two Finschhafen field workers were sent to Rabaul to gain some practical 
experience with the crop.’ However, neither this experience nor the DASF presence stopped 
plantings on a small scale. The AO’s survey attached to the January 1963 letter reported that more 
than 41,000 trees, many of them still immature, had been planted by 173 growers in 21 villages in 
the Mapi-Kotte area. Only eleven growers, or just over 6%, owned more than 500 trees, while a 
twelfth had 499 trees.
27. A similar point is made by Epstein Capitalism, Primitive and Modern p.117, who concludes, after 
noting the rapid increase in plantings, especially by growers with a few trees: ‘Unless steps were 
taken to organise the native industry so that it had efficient processing and marketing procedures, 
there was the danger that it might become chaotic, which in turn might have had adverse effects on 
the overall development of the Territory’s cocoa industry.’ Cf. for another connection between cocoa 
and the idea of chaos, Gwendolyn Mikell Cocoa and Chaos in Ghana New York: Paragon House, 
1989.
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first when the beans ferment, as a consequence of chemical reactions in the bean 
pulp. During fermentation much of the pulp drains away. A further series of 
chemical reactions occurs within the bean, some continuing during the second, 
drying, stage.
Processing of wet beans, whether fermenting or drying, can be carried out with 
fairly rudimentary equipment. The equipment can include simple baskets and holes 
in the ground where fermenting beans are covered with leaves, and wood or tin 
trays on which beans can be spread for sun or indoor drying.28 The certainty of 
fermentation understates the considerable potential for unsatisfactory processing 
to occur. Insufficient sun and continuous rain, as well as inadequate attention to 
the need to turn beans during fermentation and drying are among the conditions 
which reduce bean quality and affect flavour. Where beans are inherently uneven 
in size and shape, as is the case with beans from Trinitario trees, processing 
requirements include even more attention during the fermenting and drying stages. 
Increased attention is associated with the use of well-constructed fermenting boxes 
and extensive drying areas, plus driers propelling hot-air through the beans 
contained in rotating cylindrical drums. The extra labour and better equipment is 
necessary to produce superior quality bean which obtains the greatest price 
advantage from fine and flavour cocoa.
That is, inherent in the type of cocoa grown and the market being aimed at by 
Administration officials and marketing firms was the need for more sophisticated 
equipment and a standardised curing process. Neither the labour nor the 
equipment necessary for standardisation could be provided by a mass of 
smallholders individually processing the crop of a small number of trees. Where the 
total output from nearby households was below the amount judged necessary to 
make a central fermentary viable, about the yield of 50,000 trees or 1,000 growers 
under the Cocoa Ordinance’s terms, colonial officials were willing to accept other 
trading and processing solutions.29 While the ease of constructing small
28. Wood and Lass Cocoa Chapter 13 ‘From harvest to store’ by G.A.R. Wood, esp.pp.446-451
29. See for instances from New Ireland and Madang, PNGNA Department of Primary Industry Box 
No. 16,706, F/N 23-3-1(1) Native Cocoa Projects-New Ireland District. Where the volume of cocoa
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fermentaries made out of bush materials or selling to nearby plantations could be 
and was used where relatively small amounts of cocoa were produced by 
smallholders, neither practice met important requirements set by Administration 
policy and international markets. With small amounts of beans fermented poorly, 
quality standards of processing were hard to police. Where smallholder wet beans 
were sold to plantations acting as traders for processing in plantation fermentaries, 
a layer of capital was interposed between the grower and exporter of beans.30 In 
both cases, the prices received by households for beans were not what the colonial 
administration intended. Administration policy was reshaped to meet Henderson’s 
third condition for ‘grafting plantation methods’ on to ‘peasant methods’ by 
establishing centralised fermentaries to improve quality and increase prices paid to 
smallholders. The Tolai Cocoa Project on the Gazelle Peninsula provides the most 
substantial case of how colonial officials worked to establish and operate such 
fermentaries. However before examining this instance of administration action, the 
spread of cocoa growing and processing beyond the Peninsula is outlined, with 
emphasis on the Bougainville district where household production became 
predominant.
produced by households was too small to warrant a centralised fermentary dedicated to their crop, 
Administration officials often sanctioned arrangements between indigenous growers and plantation 
owners, including churches. For the accepted processing and marketing of smallholder cocoa by 
and through plantations on Karkar Island, Madang District, as well as the close watch kept on prices 
received by growers and the future need for an indigenous-owned central fermentary, see PNGNA 
Department of Primary Industry Box No. 16,706, F/N 23-3-1 (L) Part 1 Cocoa Projects-Madang 
District 18/6/62 MJ White, Marketing Officer, DASF to Chief of Division, Extension and Marketing, 
DASF, Konedobu ‘Report on the Marketing of Native Owned Cacao Kar Kar Island’. Shand and 
Straatmans Transition from Subsistence pp.87-89 note how, at least until the early 1970s, 
indigenous smallholder cocoa on Karkar Island was processed in plantation fermentaries.
30. For an instance where the colonial Administration initially encouraged indigenous producers to 
sell to plantations, while output of unfermented beans remained too small to warrant the 
construction of a central fermentary by growers, see PNGNA Department of Primary Industry AN 12, 
Box No. 16,706, File No.23-3-1(0) Cocoa Projects Other Than Tolai-New Britain District 20/2/58 
J.C.Lamrock, Senior Agricultural Officer, Regional Agricultural Office, to District Officer, District HQ, 
Rabaul re Native Cocoa Plantings - Bainings Coast: This memorandum is to reiterate previous 
policy in that native cocoa production is to be fostered in the Bainings Coastal area where the local 
produce can find a ready market from neighbouring plantations. Due to the low population and 
planting density it is assumed that at this stage it is highly improbable that the native production will 
be sufficient to operate their own Central Fermentary in the foreseeable future’. In other cases, to 
encourage cocoa growing in more remote areas where there were no nearby plantations, joint 
ventures between Native Societies, the Department of Cooperatives and DASF operated 
fermentaries, pooled the profits accrued (between purchase price paid for wet beans and income 
received out of sale of dry beans) for future use by the Native Societies.
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Indigenous Cocoa Growing: Colony-wide Expansion
While cocoa production among the Tolai of the Gazelle Peninsula provided the
most prominent initial instance of the official development priority, Administration 
intentions were always that growing and processing the crop would be carried out 
by smallholders in other coastal and islands areas. During the 1950s, in particular, 
the Administration made substantial attempts to ensure that where climatic and soil 
conditions seemed suitable for cocoa growing,31 households were given what 
assistance was possible within existing resource constraints.
One specific measure undertaken during the 1950s by colonial officials was 
especially fortuitous for the subsequent spread of cocoa beyond the Gazelle 
Peninsula. In 1954, a research programme to improve cocoa stock had been 
established at Sohano in Bougainville. During the 1960s vascular streak dieback 
(VSD) disease attacked trees on plantations and smallholdings in East New Britain 
District, including the Gazelle Peninsula.32 While the disease destroyed up to one 
quarter of the trees on the Gazelle Peninsula, primarily but not solely upon 
plantations where there was a greater proportion of mature trees more susceptible 
to the virus, it did not spread to other areas where cocoa was grown. Because of 
the cocoa research being carried out on Bougainville, it was possible to prevent 
stock from outside the district being brought in and also to continue to upgrade 
plantings in other parts of the colony with improved VSD-free material.
At one time or other cocoa was also grown in Gulf, Central, Milne Bay, Northern, 
Manus, Sepik, Madang, Morobe, and New Ireland Districts, as well as in New 
Britain outside the Gazelle Peninsula.33 At Independence, small amounts of cocoa 
were still being produced by smallholders in most of these districts, with over 200
31. See Chapter Two, fn. 120
32. Wood and Lass Cocoa pp.322-329 for a brief description of the disease, its characteristics and 
effects, as well as the outbreak and its treatment in PNG.
33. For an account of indigenous cocoa growing on Karkar Island, Madang District Shand and 
Straatmans Transition from Subsistence pp.73-91, and for the formation of the Nalkul Cocoa 
Growers’ Co-operative Limited within the southern Nalik villages of New Ireland, see Sumer Singh 
Co-operatives in Papua New Guinea pp.59-61. Both descriptions emphasise the early attraction of 
the crop in the 1950s and the more substantial plantings of the 1960s.
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tonnes in each of Northern, Madang, East Sepik, New Ireland and West New 
Britain.34
The expansion of smallholder production was deceptive, and is sometimes 
misunderstood.35 Even as the total acreage under cocoa trees, on plantations and 
smallholdings, increased from less than 4,000 hectares in 1950 to over 30,000 
hectares in 1959 and almost 50,000 hectares in 1965/66,36 household output 
remained negligible as a proportion of the total. In 1966, smallholder production 
was still less than 1,000 tonnes while largeholding output had reached 14,658 
tonnes.37 That is, after almost two decades of colonial policy giving primacy to 
indigenous smallholder production, in cocoa the superficial appearance was that 
policy had little effect.
However while output remained low, by 1965 indigenous growers had planted 
about eight million trees, with the majority not yet mature.38 By 1970/71, before the 
most substantial takeover of plantations occurred, the real extent of the earlier 
smallholder expansion of plantings became obvious. With over 8,000 tonnes, 
households were now producing almost a third of total PNG output of 26,000 
tonnes. As well, the full effect of a major wave of new household plantings on 
Bougainville was yet to become apparent.
Bougainville as Exceptional Exemplar
While the Gazelle Peninsula provides the best example of how colonial 
development policy encouraging smallholder cocoa growing resulted in 
contradictory outcomes, Bougainville district is exemplary for other reasons. As 
with the Gazelle Peninsula, there was early post-war interest in cocoa production • 
by wealthy Bougainvilleans. But the most important smallholder expansion in the 
latter district did not occur until after the 1950s, the decade during which many
34. Densley and Wheeler Cocoa Table 5, p.10.
35. See http://www.aciar.qov.au/proiect/ASEM/2003/015 where it is claimed that households 
emerged as substantial producers upon the break-up of the ‘plantation sector’, presumably after the 
early 1970s.
36. NAA A452/1, 1958/4219 Cocoa-Marketing of-Papua & New Guinea c.March 1960 Note on PNG 
Cocoa for Department of Trade Mission to Latin America; Densley and Wheeler Cocoa p.2
37. Densley and Wheeler Cocoa Table 2, p.3 
22. Densley and Wheeler Cocoa p.2
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households on the Gazelle Peninsula incorporated the crop into their agriculture. 
The particularly rapid expansion of cocoa tree plantings in Bougainville in the 
1960s meant that by the 1970s households in the district had become at least as 
significant for the future of cocoa production in PNG as the earlier established 
Gazelle Peninsula growers. In Bougainville more than twice the acreage as that on 
the Peninsula was planted to trees which were not yet bearing. Although in 
1972/73 Gazelle Peninsula smallholders had planted over 8,000 hectares with 
cocoa trees, and this was an almost identical area to that planted in the 
Bougainville District, the earlier planting of cocoa in East New Britain meant that 
this area had an output predominance which would probably not last as trees 
aged.39 The time-frame of the experience on Bougainville was in this respect more 
typical of cocoa growing in PNG than on the Gazelle Peninsula, with household 
production exceeding that from plantations only in the 1970s.
There is a further, more important reason than chronology why cocoa growing by 
small holders in Bougainville rather than on the Gazelle Peninsula should be 
regarded as the exemplar for what colonial policy intended to occur. In the former 
district the most substantial expansion of household planting coincided with the 
construction phase of the giant Panguna mine. The demand for labour to work at 
the mine during this phase pulled migrants from overseas and other parts of PNG. 
For many Bougainvilleans, however, cocoa growing acted as a brake on the 
movement of households off the land to wage employment at the mine. In the face 
of such large-scale, rapid industrialisation, with its demand for labour, the district’s 
cocoa growers were exceptional exemplars of what colonial policy intended by way 
of keeping households attached to smallholdings, thus checking 
proletarianisation.40 During the construction phase and early years of operation,
39. Densley and Wheeler Cocoa Table 8, p.12. Soon after Independence, as Densley and Wheeler 
indicate, an estimated 35,000 smallholders with at least 23,000 hectares of trees were producing 
about 12,600 tonnes of dry bean. About 48% of the total came from Bougainville and 37% from 
East New Britain, primarily the Gazelle Peninsula (p.18).
40. The extent to which this direction was still preferred twenty five years after the war ended is 
neatly illustrated by the following remark of the senior agricultural economist (SAE) of DASF, 
commenting upon a report on south Bougainville cocoa production. The SAE supported building a 
road linking Nagovisi to the Panguna-Kieta road. Where the main existing road went by a longer 
route, the proposed more direct route would substantially reduce the distance and thus 
transportation costs between the south-west, the major urban complex and the principal port on the 
east coast of the island. In order to deal with the most important likely ‘negative’ effect, that in
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Urbanisation was really only pronounced in the Kieta sub-district, making the 
‘mining towns of (the) Kieta/Panguna/Arawa complex...probably the fastest 
growing areas of Papua New Guinea...’41
While much of the Administration’s role in the District was identical to activities 
carried out by agricultural extension officers and other officials elsewhere in the 
colony, the importance of Bougainville lies in showing how - where soil and climate 
were especially conducive to cocoa growing - the drive to ensure that the crop was 
widely grown by smallholders was particularly successful.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century Bougainville had been an important 
area for plantation copra production. Rich volcanic soils, plentiful rainfall and 
sunshine made the eastern and north-eastern coasts, as well as Buka and several 
smaller islands, especially suitable for some of the largest plantations owned by 
international firms and European planters. Before World War II, labour demands 
for these largeholdings could not be met entirely by local populations. Recruitment 
from parts of Bougainville furthest from the plantations as well as other areas of 
PNG was an important component of largeholding operations. The 1930s 
depression when prices slumped eased demand for plantation workers as many 
largeholdings reduced their operations or cut costs while squeezing increased 
productivity out of a smaller labour force.42
With much of the Bougainville District subsequently at the centre of the World War 
II military conflict, the prolonged warfare greatly affected the capacities of the 
indigenous population. Many Bougainvilleans died, while disease and other forms
providing easier access for south Bougainvilleans to the mine and employment there, the road 
might encourage urban drift, the economist instead concluded: ‘On the other hand, the incomes 
from their own plantations are likely to give income superior to unskilled outside employment. If 
facilities are available in South Bougainville so people will spend their money on goods and 
entertainment it seems reasonable to think that the mining complex will not hold an excessive long­
term permanent attraction’. PNGNA AN 12, Box No.16,706,F/N 23-3-1(H), Native Cocoa Projects 
Bougainville District 17/2/1970 P. Emmery, SAE to Assistant Director, Development and Marketing, 
DASF ‘South Bougainville Cocoa Production’
41. T.K.Moulik Bougainville in transition Monograph No.7 Canberra: Development Studies Centre, 
The Australian National University, 1977, p.6
42. Cf. R.Stuart Nuts to You! Sydney: Wentworth Books, 1977; K.Buckley and K.KIugman “The 
Australian Presence in the Pacific”: Burns Philp 1914-1946 Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1983, 
Chs. 12-14
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of disruption occurred to affect daily life. Bombing and battles destroyed houses, 
food gardens, bridges, roads and paths. Taro, the most important item in 
household food consumption, ceased to be of importance due to the spread of a 
blight which virtually eliminated the crop in most gardens. No completely resistant 
variety was subsequently found. Sweet potato, strains of which came from other 
parts of PNG and were also brought by Japanese soldiers during their military 
occupation, replaced taro as the principal crop for household and animal 
consumption. Coconut trees on many plantations and in villages were destroyed. 
Previously cleared and cultivated areas were reclaimed by rapidly growing bush 
vegetation.
Post-war reconstruction placed a great strain on the indigenous population trying to 
rebuild houses and gardens. At the same time the re-opening and revitalizing of 
plantations in the district and elsewhere in the colony required large numbers of 
workers. The activities and ambitions of Bougainvilleans who were trying to expand 
their plantings of coconuts, peanuts, rice and cocoa added to demands for 
labour.43 Having grown up in the unsettled conditions of war-time, many of the 
younger Bougainvilleans were unused to the disciplines of smallholding agriculture. 
Young males in particular either drifted to urban centres, including Rabaul, or 
became plantation labourers. The provision of war damage compensation often 
reduced the immediate need to seek wage employment, cutting the supply of 
labour for a short period but also boosting the longer-term attractiveness of 
purchased goods.
The first decade and a half after war ended was fraught with the possibility that 
more and more Bougainvilleans would become wage workers, depending upon 
paid employment to reproduce subsistence, and maintaining a marginal 
attachment to smallholdings. This did not occur. By the time the mine at Panguna 
became a major employer in the late 1960s, wage employment was less, not more 
important for Bougainvilleans.44
43. Connell Taim bilong mani Chapters 3-4, 6-7, details the phases which each of these crops went 
through immediately after the war and into the 1950s for one district.
44. The success in maintaining and re-fastening Bougainvilleans’ attachment to smallholdings 
produced considerable tension subsequently when many non-Bougainvilleans from other parts of
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However by the early 1970s Bougainville was also unlike many areas of rural PNG 
in the extent of commercialisation of small-holder agriculture. Coconuts and then 
cocoa comprehensively tied household living standards to international market 
conditions. Bougainvilleans who lived in the crescent from Nagovisi, Siwai and 
Buin in the south-west and south, along the east coast of the main island through 
Nasioi, Teop Tinputz and to Buka Island had become more like their counterparts 
on the Gazelle Peninsula, parts of the coastal mainlands and the coffee-growing 
central Highlands.
Smallholder Cocoa
While there is some disagreement over the date of the first indigenous cocoa 
plantings on Bougainville, it seems likely that the process of commencement was 
similar to that elsewhere in PNG, including on the Gazelle Peninsula. John Connell 
notes that:
The first man to grow cocoa in south Bougainville was Widokuma of 
Mosigeta... who planted a thousand cocoa trees in March 1953. He had 
previously worked on a Rabaul plantation, and possibly also at Keravat 
agriculture station where the cocoa seeds came from....45
The similarity between this initial planting on Bougainville and by Scarlett Epstein’s 
first Rapitok grower, also a migrant who had plantation experience and 
Administration support is striking. Connell also describes subsequent plantings in 
Buin, again involving former plantation workers, and in 1955 and 1956 in Siwai 
following Administration patrols. In Nasioi, eastern Bougainville, cocoa plantings 
began through a similar process.46
PNG occupied wage positions at the mine, and became a much more prominent presence in the 
district’s main urban centres.
45. Connell Taim bilong mani p.108; cf. Donald D.Mitchell II Land and Agriculture in Nagovisi Papua 
New Guinea Monograph No.3 Port Moresby: IASER, 1976,pp.82-83, and Marion Ward Road and 
Development in Southwest Bougainville Research Bulletin No.62 Port Moresby and Canberra: New 
Guinea Research Unit, The Australian National University, 1975, p.41, whose earlier conclusion 
was ‘Cocoa was first introduced into the area [of southern Bougainville] about 1959 and was rapidly 
absorbed into the subsistence gardening economy.’
46. Eugene Ogan Business and Cargo: Socio-economic change among the Nasioi of Bougainville . 
New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 44 Port Moresby and Canberra: New Guinea Research Unit, 
ANU, 1972,pp. 124-126, reports that: ‘Villagers began to plant cocoa in the South Nasioi census 
division in 1952 with the encouragement of European plantations...The 1959 DASF patrol report 
estimated that there were 22,600 cocoa plants in the South Nasioi census division...Ownership of 
cocoa trees was generally associated with greater Europeanisation, as indicated by long-term
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Initially cocoa had a limited attraction for most smallholders, especially in areas 
where there were few roads and limited means of getting the crop to markets or 
stores where consumer goods were available. Not suitable for immediate 
household consumption, its attractiveness as a cash crop was for wealthy growers, 
particularly in Nasioi, near several plantations and the port at Kieta. For much of 
the 1950s, rice, peanuts and revitalised coconut plantings were more attractive 
crops for the bulk of households in southern Bougainville, where there was only 
one plantation, a limited market for wet beans and little fermentary capacity.
Connell describes the mid-1950s in southern Bougainville as:
a period of uncertainty. External assistance was almost non-existent, 
markets were absent and the potential of crops such as cocoa was little 
known. Consequently enthusiasm for cash cropping was no longer as it 
had been in the first post-war period; migration to work in plantations 
restarted and there was a measure of disillusionment with the low cash 
returns that followed greater incorporation in the market economy.47
Donald Mitchell goes further, claiming that in Nagovisi the first plantings were 
opposed by colonial officials.48
Whether there was opposition from officials, and if it was directed primarily at 
planting cocoa, the formation of an ‘unofficial cooperative’ or the ambitions of the 
planter as a member of the would-be bourgeois, is hard to resolve from this 
distance. However colonial officials throughout PNG had been alerted to the terms 
under which cocoa was to be grown and processed according to the 1951 Cocoa 
Ordinance (see above), which attempted to regulate spacing of trees, minimum 
numbers planted and encourage the establishment of central fermentaries. The
contact with a European employer and/or fluency in Pidgin. All cocoa owners listed had coconut 
holdings above the mean, suggesting personal qualities of industriousness’. See also the case of 
Kepoama, whom Connell (Taim bilong mani pp. 147-148) describes as ‘the first cocoa based Siwai 
businessman’ who served with ANGAU, was given encouragement by colonial policeman Barry 
Holloway, planted cocoa in the early 1950s, travelled to Rabaul to see cocoa growing there and 
became one of the first directors of the Siwai Rural Progress Society.
47. Connell Taim bilong mani p.110.
48. Land and Agriculture in Nagovisi p.82 where it is argued that: ‘According to Nagovisi tradition, 
the first plantings were made at Mosigeta by a man named Widokoma, who had learned cultivation 
techniques while working on a plantation on the east coast [of Bougainville]. He had few imitators at 
first; in fact, the Administration actively opposed his efforts, which were also at that time connected 
with the formation of an ‘unofficial cooperative’, a type of organization which the Administration 
strongly discouraged. Nevertheless, he persisted, and over time other Nagovisi began to plant 
cacao also’.
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1954 opening of the Sohano experimental station at Buka Passage, where 
experiments on cocoa growing under Bougainville conditions began,49 aided the 
dissemination of information to agricultural officers and growers. Without 
processing centres to properly ferment and cure the crop, and adequate means for 
getting dry beans at a suitable quality to market, it is unlikely that at this early 
stage, colonial officials would have given much support to any grower producing a 
small quantity of beans at some distance from a plantation or other fermentary.
It was a different story within a few years: even where Bougainvilleans from one 
district had worked for other indigenes in a nearby district, including Nagovisi 
employed by Siwais during the mid- to late-1950s, this ended ‘primarily because 
Nagovisis began to develop their own cocoa plantations’.50 An explosion of cocoa 
plantings occurred in Bougainville during the 1960s. By the early 1970s, cocoa had 
attained a dominant position in many parts of rural Bougainville.51
Marion Ward calculates that between 1965 and 1972, there was a growth rate of 
plantings of eighteen per cent per annum in southwest Bougainville, incorporating 
the three co-operative societies of Buin, Siwai and BANA. By 1972 there were 
nearly three million trees and production of 1,288 tons of dry cocoa bean. This 
output amounted to around two-thirds of all indigenous produced cocoa in the
49. Connell Taim bilong mani pp. 108-109
50. Connell Taim bilong mani p. 151. Mitchell Land and Agriculture in Nagovisi p.16 supports and 
extends this point, stating: ‘...although planting did begin prior to I960, I use the date 1960 to mark 
the beginning of intensive cacao plantings. The knowledge that money could be earned at home, on 
one’s own land (more precisely, on one’s wife’s own land) was a powerful force in recalling Nagovisi 
from work elsewhere. During the first half of the decade 1960-70, nearly every married man 
returned to work on cacao. Young unmarried men who would not in any case be planting cacao 
were free to work elsewhere and many continued to do so, although not on plantations. Instead, 
they worked in Rabaul, in Kieta town or, in increasing numbers for the copper-mining company and 
its subcontractors.’ Ward Road and Development in Southwest Bougainville Ch.4, develops the 
point even further, noting possible variations in external employment patterns between areas in the 
southwest according to the periods when the most substantial cocoa plantings commenced and 
then were completed. Nevertheless, Ward notes (p.91) that except in two census divisions, ‘the 
proportions of absent male workers [in the southwest] are...at the lower end of the national range...’
51. So successful was the emphasis upon planting and processing standards, that by the late 
1960s, the percentage of smallholder cocoa marketed by Buin and Kieta cooperative societies and 
rejected at cocoa inspections was approaching the low levels attained by plantations. PNGNA 
AN12, Box No. 16,706, F/N 23-3-1 (H) 23/3/70 Native Cocoa Projects Bougainville District Bob 
Moreland ‘South Bougainville Cocoa Production’ Table 1; cf. Connell Taim bilong mani p.153, who 
claims:’ In 1965 Rowntrees, ultimately the main purchaser of New Guinea cocoa, refused to give a 
grade to Siwai production because of its taste. (Ten years later good Siwai cocoa was the best in 
Bougainville and ranked with any in the world.)’
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Bougainville district.52 Although smallholders still only produced about one fifth of 
plantation produced cocoa in Bougainville, the extent of immature plantings soon to 
come into production in this district suggested the potential for household 
dominance of PNG’s total output which occurred soon after Independence.
The expansion was encouraged and supervised by the colonial administration, 
although it was not until the 1960s that much in the way of agricultural extension 
work was carried out, as the post-war shortage of agricultural and other skilled 
workers began to be overcome. The primary basis of this expansion, as the 
colonial government and local Administration intended, was smallholders utilising 
family labour processes to grow and harvest wet beans. While there were some 
substantial indigenous growers with thousands of trees in all cocoa growing areas 
of the district,53 most growers had a few hundred trees interplanted with coconuts 
and other food crops.54
The consequences of fitting cocoa into existing ideas of the place of permanent 
tree crops in household gardens were two-fold. A previously ‘flexible system of 
garden land use and re-use [had] been crystallized’ by permanent tree crop 
plantings. Secondly, ‘the normal fallowing cycle [had] been permanently disrupted 
[so that] practically no gardens planted during 1960-70 were allowed to fallow’.55 
That is, household labour processes and land use were intensified as a result of 
growing cocoa on smallholdings.
On Bougainville matrilineal inheritance seems to have been strengthened by cocoa 
growing which led to more fights over inheritance, as the scarcity of good cocoa
52. Ward Road and Development in Southwest Bougainville pp.36-37,42
53. Connell Taim bilong mani pp. 153-154
54. The survey of 55 growers carried out during the early 1970s in the East New Britain, 
Bougainville and Madang Districts, suggested that growers in the first district had slightly more 
trees and more mature trees per household (786) than growers in Bougainville (549) and Madang 
(489). Bougainvilleans had more immature trees (292), than either East New Britain (175) or 
Madang (138) growers, with all growers considerably below DASF recommendations for the 
average number of trees per hectare. Godyn An Economic Survey of Cocoa in Papua New Guinea 
Part III village cocoa p.10
55. Mitchell Land and Agriculture in Nagovisi p.81. As Mitchell noted of cocoa growing in Nagovisi, 
where the bulk of plantings occurred between 1960 and 1970: ‘Cacao fitted into the system of ideas 
about permanent tree crops without much difficulty and, if anything, the system of normative land 
tenure rules has been strengthened....From an outsider’s point of view, however, cacao has been 
planted where it does not belong - with the temporary and shifting system of root-crop gardening’.
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land became pronounced. There is, at least as yet, no basis for suggesting that the 
strategies for avoiding inheritance claims adopted by Tolai growers, and 
particularly those with the most extensive plantings, discussed below, were 
widespread on Bougainville. Instead the large growers were initially less restricted 
in their ability to acquire land, especially in southern Bougainville where plantations 
hardly existed, but they faced labour shortages because so many Bougainvillean 
households grew their own cocoa. Instead ambitious Bougainvilleans moved into 
private trading and fermentary operations.
Processing and Marketing on Bougainville
Fermenting and curing of beans, as well as marketing, also took a distinct route on
Bougainville. The cooperative society model associated with processing and
trading became predominant. Tussles occurred in these organisations over control
of the processors and trading opportunities. The differences between Bougainville
and East New Britain were striking, as 1973 figures for the different types of
marketing and processing indicate. While in East New Britain:
only 3% of smallholder production was sold through indigenously owned 
co-operatives and companies, 50% through traders and 20% was sold 
directly to exporters...[in] the [N]orth Solomons [ie. Bougainville] 67% 
was sold to indigenously owned co-operatives and companies, 32% to 
traders and only 1% was sold directly to exporters.56
With minimal buying and processing of smallholder cocoa by plantations and non- 
indigenous traders, the standard of processing in small bush fermentaries was 
generally low. To counter this, the colonial administration pushed for improved 
fermenting in the main south Bougainville growing area. Along with the setting up 
of an agricultural station at Konga in Siwai, to replace a station closed at Buin, in 
1956 the first agricultural officer was permanently posted to the area. Kevin Tomlin 
played a major role in establishing the Siwai Rural Progress Society (later the 
Siwai Cooperative Society) to encourage and organise production and marketing in 
an area which he saw as having ‘great potential’.57
Initially heavily involved with rice and copra production and marketing, the 
leadership of the Society was clearly in the hands of the emerging bourgeoisie with
56. Densley and Wheeler Cocoa p.18
57. Connell Taim bilong mani p. 112
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work experience away from Siwai. These cooperative officials were already 
growing cash crops, including cocoa, and were not the old guard of traditional 
leaders. Tomlin, with knowledge of how Rural Progress Societies operated in the 
Sepik and Madang, arranged for the first seven directors to visit East New Britain 
‘to see the Native Cacao Scheme, Local Government Council organization, Vudal 
Land Settlement Scheme and anything else of Interest’ as part of being “well and 
truly indoctrinated on the subject of economic development and what is entailed in 
bringing it about”.58
In the late 1950s, along with the general disinterest in cocoa growing in south
Bougainville, the Society was little involved with the crop, and languished as an
organisation.59 Only from 1960, when the Siwai Local Government Council, with
the Teop-Tinputz LGC, were set up as the first on Bougainville, did there occur the
necessary political changes which were more favourable for increased agricultural
activity by smallholders. A direct connection between administrative authority and
household production was forged, with cocoa and to a lesser extent expanded
production of other crops and marketed goods, embodying the link. As Connell
indicates, by August 1960 at the seventh meeting of the Siwai LGC, the Council:
were becoming more ambitious; they requested [of the Administration] 
an aircraft landing strip [to cut out carrying cocoa and coffee over the 
long road to Buin] but they were [also] beginning to evolve their own 
ideas on the organization of commercial agriculture.60
These ‘ideas’ included opposing the 500 tree minimum required under the 1951 
Cocoa Ordinance, in favour of allowing smaller plantings as the basis for 
subsequent expansion, and pushing for all households to be required to devote 
more labour time to growing cocoa.61 The Council also appointed its own 
indigenous agricultural officer, a director who already had planted his own cocoa
63. Connell Taim bilon mani p.117. The latter phrase regarding indoctrination appears in a direct 
quote by Connell from a memo Tomlin wrote to the District Commissioner, ENB.
59. In nearby Nagovisi, the Rural Progress Society formed in 1957-58 had a brief existence, going 
into liquidation two years later. The 1966 formation of the BANA (BAitsi/NAgovisi) Local 
Government Council and the most substantial form taken by the BANA Society occurred 
simultaneous with the major increase of cocoa output in the area. See Mitchell Land and Agriculture 
in Nagovisi p. 16, pp.82-84
60. Taim bilong mani p.126
61. Ogan Business and Cargo p.126, states the idea of expansion, to eventually reach a 15 acre, 
3,000 tree holding, from the 2 V2 acre, 500 tree minimum became a DASF guideline for a man and 
wife plus two adult male children household. Cited also in Connell Taim bilong mani p.143
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holding. In the early 1960s, the overlap between the LGC and the Society became 
considerable, with similar subjects and activities being discussed and proposed at 
meetings of each. Still, with few mature trees and cocoa bean to buy and sell to 
exporters, the Society developed little momentum. Standards of processing in 
small bush fermentaries continued to be so low that the first cocoa from local 
sellers taken by the Society to Rabaul was rejected by the Administration’s cocoa 
inspectors.
Experience of the importance of fermenting and curing quality, combined with the 
rapid increase in trees planted and maturing, pushed the Society into constructing 
and owning fermentaries, as well as continuing to purchase beans. The expansion 
took the Society beyond Siwai into surrounding areas, including Nagovisi and 
Buin,62 where there were either similar existing organisations or embryonic forms of 
cooperatives. Not only did the standard of Siwai Cooperative Society marketed 
cocoa improve dramatically during the late 1960s and 1970s (see above), the 
Society itself became a model for other indigenous operations.63
However contrary to the Siwai direction of better quality cocoa processed at 
larger, centralised fermentaries, at the same time the increase of cocoa 
growing on widely dispersed smallholdings also made it possible for more and 
more small fermentaries to be constructed throughout Bougainville. These 
remained unregulated. Only cocoa inspection at major centres and the quality 
standards imposed by exporters imposed sufficient discipline on the 
processing which was occurring at these other fermentaries.
In 1974, under the recently introduced Cocoa Industry Act, the newly formed 
Cocoa Industry Board was given wide powers, including the power to register 
fermentaries. Soon after Independence registration became obligatory but 
this remained little more than a revenue raising procedure. No action was
62. Connell Taim bilong mani p.153
63. Connell Taim bilong mani p.153, states that: ‘...by 1965 the developments in Siwai were 
considered to be the best in Bougainville. Just as Siwais had gone to New Britain to see how 
cocoa was grown and societies operated, so, in its turn, the Siwai Society became a model of 
integrated development, based upon cocoa, and there were official visitors from Buin, Kieta 
and Buka, all areas which had hitherto been in advance of Siwai in terms of cash crop 
expansion’.
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taken to limit the number of fermentaries or impose other than minimum 
requirements on fermenting equipment as a condition of registration. This 
absence of administrative limits upon fermentary operations resulted in ‘...the 
growth of individual very small scale fermentaries operated by village groups 
or individuals’ .64 Increasingly the proliferation of these fermentaries not only 
threatened the more centralised co-operative society operated processing 
centres, but the quality of exported cocoa as well. The colonial 
administration’s efforts to ensure that smallholders produced high quality fine 
and flavour cocoa became a fading memory.
If Bougainville was the exemplar for intentional development policies and the 
expansion of smallholder cocoa growing, on the Gazelle Peninsula capital 
accumulation clashed with intentional development in an especially pronounced 
manner. While the post-war drive by indigenes to plant, harvest and process cocoa 
for international markets was not confined to the Gazelle Peninsula, nevertheless it 
was here - where the European owner-occupiers and international companies also 
were especially important in largeholding agriculture - that the most substantial 
initial drive commenced. Subsequently, as noted above, the increase in plantings 
in the Bougainville District came to equal those in East New Britain. But the nature 
of the experience with cocoa production on the Gazelle Peninsula diverged 
substantially. Because of the differences, and what occurred in this area to change 
late colonial and self-government development policy and practice for PNG, cocoa 
production among the Tolai needs to be given separate, detailed consideration.
Cocoa production on the Gazelle Peninsula
The early post-war experience of cocoa growing in the favourable climatic and soil 
conditions on the Gazelle Peninsula has already been outlined in Chapter Two. 
From a very minor place in the indigenous economy between the wars, cocoa was 
first taken up by wealthy Tolai and then extended more widely to smallholders to 
the point where it became a ‘staple crop’ .65 Previous plantation experience 
provided some of the resources, including agricultural skills, which made the 
subsequent expansion of indigenous agriculture possible. In selecting Rapitok, a
64. Densley and Wheeler Cocoa p. 11
65. T.S.Epstein Capitalism, Primitive and Modern p.61
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Settlement at the frontier of Tolai lands, Epstein indicates the means by which land 
planted to commercial crops was extended where population pressures were not 
greatest.
Epstein’s exemplary former migrant who commenced cocoa growing in Rapitok 
also provides an informative instance of the process by which a member of the 
indigenous class of capital emerged. Commencing with funds acquired from 
plantation employment, the wealthy Tolai extended his activities through cocoa 
growing on land acquired through his father’s matrilineage. His first income from 
the cocoa went to provide a feast for the elders who, with no experience of working 
outside the parish, initially opposed his planting cocoa.66
The circumstances in other Tolai parishes differed in important respects, even if 
the over-ail consequence was also a drive to expand plantings of cocoa trees. 
Salisbury details how three years after the Kerevat LAES Station began to 
revitalise its cocoa trees in 1946, seed was available for planting in Vunamami 
Village, near Rabaul. Vunamami was, in Salisbury’s words, ‘an “exceptional’ 
village, not only for New Guinea as a whole but among the Tolai’.67 The 
exceptionalism arose because of the early contact between villagers and European 
missionaries and traders, as well as the extensive alienation of land for plantations 
in Vunamami and nearby villages. Vunamami was densely populated, with a long 
history of contact with plantation and administrative personnel. Unlike Rapitok, at 
the frontiers of Tolai settlement, Vunamami was one of the oldest established, 
wealthiest as well as most politically advanced villages. Indeed the first planter, 
Enos Teve, was a senior political figure, who planted cocoa on his own and his 
wife’s clan lands in proximate Balanatam and Vunamami villages.
Villagers received seed through DASF Extension officers, as part of a widespread 
process of distribution in Tolai areas.68 Between 1950 and 1952, there was a burst 
of smallholder plantings, with a decline over the subsequent three years, and a
66. Epstein Capitalism, Primitive and Modem p.61
67. Salisbury Vunamami p.14
68. Salisbury Vunamami p.56, pp.135-144
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further steady increase for the remainder of the 1950s and into the early 1960s. If 
the initial indigenous cocoa growers tended to be older and wealthier, 
subsequently:
...[the] second planters tend to have been smaller landowners, younger
men newly acquiring land, or women tending small numbers of trees.69
Distributing seed was one thing, ensuring the optimum conditions for planting and 
cultivation another. In Vunamami, the enthusiasm of senior men with access to 
‘unused garden land or plots in ravines’ meant sole cocoa, without leguminous or 
other shade, was planted using ‘needed labour from their clan dependants’.70 
Driven by the desire to accumulate but without previous experience growing cocoa 
and no colonial supervision, some of the initial plantings of the older, wealthier men 
were unsuccessful.71
As DASF Acting Director Henderson subsequently re-emphasised (see above), the 
scheme of smallholder production required active official coordination and 
supervision. If cocoa production by households was to expand efficiently and 
rapidly, the anticipatory component of intentional development was as important as 
learning through experience. Indigenous growers could not be left entirely alone on 
a broad scale to find out through failure what was already well known, including 
that proper spacing of trees and shade increased yields while reducing labour 
requirements. The early Gazelle experience reinforced the official awareness of 
what needed to be done. If all PNG cocoa exports were to meet international 
market standards, then smallholders had to be required to attain the same levels 
as plantation producers. Where household production was most advanced, 
coordination and supervision also had to be developed. Because little could be 
done about the spontaneous planting of trees by households, official attention was 
directed to processing conditions.
69. Salisbury Vunamami pp. 135-136
70. Salisbury Vunamami p.136
71. Salisbury Vunamami pp. 136-137, notes that: ‘Some of the earliest plots, planted without 
supervision by Agricultural Extension Officers, proved worthless after a few years. The most 
productive plots were those planted later in regular rows, under supervision, on the flat lands near 
Lumluvur, where many [coconut] palms had been destroyed [during the military action]. Standing 
coconuts were left for shade, as were those newly planted before 1950. By 1956 it was apparent 
that cocoa grew well, and with the least amount of care, under the high canopy of established, close 
planted palms. Small coconut growers realized that they could interplant with cocoa and so the 
number of growers increased’.
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Export Standards, Households and the Tolai Cocoa Project72 
The connection between cocoa production and the construction of five Local 
Government Councils (LGCs) in the Gazelle Peninsula was particularly important 
for official efforts to coordinate and supervise smallholder cocoa.73 As discussed in 
Chapter Three, the principal initial purpose of forming LGCs in the colony was to 
secure increases in the labour productivity of households.74 Where output of 
smallholder cocoa was an important measure of these increases, coupling the 
establishment of fermentaries to the development of LGCs in the most substantial 
area of cocoa production seemed to provide an especially significant opportunity to 
further the economic and administrative objectives of colonial rule.
Almost from the outset of cocoa growing on the Gazelle Peninsula, numbers of 
trees planted as well as anticipated output suggested the need for new 
fermentaries and drying facilities close to the areas of most rapid expansion.
72. There is as yet no comprehensive history of the Tolai Cocoa Project (hereafter the Project), 
despite the extensive documentation which is available. The brief summary presented here has 
been drawn from a large number of official files available in PNG and Australia, secondary sources, 
published as well as unpublished material and interviews with former colonial officials involved in 
administering the Project. See also: Williamson The Tolai Cocoa Project’; K.R.Gorringe The Tolai 
Cocoa Project, New Guinea’ Cocoa Grower’s Bulletin v.6, 1966, pp.27; Epstein Capitalism, 
Primitive and Modern Ch.6; Salisbury Vunamami Chapter 7; Wright State Practice and Rural 
Smallholder Production Chapter pp.348-356; PNGNA Department of Primary Industry Box No. 
16,705, F/N 23-3-1 (a) Part 6 Cacao Fermentaries-Gazelle Peninsula (Tolai) Tolai Cocoa Project ‘A 
summary report prepared by the Department of the Administrator from material submitted by the 
Departments of Agriculture, Trade and Industry and District Administration and outlining 
developments up to March, 1966’; M.B. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Port Moresby: 
Department of Law, May 1971
73. In 1950, Native Local Government Councils were proclaimed for the Rabaul, Reimber and 
Vunamami areas. Two years later, the Vunadidir-Toma-Nangananga Council was proclaimed and 
next year the Livuan LGC was proclaimed. These five Councils covered most of the area of the 
Gazelle Peninsula and included most of the Tolais with some notable exceptions such as the 
Navuneram and Raluana areas who were even this early opposed to local government as such.’ 
Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project p.2. These five LGCs were subsequently 
amalgamated into four councils, with Reimber-Livuan joining together, and in 1964 a further 
concentration produced one single Gazelle Peninsula Local Government Council. In 1969, the 
transformation of this Council into a multi-racial organization which covered non-indigenous 
residents of the Peninsula as well as indigenes, with the former also eligible to vote and hold office, 
prompted widespread protests and gave further impetus to nationalist expression through the 
Mataungan Association (see below).
74. See also Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production Chapter 8, and especially 
p.344.
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Conditions on the Gazelle Peninsula that give rise to a relatively brief period of the 
main cocoa flush when pods ripen, further strengthened this requirement.75
However centralisation of processing in factories could take a number of forms, 
including on plantations and separately constructed by private owners and 
operators. The form initially preferred by the Administration, some of the most 
influential and successful Tolais and many household growers resulted in the 
construction and operation of eighteen LGC-affihated fermentaries. These were 
operated under the Tolai Cocoa Project, which processed and then sold to 
exporters the largest proportion of the smallholder crop during the early period of 
cocoa growing. However as will also be shown, the Administration’s commitment to 
individual property rights and competition meant that other Tolai as well as non- 
indigenous traders and fermentary operators were always able to build and operate 
private fermentaries. These continually attracted a share of the totai smallholding 
output and threatened the viability of the TCP.
Wright, following and elaborating upon Scarlett Epstein, explains that the Project 
went through three phases.76 The first phase began when the Vunamami Council 
utilised revenues to build a cocoa fermentary and followed a failure by individual 
growers to process their beans at Malekuna/Malakuna, when the Vunamami 
Council utlised revenues to build a cocoa fermentary.77 Salisbury notes a similar
75. Cocoa pods ripen over a fairly lengthy period, of anywhere between 165 and 200 days and on 
average about six months after fertilising the flower takes place. Because of weather and other 
factors, while some cocoa ripens over much of the year, there tends to be one or possibly two flush 
periods varying from a few weeks to around two months when most pods ripen. In the Gazelle, the 
main flush and thus the greatest need for fermentary capacity occurs each year over a short period, 
of six to eight weeks in May and June. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 9. The 
main flush period occurs slightly earlier on the Gazelle Peninsula than it does in the other main 
cocoa producing areas of Bougainville and Madang. See Godyn An Economic Survey of Cocoa in 
Papua New Guinea Part III village cocoa Table 2, p.4
76. Wright State Practice and Rural Smallholder Production
77. Williamson The Tolai Cocoa Project’, p.594 generalises the 1951 experience with growing and 
processing, stating: ‘Although marketing of beans did not reach substantial proportions, there was 
already evidence that processing of beans was haphazard and standards were generally low. 
Production was distributed among numerous growers on smallholdings acting independently and in 
consequence there was no strength in the marketing procedure from the producer’s end.’ 
Williamson then emphasizes the consequences of inefficient processing and marketing procedures 
for the local and Territory economies, repeating points noted previously of the need to produce a 
uniformly high quality product to maximize prices on world markets and ‘avoid at all costs the 
disasters which had occurred among peasant cocoa producers of Ghana.’
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impetus for setting up a cocoa fermentary at Ngatur on a plot of land which had 
previously been planted to coconuts.78
The initial prestige of the Councils among many Tolai encouraged Administration 
officials, Councillors and leading cocoa growers alike to agree on the need for 
‘non-profit fermentaries’ based upon elected LGCs which would ‘process and 
market individual growers’ beans’.79 In 1951, the Vunamami LGC provided £A240 
from revenues for the Ngatur fermentary, and £A64 for the construction of sun 
drying facilities. Two years later, the Reimber/Livuan LGC allocated funds for a 
processing centre at Pelegir. Critically, at this stage, no growers individually 
provided funds. Each grower who decided to have wet beans processed and 
marketed to an exporter by a fermentary, was required to register with that 
fermentary. The fermentary subsequently marketed the beans under its own name, 
but ownership of the beans remained with individual growers. Until the late 1960s, 
growers were paid in two tranches, an initial advance or part-payment upon 
delivery of the wet beans and a final payment once the beans had been sold and 
operating costs of the fermentary deducted.
The early difficulties of the cooperative movement in the Gazelle, which was 
primarily involved with copra marketing and consumer goods retailing, ensured that 
in this area the cooperative model was not adopted for cocoa processing and 
marketing.80 Instead the emphasis was placed upon the construction of LGC 
fermentaries which would maximize returns to growers who retained individual 
ownership of ‘their beans’ at all times. Even if subsequently the public utility 
appearance of the fermentaries and the maintenance of individual ownership of 
beans would undercut the Project (see below), at the outset each made the Project 
more attractive to most growers as well as to the Administration.
78. Salisbury Vunamami p.256, states that:’ the Council had set up the fermentary on the same plot 
of land, ostensibly to provide for the active individual politicians and entrepreneurs who were 
privately growing cocoa’.
79. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project p.2, citing Department of Agriculture History of 
Tolai Cocoa Project 1965
80. Epstein Capitalism, Primitive and Modern p. 118
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In the second phase of the TCP, the Administration provided loans, both low 
interest and non-interest bearing, to Reimber/Livuan, Vunamami and Vunadadir 
LGCs to further increase capacity and improve equipment. As well, some funds 
were provided by growers who relinquished final payments from a number of 
consignments that had been sold. These growers were subsequently repaid.81
However the rapid increases in output as more and more trees were planted and 
earlier plantings matured, soon exerted pressure for fermentaries with even greater 
processing capacity in all LGC areas. A serious over-estimation of yield per trees, 
which amounted to almost doubling the actual yield of dry beans received, to 4 lbs 
per tree instead of 2.2 lb, made the position appear even worse. A 1955 estimation 
of fermenting and drying capacity needed in the Gazelle concluded that twelve 
fermentaries would be required to process smallholder output, at a cost of 
approximately £80,000.
Funding this expansion was beyond the capacity of the LGCs and the 
Administration. The third phase, which effectively continued until the TCP was 
privatised in 1971, involved private capital underpinning the increase in the number 
of fermentaries built and the growing sophistication of the equipment employed to 
process wet and dry beans. Provided with the appropriate collateral of assets from 
the councils, which could not include titles to land and a guarantee by the 
Administration, the Bank of New South Wales (henceforth the Bank) agreed to lend 
up to £A80,000 to the councils at 4 %% interest per annum.82 The first loan was 
made in 1956. Over the next four years, there were two further increases in 
borrowings. The peak of the loan commitment by the Bank reached £A227,000 in 
1960, while the maximum actual borrowing occurred in the following year at 
£A177,930. In 1961 the balance in the redemption account, representing 
repayments from the levy of £35 per ton of dry bean sold, was £78,133. The net 
balance of indebtedness was less than £100,000. As a consequence of the
81. For two conflicting accounts of how the growers were repaid, see Allwood A Report on the Tolai 
Cocoa Project p.4
82. The Allwood account A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project p.5, gives January 1956, after the 
Administrator provided the guarantees to the Bank of New South Wales as the end of the 
development phase and the official commencement date of the Tolai Cocoa Project.
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prudent operation of the Project, the Bank agreed to a reduction in the redemption 
rate, from £35 per ton to £30 per ton.83
The Bank loan for plant and equipment was not the only money capital employed. 
In 1958, a Bank overdraft of £A20,000 for other operating expenses was 
negotiated: three years later, the overdraft limit was raised to £A30,000. With this 
support from the Bank, plus the continuing absorption by the colonial government 
of the salary and other costs of Administration personnel working on the TCP, the 
Project was able to expand the number of fermentaries. By 1964, at which time the 
four LGCs had been consolidated into a Gazelle Peninsula LGC, the TCP 
consisted of eighteen fermentaries. At its peak, just a few years later, the annual 
output of these fermentaries was more than 1500 tons of dry bean. The Tolai 
Cocoa Project became the largest non-plantation exporter of cocoa, with the 
produce from some fermentaries obtaining premium prices on international 
markets.
The TCP Under Increasing Pressure
Between 1961 and 1965 smallholder production on the Peninsula increased to 
over four thousand tons of dry beans, from more than four million mature trees, 
with 3.6 million of those registered. However at the same time as the total output of 
wet beans increased, the TCP share of beans processed declined to little over one 
third. In 1967, the management of the Project was changed and the Project was 
vested entirely in the newly formed Gazelle Peninsula LGC. The two payment 
system for wet beans ended. Payment by the TCP to growers was changed to the 
same one payment arrangement practised by private traders. Fermentaries were 
also opened to receive beans for six days per week, instead of the previous five.
These changes appeared to breathe new life into the TCP. While smallholder 
production remained below the 1965 peak, the Project increased production by 
gaining a greater share of smallholder wet beans, which in 1968 reached sixty 
three per cent of the beans grown. A (short-lived) price stabilization fund was 
introduced and in February 1968, a conference decided on a policy of centralizing
83. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 1, pp.5-6
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fermentaries. It was decided that the number of operating fermentaries would be 
reduced to three, at Volavola, Vunakanau and Malapau, with former fermentaries 
continuing as buying points for wet bean. This bean was transported to the three 
surviving processing centres. However resistance to the closures meant that 
‘although initially some of the fermentaries in the Gazelle were closed, most appear 
to have re-opened’,84 and the anticipated benefits for the TCP of centralising 
processing did not necessarily occur.
By mid-1968, the initial Bank loan for building and equipping fermentaries was re­
paid. However the Project was forced to increase its overdraft limit to $A300,000 to 
accommodate increased operating costs.85 In 1968, responding to demands from 
growers, the Project also began purchasing coconuts. These were processed into 
copra in a recently constructed copra dryer.
The improvement in the Project’s trading position was brief, however. Over just 
nine months, between May 1969 and January 1970, its share of smallholder cocoa 
declined to thirty two percent as other processors gained the ascendancy. What 
had become a profitable operation soon changed so that it appeared unlikely the 
Project could repay a sizable Bank loan obtained to construct the ultra-modern 
central fermentary opened in 1969 at Volavola.86 The Administration again turned 
to a Sydney adviser who repeated his earlier recommendation for privatisation of 
the TCP. On July 15, 1970 a special meeting of the Gazelle Peninsula LGC 
adopted this recommendation, as did the Director of Agriculture. Over the next 
year, a conversion programme was put into effect. Why the TCP, an organisation 
affiliated to and supported by the Administration, Local Government Councils and 
many growers, was wound up is now explained. To do so, it is necessary to 
examine important features of the Project’s management and ownership.
84. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 2 ‘Management Structure’, p.9
85. In February 1966, the Australian currency was changed from £A to $A, with the latter legal 
tender in PNG until April 1975, when the national currency, kina and toea, was introduced
86. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 1, pp.7-11
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TCP’s Management-a contested realm
Since the 1950s, the dominance of the Administration in determining the 
operations of the TCP had prompted much local criticism. The objections reflected 
the economic and political tensions inherent in the structure of a public utility. While 
‘the establishment of the Project was due entirely to the efforts of the 
Administration who wished to avoid some of the problems [with] which West Africa 
had had to deal over the years’,87 there was also, as noted above, the need to 
restrain ‘the wealthy’ in an area of PNG where these were especially advanced.88
The structure of the TCP’s administration and management up until 1967, when 
the project was effectively passed to/taken over by the Gazelle Peninsula LGC, 
ensured the Administration’s continued authority and tied this to the provision of 
loans. In 1955, when the first Bank loan was being negotiated, an ‘ad hoc 
committee’ to provide the overall administrative direction was established in Port 
Moresby.89 On the Gazelle Peninsula, four Council Cocoa Committees were 
established to run the fermentaries. Committee duties included over-seeing the 
disbursement of loan funds for fermentary construction, the control of policy and 
the operations of each fermentary in the appropriate council area. These Council 
Committees were dominated by a General Manager, from the Department of 
District Affairs, a Field Manager from the DASF and an Accountant - all employed 
and paid for by the Administration.90
Little changed with the 1958 formation of a Board of Management for the Project 
that included a representative from each fermentary, by then eighteen, as well as a 
representative from each Council. Control was still exercised through five 
Administration officers on the Board. The District Officer was Chairman, and there 
were an Executive Officer, a Field Manager, an Accounts Officer and the District
87. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 5 ‘Administration Involvement’ p.1
88. Epstein Capitalism, Primitive and Modern Chs. 1-4; Salisbury Vunamami Part 1-2; A.L.Epstein 
Matupit: Land, Politics and Change among the Tolai of New Britain Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1969, Ch.1
89 This committee consisted of the Chief of the Division of Agricultural Extension, DASF, and the 
Chief of the Division of Development and Welfare, Department of Native Affairs, consulting with the 
Administrator.
90. Williamson The Tolai Cocoa Project’ pp.596-597
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Agricultural Officer. ‘[A]t the fermentary level the “didiman” [agricultural officer] and 
“kiap” [district officer] supervised operations’.91
The selection of the local representatives for the Board of Management showed 
the extent of the Administration’s authority, but also the continuing push by the 
most substantial growers to dominate the TCP. This push was conveyed directly to 
the most senior levels of the colonial administration.92 In September 1957, 
J.C.Lamrock, the Senior Agricultural Officer (SAO) to whom Conroy had written, 
showed a clearer understanding of the implications of letting the biggest producers 
dominate the management of fermentaries. For the drive by wealthy Tolai to have 
more influence on the TCP’s operations came at the same time as Councils and 
local district agricultural officers were in agreement on the need to stop the erection 
of ‘bush material’ fermentaries. These were privately owned by Tolai individuals for 
the processing of their own and purchased wet bean. The central Administration 
was opposed to any restraints on such operations, and could block Native Local 
Government Council rules ‘as restrictive in principle’ and thus invalid.93 However 
SAO Lamrock was not prepared to let the large producers have complete 
dominance of indigenous representation on the Project’s Board of Management.
He proposed a compromise to be applied to each Council Cocoa Committee, 
where the five paid Administration personnel held near-complete authority. 
Lamrock recommended that five grower representatives be appointed, but not as 
proposed by the Chief of the Agricultural Extension Division. In a letter addressed
91. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 5, p.2
92. PNGNA Department of Primary Industry Box No. 16,704, F/N 23-3-1 (a) Part 1 Production and 
Marketing-Native Projects Cacao Fermentaries-Gazelle Peninsula 7/8/1957 W.L.Conroy to Senior 
Agricultural Officer (SAO), Rabaul. In August 1957, W.L.Conroy, Chief, Division of Agricultural 
Extension wrote to the Senior Agricultural Officer, Rabaul: ‘When I visited the project early in the 
year some growers expressed to me the view that the prime say in management of the affairs of the 
fermentaries should be with the biggest producers. I am inclined to think there is a lot in this, for 
example it would give men like Tomariba a chance to transmit their personal efficiency to the 
fermentary management. I could envisage that, say there are to be five grower representatives on 
each fermentary Committee, they should be the five heaviest deliverers of wet bean at last flush. It 
is not democratic but may well make for smoother performance at present. Please give this your 
personal consideration and discuss its feasibility with the Department of Native Affairs staff and let 
me know opinions at earliest. Perhaps the Councils themselves would approve this course of 
action’.
93. PNGNA Department of Primary Industry Box No. 16,704, F/N 23-3-1 (a) Part 1 Production and 
Marketing-Native Projects Cacao Fermentaries-Gazelle Peninsula See correspondence of early 
1958 on Rule 9 of NLGCs.
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above Conroy’s head to the Director of DASF, Lamrock suggested that there 
should be three large and two small growers on each committee.94 That is, the 
large grower push could be contained within a form which protected small growers, 
assuming the local Administration personnel were of like mind or willing to accept 
instruction from the SAO. As long as the Administration continued to provide 
substantial assistance to the Project, none of it costed or charged out,95 protection 
of smallholders against the drive by indigenous accumulators could to an extent 
continue within the Project.
Encouraging competition was also a central component of colonial policy, so the 
protection was limited. After the mid-1950s, as the post-war shortage of cocoa was 
replaced by fluctuations between supply and demand, the changes also affected 
the competition between traders and fermentaries to obtain smallholder produce. 
As trees matured and production increased, this competition intensified further. In 
the competition, the continuing Administration dominance of the TCP’s 
management could be used against the Project by indigenous as well as non- 
indigenous commercial concerns. The privatisation of the TCP showed to what 
extent the Project, having initially provided space in which household production 
could be expanded, had lost support commercially as well as politically among the 
most powerful Tolai. The second major arena of tussle, after management, 
concerned ownership of the project.
94. PNGNA Department of Primary Industry Box No. 16,704, F/N 23-3-1 (a) Part 1 Production and 
Marketing-Native Projects Cacao Fermentaries-Gazelle Peninsula 2/9/1957 J.C.Lamrock, SAO, 
Rabaul to Director, DASF
95. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 5 ‘Administration Involvement’ provides 
several statements, prepared from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, on the extent of the subsidy 
provided to the TCP by the Administration as well as an assessment of the effect of withdrawing the 
subsidy. 9/2/1960 Executive Officer, TCP to Chairman, TCP ‘At present the Project is still heavily 
subsidized by the Administration when one considers the European staff salaries which are not 
charged to the fermentaries. Office space is free, electricity for the office is free. These costs would 
of course be borne by the Project if it were (an) independent business undertaking, and should the 
policy be adopted to eliminate the Administration subsidy completely, then I consider it quite likely 
that the Project’s fermentaries would not be able to pay much more, if any more at all, than private 
traders.’ A December 1968 memo to the Assistant Administrator (Economic Affairs), which takes up 




An important Administration objective was served by tying the fermentaries to the 
LGCs as a public utility. Such tying could ‘overcome any difficulty there might be in 
collecting share capital from growers’.96 Collecting share capital from individual 
growers would open ownership of fermentaries to different forms and amounts of 
share ownership, and through trading in shares make the ownership of 
fermentaries subject to the process of accumulation. This process could also 
undercut a major objective of colonial policy, that all growers’ Incomes would be 
optimized by continued ownership of ‘their’ crop until sold to international trading 
firms. Such optimization was central to making household production of crops, 
including cocoa, preferable to wage employment. Privately owned fermentaries, 
on the other hand, purchased wet bean, at which point the growers lost all 
proprietorial rights and possibilities of further income increases in the produce as a 
consequence of processing.
From January 1956 onwards, TCP growers were levied on a tonnage basis for the 
repayment of the loans provided by the Bank of New South Wales. Growers, 
particularly those who produced more cocoa and therefore per person paid more of 
the levy, increasingly conceived of this as a payment which acquired equity in the 
fermentaries constructed and operated with the borrowings. Regularly aired at 
meetings, the grievance of larger producers became most significant when in 1971 
no shares were given to TCP growers in the privatised New Guinea Islands 
Produce, and this firm obtained the assets of the TCP at a bargain-basement price 
(see below).
Although it was the Councils and the colonial administration which provided 
collateral for and ultimately guaranteed repayment of the loans, the fact that 
repayments in full were always made, easily gave the impression that such 
backing, however necessary from the Bank’s perspective, was rather meaningless. 
Growers’ efforts repaid the borrowings which made the building and equipping of 
fermentaries possible: therefore, went the reasoning, growers, and especially the
96. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 4, p.2
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more substantial growers, owned - or at least had substantial equity in - the 
fermentaries. These growers expected to be beneficiaries if and when the Project 
was wound-up and its assets privatised. That this did not occur only intensified the 
dissatisfaction with colonial development policy from the wealthiest Tolais who had 
continued to have their cocoa processed at project fermentaries. Privatization was 
hastened by another aspect of colonial policy, which had been challenged since 
the late 1950s.
Competition from processors and traders
The success of the late colonial drive to increase smallholder production of export 
cocoa had created more space within the cocoa-growing areas for trading as well 
as manufacturing, processing, capital. That is, increasing the productivity of 
households by raising the output of marketed crops and consumption of purchased 
goods enlarged the space for traders but also encouraged the building of other, 
non-Project fermentaries. This space was further enlarged through the continuing 
conflict between two aspects of Administration policy to maximize the income of 
smallholder producers.
Processing cocoa in Tolai Cocoa Project fermentaries had been in conflict with 
another policy direction. The latter policy refused to limit the operation of traders 
and other fermentary owners, many of them local Chinese, who competed with the 
LGC owned and operated fermentaries. Despite the frequently expressed desire of 
many Tolai growers and political leaders to stop smallholder sales to private 
traders and strengthen the position of LGC fermentaries, the colonial 
administration refused to restrict competition in this manner. Once again one 
aspect of policy, which buttressed the spontaneous process of capitalist 
development, collided with and over-rode what the Administration intended as a 
principal means for securing household production.
Even before the formal inception of the TCP in 1956, a substantial amount of 
smallholder cocoa had been sold to traders and nearby plantations for processing 
in non-TCP fermentaries. Before and after 1956, this activity continually led to 
public criticism by Project supporters and to demands for action to make these
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sales illegal. In the late 1950s several LGCs passed regulations prohibiting the 
activity and imposed fines upon some Tolai. However the Administration, through 
the Crown Law Department, ruled that council legislation prohibiting the sales and 
imposing fines for transgressors was ultra vires. The legislation had to be 
rescinded but the criticism did not cease.97 Although changes in payment policy 
and in operations improved the TCP fermentaries’ position in obtaining a greater 
share of an increased total smallholder output in the late 1960s, as already noted 
the Project never held unchallenged dominance. 98 The decision to close down 
many TCP fermentaries and centralise production in just three fermentaries also 
reduced the amount of bean processed.99
In the late 1960s, some of the loss of grower support for the Project can also be 
explained by mounting opposition from the nationalist Mataungan Association 
(MA).100 However that the growing nationalist sentiment on the Gazelle Peninsula 
of the 1960s and early 1970s did not turn indigenous growers even more towards 
the TCP and away from non-indigenous traders and fermentary owners suggests 
the need to find another possible explanation for Tolai sales to non-TCP 
fermentaries and traders. This explanation needs to encompass the tussle that had 
been central to indigenous cocoa production throughout and which continued in the 
self-government period.
The Clash: Indigenous capital against household production
It has been argued that the most important explanation for the attractiveness of
selling cocoa to traders rather than having wet bean processed and sold by the
97. As Epstein notes, in support of the TCB aim to secure a monopsony over Tolai cocoa 
processing .there was ‘a motion proposed by a leading Tolai and passed by a large majority’ at a 
January 1961 meeting of the Board of the TCP which requested that the Administration ‘bring in 
legislation to compel all Tolai people within council areas to take their wet beans to council 
fermentaries’. Capitalism, Primitive and Modern p. 121.
98. Epstein Capitalism, Primitive and Modern Table 19, p.16; Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa 
Project Appendices A and B
99. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 2 ‘Management Structure’ p.9 cites Mr K 
Gorringe, Manager of the Project, as claiming ‘that it was due to the endeavour to centralize that the 
present [late 1960s and 1970: SM] downward trend in input can be attributed’.
100. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 1 ‘A History of the Project’, p.10 cites a 
Department of Agriculture history of the TCP: This drift away from the project was concurrent with 
extreme political unrest in the Gazelle-namely, between the Gazelle Council and the Mataungan 
Association. It was reported that the Mataungan Association in their bid to rid the area of the 
Council used the project as a financial lever as they felt that by destroying the project they would in 
turn destroy the Council.’
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TCP lay not in the immediate realm of financial return but in the growing clash 
between ‘tradition’, represented by matrilineal inheritance patterns, and ‘modernity’. 
The latter described the desire of cocoa-growing males to hide the extent of their 
holdings so that these could be passed on to their sons according to rules of 
patrilineal descent.101 In short, the requirement of the TCP that producers register 
with the project as a condition of accepting wet bean for fermenting and curing laid 
male producers open to scrutiny by members of the matrilineage upon whose land 
the cocoa was grown, as well as their own kin. The latter could easily find the 
extent of tree ownership and output from the register.
Such scrutiny would eventually preclude plantings from being passed on to sons, 
as the senior males desired and instead subject the plantings to disputes about 
ownership between the land-owning matrilineage and the kin-group of the trees’ 
owners, in this dispute, the intentions of the owner-producers - for the trees to be
inherited by their son(s) - would only rank as one determinant among many of the
1 0?outcome.
When land boundaries had not been formally surveyed and registered, and 
disputes were settled by leading elders, inheritance became even more uncertain. 
Cash which could be ‘hidden’ became especially attractive. While there were some 
means of circumventing the difficulty, such as by registering a son or sons as the 
owner of trees on matrilineage lands, none of these was without its own possible 
problems. Instead by not selling a substantial portion of cocoa to the TCP, a 
grower-producer - especially one cultivating many trees on lands obtained through 
several distinct arrangements - could accumulate the funds, deposit the money in 
bank accounts or engage in other commercial activities with less scrutiny and 
greater certainty. At worst, the trees themselves would be lost during squabbles 
over inheritance but at least the grower-producer could deploy the proceeds
101. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 6 ‘Drift away from Fermentaries’, provides a 
lengthy discussion of the competition with traders and other fermentaries. The discussion includes a 
summary of Epstein’s ‘rules of inheritance’ explanation, discussed below
102. Epstein Capitalism, Primitive and Modern p.126 states that: ‘A considerable number of Rapitok 
men, who have had their own matrilineage lands planted with cocoa by their sons, wish to conceal 
this fact from their fellow parishioners’, estimating that over 80% of ‘the house-holders in the 
Rapitok area sold some cocoa to the traders in 1959/60 as a means of providing for their sons’.
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received during his lifetime as he intended and improve the chances that his 
intentions would be satisfied after his death. This anthropological explanation 
based upon conflicting inheritance customs best explains the practice of growers 
selling such a substantial amount of cocoa to traders rather than the TCP, even if 
there appeared to bo no immediate financial incentive to do so .103
A major difficulty with this explanation, and the ultimate failure of the TCP which 
lead to privatisation, is that it does not take the next, necessary step. The 
anthropological explanation does not distinguish between the drive to accumulate 
by Tolai who formed the local indigenous class of capital, and the possibility that 
for other, most, Tolai, cocoa provided the means for acquiring an enlarged mass of 
consumption goods.104
For members of the emerging capitalist class any principal of inheritance which 
dispersed assets, either as welfare or by passing them into the hands of a 
commercial rival, would have been anathema. Being able to determine the present 
as well as future ownership of assets is critical for accumulation. Any means of 
securing ownership for the current as well as the next generation is to be preferred. 
In this case a ‘new’ principal of inheritance, individual determination by the current 
owner(s) was chosen. For the members of households for whom cocoa income 
provided the basis for immediate, possibly enlarged consumption, the hiding of 
assets by the class of accumulators was an attempt to reduce their welfare. 
Unsurprisingly, the tussle between accumulation and welfare was a constant 
feature in all cocoa growing areas. Where land to expand plantings was least 
plentiful, including on parts of Peninsula, the conflict was especially sharp.
The distinction between accumulation and welfare is critical for understanding 
central features of the late colonial establishment of cocoa growing, marketing and 
processing among the indigenous population of the Gazelle Peninsula. As noted
103. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 6 ‘Drift away from Fermentaries’, which 
provides an extensive list of possible financial and other reasons why Tolai sold to traders rather 
than to the Project.
104. Salisbury Vunamami p.237, hints at the distinction, referring to two types of activities practised 
by Tolais, between ‘bisnis’ [Melanesian pidgin tok pisin: business] and ‘not-bisnis’ (food) as with 
‘land purchase and cultivation for subsistence’.
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above, wealthy Tolai who had been involved in the pre-war increases in copra 
production and trade were among the first to plant cocoa, not always successfully. 
Indigenous growers with substantial numbers of cocoa trees as well as other 
commercial activities were also involved in the first efforts to construct a fermentary 
utilising Council resources at Ngatur. The same people were leaders of the LGCs, 
established in the early 1950s, who joined commercial activities with forms of 
political power. Their progress occurred despite the best efforts of the colonial 
administration which hoped to restrain any advance of the class, which as with 
international and expatriate capital might increase landlessness and 
proletarianisation.
Despite this intention to limit indigenous capital in cocoa growing, a small number 
of growers owning thousands of trees - often spread over a number of land- 
holdings owned and operated under different arrangements - emerged. By 1974, 
fifteen per cent of all indigenous-owned cocoa in East New Britain and Bougainville 
was grown using wage labour.105 The extent of other labour-forms employed by the 
most substantial indigenous growers is unknown.106
Initially the format of the TCP assisted in concealing the opposition between 
growers engaged in accumulation and those reproducing consumption at varying 
levels of need. Central to the disguise was the previously noted condition that all 
cocoa processed and sold through the Project remained the private property of 
each grower who registered with and sold to one or more of the Project’s 
fermentaries. That is, distinct ownership conditions - for accumulation and 
consumption - could appear as the same private property rights. At the same time
105. Densley and Wheeler Cocoa p.18, citing Godyn An Economic Survey of Cocoa in Papua New 
Guinea Part III Village cocoa p.21. However it should also be noted that so substantial was the 
drive to plant more cocoa in south Bougainville where there were competing demands for labour 
from the newly opened mine and what John Connell describes as ‘the lure of a new cattle industry’, 
that by the early 1970s there were labour shortages. ‘At the February 1970 Busiba Society 
directors’ meeting a motion was passed that Busiba should find labour from outside Bougainville 
(“Highland labour”) since local labour was in short supply. The Society were also willing to construct 
houses for such labourers...’ Taim bilong mani p.175.
106. In the context of labour exchange in rural Africa, Harold White has pointed to the limits of 
confining analysis of hired labour to wage employment. See ‘Combining Quantitative and 
Qualitative Approaches in Poverty Analysis’ World Development v.30, no.3, 2002, pp.511-522. 
There is no reason to believe that the point is any less relevant for rural PNG, and the means by 
which indigenous capitalists obtained labour to work their largeholdings.
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as the processed cocoa was secured as the private property of growers, 
Administration objectives regarding land usage - that the crop be grown on ‘native 
land’ which could not be bought and sold - and product quality could be met as 
well. That is ‘better control of the product through all stages of production from land 
usage to final processing can be exercised’ if the ‘economic unit’ is tied to the 
‘existing administrative organisation [Council] ' . 107
However the TCP format also constrained the capacity of the indigenous 
bourgeoisie to accumulate in a potentially important area of commercial activity, 
processing smallholder cocoa. While individual Tolai could establish smaller 
fermentaries, compete with expatriate owned plantation procssors and Chinese 
operations, the centralised production operations of the TCP offered a superior 
alternative. Gaining control of the TCP’s assets became especially important, and 
privatisation of iis operations added to the intensity of political tussles as self- 
government approached.
Accumulation and political power on the Gazelle Peninsula
Chapter Four considered how the political ambitions of local indigenous
capitalists and would-be members of this class were often expressed as anti­
colonial nationalism.108 This nationalism was overtly directed at the local 
government system constructed in the Gazelle Peninsula as well as the 
European and Chinese presence in all spheres of commerce and industry. 
However less frequently noticed is the attachment between the political and 
commercial ambitions of the leadership of the most prominent anti-colonial 
nationalist organisation, the Mataungan Association (MA).
As with other Tolai businessmen and women, these commercial ambitions 
required breaking the bounds set against their expansion in the marketing 
and processing of smallholder produce: in this case, ending the restraints 
imposed by the dominance of the Administration-supported TCP joined 
economic and political objectives for some members of the indigenous class
107. Allwood A Report on the Tolai Cocoa Project Part 4, p.1
108. See also Thompson and MacWilliam The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea, pp.56-60
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of capital.109 Indigenous leaders simply inverted the reasoning initially applied 
by the Administration when the Tolai Cocoa Project was introduced: for the 
former, ending the connection between household productivity and local 
government councils which had been made in part to restrain their ambitions 
had to occur in the interests of expanding the space occupied by indigenous 
capital. Even if the dominance of smallholder growing and harvesting of 
cocoa was to continue for the foreseeable future, trading and processing 
were to be opened up further for indigenous capital.
In March 1971, the Tolai Cocoa Project ended. At minimal cost, its assets passed 
into the hands of the recently incorporated firm New Guinea Islands Produce Co 
Ltd (NGIP), whose directors were mostly wealthy and powerful Tolai.110 These 
men also were members of the multi-racial Gazelle Peninsula LGC, the 
organization favoured by the colonial administration and the object of intense 
opposition from the radical nationalists. Less than eighteen months later, New 
Guinea Development Corporation was incorporated, with its first proposed activity 
including trading and operation of a fermentary. Subsequently, the company 
purchased a 600-hectare plantation Vunapit. John Kaputin and Damien Kereku 
who had been recently elected to the House of Assembly as leaders of the 
Matanguan Association and were stringent critics of the LGC, were among seven 
directors and shareholders of a firm with paid up capital of $A7 and nominal capital 
of $A250,000.* 111 That is, the long-standing competition between Tolai bourgeois
109. The wealthiest Tolai also began to take over plantations as these were vacated, particularly by 
expatriate owner-occupiers or planters.
110. PNG Registrar of Companies C.3193 New Guinea Islands Produce Co.Ltd and information 
provided by Company General Manager Mr Mike Manning. For a brief biography of one of these 
directors, Stanley Tomarita, who stood unsuccessfully on a ‘conservative’ platform for the Gazelle 
seat in the 1968 House of Assembly elections, see: Chowning, A.L.Epstein, T.S.Epstein, Jane 
Goodale and Ian Grosart ‘Under the volcano’ in Epstein, Parker and Reay eds. The Politics of 
Dependence: Papua New Guinea 1968, p.59. Another director, Meriba Tomakala, stood as an 
independent, effectively anti-Mataungan Association, pro-United Party (Rabaul) candidate for the 
Kokopo Open electorate in the 1972 House of Assembly elections. He polled second after the MA’s 
Oscar Tammur. He also had been an unsuccessful candidate at the 1964 elections. In 1972 
Tomakala was ‘the wealthiest Tolai [standing] with no close rival’ according to Ian Grosart and 
Christine F.McColl ‘East New Britain’ in Stone ed. Prelude to Self-Government,p.388
111. Registrar of Companies C.3868 New Guinea Development Corporation Ltd. The connection 
between the radical nationalist Mataungan Association, its preferred form of local government 
council -  the Warkurai Nigunan - and the NGDC as the commercial opposition to the 
Administration-favoured New Guinea Islands Produce Co., is detailed in Ian Grosart ‘Nationalism 
and micronationalism: the Tolai case’ in R.J.May ed. Micronationalist movements in Papua New
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and would-be bourgeois, as well as against non-indigenous traders and fermentary 
owners took an overt commercial form.
The subsequent limited commercial success of the New Guinea Development 
Corporation (NGDC) in the Gazelle Peninsula, and its move into Port Moresby, 
showed how intense was the competition in the activities of cocoa trading and 
processing.112 After Independence, however, the New Guinea Islands Produce 
Company (NGIP) remained heavily involved in the cocoa industry in East New 
Britain.113 In late 1986, NGIP was involved as the management company for a 
‘locally-owned’ consortium buying out the twenty one plantations in East New 
Britain, New Ireland and Bougainville/North Solomons still owned by the major 
Australian trading and plantation firm Burns Philp. The announced intention was to 
substantially expand hybrid cocoa plantings.114
Conclusion
The chapter has shown how important was the colonial administration’s role in 
formulating a direction for cocoa production in PNG which sought to maximize 
output and prices obtained by local producers. Increasing smallholder output, in 
particular, represented a major success for the colonial administration. Income 
received from the crop lifted household living standards in island and some coastal 
districts, meeting the improved welfare objective of colonial development policy.
However increased cocoa production also brought to the fore important features of 
the spontaneous process of development, and continually threatened to undermine 
other aspects of colonial policy. The challenge was most obvious over processing 
and marketing on the Gazelle Peninsula. The rapid increase in the numbers of 
indigenous and other businesses processing smallholder cocoa and trading in the
Guinea p. 142; and Grosart and McColl ‘East New Britain’, pp.380-381. The NGDC subsequently 
invested in a cocoa plantation, a tavern, tourism, and real estate on the Gazelle. After 
Independence, utilising funds borrowed in Australia, the firm purchased squash courts in Boroko, 
Port Moresby: see The Times July 19, 1984, p.32 ‘Tolai’s search for capital: a case of national 
enterprise’.
112. Registrar of Companies C.3868 New Guinea Development Corporation Ltd.
113. Registrar of Companies C 3193 New Guinea Islands Produce Co. Ltd.
114. MacWilliam ‘International Companies and Nationalist Politics in Papua New Guinea’ p.41. 
Unfortunately for the consortium, the revolt on Bougainville which broke out in November 1988 
eventually resulted in the closure of plantation operations in the province.
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crop posed a constant threat to the Tolai Cocoa Project. As colonial authority was 
weakened during the move to self-government, this threat was realised when the 
assets of the public utility were transferred to a private firm owned by wealthy and 
politically powerful Tolai.
Across PNG, and not only on the Gazelle Peninsula, the colonial government- 
backed processing and trading arrangements which tried to protect growers and 
maximize returns rapidly disappeared. Instead, with only minimal state supervision 
of fermentaries, growers could either process their beans in rudimentary facilities 
or sell wet beans to an increasing number of processors and traders. The quality of 
smallholder cocoa began to decline.
The success of the colonial policy to increase smallholder output had limited the 
ability of local, mainly indigenous, capital to acquire land for largeholding cocoa 
production. One effect of this barrier to the acquisition of land was to intensify the 
tussle over plantations being vacated by expatriate owner-occupiers and 
international firms. Another was to ensure that the Papua New Guineans who 
came to power were ambivalent about the importance of the colonial development 
policies and practices which had sustained smallholder production. While 
household output and consumption provided an important underpinning for the 
processing and trading activities in which the indigenous bourgeoisie engaged, 
smallholder occupation of so much land also limited the largeholding ambitions of 
the class.
The removal of restrictions against the construction and operation of rudimentary 
fermentaries provided opportunities for households, to process their own bean, and 
would-be bourgeois to accumulate capital. With this intensified competition the 
PNG Cocoa Board was unable to maintain much authority over processing 
faciities. While licensing of fermentaries continued, inspections of their operations 
became cursory. Quality control passed to the exporting companies, and a long­
term decline in PNG cocoa set in so that the country became a bulk cocoa, rather 
than fine and flavour producer. One direction plotted so deliberately by colonial
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The post-World War II period of colonial rule which preceded Independence in
PNG and other countries in the South Pacific continues to be assessed in terms of
the consequences for the indigenous population. In general, the evaluations are
condemnatory, concluding that the colonial powers, particularly Australia, failed to
bring growth and development. Sometimes critics make contradictory claims. Thus
Helen Hughes asserted that although the region ‘has been stalled at the communal
stage of development’, nevertheless:
the violence that was endemic in Pacific societies was held at bay 
during the colonial era by the imposition of security and probably more 
importantly, by rising living standards.1
How stalling at the communal stage was or could be associated with colonial 
authority and welfare improvements is not explained. Drawing upon the anti­
colonial objections formulated during the last years of Australian rule discussed in 
this thesis, Hughes also proposed that nostalgia about the colonial legacy is 
entirely misplaced. This is in part because:
Colonial administration was almost entirely carried out by expatriates.
Kiaps, other local administrators and Christian missions treated local 
populations as children. Roads, airfields, ports, water and electricity 
serviced urban areas where expatriates lived. Production and 
productivity were neglected except for expatriate plantations... The 
prospects for independence were long denied (as they still are in the 
French colonies) so that when independence came to the Pacific as the 
result of global anti-colonisation agitation, Pacific populations were 
unprepared for it. Unpreparedness was a major cause of the difficulties 
the Pacific has encountered.2
The thesis has pointed to some of the empirical fallacies in such claims, including 
the extent to which the post-war colonial administration in PNG was driven by a 
smallholder rather than a plantation vision. Moreover Australian officials willingly 
accepted that the political future for the colony Papua and the UN Trust Territory 
New Guinea lay in their uniting as an independent nation-state. However the main
1. ‘Aid has failed the Pacific’ Issue Analysis No.33, May 7, 2003, p.11 Accessed 12/09/2005 on 
http://exkiap.net?articles/cis20030507-failed-aid/ia33.htm
2. ‘Aid has failed the Pacific’ p. 12
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concern of this study has not been to point out the weaknesses and errors in other 
accounts. Instead the thesis has examined what was probably the most important 
idea which informed policy throughout the thirty years after World War II, including 
during the period when Papua New Guineans began to hold and shape power at 
the apex of the transitional state.
Countless documents, statements and other forms of expression, only a few of 
which have been cited here, attest to the importance which the idea of 
development had for colonial and then indigenous officials. Probably no idea 
appeared more often as a guiding premise of policy. The thesis has considered 
what these officials meant by development, showing how some central elements 
remained constant while others changed. It is argued here that some of the 
difficulty in understanding the meaning of development lies in its historic 
relationship with other ideas, including growth and progress.
Cowen and Shenton, with whose account of development the thesis started, 
provide considerable detail on the connections between these ideas. They also 
outline how development was ‘invented’ and shaped over the next two centuries. 
Their examination stresses the continuing confusion surrounding the idea of 
development, so that today little remains beyond ‘the jargon of development’, 
defying definition.3 This jargon is apparent in commonplace descriptions, including 
the everyday understanding of the word as economic growth. However such 
popular versions conceal the substance of the definitional difficulty, which lies in 
‘making the intent to develop consistent with immanent development’ .4
As Cowen and Shenton explain:
The difficulty arises because, while an immanent process of 
development encompasses the dimension of destruction, it is difficult to 
imagine why and how the intent to destroy should be made in the name 
of development.5
3. Doctrines of Development'Conclusion’ p.438
4. Doctrines of Development p.438
5. Doctrines of Development p.438
297
As the thesis has demonstrated, from the statement of PNG Administrator Colonel 
J.K. Murray in late 1947 (Chapter Two, pp.65-66) to that of Minister Hasluck in his 
1956 lecture cited at the beginning, senior colonial officials were aware that 
development meant destruction and reconstruction, growth and preservation.
With this awareness, the principal difficulty faced was flow to sfiape policies which 
responded to the contradictory nature of the idea which informed so much of 
colonial rule. Thus the second major objective of the thesis has been to shed light 
on a critical question: what was the policy effect of the idea of development which 
was held so strongly by those who wielded political power? The thesis argues that 
much of the confusion in understanding what occurred in late colonial PNG is due 
not only to the difficulty outlined above which is inherent in the idea of development 
itself, but also to the contradictory policies and outcomes which flowed from the 
influence of this powerful idea. Committing considerable resources to the attempt 
to grow dry upland rice in order to attain colonial self-sufficiency and importing rice 
which undercut domestic production of the crop but assisted in lifting indigenous 
living standards were both carried out in the name of development.
Development and PNG
Because the approach to development adopted by colonial authorities in PNG is a 
particular local adaptation of an influential idea, with roots reaching back at least to 
the late eighteenth -  early nineteenth century in Europe, the thesis began outside 
Australia and the South Pacific. In Chapter One, a brief history was provided to 
show the origins of the modern idea of development. It is described as a response 
to what was seen as negative in the changes occurring in early industrial Europe, 
in particular unemployment and the disorder which could flow from 
impoverishment. Development was formulated to shape reform by retaining the 
positive aspects of growth -  including the possibility of higher living standards 
flowing from increased productivity. In going beyond earlier ideas, development 
also retained elements of them, seeking to combine what was desirable in the old 
with a belief in the possibility of reducing or minimizing negative consequences of 
growth and progress. Development was formulated as the basis for combining two 
processes, one immanent, the other intentional. The latter subjective process
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would provide the means of over-coming what was negative in the former by 
making productive that which had become unproductive or under-utilised.
Invented at a moment when industrial capitalism, the driver of growth as well as 
guarantor of unemployment had become dominant, development did not aim to 
overthrow the external authority or rule of capital. Instead development sought to 
transcend the worst effects of capital accumulation by means of state action which 
would secure or re-attach unemployed and under-employed labour to other means 
of production, including land. Thus capitalist development came to have a distinct, 
additional meaning to that of mere increase or growth, implying a form of change 
which combined the spontaneous process of accumulation with an intentional 
process that sought to make further accumulation possible by countering its 
tendencies to generate unemployment and disorder.
If the origins of the modern idea lay in Europe, its adoption and adaptation by 
Australian authorities in the first half of the twentieth century became especially 
important for post-war PNG. The Australian version of development retained its 
positivist and nationalist heritage, combining them in a slogan ‘positive 
Australianism’. Although use of the slogan disappeared by the 1950s, its influence 
continued among officials who emphasized the distinctiveness of Australian policy 
for PNG by comparison to what they imagined occurred in the colonies of other 
metropolitan powers.
The two most important features of post-war development thought as applied to 
PNG were its emphasis on blocking further increases in the area of land held in 
largeholdings and increasing output on rural smallholdings farmed by indigenous 
households to maintain village communities. Chapter Two showed that despite the 
pressure applied by international firms as well as an emerging indigenous capitalist 
class with an increased presence in agriculture, colonial policy initially did not 
waver from either emphasis. Post-war reconstruction efforts eschewed what was 
advocated as a ‘quick fix’, allowing a rapid rehabilitation and extension of plantation 
agriculture to meet highly favourable international market conditions. Instead 
primary emphasis was given to rebuilding roads and bridges, housing and
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household gardens, with an eye to the long-term effects this would have for 
increasing smallholder production and indigenous welfare.
The immediate post-war years also made clear the difficulty of putting what was 
intended into effect. While limits could be placed upon the spontaneous 
development of capitalism by restraining attempts to further extend largeholdings 
used for agricultural production, it was not so easy to expand smallholder output. 
Shortages of trained personnel, the immediate tasks of rebuilding property and 
lives affected by warfare, and extending colonial authority to more parts of the 
country combined with a lack of specific direction from the Minister and Department 
of External Territories in Canberra to make development uncertain.
During the 1950s, the importance of trusteeship for development was amply 
demonstrated. From the origins and practice of the idea of development, the role 
of trustees who could implement a particular doctrine of development was central 
to what was meant by making development happen, or bringing development. With 
an activist Minister in charge of the reformed and strengthened department 
responsible for PNG, the colony entered a period of considerable change. Official 
coordination and supervision of rural households’ activities became extensive 
under the agrarian doctrine of development which underpinned much official policy. 
Smallholder production for immediate consumption and marketed output 
increased, while output on largeholdings rose without seriously threatening the 
principal objective of colonial development policy. Policies for uniform or even 
development sought to extend the smallholder increases as widely as possible 
across the colony. Indigenous employment in wage labour was discouraged in the 
name of maintaining rural, village life as the preferred form of community.
The uniform development policies were generally successful, as Chapter Three 
shows. That success made further growth without substantial disruptions more 
difficult. Land shortages began to limit possibilities for further extending household 
production. The Minister and Department pushed for tax reform, largely because of 
the need for increased state revenues to extend the capacity of the colonial 
administration to coordinate and supervise further household production, including
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through more extension services. Requesting World Bank assistance was driven 
by the same objective. Simultaneously international and Australian domestic 
pressure to accelerate political changes to meet the goals of self-government and 
national independence became more important.
As Chapter Four shows, during the 1960s a further revised vision of development 
came to drive colonial policy, pushed by important political and administrative 
changes. Hasluck, Lambert and Cleland departed and were replaced by people 
with a commitment to accelerated development, a greater role for private capital 
and spontaneous growth. Planning for and then construction began of a massive 
mine at Panguna, in the Bougainville district. A major increase in the immigration of 
skilled and semi-skilled expatriates to work in private and state employment led to 
a rapid growth in commerce. The continued output increases from smallholder 
agriculture also created room for indigenous commerce in the processing and 
marketing of export crops, transporting and selling consumer goods. The growth of 
towns encouraged migration from rural areas, and wage employment of indigenes 
in the Administration and private firms grew considerably.
The pace of change became especially rapid and the agrarian doctrine of 
development, so important for the first two decades after the war, began to lose its 
importance in providing a distinct direction for state policy. The focus of 
trusteeship changed from maintaining community while expanding smallholder 
agriculture to accelerating economic growth without much official concern about 
negative consequences: spontaneous development became the focus of official 
aims and policy shifted to place investment by private firms foremost. An important 
part of the change was the reform of representative institutions to include more 
indigenes. A significant consequence of the political changes was the emergence 
of anti-colonial politics among the increasing number of Papua New Guineans 
whose ambitions were being thwarted by the expanding expatriate presence in 
waged and salaried employment, and small commercial operations.
Chapter Four’s description of the phase of rapid growth and the criticism which 
arose illustrates some central features of the spontaneous process of
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development. Rapid growth spurred the advance of indigenous capital, some of 
whose representatives became forceful opponents of colonial policy. Growth also 
accelerated the process by which indigenes were separated from land and became 
increasingly susceptible to the vagaries of wage labour markets in towns and rural 
areas. Squatter occupation of vacant and under-utilised largeholding land became 
more common. In the Highlands there was a major outbreak of fighting, driven 
partly by land-shortages and people jostling to claim land currently occupied by 
plantations. In this region and elsewhere, vociferous opposition to foreign 
ownership only partly concealed the growing tussles between the ambitions of 
indigenous capitalists and would-be capitalists aiming to take over largeholdings 
from departing expatriates and households trying to acquire smallholdings by sub­
dividing plantations. In short, along with the positive side of growth, including 
Hughes’ ‘rising living standards’, threats to social order became especially 
pronounced as policy drifted away from the earlier dominance of intentional over 
immanent development.
If increased unemployment and disorder in early industrial Europe provided 
important conditions for the invention of the modern idea of development, in the 
early 1970s similar circumstances occurred globally, including in PNG. 
Development thought was further reshaped. Academics, consultants and others 
fashioned a policy direction which emphasized growth through redistribution. The 
drive to make productive that which had become unproductive or under-utilised, 
the central concern of intentional development, resulted in a plethora of 
internationally influential reports, including for non-industrial countries. An 
important component of this phase of thought about how to renew development 
was a focus upon rural areas, and agricultural production.
For PNG, the Faber Report which fitted with the direction being proposed 
internationally was influential. This importance arose in part from the Report’s 
concern for domestic demands for the redistribution of largeholdings and other 
commercial operations from expatriates to indigenes. These demands had a 
lengthy history in parts of PNG, including the Gazelle Peninsula where foreign 
ownership of plantations and land shortages for smallholdings were especially
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pronounced. Intensified squatter occupation of under-utilised acreages on 
largeholdings, the rise of a more pronounced radical nationalism, approaching self- 
government and the increasing importance of indigenous capitalists made the 
precise meaning and implications of redistribution for further growth unclear.
Chapter Four emphasized how in the late 1960s and early 1970s tensions 
heightened between the two processes of development, spontaneous and 
intentional. There was never a major challenge to capitalist accumulation, in a 
country where income from mineral and agricultural exports to major industrial 
countries substantially lifted living standards for most of the population. But the 
policy requirements necessary to sustain growth and profitability for capitalist 
enterprises were continuously contested. While statements by politicians and other 
officials continued to emphasise the importance of further welfare improvements 
for rural households, there was growing uncertainty about what official policy and 
practice was necessary for this to occur. Nevertheless, by Independence, when 
this study ends, increased revenues from the Panguna mine and the beginning of a 
substantial increase in coffee prices due to a major frost in Brazil gave some 
grounds for optimism about the country’s prospects,6 and to an extent papered 
over the consequences of the shift away from the previously ascendant agrarian 
doctrine of development.
The subsequent chapters of the thesis, case studies of rice and cocoa production, 
processing and marketing, emphasised how the international process of capitalist 
accumulation determined what Australian authorities could achieve through 
development policies. While there was little increase in rice production within PNG, 
despite a substantial commitment of personnel and other resources, the greater 
availability of rice internationally made more imports possible. This in turn led to 
improved living standards for much of the rural and urban population. Self- 
sufficiency in rice production was not achieved but increased consumption of




imported rice assisted in ensuring that the over-arching goal of improved 
consumption and welfare was attained.
The production, processing and international marketing of cocoa also illustrated 
how colonial development as thought and policy needs to be evaluated in the light 
of the tensions inherent in the immanent and intentional processes which constitute 
development. International and domestic processes of capitalist accumulation 
continually constrained what could be achieved by and through official policy.
While the effect of international markets is well understood, less often considered 
are the domestic process of accumulation and the significance of the indigenous 
capitalist class in PNG.
The success of colonial policy for the expansion of smallholder cocoa production 
provided a potential space in which local, mainly indigenous capitalists could 
operate. (A similar process occurred in the production of other export crops, 
particularly coffee.) The output increases from the 1950s and the subsequent 
widespread plantings which led to the post-independence dominance of household 
cocoa production over plantation output created room for Papua New Guineans to 
establish processing and trading enterprises. This commercial advance occurred 
while the indigenous presence in largehoiding agriculture remained constrained by 
colonial policy and the dominance of expatriate plantation ownership.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the efforts of indigenous capitalists and would- 
be capitalists to enlarge the space available for their operations helped shape late 
colonial representative politics. During the transition from the colonial to the 
national state in the early 1970s, their growing influence became a significant 
factor affecting future government policies on the direction of development. The 
colonial administration’s coordination and supervision of increased cocoa 
production by smallholders was seen by some of the indigenous capitalist class as 
a barrier to further advance. This awareness enhanced the prospect that as 
representatives of indigenous capital gained more political power state policy 
would be turned against the smallholder scheme of agriculture, including to favour 
largehoiding agriculture. Uncertainty came out of the certainties of even
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development, as pushed by colonial policy of the 1950s. State coordinated and 
supervised development of smallholder production was threatened.
The Future of Development in PNG
Finally, the thesis shed light on present concerns about development in Papua 
New Guinea. Among the continuing descriptions of failures of development in the 
South Pacific region in general and PNG in particular, a recent Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID) report notes th a t:
The Pacific as a whole is significantly off track to meet the MDGs 
[Millenium Development Goals] by 2015... Of greatest concern are 
[PNG] and Timor-Leste, two significant countries which are both offtrack 
on almost all MDGs.7
Other accounts have portrayed PNG as a country divided into two nations,
comprising ‘a wealthy elite’ with the bulk of the population living in rural
‘villages...and shanty township settlements’, with ‘fair nutrition’ but little else,
‘among the poorest people in the world’.8 At best, PNG is a country which struggles
to ‘come back from the brink’ of even greater decline, relative to other countries.9 If
for Morris and Stewart, village agriculture is the cornerstone of life for the majority
of Papua New Guineans which should not be undermined,10 Hughes proposes
that while ‘resource projects are important’ for much needed economic growth:
they should be seen as the icing on the cake of labour-intensive 
agriculture, tourism and manufacturing that would provide the [waged] 
jobs and income needed to meet the aspirations of a young and growing 
population.* 11
7. Tracking development and governance in the Pacific Canberra: AusAID, August 2009, p.1
8. Helen Hughes and Susan Windybank ‘Papua New Guinea’s Choice A Tale of Two Nations’ Issue 
Analysis No.58, May 31 2008, p.1
9. ‘Can Papua New Guinea Come Back from the Brink?’ Issue Analysis No.49, July 13, 2004, which 
followed Susan Windybank and Mike Manning ‘Papua New Guinea on the Brink’ Issue Analysis 
No.30, March 12, 2003, which began with the assertion that: ‘(PNG) shows every sign of following 
its Melanesian neighbour, the Solomon Islands, down the path to economic paralysis, government 
collapse and social despair’.
10. Papua New Guinea Analytical Report p. 9-18
11. ‘Can Papua New Guinea Come Back from the Brink?’ p.3. The focus upon growth as the 
principal means of reducing poverty is not confined to the former academic, economist Hughes. In 
its 2005 recommendations for a revamping of Australia’s overseas aid programme, including for 
PNG, the Core Group which oversaw the preparation of a White Paper listed economic growth as 
the first of four priorities, which also included ‘fostering functioning and effective states, investing in 
people, and promoting regional stability and cooperation’. Ron Duncan, Meryl Williams and Stephen 
Howes Core Group Recommendations Report for a White Paper on Australia’s aid program 
Canberra: AusAID, December 2005, piii
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What the thesis has shown, in the context of late colonial PNG, are the 
contradictions inherent in what is being advocated. Where Australian Territories 
Minister Hasluck and other officials saw a threat to their vision of development 
arising from largeholding agricultural expansion and waged employment, it is now 
being asserted that growth will lead to development without the need for policy 
which anticipates and counters any negative consequences. Where the late 
colonial administration sought to preserve village life and restrain 
proletarianisation, improving living standards and maintaining household 
attachment to land as the embodiment of development, now there is only limited 
recognition that one form of growth may have damaging consequences for the 
other. The inevitability of increased landlessness and unemployment as well as 
environmental degradation as a result of the expansion of largeholdings and 
factories does not appear in current proposals advocating higher rates of growth. 
Instead of seeing manufacturing and urbanization as a threat to development, to be 
restrained until safeguards against impoverishment and disorder could be erected, 
the predominant tendency is to believe that there are few important deleterious 
consequences which could follow from pursuing both largeholding agriculture and 
manufacturing.12
Instead of a colonial administration imbued with a belief in its role as trustees 
committed to bringing development, little is now said about how trusteeship might 
be exercised and who the trustees would be in contemporary PNG. Beyond PNG, 
when it is suggested internationally that ‘it is necessary to build a new 
developmental state’13 to deal with extensive impoverishment in many countries, 
the politics of such an endeavour are rarely mentioned. The important matters of 
who are to be the developers and how such a stratum might capture state power to 
bring development are rarely considered.14
12. There are, of course, dissenting views rejecting this tendency: see, for example, the essays in 
Jim Fingleton ed. Privatising Land in the Pacific Canberra: The Australia Institute Discussion Paper 
No. 80, June 2005
13. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development The Least Developed Countries Report 
2009 The State and Development Governance New York and Geneva, 2009, p.iv
14. These have been important matters raised in the ‘developmental state debate’ regarding the 
means by which industrialization occurred in Germany as well as Japan and other countries. 
However they do not have any prominence in contemporary official proposals to join agriculture with 
development. See, for one instance, IBRD/World Bank World Development Report 2008 Agriculture
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As this thesis has shown, the capacity of the state to bring development and even 
restrain what is negative in the immanent process of capitalist development is the 
product of particular, limited circumstances. In the case of late colonial PNG, these 
circumstances included a government whose authority over the colony stemmed 
from international agreements, not from any expression of popular will by the 
indigenous population. These agreements underpinned the capacity to exercise 
trusteeship, initially at least without reference to elections or other forms of 
representative politics in the colony. The short period of transition to self- 
government and independence indicates that when bringing development was an 
objective adopted by a popularly elected government, the ability to make 
development happen was not increased by changes in the nationality and race of 
the holders of state power. Nor did the shift from a colonial to a national state make 
development more likely. Instead tussles intensified among Papua New Guineans 
about what development might mean and the policies required for it to happen. The 
late colonial PNG experience suggests that calls to make ‘free’ or ‘full’ human 
development occur face the substantial challenge of what is inherently 
contradictory, incapable of being resolved, within capitalist development.
for Development Washington, D.C.: IBRD/World Bank, 2007.
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